Mario Dion Woodward, alias v. State of Alabama
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Rel: Rel: 12/16/2011 08/24/2012 as m o d i f i e d on d e n i a l o f r e h e a r i n g Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 CR-08-0145 Mario Dion Woodward v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CC-07-1388) Court WELCH, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . M a r i o D i o n Woodward was i n d i c t e d b y a Montgomery C o u n t y g r a n d j u r y on two c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r f o r h i s i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e s h o o t i n g d e a t h K e i t h H o u t s , a C i t y o f Montgomery p o l i c e officer. C o u n t 1 a l l e g e d t h a t Woodward intentionally killed CR-08-0145 O f f i c e r H o u t s w h i l e H o u t s was A l a . Code 1975, by firing a the murder. by jury weapon found o f 8-4, from inside him a 13A-5-40(a)(5), vehicle, Woodward was guilty t h a t the imprisonment separate and § on see § 13A-5- t r i e d before a jury, both counts of capital F o l l o w i n g a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e j u r y recommended, a vote life see and c o u n t 2 a l l e g e d t h a t Woodward k i l l e d H o u t s 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 8 ) , A l a . Code 1975. and on d u t y , after without sentencing c o u r t impose a s e n t e n c e the possibility of parole. h e a r i n g was held before the trial that hearing, v e r d i c t and s e n t e n c e d trial the trial court overrode Woodward t o d e a t h . the This appeal of A court jury's follows. Facts Montgomery p o l i c e o f f i c e r K e i t h H o u t s was on p a t r o l i n a n e i g h b o r h o o d i n n o r t h Montgomery on S e p t e m b e r 28, 2006, and conducted a t r a f f i c stop at approximately L a t t i m o r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she was saw Lattimore reach being d r i v e n by testified that down f o r s o m e t h i n g a black she as saw the p.m. a s t o p on a g r a y man wearing the driver Impala and of the a Impala red the hat. Impala police w i t h i t s emergency l i g h t s on, p a s s e d by t h e end o f h e r 2 Shonda s i t t i n g on h e r p o r c h when she a p o l i c e o f f i c e r begin to execute automobile 12:30 he car, street, CR-08-0145 b e f o r e t h e y went o u t of her sight, she of s i g h t . Soon a f t e r t h e heard f o u r or cars passed f i v e gunshots fired. D u r i n g the t r a f f i c s t o p O f f i c e r Houts e n t e r e d the t a g of the I m p a l a i n t o the m o b i l e d a t a t e r m i n a l car; the vehicle Houts's patrol r e c o r d e d the was car registered was was played Houts got out of side door of the bullet of the jaw. entered Officer his of the times. The Just as reveal vehicle and Houts's patrol because the identity car assailant was in his video The stop. a gun and The shooting driver d i d not get 3 on out that driver's shot severed the Officer that his then the spine, reached H o u t s f o u r more Although the videotape, i t did because Officer assailant positioned video showed established shot O f f i c e r the The that Houts r e a c h e d scene i n the Impala. of Officer approached the n e c k and patrol camera video Officer instantly. d r i v e r f l e d the the a testimony d a s h b o a r d camera c a p t u r e d t h e not and Impala f i r e d collapse out car Houts's to with jury. Medical c a u s i n g him arm the Impala. driver Houts for license Morrie Surles. o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the his patrol the door, the in equipped events that recording to out behind of the the Impala vehicle. and CR-08-0145 Although Officer Houts survived the shooting, r e g a i n e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d he d i e d two d a y s The Morrie he never later. p o l i c e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e I m p a l a was r e g i s t e r e d t o Surles purchased ("Morrie"). the Impala Morrie f o r her testified daughter, that she h a d Tiffany Surles ("Surles") . A t a r o u n d 9:30 on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e s h o o t i n g , visited a family friend, Shirley Porterfield. Woodward According to P o r t e r f i e l d , Woodward was d r i v i n g a l i g h t - c o l o r e d I m p a l a , and he was w e a r i n g b l u e j e a n s , a w h i t e t - s h i r t , jacket. and a r e d f l e e c e A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e t h e s h o o t i n g o c c u r r e d , Sharon Shephard, a Montgomery A n i m a l C o n t r o l o f f i c e r driving i n t h e a r e a , saw an I m p a l a b e i n g d r i v e n b y a d a r k - s k i n n e d m a l e pass by h e r a t a h i g h r a t e o f speed. During the evening on the date the shooting occurred S u r l e s ' s I m p a l a was f o u n d b u r n e d i n a Montgomery n e i g h b o r h o o d . Thalessa Shipman testified that she was " N e i g h b o r h o o d Watch" f o r h e r s t r e e t . a loud car driving S e p t e m b e r 28, 2006. around a captain of the She s a i d t h a t she h e a r d t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d on t h e n i g h t o f The c a r s t o p p e d a t h e r d r i v e w a y i n t h e c u l - d e - s a c , t h e n b a c k e d up t o an empty l o t l o c a t e d n e x t t o h e r 4 CR-08-0145 lot. She i d e n t i f i e d Shipman l o o k e d over t h e c a r as a d a r k - c o l o r e d the fence into Dodge Neon. t h e empty l o t a n d saw a l i g h t - c o l o r e d c a r t h e r e , a n d someone s t a n d i n g b e s i d e t h a t c a r . Seconds l a t e r , the person jumped who into the l i g h t - c o l o r e d had been t h e Neon, standing and contacted identified the Impala on evidence the next t h e Neon law-enforcement based c a r went up i n f l a m e s , as b e i n g that sped authorities, a away. Shipman later registered to Morrie Surles friend and car they vehicle-identification established to the burning and number. Additional o f Woodward's, Joseph P r i n g l e , owned a b l a c k Dodge Neon t h a t h a d a l o o s e m u f f l e r a n d was loud. The S t a t e played a video recording of P r i n g l e ' s Neon f o r S h i p m a n , a n d she i d e n t i f i e d t h e s o u n d o f t h e c a r as t h e one she h a d h e a r d on t h e n i g h t t h e c a r was b u r n e d i n h e r neighborhood. A detective involved in the murder i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t a b l a c k Dodge Neon, and car. on t h e d a y o f t h e m u r d e r he and h i s p a r t n e r located the J o s e p h P r i n g l e was i n t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t , and a n o t h e r man was i n t h e p a s s e n g e r s e a t ; t h e t r u n k o f t h e v e h i c l e was o p e n . A t h i r d man was s t a n d i n g n e x t t o t h e c a r , s p e a k i n g t h a t man was h o l d i n g a g a s c a n . 5 to P r i n g l e ; CR-08-0145 T i f f a n y S u r l e s , Woodward's g i r l f r i e n d a t the time of the s h o o t i n g , t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n S e p t e m b e r 2006 she was l i v i n g Woodward i n an a p a r t m e n t t h e y h a d r e n t e d t o g e t h e r . with During the e v e n i n g o f September 27, 2006, S u r l e s a n d Woodward a r g u e d , a n d Woodward later left that the apartment night. i n her Impala, Surles testified and he that m o r n i n g , on t h e d a y O f f i c e r H o u t s was s h o t , gone. to S u r l e s had decided move out of Woodward h a d and t h e I m p a l a the night before the apartment. following she was t a k i n g a shower when Woodward l e f t t h e a p a r t m e n t a g a i n . the keys t o her Impala the n i g h t before, the returned After t h a t she was Woodward a p a r t m e n t on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e s h o o t i n g left was going the Surles telephoned a f r i e n d , Wendy W a l k e r , a n d a s k e d h e r t o h e l p S u r l e s move o u t o f the apartment. belongings drive Surles Walker and S u r l e s moved Surles's personal t o W a l k e r ' s a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h e two women d e c i d e d t o t o Birmingham before t o go shopping. s h e and W a l k e r left Woodward telephoned f o r Birmingham, and he w a n t e d S u r l e s t o meet h i m . S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Woodward met them a t W a l k e r ' s a p a r t m e n t c o m p l e x a n d t h a t he g o t o u t o f a small, dark c a r . out Walker t e s t i f i e d o f was a b l a c k N e o n . t h a t t h e c a r Woodward g o t N e i t h e r woman saw S u r l e s ' s 6 Impala. CR-08-0145 Woodward j o i n e d S u r l e s and they drove that during and W a l k e r t o Birmingham. Surles the t r i p t o Birmingham i n Walker's v e h i c l e , and Walker testified Woodward s a i d t h a t he h a d "messed up" a n d t h a t he h a d s h o t a p o l i c e o f f i c e r who p u l l e d him over. Walker testified that Woodward spoke on h i s c e l l u l a r t e l e p h o n e d u r i n g t h e t r i p and t h a t she h a d h e a r d h i m tell someone t o " g e t r i d h i s g i r l [ ' s ] c a r . " (R. 963.) Surles stated t h a t Woodward t o l d h e r t h a t he h a d t a k e n c a r e o f h e r car. Surles s a i d she d i d n o t g e t h e r c a r b a c k . Walker and S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Woodward t h r e w s o m e t h i n g o u t o f W a l k e r ' s vehicle testified while they were en route Walker t h a t t h e o b j e c t Woodward t h r e w was a gun. Walker and S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n Birmingham to the Century P l a z a shopping m a l l . of t o Birmingham. t h e y went Woodward b o u g h t a change c l o t h i n g a n d t h e n a s k e d t h e women t o d r o p him o f f a t a b u i l d i n g near the V a l l e y d a l e e x i t of the i n t e r s t a t e . Vernon Cunningham t e s t i f i e d t h a t he i s a c q u a i n t e d w i t h Woodward, a n d t h a t Woodward t e l e p h o n e d h i m on September t o meet w i t h h i m . and said two 28, 2006, a n d w a n t e d Cunningham a r r a n g e d t o meet w i t h girls dropped Woodward Woodward o f f at the arranged m e e t i n g p l a c e on V a l l e y d a l e Road i n B i r m i n g h a m l a t e r t h a t d a y . 7 CR-08-0145 Cunningham d r o v e Woodward t o Cunningham's h o u s e . to Cunningham's videotape house, from the they stopped store's a red baseball cap w i t h at a grocery security Woodward was w e a r i n g b l u e - j e a n On t h e way camera store; a showed that shorts, a red sweatshirt, a w h i t e emblem on t h e f r o n t . and After t h e y a r r i v e d a t Cunningham's h o u s e , Woodward gave Cunningham the sweatshirt and r e d b a s e b a l l cap he h a d b e e n w e a r i n g , and he t o l d Cunningham t o b u r n them. Cunningham t e s t i f i e d t h a t he burned the items i n h i s outdoor g r i l l , remnants o f c l o t h i n g i n t h a t g r i l l . that Woodward during told a traffic him that he and t h e p o l i c e Cunningham a l s o had shot found testified a police officer stop. Cunningham t e s t i f i e d t h a t Woodward a s k e d f o r a r i d e and Cunningham a g r e e d t o t a k e h i m t o a l o c a l r e s t a u r a n t . Roderick J e t e r p i c k e d Woodward up a t t h e r e s t a u r a n t and d r o v e Woodward t o A t l a n t a , where he d r o p p e d Woodward o f f a t a gas Montgomery witnesses, and, determined that police from the detectives information Woodward h a d c o n f e s s e d H o u t s and t h a t he was t h e n i n A t l a n t a . 8 interviewed they station. numerous received, to shooting they Officer CR-08-0145 Deputy U n i t e d S t a t e s Marshal Joe P a r k e r t e s t i f i e d that a b e - o n - t h e l o o k o u t , o r "BOLO," h a d b e e n i s s u e d f o r Woodward i n the A t l a n t a area a n d t h a t on t h e day a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g he r e c o g n i z e d Woodward w h i l e he was a t a gas s t a t i o n i n A t l a n t a . P a r k e r a r r e s t e d Woodward. He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t i m e o f t h e a r r e s t , Woodward s p o n t a n e o u s l y g o i n g on? I d i d n ' t shoot anybody." about calls placed exclaimed, "What's (R. 1114.) R e c o r d s c u s t o d i a n s f o r two c e l l u l a r testified that, at the companies Woodward's from telephone cellular t e l e p h o n e s a n d as t o w h i c h t o w e r s i n Montgomery and B i r m i n g h a m that the calls were routed through. That testimony e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Woodward was i n t h e a r e a where O f f i c e r H o u t s was s h o t a t t h e same t i m e t h e s h o o t i n g t o o k p l a c e . Finally, Agent A l Mattox from t h e Alabama Bureau of I n v e s t i g a t i o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h a d r e v i e w e d and a t t e m p t e d t o enhance t h e v i d e o t a p e He testified that from O f f i c e r Houts's dashboard i t appeared from the videotape camera. that the p e r s o n who k i l l e d O f f i c e r H o u t s was a b l a c k m a l e . The both jury returned verdicts finding counts, and t h e case proceeded 9 Woodward guilty t o the p e n a l t y phase. on CR-08-0145 At the sentencing hearing before the j u r y , the State attempted t o prove three s t a t u t o r y aggravating circumstances: that of Woodward had been previously convicted a felony i n v o l v i n g t h e use or t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e , § 13A-5-49(2), A l a . Code 1975; t h a t Woodward c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r t o a v o i d or to p r e v e n t a l a w f u l a r r e s t , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 5 ) , A l a . Code 1975; a n d t h a t Woodward c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r t o d i s r u p t o r t o h i n d e r t h e lawful exercise of any governmental function or the e n f o r c e m e n t o f l a w s , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 7 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The S t a t e presented evidence of Woodward's 1990 conviction for manslaughter. Woodward circumstances, d i d not rely on any statutory mitigating § 13A-5-51, A l a . Code 1975, b u t he d i d s e e k t o e s t a b l i s h n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s as p r o v i d e d i n § 13A-5-52, A l a . Code difficult, family. had 1975: that that h i s family loved Woodward's childhood was h i m , a n d t h a t he l o v e d h i s The d e f e n s e p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e a b o u t abuse Woodward s u f f e r e d as a c h i l d . The d e f e n s e a l s o p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e a b o u t Woodward's i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e l i v e s o f h i s f i v e c h i l d r e n who, a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l , nine r a n g e d i n age f r o m f o u r y e a r s t o years. 10 CR-08-0145 The proffered the jury entered specific written aggravating circumstances. proffered aggravating findings The j u r y circumstances as t o t h e f o u n d two o f to exist, but i t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Woodward d i d n o t m u r d e r O f f i c e r H o u t s t o a v o i d a lawful arrest. The j u r y recommended, b y a v o t e o f 8-4, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e Woodward t o l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t the p o s s i b i l i t y The trial without of parole. court held a separate sentencing hearing. A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e from t h e t r i a l , t h e p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t , and a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Woodward t o d e a t h . Analysis Woodward r a i s e s 24 i s s u e s i n h i s b r i e f , many o f w h i c h he did not f i r s t r a i s e i n the t r i a l sentenced t o death, h i s f a i l u r e court. to object at t r i a l bar a p p e l l a t e review of those i s s u e s . P., B e c a u s e Woodward was does n o t R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. states: "In a l l cases i n which t h e death p e n a l t y has been imposed, t h e Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals s h a l l n o t i c e any p l a i n e r r o r o r d e f e c t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r review, whether or not brought t o the a t t e n t i o n o f the t r i a l c o u r t , and t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e a p p e l l a t e a c t i o n by r e a s o n t h e r e o f , whenever such e r r o r has o r 11 CR-08-0145 p r o b a b l y has a d v e r s e l y affected r i g h t of the a p p e l l a n t . " the substantial The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s e x p l a i n e d e r r o r r u l e i s t o be a p p l i e d that the p l a i n - sparingly: "The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m u n d e r the plain-error doctrine i s stricter than the standard used i n reviewing an i s s u e that was p r o p e r l y r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l . As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r doctrine applies only i f the e r r o r i s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y egregious' and i f i t ' s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t [ s ] t h e f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c reputation of j u d i c i a l proceedings.' See Ex p a r t e P r i c e , 725 So. 2d 1063 (Ala. 1998)." Ex parte Hall v. Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935-36 State, 1999)(additional 820 So. 2d 113, preclude object review will now makes. ( A l a . Crim. i n Ex p a r t e to object weigh h e a v i l y a g a i n s t App. Brown). at t r i a l any c l a i m See, e.g., P h i l l i p s v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; W i l l i a m s 1066 ( A l a . Crim. will not App. The p r e j u d i c e 1991), aff'd, 199, 1998) App. 12 he 662 601 So. 2d 1062, So. 2d 929 ( A l a . a l l e g e d must be s u b s t a n t i a l b e f o r e result. ( A l a . Crim. of prejudice to 65 So. 3d 971, 986 v. S t a t e , f i n d i n g of p l a i n e r r o r w i l l 209 quoting o f any a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r , h i s f a i l u r e (Ala. 1992). 121-22 c i t a t i o n s omitted A l t h o u g h Woodward's f a i l u r e ( A l a . 2008), a Hyde v. S t a t e , 778 So. 2d ("To rise to the l e v e l of CR-08-0145 p l a i n e r r o r , t h e c l a i m e d e r r o r must n o t o n l y s e r i o u s l y a defendant's unfair affect ' s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s , ' b u t i t must a l s o h a v e an prejudicial impact a f f ' d , 778 So. 2d 237 on the jury's ( A l a . 2000) . deliberations."), Finally, "the p l a i n - e r r o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s - o b j e c t i o n r u l e i s t o be 'used sparingly, solely in those miscarriage of justice would circumstances otherwise in which result.'" a United S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. F r a d y , 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982). Guilt-phase Issues I. Woodward prohibited argues the defense that the trial court erred when i t from p r e s e n t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f h i s former a t t o r n e y , T i f f a n y McCord, d u r i n g h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f and that the t r i a l court's decision resulted i n a denial of h i s r i g h t t o p r e s e n t a d e f e n s e as p r o t e c t e d b y t h e S i x t h Amendment and t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e United States Constitution. South Carolina, 547 U.S. Woodward 319 argues (2006), t h a t Holmes v. provides that the e x c l u s i o n of testimony v i o l a t e s a defendant's r i g h t to present a defense i f i t infringes on 13 a "weighty interest of the CR-08-0145 a c c u s e d , " and i f i t i s a r b i t r a r y o r d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e purpose i t i s designed interest i n presenting court's ruling to serve, that he had to the a weighty McCord's t e s t i m o n y , and t h a t t h e t r i a l excluding that testimony was a r b i t r a r y and disproportionate. During the State's c a s e - i n - c h i e f Agent Joe Parker of the U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r s h a l ' s S e r v i c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw Woodward a t a gas s t a t i o n i n A t l a n t a , G e o r g i a , and a r r e s t e d h i m t h e r e . Parker testified custody, didn't that, Woodward immediately spontaneously shoot anybody." upon said, (R. 1114.) being "What's g o i n g w h e t h e r Woodward a l s o been h i s attorney himself not in." make t h a t with (R. 1115.) Parker I the s a i d t h a t he h a d a n d "was testified into on? On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n defense asked Parker i n contact taken looking to turn t h a t Woodward d i d s t a t e m e n t i n f r o n t o f h i m , n o r d i d he h e a r o f s u c h a s t a t e m e n t a f t e r Woodward was t a k e n i n t o c u s t o d y . After notified the State the t r i a l presented court that i t s case-in-chief, he intended to call Woodward Tiffany M c C o r d -- an a t t o r n e y who was r e p r e s e n t i n g Woodward on a n o t h e r matter a t the time of the shooting had contacted her before -- t o t e s t i f y t h a t Woodward h i s a r r e s t , a n d t h a t "as a r e s u l t o f 14 CR-08-0145 t h a t , she c o n t a c t e d t h e Montgomery P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t make a r r a n g e m e n t s court to turn him in." (R. to t r y to 1233.) The trial he would t o l d h i m t h a t i f he c a l l e d M c C o r d t o t e s t i f y , waive his attorney-client privilege, subject to cross-examination and McCord on a l l c o n v e r s a t i o n s would be she h a d had w i t h Woodward. The d e f e n s e i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t w a n t e d t o the q u e s t i o n i n g of McCord f o r the purpose of showing t h a t h a d had c o n t a c t w i t h Woodward and t h a t she h a d t h e n the Montgomery turning himself Police Department to facilitate limit she contacted Woodward's i n . The d e f e n s e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t Parker's t e s t i m o n y t h a t Woodward h a d s a i d " I d i d n ' t s h o o t a n y b o d y " was " t o t a l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g " and t h a t M c C o r d ' s t e s t i m o n y w o u l d show that Woodward sought Parker's "was after." (R. testimony p r e j u d i c i a l because and Wendy W a l k e r , already 1 aware 1238.) about The that trial Woodward's he was, court basically, stated statement the p o l i c e had c o n t a c t e d was that not McCord, Surles, "so t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p o l i c e were looking The t r i a l c o u r t s t a t e d "Wendy W i l l i a m s , " w h i c h t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r i n d i c a t e d was an e r r o r by p l a c i n g " ( s i c ) " a f t e r t h e c o u r t s a i d t h a t name. (R. 1238.) T h e r e f o r e , we presume t h a t the t r i a l court intended t o g i v e t h e name o f t h e trial w i t n e s s , Wendy W a l k e r . 1 15 CR-08-0145 for him should trial when first, court stated i t sintention to call The "And again stated that i t d i d not b e l i e v e the defense f o r a l l I know, he c o n f e s s e d 42.) The t r i a l to call c o u r t t h e n d e n i e d Woodward's r e q u e s t c o u r t had p e r m i t t e d Woodward now a r g u e s rebutted Parker's was taken into the testified testimony. t h a t McCord's t e s t i m o n y testimony to allow Woodward d i d n o t make an t o e s t a b l i s h what M c C o r d w o u l d have i f the t r i a l he with her c l i e n t , t o [McCord] t o o . " (R. 1241¬ M c C o r d as a w i t n e s s . o f f e r of proof when h e r , McCord t h e c o u r t t h a t she knew members o f t h e j u r y ; s e c o n d , could reveal only part of her conversations to 2 M c C o r d h a d n o t b e e n l i s t e d as a w i t n e s s a n d , the defense informed him (R. 1 2 3 8 . ) c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n s e h a d two p r o b l e m s i f M c C o r d testified: the have come as no s u r p r i s e . " would have a b o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t Woodward made custody. Specifically, Woodward argues: " A g e n t P a r k e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t Mr. Woodward s a i d 'I d i d n ' t s h o o t a n y b o d y ' upon h i s a r r e s t c o u l d o n l y mean t h a t Mr. Woodward knew t h a t he was being a r r e s t e d f o r s h o o t i n g someone. The o n l y i n f e r e n c e t h e j u r y c o u l d have drawn was t h a t t h e r e a s o n Mr. A d d i t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n revealed that the d i s t r i c t attorney had n o t i n t e n d e d f o r P a r k e r t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t , and she a g r e e d n o t t o m e n t i o n t h e s t a t e m e n t i n h e r c l o s i n g argument t o t h e j u r y . (R. 1241.) 2 16 CR-08-0145 Woodward knew t h a t he was b e i n g arrested for s h o o t i n g someone was t h a t he h a d , i n f a c t , shot someone. Ms. M c C o r d ' s t e s t i m o n y was n e c e s s a r y t o r e f u t e t h a t damaging i n f e r e n c e by p r o v i d i n g a n o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n f o r how Mr. Woodward knew t h a t he was b e i n g a r r e s t e d f o r s h o o t i n g someone: t h a t Ms. M c C o r d had t o l d h i m t h a t he was s o u g h t b y l a w e n f o r c e m e n t in connection with a shooting." (Woodward's b r i e f , a t p. 2 1 . ) ( E m p h a s i s added.) B e c a u s e Woodward f a i l e d t o make an o f f e r the of proof testimony elicited he now claims M c C o r d , t h e i s s u e was n o t he would have as t o from preserved. R u l e 103, A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s , i n relevant part: " E r r o r may n o t be p r e d i c a t e d upon a r u l i n g w h i c h admits or excludes evidence unless a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t o f t h e p a r t y i s a f f e c t e d , and " "(2) O f f e r o f P r o o f . I n c a s e t h e r u l i n g i s one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known t o t h e c o u r t b y o f f e r o r was a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h q u e s t i o n s were a s k e d . " Rule 103(a)(2), This A l a . R. E v i d . Court reviewed a s i m i l a r issue i n M i l l e r v. S t a t e , 63 So. 3d 676 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) , when M i l l e r a r g u e d t h a t the trial court e r r e d when i t p r o h i b i t e d h i m f r o m testimony about h i s mental state 17 from eliciting two w i t n e s s e s . We CR-08-0145 r e j e c t e d M i l l e r ' s c l a i m b e c a u s e he f a i l e d t o make an o f f e r o f p r o o f , a n d we e x p l a i n e d : " R u l e 1 0 3 ( a ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s t h a t ' [ e ] r r o r may n o t be p r e d i c a t e d upon a r u l i n g w h i c h ... e x c l u d e s e v i d e n c e u n l e s s a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t o f t h e p a r t y i s a f f e c t e d , a n d ... t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e was made known t o t h e c o u r t b y o f f e r o r was apparent from t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n which q u e s t i o n s were asked.' The A l a b a m a Supreme Court has e x p l a i n e d t h a t '[w]hen t h e t r i a l c o u r t s u s t a i n s an o b j e c t i o n t o a q u e s t i o n t h a t does n o t on i t s f a c e show t h e e x p e c t e d a n s w e r , a p a r t y must make an o f f e r of p r o o f and e x p l a i n t h e r e l e v a n c y o f t h e e x p e c t e d answer t o p r e s e r v e e r r o r f o r a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . ' E n s o r v. W i l s o n , 519 So. 2d 1244, 1262 ( A l a . 1987) (citing Bessemer Executive Aviation, I n c . v. B a r n e t t , 469 So. 2d 1283 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ) . '[I]n the a b s e n c e o f an o f f e r o f p r o o f [ r e g a r d i n g a w i t n e s s ' s expected answer], [ a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s ] cannot review [the e x c l u s i o n o f t e s t i m o n y ] . To a t t e m p t t o do so would n e c e s s i t a t e i m p e r m i s s i b l e s p e c u l a t i o n by t h i s Court.' B u r k e t t v. A m e r i c a n Gen. F i n . , I n c . , 607 So. 2d 138, 140 ( A l a . 1992) ( c i t i n g E n s o r , 519 So. 2d a t 1262, a n d C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s Alabama E v i d e n c e § 425.01(4) (4th ed. 1 9 9 1 ) ) . " H e r e , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o p r o f f e r what a n s w e r s S m i t h a n d D r . G o f f w o u l d have g i v e n i f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s o b j e c t i o n had n o t been s u s t a i n e d . I n f a c t , he w i t h d r e w t h e q u e s t i o n t o D r . G o f f . B e c a u s e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d i d n o t p r o f f e r what t h e w i t n e s s e s ' testimony would have been, this Court cannot determine that the e x c l u s i o n of the testimony a f f e c t e d a ' s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t ' o r was p r e j u d i c i a l . R u l e 1 0 3 ( a ) , A l a . R. E v i d . Accordingly, Miller f a i l e d t o preserve t h i s issue f o r a p p e l l a t e review. See Perry v. S t a t e , 568 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) ('[B]ecause [the a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d ] t o make an o f f e r o f p r o o f as t o t h e e x p e c t e d testimony of the witness, this issue i s not 18 CR-08-0145 preserved f o r review.'). Therefore, n o t e n t i t l e M i l l e r t o any r e l i e f . " M i l l e r v. S t a t e , 63 So. 2d a t 699. t h i s i s s u e does See a l s o F u t r a l v. S t a t e , 558 So. 2d 991 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) . We do n o t c o n c l u d e that the substance of the testimony Woodward now a l l e g e s he w o u l d have e l i c i t e d made known to the court, n o r do we conclude o t h e r w i s e f u l l y apparent from t h e r e c o r d . at trial that arrested Woodward and t h a t had c o n t a c t e d McCord had then f r o m M c C o r d was that i t was The d e f e n s e McCord contacted before stated he was t h e Montgomery p o l i c e , b u t t h e r e c o r d does n o t r e f l e c t t h a t Woodward became aware t h a t he was w a n t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n Officer Houts Woodward only because d i d n o t make Woodward l e a r n e d an McCord offer with told the shooting him so. of proof that, of Because in fact, f r o m M c C o r d t h a t t h e p o l i c e were l o o k i n g f o r him a n d was n o t o t h e r w i s e aware t h a t he was w a n t e d i n r e l a t i o n to the shooting, R e y n o l d s v. S t a t e , (Ala. (Ala. death, error. the alleged error [Ms. CR-07-0443, C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; M i l l e r C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) . however, we must was not O c t . 1, 2010] v. S t a t e , preserved. So. 3d 63 So. 2d 676 B e c a u s e Woodward was s e n t e n c e d t o review Woodward's R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P. 19 claim for plain CR-08-0145 Woodward c l a i m s t h a t t h e t r i a l his court's r u l i n g denied c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to present a him defense. " S t a t e s have s u b s t a n t i a l l a t i t u d e u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n to d e f i n e r u l e s f o r the e x c l u s i o n of evidence and to apply those rules to criminal defendants. See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S c h e f f e r , 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). T h i s a u t h o r i t y , however, has constitutional limits. '"Whether r o o t e d d i r e c t l y i n t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment or i n the Compulsory Process or C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e s o f t h e S i x t h Amendment, t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"' Holmes v. S o u t h C a r o l i n a , 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) ( q u o t i n g C r a n e v. K e n t u c k y , 476 U.S. 683, 690 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , i n t u r n q u o t i n g C a l i f o r n i a v. T r o m b e t t a , 467 U.S. 479, 485 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ) . ' T h i s r i g h t i s a b r i d g e d by evidence rules that "infring[e] upon a weighty i n t e r e s t of the accused" and a r e " ' a r b i t r a r y ' " o r " ' d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the purposes they are designed to serve.'"' Holmes, supra, a t 324 (quoting S c h e f f e r , s u p r a , a t 308, i n t u r n c i t i n g and q u o t i n g Rock v. A r k a n s a s , 483 U.S. 44, 58 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ) . " C l a r k v. A r i z o n a , 548 U.S. 735, 789-90 (2006). This Court, i n c o n s i d e r i n g a defendant's trial c o u r t had proposed e r r e d when defense w i t n e s s , i t excluded the c l a i m t h a t the testimony stated: "'The S i x t h Amendment g u a r a n t e e s a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to p r e s e n t a defense, i n c l u d i n g the r i g h t to c a l l w i t n e s s e s t o t e s t i f y on h i s b e h a l f . W a s h i n g t o n v. T e x a s , 388 U.S. 14, 19 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . Commonwealth v. D u r n i n g , 406 Mass. 485, 495 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . Accord Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-409 ([1988]). "However, t h e right to c a l l witnesses i s not a b s o l u t e ; i n t h e f a c e o f ' l e g i t i m a t e demands o f t h e 20 of a CR-08-0145 adversarial s y s t e m , ' t h i s r i g h t may be tempered a c c o r d i n g to the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l judge." Commonwealth v. D u r n i n g , s u p r a a t 495, q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. N o b l e s , 422 U.S. 225, 241 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . I f a judge e x e r c i s e s h i s or her d i s c r e t i o n t o l i m i t the defendant's right to call w i t n e s s e s , the r e s t r i c t i o n c a n n o t be a r b i t r a r y . See W a s h i n g t o n v. Texas, s u p r a a t 23....'" J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 842, 859 quoting Commonwealth v. plain-error review ( A l a . C r i m . App. Drumgold, 668 N.E.2d 300, 2000), 313-14 (1996). Our Woodward's failure to make of this claim an offer of Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l testimony d e n i e d him defense because he proof. by Although c o u r t ' s e x c l u s i o n o f McCord's his constitutional learned i s hampered right from McCord t h a t to present a the authorities were s e a r c h i n g f o r h i m i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a s h o o t i n g and h i s spontaneous anybody," statement therefore, to had Parker that he "didn't shoot a noninculpatory explanation, the r e c o r d b e f o r e us c o n t a i n s no e v i d e n c e f o r Woodward's p r e s e n t argument, w h i c h i s b a s e d e n t i r e l y on M c C o r d w o u l d have s a i d . 67 So. 3d 936, 961 speculation about T h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n D o t c h v. ( A l a . C r i m . App. State, 2010): " S p e c u l a t i o n from a s i l e n t r e c o r d w i l l not s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g o f p r e j u d i c e . Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 972 So. 2d 737, 755 ( A l a . 2007), cert. denied, Walker v. 21 what CR-08-0145 A l a b a m a , 552 U.S. 1077, 128 S.Ct. 806, 169 L.Ed.2d 608 ( 2 0 0 7 ) . A r e v i e w i n g c o u r t can n o t presume e r r o r from a s i l e n t r e c o r d . ' " T h i s c o u r t i s b o u n d by t h e r e c o r d and n o t by a l l e g a t i o n s o r a r g u m e n t s i n b r i e f r e c i t i n g m a t t e r s n o t d i s c l o s e d by t h e r e c o r d . " Webb v. S t a t e , 565 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990) . See a l s o A c r e s v. S t a t e , 548 So. 2d 459 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 7 ) . F u r t h e r , we c a n n o t p r e d i c a t e e r r o r from a s i l e n t r e c o r d . Owens v. S t a t e , 597 So. 2d 734 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 2 ) ; Woodyard v. S t a t e , 428 So. 2d 136 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 2 ) , a f f ' d , 428 So. 2d 138 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . ' W h i t l e y v. S t a t e , 607 So. 2d 354, 361 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . " Q u o t e d i n R e v i s v. S t a t e , So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. Nothing present with the that had the he the us he not informed and l e v e l of p l a i n e r r o r . affecting had shooting record, before reason about McCord's the CR-06-0454, J a n . 2011] shot him of supports Woodward's spontaneously Officer testimony i t cannot, told the that his wanted in anyone was that he was Houts. i s not Woodward's obvious therefore, P l a i n e r r o r has defendant's 13, 2011). record that attorney assertion of the officer connection face in claim arresting defense [Ms. from rise to b e e n d e f i n e d as substantial rights, and the the error error so obvious t h a t the c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to n o t i c e i t would s e r i o u s l y undermine proceedings. the fundamental See, e.g., fairness K u e n z e l v. 22 of State, the 577 So. judicial 2d 474, CR-08-0145 481-82 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991). I n Ex parte 1990), Walker, aff'd, 972 So. 2d 577 So. 737 2d 531 (Ala. ( A l a . 2007), A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t e x a m i n e d W a l k e r ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e c o u r t had c o m m i t t e d p l a i n e r r o r when i t a d m i t t e d a trial videotaped s t a t e m e n t W a l k e r had g i v e n b e c a u s e , he s a i d , t h e s t a t e m e n t taken subsequent to an unlawful arrest and was Court rejected present more t h a n an the claim because a l l e g a t i o n that cause t o s u p p o r t h i s a r r e s t . The The Walker there was Court then was therefore i n a d m i s s i b l e as t h e f r u i t o f t h e p o i s o n o u s t r e e . Supreme the Alabama failed no to probable stated: " A d d i t i o n a l l y , the a l l e g e d e r r o r i s not p l a i n b e c a u s e p l a i n e r r o r must be o b v i o u s on t h e f a c e o f the r e c o r d . A s i l e n t record, that i s a record that on i t s f a c e c o n t a i n s no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r , does n o t e s t a b l i s h an o b v i o u s e r r o r . Our p r e c e d e n t h o l d s t h a t t h e r e c o r d must a t l e a s t p r e s e n t an i n f e r e n c e o f e r r o r b e f o r e an a p p e l l a t e court w i l l hold that r e v e r s i b l e error occurred." Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 972 As i n Ex p a r t e So. 2d a t W a l k e r and 752. the c a s e s on w h i c h i t r e l i e d , t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r Woodward a s s e r t s i s n o t o b v i o u s on t h e of the r e c o r d . The r e c o r d i s s i l e n t as t o Woodward's c l a i m t h a t M c C o r d had authorities i n f o r m e d him i n connection that t h i s testimony with t h a t he was present w a n t e d by the O f f i c e r Houts's shooting and would provide a n o n i n c u l p a t o r y 23 face explanation CR-08-0145 for h i s spontaneous statement to Parker. The t r a n s c r i p t discloses only repeated statements from defense counsel McCord testify that would Moreover, Woodward M c C o r d w o u l d have b e e n u n a b l e Woodward h a d b e e n unaware -- p r i o r that Montgomery he d i d n o t t e s t i f y contacted to t e s t i f y to their a u t h o r i t i e s wanted w o u l d have b e e n i n f o r m a t i o n and had to question Any t e s t i m o n y a b o u t what Woodward d i d o r d i d n o t know b e f o r e McCord's t e s t i m o n y whether him. -¬ That himself, from McCord he t e l e p h o n e d h e r w o u l d have b e e n p u r e s p e c u l a t i o n on h e r p a r t . a s s e r t i o n o f e r r o r i s b a s e d on h i s c u r r e n t her. conversation known o n l y t o Woodward, at t r i a l . that Woodward's speculation about -- t h a t she w o u l d have t e s t i f i e d t h a t she informed him t h a t the p o l i c e suspected him i n the s h o o t i n g o f O f f i c e r H o u t s -- a n d s p e c u l a t i o n b a s e d on a s i l e n t r e c o r d does not support a f i n d i n g of p l a i n e r r o r . A finding of plain error is unwarranted f o r the a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n t h a t t h e r e c o r d does n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e trial court's error adversely R u l e 401, A l a . R. E v i d . , provides: substantial alleged affected Woodward's rights. "'Relevant evidence' means e v i d e n c e h a v i n g any t e n d e n c y t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any f a c t t h a t i s 24 CR-08-0145 of consequence t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n more p r o b a b l e or l e s s probable t h a n i t w o u l d be without the evidence." R u l e 402, A l a . R. E v i d . , provides: "All r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e i s a d m i s s i b l e , e x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o r t h a t o f t h e S t a t e o f Alabama, by s t a t u t e , by t h e s e r u l e s , o r b y o t h e r r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h e courts of t h i s State. Evidence which i s not relevant i s not admissible." "The left question of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence i s g e n e r a l l y to the d i s c r e t i o n court's determination of the t r i a l court, on t h a t q u e s t i o n will and t h e n o t be reversed e x c e p t upon a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . " Loggins, trial Ex p a r t e 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . Woodward a s s e r t e d a t t r i a l o n l y t h a t M c C o r d w o u l d t e s t i f y that she s p o k e testimony would determination Houts. t o Woodward have when he telephoned h a d no p r o b a t i v e value her. on t h e j u r y ' s o f t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r Woodward h a d s h o t McCord's t e s t i m o n y he was en r o u t e That Officer t h a t Woodward c o n t a c t e d her while t o A t l a n t a w o u l d n o t have p r o v i d e d evidence, o r e v e n an i n f e r e n c e , t h a t Woodward became aware t h a t he was wanted by t h e p o l i c e o n l y because McCord had t o l d him s o . the c o n t r a r y , a reasonable i m p l i c a t i o n from McCord's w o u l d have b e e n t h a t Woodward c o n t a c t e d 25 h i s defense To testimony attorney CR-08-0145 during his flight Houts. to Atlanta because he had shot Because McCord's t e s t i m o n y would existence o f any f a c t Officer n o t have made t h e o f c o n s e q u e n c e more p r o b a b l e or less p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d be w i t h o u t t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e t e s t i m o n y w o u l d have b e e n i r r e l e v a n t . t h i s was n o t t h e t r i a l R u l e 402, A l a . R. E v i d . c o u r t ' s s t a t e d reason f o r r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w M c C o r d t o t e s t i f y , we c a n a f f i r m a t r i a l affirm f o r a reason Peraita v. State, 2003), a f f ' d , other than 897 Although the stated So. 2d 1161, 1183 897 So. 2d 1227 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . court's ruling one. See, e . g . , ( A l a . Crim. App. Because the t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d have r e f u s e d t o p e r m i t t h e t e s t i m o n y on t h e g r o u n d that i t was irrelevant, we hold that the t r i a l court's j u d g m e n t was due t o be a f f i r m e d on t h i s a d d i t i o n a l g r o u n d , a n d t h a t t h i s g r o u n d p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r r e a s o n t h a t Woodward i s n o t entitled to relief The Sixth on h i s c l a i m o f e r r o r . Amendment does v i o l a t e the rules of evidence. 400 (1988)("The n o t empower a defendant T a y l o r v. I l l i n o i s , to 484 U.S. a c c u s e d does n o t have an u n f e t t e r e d r i g h t t o o f f e r testimony that i s incompetent, p r i v i l e g e d , or otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules of evidence."). C o n t r a r y t o Woodward's a s s e r t i o n on a p p e a l , he c o u l d have no 26 CR-08-0145 "weighty interest" in the presentation t e s t i m o n y , and t h e t r i a l court's evidence considered could not be of irrelevant enforcement of the r u l e s of arbitrary. Certainly Woodward h a d a S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o p r e s e n t w i t n e s s e s t h a t were material and favorable t o h i s defense. S i n g l e t a r y , 122 F.3d 1390 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . Taylor v. To e s t a b l i s h m a t e r i a l i t y o f excluded evidence, h o w e v e r , Woodward w o u l d have h a d t o show that the "evidence [unavailable at t r i a l ] c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y be t a k e n t o p u t t h e whole case i n such a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t undermine quoting confidence Kyles v. i n the v e r d i c t . " Whitley, 514 U.S. 122 419, as t o F.3d a t 1395, 434-35 (1995). T e s t i m o n y f r o m M c C o r d t h a t she t o l d Woodward t h a t t h e p o l i c e were looking f o r him different light. travels of n o t have put the case in a Woodward t o l d t h r e e p e o p l e t h a t he h a d s h o t a police o f f i c e r during solicitation would a traffic the assistance out of the c i t y and stop. of then Further, several Woodward's people in his out of the s t a t e , h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t o Cunningham t o b u r n some o f t h e c l o t h i n g he h a d been w e a r i n g , and h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t o a n o t h e r f r i e n d t o d i s p o s e of Surles's vehicle a l l indicated w o u l d be l o o k i n g f o r h i m . that His i n a b i l i t y 27 he knew the p o l i c e t o p r e s e n t McCord's CR-08-0145 t e s t i m o n y t h a t she t o l d h i m t h e Montgomery p o l i c e were l o o k i n g for him d i d not p r e c l u d e undermine confidence him from p u t t i n g on a d e f e n s e o r i n the v e r d i c t s . Even a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n e d a p r o f f e r showing t h a t M c C o r d w o u l d have t e s t i f i e d as Woodward a l l e g e s she w o u l d h a v e , t h a t i s , e v e n a s s u m i n g Woodward e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h an o f f e r o f p r o o f t h a t M c C o r d w o u l d have t e s t i f i e d t h a t she t o l d Woodward that he was testimony would Woodward's statement g u i l t y knowledge. not being sought have by rebutted the the police, inference to the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r that that was b a s e d on T h a t Woodward h e a r d f r o m M c C o r d t h a t he was w a n t e d b y t h e p o l i c e does n o t e l i m i n a t e o r e v e n d i m i n i s h t h e inference court that noted, Woodward shot O f f i c e r Houts. testimony already witnesses earlier i n t h e day t h a t he h a d s h o t someone. no record that at t r i a l State's the established received As t h e Woodward s u p p o r t e d Woodward's c u r r e n t from had t o l d 3 trial three them Thus, e v e n i f c l a i m , we w o u l d e r r o r , a n d c e r t a i n l y no p l a i n e r r o r , i n t h e t r i a l find court's d e n i a l o f h i s r e q u e s t t o a l l o w McCord t o t e s t i f y , because h e r I n f a c t , i t was t h r o u g h i n v e s t i g a t o r s ' q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h o s e same w i t n e s s e s t h a t t h e y l e a r n e d t h a t Woodward was i n Atlanta. 3 28 CR-08-0145 testimony would have been irrelevant and immaterial and therefore not probative. Finally, as M c C o r d h e r s e l f n o t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t when Woodward a n n o u n c e d h i s i n t e n t t o c a l l h e r as a w i t n e s s M c C o r d had b e e n unaware t h a t she was a p o t e n t i a l w i t n e s s a n d she knew s e v e r a l o f t h e j u r o r s , who h a d n o t b e e n a s k e d d u r i n g v o i r about prevent their relationship with h e r and whether them f r o m b e i n g i m p a r t i a l For a l l the f o r e g o i n g reasons, to relief on t h i s that dire would jurors. Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d claim of error. II. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s that the t r i a l p e r m i t t e d Agent A l Mattox, Bureau of I n v e s t i g a t i o n c o u r t e r r e d when i t an i n v e s t i g a t o r w i t h t h e A l a b a m a ("the A B I " ) , t o t e s t i f y as an e x p e r t t h a t he h a d v i e w e d t h e v i d e o t a k e n f r o m O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s p a t r o l car a n d t h a t he h a d d e t e r m i n e d male. Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e a s s a i l a n t was a b l a c k t h a t Agent Mattox's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e r a c e o f t h e s h o o t e r was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e e x p e r t under Rule Mattox his 702, A l a . R. E v i d . The S t a t e a r g u e s testimony t h a t Agent gave b o t h e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y a n d l a y t e s t i m o n y a n d t h a t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s h o o t e r as a b l a c k male 29 constituted CR-08-0145 only l a y testimony, R u l e 701, A l a . R. Before Woodward the a n d t h e r e f o r e was a d m i s s i b l e Evid. State argued presented to the t r i a l v i e w e d an e n h a n c e d v i d e o t a p e camera a n d t h a t he s h o u l d conclusions that the shooter Woodward a l s o s t a t e d , [that the shooter already. And Agent court Mattox's that from O f f i c e r [could] testimony, Agent Mattox Houts's n o t be p e r m i t t e d "which the j u r y particularly pursuant to reach dashboard to t e s t i f y just as was a b l a c k m a l e . was] that "[h]is ability dark-skinned video c a r and i s not from what going to (R. 1142.) 4 we've "'this i s what witness court that o r any j u r o r . " the State could heard definitively He a r g u e d t h a t videotape I eyeballed,'" t o e y e b a l l w h a t ' s on t h e v i d e o t h a n any o t h e r stated easily," (R. 1 1 4 2 . ) A g e n t M a t t o x w o u l d t e s t i f y t h a t he h a d e n h a n c e d t h e the p a t r o l as t o "What t h e e v i d e n c e h a s e s t a b l i s h e d i s determine t h a t i t ' s a b l a c k male." from had i s not b e t t e r (R. 1144.) use and Agent The trial Mattox's P o w e r P o i n t p r e s e n t a t i o n t o e m p h a s i z e t h e p o i n t s i t was trying to Agent make a n d t h a t defense counsel could cross-examine T h e S t a t e c o r r e c t l y n o t e s t h a t two w i t n e s s e s h a d a l r e a d y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f t h e I m p a l a t h e y saw i n t h e a r e a a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s h o o t i n g was a b l a c k m a l e . (R. 786, 833.) 4 30 CR-08-0145 M a t t o x on w h e t h e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n s he drew f r o m t h e v i d e o were valid. the Woodward t h e n r e q u e s t e d jury that facts, that the t r i a l i t , and n o t Agent Mattox, and t h e t r i a l court instruct was t h e f i n d e r o f c o u r t a g r e e d t o do s o . Agent Mattox then t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a e m p l o y e d t h e A B I i n t h e Bomb Squad a n d T e c h n i c a l S e r v i c e s U n i t . Mattox stated Services Unit surveillance videos, be that he was t h e s u p e r v i s o r and that a n d was he responsible that i s , attempting seen. Agent handled Mattox a l l the large-scale f o r t h e enhancement about so they in video enhancement, a n d t h e t r i a l court c a r had a v i d e o t a p e , as an e x p e r t . and s a f e k e e p i n g , n o t damaged o r d e s t r o y e d . Agent Agent Mattox Houts's a n d he d o w n l o a d e d t h e t a p e t h e c o m p u t e r h a r d d r i v e o f an I n t e r g r a p h v i d e o - a n a l y s t storage used t o stated that t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n - c a r d a s h b o a r d camera i n O f f i c e r for he The S t a t e p r o f f e r e d A g e n t M a t t o x as an e x p e r t Mattox could o f f e r h i s opinions patrol of could the t r a i n i n g r e c e i v e d i n v i d e o enhancement a n d a b o u t t h e t e c h n i q u e s enhance v i d e o s . Agent of the Technical t o c l e a r up v i d e o s testified by so t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l onto system video was Agent M a t t o x s a i d t h a t t h e computer s y s t e m made i t p o s s i b l e t o v i e w t h e v i d e o 31 frame b y f r a m e a n d CR-08-0145 provided for additional magnification and a l t e r a t i o n of the l i g h t c o n t r a s t f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e images b u t t h a t i t d i d not alter the video itself. Agent Mattox had prepared a P o w e r P o i n t p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e v i d e o enhancement t o a s s i s t h i m in h i s explanation objected to the jury. on t h e g r o u n d s Woodward he h a d s t a t e d stated before Agent that he Mattox t e s t i f i e d , a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y as f o l l o w s : " L a d i e s a n d g e n t l e m e n , l e t me t e l l you t h i s : The PowerPoint p r e s e n t a t i o n i n and o f i t s e l f , t h a t ' s n o t evidence. That's j u s t something the p r o s e c u t i o n i s o f f e r i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e t o h e l p them make c e r t a i n points t o you. Just because the PowerPoint p r e s e n t a t i o n s a y s one t h i n g , t h a t d o e s n ' t mean t h a t you have t o a g r e e t o i t . A n d t h e S t a t e s t i l l h a s i t s b u r d e n o f p r o o f t o p r o v e t o y o u what t h e y s a y the t a p e shows. A n d y o u ' r e n o t b o u n d b y any w i t n e s s ' s c o n c l u s i o n as t o what t h e S t a t e -- what t h e t a p e -- shows. You, c e r t a i n l y , c a n r e l y on y o u r own i n d e p e n d e n t e v a l u a t i o n a n d r e v i e w o f t h e t a p e . And y o u c a n draw w h a t e v e r c o n c l u s i o n s y o u want t o draw f r o m t h a t t a p e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , y o u d o n ' t have t o go w i t h what t h e y s a y t h e t a p e s a y s . R e l y on i t b a s e d on y o u r own o b s e r v a t i o n . " (R. 1196-97.) Following the trial PowerPoint p r e s e n t a t i o n , Y o u r Honor." court's instruction defense counsel about the s t a t e d , "Thank y o u , (R. 1197.) Agent Mattox then Department had r e q u e s t e d testified that t h e Montgomery Police t h a t he a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e s e v e r a l 32 CR-08-0145 pieces of information from t h e v i d e o t a p e : t h e v e h i c l e ; t h e make, m o d e l , y e a r , t h e t a g number o f and c o l o r o f t h e v e h i c l e ; t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e p e r s o n i n s i d e t h e v e h i c l e ; w h e t h e r t h e gun was fired with the shooter's right hand or l e f t hand; t h e make, m o d e l , a n d c a l i b e r o f t h e weapon u s e d i n t h e s h o o t i n g ; t h e number o f s h o t s trajectory casings; of fired; the s h e l l the duration of the shooting; the casings; the color of the shell a n d a n y a c t i o n s O f f i c e r H o u t s t o o k as he a p p r o a c h e d the v e h i c l e . A g e n t M a t t o x t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e tag number Chevrolet; car. on the he c o u l d vehicle and not determine that the vehicle a t h e make o r model o f t h e A g e n t M a t t o x s a i d t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e was t h e shooter and t h a t he h a d f i r e d t h e gun w i t h his right A g e n t M a t t o x f o u n d no e v i d e n c e t o i n d i c a t e t h a t second occupant i n the v e h i c l e . to conclude that the shooter determined that the semiautomatic p i s t o l , model, that was or c a l i b e r five shots had b u t he c o u l d o f t h e weapon. were f i r e d , fired a Agent Mattox large-frame, not determine He was a b l e and t h e s h o t s 33 was a A g e n t M a t t o x s a i d he was a b l e was a b l a c k m a l e . driver there hand. t h e make, to determine had been f i r e d i n CR-08-0145 2.89 seconds. and you can see t o o k any of F i n a l l y , Agent Mattox t e s t i f i e d , f r o m t h e v i d e o -- t h a t "I concluded [ O f f i c e r Houts] never a c t i o n s t h a t w o u l d have b e e n i n r e s p o n s e t o any threat he perceived from ... i n s i d e the type vehicle." (R. 1204.) Woodward permitted shooter that the Agent Mattox to o f f e r was claimed argues a b l a c k male. to base his trial h i s expert 1220), subject was and for expert not identification an officer, this as he when i t that an expert because the the was to not a proper Agent Mattox make a racial amounted t o l i t t l e the must have b e e n a b l a c k shooter's [and] p h y s i c a l t r a i t s " e v e n i f i t was, "Mattox's testimony assertion that opinion on identification o p i n i o n and, qualified identification. than that erred Woodward a r g u e s t h a t A g e n t M a t t o x " m a n n e r i s m s , movement, c h a r a c t e r t r a i t s (R. court a s s a i l a n t shot m a l e , " and the more a police testimony v i o l a t e d Woodward's r i g h t s u n d e r t h e E q u a l - P r o t e c t i o n and Process Clauses (Woodward's b r i e f , trial before Agent of a t p. the United 28.) Mattox States Due- Constitution. A l t h o u g h Woodward o b j e c t e d testified M a t t o x ' s a b i l i t y t o draw c o n c l u s i o n s 34 and argued at that Agent from the enhanced video CR-08-0145 was no b e t t e r t h a n the j u r y ' s , he now argues f o r the first t i m e t h a t A g e n t M a t t o x ' s t e s t i m o n y was r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y and that i t violated protection. trial, we his rights t o due process and equal B e c a u s e Woodward o b j e c t s on g r o u n d s n o t r a i s e d a t review that p o r t i o n of the c l a i m f o r p l a i n error only. "The left question of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence to the d i s c r e t i o n court's determination of the trial court, and the trial n o t be reversed e x c e p t upon a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . " Ex p a r t e Loggins, Evid., 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 provides: specialized understand witness on t h a t q u e s t i o n w i l l i s generally "If knowledge the evidence qualified as ( A l a . 2000) . scientific, will assist technical, the or t o determine an expert R u l e 702, A l a . R. trier a fact by or of other fact to i n issue, a knowledge, skill, e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n , may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e f o r m o f an o p i n i o n o r o t h e r w i s e . " rule 5 Thus, i s not whether the s u b j e c t matter within t h e common k n o w l e d g e the focus of the of the testimony or understanding of the is jurors, Rule 702, A l a . R. E v i d . , has been amended. The amendment, e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 2012, keeps t h i s p r o v i s i o n i n s u b s e c t i o n (a) and adds s u b s e c t i o n s (b) and ( c ) . 5 35 CR-08-0145 but whether t h e e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n or testimony w i l l a s s i s t t h e trier of fact i n understanding issue of fact. video the evidence The S t a t e o f f e r e d A g e n t M a t t o x as an e x p e r t i n enhancement, and Agent Mattox testified p r o c e s s he u s e d t o enhance t h e v i d e o t a p e patrol c a r ; he enhanced o r d e c i d i n g an video testified he about prepared as to the from O f f i c e r Houts's the photographs during that and t h e process; a n d he t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s a n d o b s e r v a t i o n s he made as a r e s u l t of that process. A g e n t M a t t o x was n o t t e s t i f y i n g as a r a c i a l - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n expert. his conclusions regarding Agent Mattox's testimony the race of the person about who shot O f f i c e r H o u t s i s no d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e t e s t i m o n y a b o u t a n y o f the other conclusions enhancement of the video enhanced v i d e o All o f Agent he reached as a and h i s r e p e a t e d result viewing Mattox's opinions were offered to a s s i s t the the evidence or i n determining i s s u e s o f f a c t and were, t h e r e f o r e , p e r m i s s i b l e . vehicle, which of the a n d t h e p h o t o g r a p h s he made f r o m t h e v i d e o . t r i e r s of fact i nunderstanding Agent Mattox of the testified about t h e l i c e n s e F o r example, t a g number o f t h e a b o u t t h e number o f s h o t s f i r e d a n d t h e d i r e c t i o n i n the casings were ejected, 36 about the color of the CR-08-0145 c a s i n g s , a n d t h a t t h e s h o o t e r was r i g h t - h a n d e d . jury, t o o , w o u l d have b e e n a b l e enhanced video and the not t o (and d i d ) " e y e b a l l " t h e photographs d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , Woodward does Although the to make those n o t now a r g u e -- a n d we would f i n d -- t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t permitted Agent Mattox to testify about the d e t a i l s he o b s e r v e d a n d a b o u t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e s e m a t t e r s b e c a u s e , we c o n c l u d e , Agent Mattox's testimony a s s i s t e d the jury i n understanding the evidence or i n determining a fact i n issue. Woodward a l s o does n o t a r g u e on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l court e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d A g e n t M a t t o x t o t e s t i f y as t o t h e make of t h e v e h i c l e , e v e n t h o u g h A g e n t M a t t o x was n o t q u a l i f i e d as an e x p e r t i n v e h i c l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; that the t r i a l Agent Mattox shooting, n o r does Woodward a r g u e c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t p e r m i t t e d to t e s t i f y even though about Agent t h e t y p e o f gun u s e d Mattox was n o t p r o f f e r e d weapons e x p e r t ; n o r does Woodward a r g u e t h a t t h e t r i a l abused i t s discretion when i n the i t permitted Agent as a court Mattox to t e s t i f y t h a t O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s a c t i o n s d i d n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t he was r e s p o n d i n g t o any t y p e o f t h r e a t he p e r c e i v e d f r o m anyone in t h e v e h i c l e , e v e n t h o u g h A g e n t M a t t o x was n o t an e x p e r t i n 37 CR-08-0145 human b e h a v i o r o r p s y c h o l o g y . a r g u m e n t s , we Even i f Woodward had made t h o s e would conclude t h a t t h e r e had b e e n no abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n i n the admission of t h a t testimony because i t , helped the j u r y to understand fact i n issue. as to his The opinion the evidence or to determine same i s t r u e o f A g e n t M a t t o x ' s about the race of too, the a testimony shooter. That t e s t i m o n y was b a s e d on A g e n t M a t t o x ' s repeated viewings of the d i g i t i z e d and e n h a n c e d v i d e o , as was the testimony about a l l t h e o t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s and o p i n i o n s he gave a t t r i a l . There i s no i n d i c a t i o n f r o m t h e r e c o r d t h a t t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e r a c e o f the assailant was o f f e r e d or used by the prosecution to i n f l a m e t h e j u r y o r t o c a u s e undue p r e j u d i c e b a s e d on r a c e , o r for a purpose Mattox's other testimony. than any of the of Agent offered to assist or to determine a fact A l l t h e t e s t i m o n y was the j u r y i n understanding the evidence in remainder issue. Furthermore, examination i t is Woodward important vigorously to note challenged that Agent on crossMattox's o p i n i o n t h a t t h e a s s a i l a n t was a b l a c k m a l e , and he c h a l l e n g e d other c o n c l u s i o n s Agent Mattox reached, a s s a i l a n t was alone i n the v e h i c l e . 38 i n c l u d i n g whether the (R. 1216-20.) CR-08-0145 F i n a l l y , the t r i a l c o u r t e m p h a t i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y t h a t i t was t h e u l t i m a t e f i n d e r o f f a c t and t h a t the j u r y n o t b o u n d by A g e n t M a t t o x ' s o p i n i o n s a b o u t what t h e showed. Jurors instructions. (Ala. 2008) follows are See, presumed e.g., ("[A]n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t the 1169, follow trial 1176 the court's videotape trial Ex p a r t e B e l i s l e , 11 So. evidence to the c o n t r a r y . ' " 2d to was court's 3d 323, 'presume[s] t h a t the i n s t r u c t i o n s unless 333 jury there is ( q u o t i n g C o c h r a n v. Ward, 935 So. (Ala. 2006))). Nothing i n the record i n case i n d i c a t e s t h a t the j u r y d i d not f o l l o w the t r i a l this court's instruction. Thus, we find admission of Agent violation of equal-protection Woodward has no abuse of Mattox's discretion testimony b e l a t e d l y argued. t h a t the State Finally, even i f the t r i a l Agent Mattox's testimony Impala, the error r e c o r d does n o t supporting form of rights as contain Woodward's racial Agent Mattox's bias or testimony. c o u r t e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d have 39 no The about the would the certainly and in due-process e n g a g e d i n any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n when i t p r e s e n t e d error or e v e n an i n f e r e n c e , much l e s s e v i d e n c e , claim or race of the d r i v e r of been harmless the because CR-08-0145 eyewitnesses man. h a d a l r e a d y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r was a b l a c k R u l e 4 5A, A l a . R. App. P. III. Woodward several next errors argues related testimony a l l e g e d l y made to and d e m o n s t r a t i v e calls that he the the trial State's court committed presentation of evidence about c e l l u l a r - t e l e p h o n e near the time of O f f i c e r Houts's murder. P e t e DeLeon, a c u s t o d i a n testified about information, accounts, the user call of records records, at A l l t e l including f o r three d i f f e r e n t accounts. but the records Wireless, cell-tower Woodward indicated that Tiffany Surles o f t h e c e l l phone a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one o f accounts. The t h i r d Walker's. DeLeon i d e n t i f i e d r e c o r d DeLeon t e s t i f i e d engineers; a b o u t was Wendy two maps: one map c o n t a i n e d that DeLeon t e s t i f i e d f r o m Woodward's cell i n the area a second witness map t o w e r s t h a t were " h i t " t o w e r s were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h where only created phone on t h e day o f t h e s h o o t i n g . l o c a t i o n s of the c e l l being t h a t he c r e a t e d showed t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e c e l l was Woodward's t h e l o c a t i o n f o r A l l t e l ' s c e l l t o w e r s a n d t h a t map was by h a d two Shirley [ s u b s t i t u t e d p. 40] The Woodward's Porterfield had CR-08-0145 testified she h a d s e e n h i m on t h e m o r n i n g d r i v i n g a l i g h t - c o l o r e d Impala. of the shooting, DeLeon t e s t i f i e d t h a t A l l t e l r e c o r d s d i d n o t p e r m i t even a r a d i o - f r e q u e n c y ("RF") e n g i n e e r to using the c e l l pinpoint the exact phone; t h e r e c o r d s location of the person only provided i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e c e l l t o w e r s t h a t were u s e d d u r i n g a c a l l . Jennifer Nextel, Scheid, testified information, a about f o r three custodian call of records, accounts: records for Sprint including cell-tower one a c c o u n t was a p r e p a i d phone; one s u b s c r i b e r was P a u l L e w i s b u t t h e r e g i s t e r e d u s e r ' s name on t h a t a c c o u n t used by Joseph Deramus's. ordinary Pringle; She s a i d course was J o e a n d was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h and t h e f i n a l the records of business account was Brittne kept were t h e t y p e f o r Sprint being i n the Nextel. Scheid t e s t i f i e d w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n t h a t S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 63 c o n s i s t e d o f maps d i s p l a y i n g t h e l o c a t i o n s o f S p r i n t N e x t e l ' s c e l l - p h o n e towers, b a s e d on t h e l a t i t u d e company's accurately database. and l o n g i t u d e r e a d i n g s She s t a t e d represented that the c e l l - s i t e t h e maps i nthe fairly l o c a t i o n s of and Sprint N e x t e l , and t h a t they would a i d i n h e r e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e j u r y a b o u t t h e c a l l s made on t h e d a y o f t h e m u r d e r . admitted without o b j e c t i o n . [ s u b s t i t u t e d p. 41] The maps were CR-08-0145 Scheid records testified without objection one of the d i s p l a y e d o u t g o i n g phone c a l l s f r o m t h e p r e p a i d a t 12:36 p.m. a n d a g a i n a t 12:38 p.m. t o a number t h a t e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d was T i f f a n y S u r l e s ' s Those c a l l s were p l a c e d Montgomery, S c h e i d Woodward. prepaid that Scheid phone using t h e tower l o c a t e d t e s t i f i e d -- a g a i n testified that one o f w h i c h about other calls i n downtown from made f r o m t h e went through a o f Montgomery a n d a n o t h e r u s e d a tower l o c a t e d i n A t l a n t a , Georgia. received other number. without objection a b o u t phone c a l l s afternoon, t o w e r l o c a t e d on I-65 n o r t h cell-phone phone A d d i t i o n a l t e s t i m o n y was made t h a t d a y ; some o f t h e c a l l s went t h r o u g h a t o w e r t h a t was c l o s e t o C e n t u r y P l a z a m a l l i n Birmingham. A f t e r S c h e i d t e s t i f i e d t h a t one o f t h e c a l l s went t h r o u g h a tower located whether the c e l l on I n t e r s t a t e 65 t h e p r o s e c u t o r phone c u s t o m e r h a d b e e n t r a v e l i n g the i n t e r s t a t e a t t h e time. Defense counsel objected asked her north on that the q u e s t i o n was b e y o n d S c h e i d ' s e x p e r t i s e , a n d he s a i d , "They c a n talk a b o u t t o w e r s where t h e c e l l phone went t h r o u g h b u t n o t the p h y s i c a l l o c a t i o n o f any p e r s o n making t h e c a l l , foundation predicate." (R. 1159.) 42 The S t a t e improper withdrew the CR-08-0145 question. The S t a t e l a t e r p o i n t e d a t a c e l l - p h o n e t o w e r on one o f t h e maps a n d a s k e d S c h e i d , " I f t h e r e h a d b e e n t e s t i m o n y s a y i n g t h a t t h i s phone h a d b e e n u s e d g o i n g up I - 6 5 , w o u l d t h a t be consistent with phone t o w e r ? " an i n d i v i d u a l (R. 1160-61.) being close to this cell¬ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e w i t n e s s was l i m i t e d t o t e s t i f y i n g a b o u t w h i c h t o w e r s were u s e d d u r i n g certain calls, and t h e t r i a l court overruled that objection. On that cross-examination she h a d "some l e v e l defense counsel stated to of e x p e r t i s e , obviously, p h o n e s and t o w e r s a n d t h a t k i n d o f t h i n g , " a n d S c h e i d (R. 1165.) an RF e n g i n e e r and S c h e i d agreed, cell agreed. typically when d e f e n s e counsel comes i n t o d e t e r m i n e o f a p e r s o n m a k i n g a phone c a l l , the w i t n e s s , then t e s t i f i e d i s someone who w o r k s w i t h t h e a c t u a l f u r t h e r agreed engineer to D e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h e n s t a t e d t o S c h e i d t h a t she was n o t an "RF e n g i n e e r , " Scheid Scheid "And t h a t ' s why said that towers. t h a t an RF the a c t u a l l o c a t i o n a n d when he f u r t h e r s t a t e d t o you were o n l y a b l e t o t e l l t h e j u r y a b o u t what t o w e r s were u s e d b u t n o t , b a s i c a l l y , where t h e person from?" was, t h e a p p r o x i m a t e a r e a where t h e c a l l s o r i g i n a t e d (R. 1166.) Defense counsel then asked S c h e i d a s e r i e s 43 CR-08-0145 of q u e s t i o n s about the c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of c e l l - p h o n e towers she answered those about the towers, c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of Scheid information. testified into that antennas an tower the S c h e i d was evidence on engineer counsel the asked cell-phone would know company's that cell-phone o r t h r e e " s e c t o r s , " w h i c h she s a i d " r e f e r s s i d e of the 1169.) the Scheid t e s t i f i e d t h a t her t o w e r s have two which q u e s t i o n s , b u t when d e f e n s e call was hitting off of." a b l e t o i d e n t i f y from the r e c o r d s which sector a c a l l had been to b e t t e r determine had created, admitted routed through; Woodward p r o v i d e d i t purported Woodward's phone on the day to well foundation qualified "considering just like to S c h e i d w i t h a map represent of the o b j e c t e d t o Woodward's use o f t h e map a proper calls murder. made When t h e State for i t , Woodward a r g u e d t h a t S c h e i d answer some questions from (R. 1172.) Woodward a l s o the helps -- enables -- her 44 to e x p l a i n -- (R. was [were] stated, " laid map, "And, Judge, the s e c t o r l a y o u t i s n ' t c r u c i a l t o the t e s t i m o n y . just he from b e c a u s e he had n o t a l l t h e maps s h e ' s b e e n l o o k i n g a t t h a t this." able t h e l o c a t i o n o f a c a l l e r by k n o w i n g w h i c h used. and to (R. h o w e v e r , she a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t an RF e n g i n e e r m i g h t be sector a c a l l and It 1173.) CR-08-0145 After reviewing admitted the records i n t o e v i d e n c e S c h e i d t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e 12:36 phone c a l l f r o m Woodward's t h a n d i d t h e 12:38 p.m. Scheid call from S p r i n t N e x t e l t h a t had been testified signal, sector c a l l he made. on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n u s u a l l y i s routed strongest phone came f r o m a d i f f e r e n t p.m. through but that that a cell-phone the c l o s e s t tower i f there was with the a problem with the c l o s e s t t o w e r o r i f a t o w e r was a t maximum c a p a c i t y , t h e c e l l ¬ phone h a n d s e t w o u l d t h e n u s e a n o t h e r n e a r b y t o w e r o r t h e t o w e r p r o v i d i n g the next strongest signal. Woodward r a i s e s t h r e e c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g t h i s e v i d e n c e , and we a d d r e s s e a c h i n t u r n . A. present Woodward first l i v e testimony argues: "Because from the engineers the State d i d not who c r e a t e d t h e c e l l phone r e c o r d s a n d maps, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g t h e records that a n d maps." the through violated State's the risk presentation testimony of of the h i s S i x t h Amendment examine w i t n e s s e s the (Woodward's b r i e f , a t p. 45.) He a s s e r t s the cell-phone custodians of right evidence the to confront and records cross- who h a d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e r e c o r d s a n d maps o r o f e r r o r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them. 45 He c i t e s Melendez- CR-08-0145 Diaz v. M a s s a c h u s e t t s , 557 U.S. , 129 S. C t . 2527 Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l , it now only for plain error. discretion i n determining evidence, and the A whether trial trial court's so we court t o exclude (2009). has review wide o r t o admit determination on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . S e e , e . g . , Hudson v . S t a t e , [Ms. CR-09-1913, Aug. 26, 2011] App. 2011). We court's admission find no abuse So. 3d (Ala. Crim. of d i s c r e t i o n of the evidence; i n the t r i a l t h e r e f o r e , we f i n d no p l a i n error. The United States Supreme Court i n Melendez-Diaz held t h a t t h e S i x t h Amendment g e n e r a l l y p r o h i b i t s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a f o r e n s i c l a b o r a t o r y r e p o r t t h a t was c r e a t e d to has serve no o p p o r t u n i t y report. not as e v i d e n c e i n a c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g specifically i f the defense t o c r o s s - e x a m i n e t h e p e r s o n who made t h e F o r t h e r e a s o n s e x p l a i n e d b e l o w , M e l e n d e z - D i a z does support First, Woodward's a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r . DeLeon o f A l l t e l testified on cross-examination t h a t he c r e a t e d t h e map t h a t d i s p l a y e d e a c h c a l l made a n d t h e tower through which the c a l l was r o u t e d . 46 "The a c t u a l call CR-08-0145 records i n d i c a t e the exact DeLeon s a i d . t o w e r t h a t t h e c a l l went t h r o u g h , " (R. 1133.) DeLeon a n s w e r e d a f f i r m a t i v e l y when Woodward a s k e d d u r i n g c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , " [ Y ] o u d o n ' t have t o be an e n g i n e e r t o do t h a t p a r t , r i g h t ? " u s e d a t Woodward's location cell-phone The map t r i a l t h a t d i s p l a y e d t h e c a l l s made a n d t h e of the towers Furthermore, (R. 1131.) DeLeon was not generated testified that by an engineer. he h a d i d e n t i f i e d which t o w e r e a c h c a l l went t h r o u g h , b u t t h a t he was n o t t e s t i f y i n g about the exact l o c a t i o n of the person holding the cell was phone whether an when t h e c a l l RF engineer o p i n i o n on t h e e x a c t would be When Woodward required give queried an expert l o c a t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n m a k i n g t h e phone c a l l , DeLeon s t a t e d , "No. exact made. p i n p o i n t i n g -- " The A l l t e l s y s t e m does n o t a l l o w an (R. 1132.) Therefore, as t h e State c o r r e c t l y a r g u e s , t h e r e i s no b a s i s i n t h e r e c o r d f o r Woodward t o now a r g u e t h a t t h e A l l t e l maps were c r e a t e d b y an e n g i n e e r and t h a t he was d e n i e d someone h i s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o q u e s t i o n k n o w l e d g e a b l e a b o u t t h e maps. S e c o n d , as t o S c h e i d ' s t e s t i m o n y records and maps, t h e o n l y relevant about the S p r i n t testimony i n the record a b o u t t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e maps i s t h a t t h e r e c o r d s 47 Nextel from which CR-08-0145 they were business all generated and t h a t t h e y Sprint Nextel Scheid, were kept i n the ordinary course a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t e d the l o c a t i o n s of cell towers throughout the U n i t e d t o o , t e s t i f i e d o n l y about the c e l l - p h o n e States. towers r o u t e d c a l l s f r o m c e r t a i n p h o n e s r e l e v a n t t o Woodward's calls on t h e day o f t h e m u r d e r . Defense more t h a n one o c c a s i o n d u r i n g t r i a l to give information about that he was denied counsel Woodward's phone the qualified cell-phone a r g u m e n t on his constitutional that s t a t e d on t h a t S c h e i d was the l o c a t i o n of t o w e r s t h e c a l l s went t h r o u g h . -- of right to appeal cross- e x a m i n e t h e w i t n e s s e s who g e n e r a t e d t h e maps -- was n o t t i m e l y raised, not i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e p o s i t i o n he t o o k a t t r i a l , supported by t h e r e c o r d . We a r e aware o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s decision i n Bullcoming 2705 (2011). v. New M e x i c o , 564 U.S. The U n i t e d States Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e the prosecution a as forensic-laboratory report recent , 131 S. C t . S i x t h Amendment does n o t p e r m i t proceeding and i s evidence through the i n - c o u r t testimony in to introduce a criminal of a s c i e n t i s t who did n o t p e r f o r m o r o b s e r v e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e t e s t o r who did not sign the c e r t i f i c a t i o n 48 of the r e s u l t s . The accused CR-08-0145 has the right t o be c o n f r o n t e d at t r i a l by t h e a n a l y s t who c e r t i f i e d the t e s t r e s u l t s unless that analyst i s unavailable at t r i a l him a n d t h e a c c u s e d h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y pretrial, here, the Court h e l d . either, records T h a t c a s e h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e same r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d Melendez-Diaz. the t o cross-examine Bullcoming custodians with regard to i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h a t one o f who t e s t i f i e d a t Woodward's t r i a l h a d c r e a t e d t h e map s h o w i n g t h e t o w e r s u s e d t o r o u t e t h e r e l e v a n t phone c a l l s and t h e o t h e r used the c a l l records i n court to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e t o w e r b a s e d on d a t a from the call both witnesses e x t e n s i v e l y r e g a r d i n g t h e s c o p e and l i m i t s o f t h e i r testimony, records. making Woodward i t clear that Woodward's precise Therefore, there cross-examined neither witness was location during any was no violation Amendment r i g h t o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n . plain error, B. of testifying of the Woodward's about calls. Sixth No e r r o r , a n d c e r t a i n l y no occurred. I n a r e l a t e d a r g u m e n t , Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d witnesses cell-phone DeLeon a n d S c h e i d -- b o t h l a y -- t o o f f e r t h e i r o p i n i o n s as t o t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e records and maps, rather 49 than testifying about CR-08-0145 matters within their personal Specifically, he S c h e i d were e r r o n e o u s l y p e r m i t t e d a r g u e s t h a t DeLeon and knowledge. to t e s t i f y t h a t the c e l l - p h o n e records i n d i c a t e d the l o c a t i o n s of the c a l l e r s at c e r t a i n of the t r a n s c r i p t correctly notes d u r i n g any we times. Woodward c i t e s i n t h i s p o r t i o n of h i s argument. t h a t Woodward d i d n o t o f DeLeon's t e s t i m o n y ; review this o n l y two claim for plain raise The there had been t e s t i m o n y State this objection t h u s , as t o h i s testimony, error. Woodward d i d o b j e c t d u r i n g S c h e i d ' s t e s t i m o n y , when t h e p r o s e c u t o r a s k e d if pages whether, t h a t Woodward's phone had been u s e d as he t r a v e l e d on I n t e r s t a t e 65, w o u l d t h a t be c o n s i s t e n t with (R. the caller 1160-61.) qualified being close to Woodward then a certain argued that that question. We review the t r i a l Woodward's o b j e c t i o n t o discretion. Scheid's Scheid t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e a r e a t h e phone was and he a r g u e d t h a t an e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n was 2000) . cell-phone We Scheid's See Ex p a r t e L o g g i n s , tower. was used not from, r e q u i r e d t o answer c o u r t ' s adverse testimony ruling on abuse of f o r an 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r i n any o f DeLeon's t e s t i m o n y testimony, and we f i n d no abuse o f t h e t r i a l 50 or court's CR-08-0145 d i s c r e t i o n i n i t s r u l i n g on Woodward's o b j e c t i o n t o S c h e i d ' s testimony. R u l e 701, A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s : " I f a w i t n e s s i s n o t t e s t i f y i n g as an e x p e r t , the w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y i n t h e form o f o p i n i o n s o r inferences i s limited to those opinions or i n f e r e n c e s w h i c h a r e (a) r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d on t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e w i t n e s s and (b) h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact i n issue." R u l e 702, A l a . R. E v i d . , 6 provides: " I f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , or other s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge w i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y a s s i s t t h e t r i e r o f f a c t t o understand the evidence or t o determine a f a c t i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d as an e x p e r t b y knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n may t e s t i f y i n t h e f o r m o f an o p i n i o n o r o t h e r w i s e . " A l t h o u g h o u r r e s e a r c h has d i s c l o s e d no A l a b a m a c a s e addresses t h i s i s s u e , t h e Tennessee Court o f C r i m i n a l addressed a similar that the t r i a l testify issue i n dicta when Appeals a defendant c o u r t had e r r e d i n p e r m i t t i n g that argued a detective to as an e x p e r t r e g a r d i n g c e l l - p h o n e t o w e r s . S t a t e v. H a y e s , (No. M2008-02689-CCA-R3-CD, Dec. 23, 2010) (Tenn. C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ( n o t p u b l i s h e d i n S.W.3d). C r i m i n a l Appeals r e j e c t e d t h e argument, R u l e 702 was s u p r a N o t e 5. 6 The T e n n e s s e e C o u r t o f amended e f f e c t i v e 51 stating: January 1, 2012. See CR-08-0145 "The d e t e c t i v e m e r e l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw t h e l o c a t i o n s o f t h e c e l l phone t o w e r s l i s t e d on t h e c e l l phone r e c o r d s and p l o t t e d t h o s e l o c a t i o n s on a map. He i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t t r a v e l e d n e a r those towers. Detective Fitzgerald explicitly s t a t e d t h a t he was n o t an e x p e r t i n how t h e c e l l phone t o w e r s w o r k e d . We c o n c l u d e t h a t a l a y p e r s o n c o u l d p l o t t h e l o c a t i o n s o f t h e t o w e r s on a map and draw t h e same i n f e r e n c e ; t h e r e f o r e , h i s t e s t i m o n y did not require specialized knowledge as c o n t e m p l a t e d by T e n n e s s e e R u l e o f E v i d e n c e 702, w h i c h g o v e r n s e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r by a l l o w i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y . " 7 We adopt agree with i t here. the Tennessee DeLeon and court's analysis, Scheid t e s t i f i e d based and on r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d s o f t h e c e l l - p h o n e company e a c h for as a records k n o w l e d g e o f t h e manner i n w h i c h t h o s e r e c o r d s a r e generated and Scheid's testimony The t e s t i m o n y was offered to DeLeon's r e q u i r e d s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge. assist the jury to based reach a nor clear w i t n e s s ' s testimony or t o determine on worked personal Neither and their their recorded. custodian we understanding a fact i n issue, t h u s p r o p e r l y o f f e r e d as l a y - w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y . the S t a t e d i d not trial court, offer therefore, the did witnesses not as accept of the and was Furthermore, e x p e r t s , and them as the experts. R u l e 701 and R u l e 702 o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e a r e s u b s t a n t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l t o R u l e 701, A l a . R. E v i d . , and t o R u l e 702, A l a . R. E v i d . , b e f o r e t h e amendment t o R u l e 702. 7 52 CR-08-0145 Moreover, Woodward established through was cross-examined each his cross-examination witness, t h a t each and witness a b l e t o e x p l a i n t o the j u r y which c e l l - p h o n e tower a went t h r o u g h when t h e c a l l was made b u t was call not able t o g i v e t h e e x a c t l o c a t i o n o f t h e c a l l e r when t h e c a l l was made. (R. 1131-33, 1166.) The w i t n e s s e s d i d n o t t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e e x a c t l o c a t i o n o f the caller a t any time during Woodward's a s s e r t i o n on that A l l t e l was not their appeal. In testimony, fact, able to p i n p o i n t the contrary DeLeon location testified of a b a s e d on c e l l - t o w e r i n f o r m a t i o n . did commit p l a i n user We h o l d t h a t t h e t r i a l not abuse permitted records i t s discretion the and witnesses cell towers to or testify used during about to court e r r o r when i t the certain cell phone phone calls. Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f on t h i s c l a i m o f e r r o r . C. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l discretion procure the when the i t denied h i s motion s e r v i c e s o f an RF an RF engineer continuance Woodward a r g u e s would that S t a t e ' s a r g u m e n t and w o u l d have d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t he was not s c e n e when O f f i c e r H o u t s was 53 have to the the crime of for a rebutted at testimony expert. c o u r t abused i t s shot. CR-08-0145 "'"[I]n Alabama, our courts have always h e l d i t i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y w i t h the trial c o u r t whether i t s h o u l d h a l t or suspend the t r i a l t o enable a p a r t y t o secure or produce witness i n court And, i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s n o t t o be r e v e r s e d s a v e f o r g r o s s abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . " A l o n z o v. S t a t e ex r e l . B o o t h , 283 A l a . 607, 610, 219 So. 2d 858, 861 (1969). I n Ex p a r t e S a r a n t h u s , 501 So. 2d 1256 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e of a p r e t r i a l c o n t i n u a n c e : "'"A motion for a continuance i s addressed to the d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e c o u r t and t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on i t w i l l n o t be disturbed unless there is an abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . F l e t c h e r v. S t a t e , 291 A l a . 67, 277 So. 2d 882 (1973). I f the following p r i n c i p l e s are s a t i s f i e d , a t r i a l court should grant a motion f o r c o n t i n u a n c e on t h e g r o u n d t h a t a witness or evidence i s absent: (1) t h e e x p e c t e d e v i d e n c e must be m a t e r i a l and c o m p e t e n t ; (2) t h e r e must be a p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w i l l be f o r t h c o m i n g i f t h e c a s e i s c o n t i n u e d ; and (3) the moving party must have e x e r c i s e d due d i l i g e n c e t o s e c u r e the evidence. K n o w l e s v. B l u e , 209 A l a . 27, 32, 95 So. 481, 485-86 ( 1 9 2 3 ) . " " ' S a r a n t h u s , 501 So. 2d a t 1257. "'There a r e no m e c h a n i c a l t e s t s f o r d e c i d i n g when a d e n i a l o f a c o n t i n u a n c e i s so a r b i t r a r y as t o v i o l a t e due p r o c e s s . The a n s w e r must be f o u n d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t i n 54 CR-08-0145 every case, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the reasons p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l judge a t the time t h e r e q u e s t i s d e n i e d . ' Ungar v. S a r a f i t e , 376 U.S. 575, 589 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . " G l a s s v. S t a t e , 557 So. 2d 845, 848 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 0 ) . "'"The reversal of a conviction because o f the r e f u s a l o f the t r i a l judge t o g r a n t a c o n t i n u a n c e r e q u i r e s 'a p o s i t i v e demonstration of abuse of judicial discretion.' C l a y t o n v. S t a t e , 45 A l a . App. 127, 129, 226 So. 2d 671, 672 ( 1 9 6 9 ) . " B e a u r e g a r d v. S t a t e , 372 So. 2d 37, 43 (Ala. C r . App. 1979) . A "positive demonstration of abuse of judicial d i s c r e t i o n " i s r e q u i r e d e v e n where t h e refusal to grant the continuance is "somewhat h a r s h " a n d t h i s C o u r t does n o t "condone l i k e c o n d u c t i n f u t u r e s i m i l a r circumstances." Hays v. S t a t e , 518 So.2d 749, 759 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , a f f i r m e d i n p a r t , r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 518 So.2d 768 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . ' "McGlown v. S t a t e , 598 So. 2d 1027, 1028-29 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . " ' " T r i a l judges n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e a g r e a t d e a l o f l a t i t u d e i n s c h e d u l i n g t r i a l s . Not the l e a s t of t h e i r problems i s t h a t o f assembling t h e w i t n e s s e s , l a w y e r s , and j u r o r s a t t h e same p l a c e a t t h e same t i m e , and this burdens counsels against continuances except f o r compelling reasons. Consequently, broad d i s c r e t i o n must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances."' " P r i c e v. S t a t e , 725 So. 2d 1003, 1061 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , q u o t i n g M o r r i s v. S l a p p y , 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983). See a l s o S u l l i v a n v . S t a t e , 939 So. 2d 58, 66 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2006) ('"As a g e n e r a l 55 CR-08-0145 r u l e , c o n t i n u a n c e s a r e n o t f a v o r e d , " I n r e R.F., 656 So. 2d 1237, 1238 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , and " [ o ] n l y r a r e l y w i l l [an] a p p e l l a t e c o u r t f i n d an abuse o f discretion" i n the denial of a motion for a continuance.')." G o b b l e v. , State, [Ms. CR-05-0225, Feb. ( A l a . C r i m . App. 5, 2010] So. 3d 2010). Viewing the circumstances of t h i s case, d i s c u s s e d below, w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g g u i d e l i n e s i n m i n d , we h o l d t h a t t h e trial c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t d e n i e d Woodward's m i d - t r i a l motion any f o r a continuance. of the t h r e e requirements 1. First, Woodward Woodward d i d n o t for a failed continuance. to t e s t i m o n y w o u l d have b e e n m a t e r i a l . p.m. phone c a l l he the which because sector of the t h a t he would t e s t i f y t h a t the s e c t o r three of the c e l l tower, This testimony the S t a t e d i d not the cell tower the would not present phone have testimony call been about hit. S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d o n l y t h a t t h e c a l l went t h r o u g h tower near the crime two t h e s e c t o r o f t h e t o w e r c l o s e s t t o where shooting occurred. material that placed to Surles approximately minutes a f t e r the murder " h i t " w h i l e s e c t o r one was establish Woodward a r g u e d n e e d e d t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e x p e r t who 12:36 satisfy scene. T e s t i m o n y by 56 a defense The the expert CR-08-0145 about which s e c t o r o f t h e c e l l t o w e r t h e c a l l h i t two a f t e r t h e m u r d e r o c c u r r e d w o u l d n o t have r e b u t t e d any t h e S t a t e a d m i t t e d a b o u t t h e phone c a l l . phone call murder, was the placed testimony approximately evidence Rather, because the two Woodward a r g u e d minutes minutes he after needed t o the present w o u l d h a v e , i n f a c t , p r o v i d e d a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e t h a t he in t h e a r e a where t h e s h o o t i n g o c c u r r e d w i t h i n m i n u t e s the s h o o t i n g . I m p o r t a n t l y , the S t a t e d i d not p r e s e n t was after evidence a b o u t Woodward's p r e c i s e p a t h i n t h e moments a f t e r he l e f t the scene the of the testimony present shooting. Woodward would not As argues have the he State should correctly have c o n t r a d i c t e d the argues, been allowed State's testimony a b o u t t h e phone c a l l o r h i s g e n e r a l l o c a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y the shooting. would not have The trial been c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the material. argument i n s u p p o r t o f t h e m o t i o n stated that testimony caller's Woodward had about a c e l l exact understands "more response to evidence Woodward's to continue the t r i a l than after court established" that the tower b e i n g h i t d i d not p i n p o i n t the location; the court said: a l l i t does i s p u t going to h i t a c e l l In to you i n an " I t h i n k everybody area. t o w e r i n downtown Montgomery 57 You're not [ i f ] you're CR-08-0145 c a l l i n g f r o m B i r m i n g h a m o r y o u ' r e c a l l i n g f r o m E a s t Montgomery .... I t h i n k we As to the a l l got t h a t . " competence of (R. the 1229-30.) evidence, nothing in r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a w i t n e s s Woodward m i g h t p r e s e n t the would n o t be c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e s e c t o r o f t h e c e l l phone tower h i t d u r i n g the establish failed t h a t the to call. However, Woodward's f a i l u r e evidence establish the was m a t e r i a l means t h a t he first requirement e s t a b l i s h i n order to support h i s motion 2. Woodward a l s o f a i l e d to he for a to e s t a b l i s h has needed to continuance. t h a t t h e r e was a p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y w o u l d have b e e n f o r t h c o m i n g i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t had c o n t i n u e d t h e c a s e . the motion to continue, which d u r i n g the t r i a l , was on A u g u s t 22, D u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g on h e l d on a F r i d a y a f t e r n o o n 2008, t h e t r i a l court asked w h e t h e r Woodward had an e x p e r t " h e r e , r e a d y t o go r i g h t now?" (R. 1226.) Woodward r e p l i e d , "We d o n ' t have one." Woodward f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d "But we to get i t out of f i g u r e d , we (R. 1226.) w o u l d be able [the S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s ] a t c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . B u t we were u n a b l e t o o b t a i n o u r own b e c a u s e o f t h e v e r y , v e r y s h o r t t i m e , t h e t i m e t h e C o u r t had funds." (R. 1226.) granted that approval f o r Woodward t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n s e 58 had CR-08-0145 to request (R. a c o n t i n u a n c e " t o be a b l e t o o b t a i n t h a t 1227.) filed Woodward then a w r i t t e n order experts, he a r r a n g e and c o o r d i n a t e s t a t e d that a f t e r the t r i a l granting "made c a l l s person." funds t o h i r e the c e l l to the appropriate one f o r u s . " people (R. 1227.) and the court granted t h e f o l l o w i n g week o f t r i a l . "So a r e you r e p r e s e n t i n g that can Woodward s a i d between the motion f o r funds The t r i a l t o me phone that he h a d b e e n u n a b l e t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an e x p e r t the Thursday a f t e r n o o n court court then asked, there's r e a d y t o come i n n e x t week a n d t e s t i f y ? " somebody (R. 1227.) whose Woodward t h e n s t a t e d t h a t "Mr. P i t t s " -- who i s o t h e r w i s e u n i d e n t i f i e d in the record information. witness, would -- w o u l d be a b l e Defense be able to testify he h a d s p o k e n Nextel further I b e l i e v e , w o u l d be a b l e s e c t o r -- t h r e e means." that counsel to t e s t i f y who requested knew what (R. 1227.) e x c l u d e t h e e v i d e n c e on t h e c e l l 59 that Finally, records the sector e i t h e r a continuance stated: "The t o g e t -- Any RF to the f a c t t o another about the s e c t o r data engineer sector -- Woodward custodian meant, " t o g e t him here towers." State's at and what stated Sprint he then o r move t o (R. 1228.) CR-08-0145 The evidence record does not d i s c l o s e w o u l d have b e e n f o r t h c o m i n g granted a continuance. he h a d a t t e m p t e d probability that the i f the t r i a l c o u r t had Woodward i n f o r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t before t r i a l e x p e r t b u t had been u n a b l e His a t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF t o do so i n t h e t i m e argument on a p p e a l t h a t i f t h e t r i a l available. c o u r t had g i v e n him " s l i g h t l y more t i m e , i t [was] v e r y l i k e l y " t h a t he c o u l d have o b t a i n e d t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e x p e r t , Woodward's b r i e f , a t p. 53, i s n o t r e a s o n a b l e , b a s e d on Woodward's a l l e g a t i o n s his f a i l e d attempts before t r i a l about t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e x p e r t . The State acknowledged a t t r i a l , h o w e v e r , t h a t Woodward had s p o k e n t o Mr. P i t t s a n d c o u l d have s u b p o e n a e d h i m , t h a t he had s p o k e n t o e x p e r t s a t S p r i n t N e x t e l , a n d t h a t a j u r y member was an RF e n g i n e e r (R. 1228.) and " [ s ] othey're not that hard to locate." Even i f Woodward h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s requirement h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t was p r o b a b l e would have been forthcoming, remaining requirements his failure w o u l d have w a r r a n t e d d e n i a l of h i s request f o r a continuance. 60 that the evidence to establish the t r i a l the court's CR-08-0145 3. is Finally, entitled i n order t o prove t o a continuance to a t r i a l because c o u r t t h a t he o f t h e absence of a w i t n e s s t h e m o v i n g p a r t y must have e x e r c i s e d due d i l i g e n c e t o secure the presence due d i l i g e n c e . had failed of the witness. Woodward d i d n o t e x e r c i s e Woodward a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l t o grant h i s motion f o r funds to retain e x p e r t u n t i l t h r e e b u s i n e s s days b e f o r e t r i a l . when he made h i s m o t i o n attempts court an RF He a l s o a r g u e d t o c o n t i n u e t h a t he h a d i n i t i a t e d h i s t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e n g i n e e r after he r e c e i v e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s w r i t t e n o r d e r g r a n t i n g him funds t o retain an e x p e r t a few d a y s e a r l i e r . c o r r e c t l y argues However, as t h e S t a t e on a p p e a l a n d as i t p o i n t e d o u t t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t when Woodward moved f o r a continuance, the t r i a l had o r a l l y g r a n t e d Woodward's m o t i o n f o r f u n d s weeks b e f o r e t r i a l , and Woodward c o u l d have s o u g h t a n d r e t a i n e d an e x p e r t d u r i n g that time. A pretrial a h e a r i n g was h e l d on J u l y 7, 2008, a n d d u r i n g d i s c u s s i o n about whether the State was g o i n g to present t e s t i m o n y f r o m a c e l l - p h o n e e x p e r t Woodward made a m o t i o n f o r funds t o employ a c e l l - p h o n e e x p e r t . the motion. T h a t Woodward h a d p l a n n e d 61 The t r i a l court granted a t t h a t time t o h i r e a CR-08-0145 cell-phone telephone day. expert call i n the t r a n s c r i p t of a Woodward made f r o m t h e c o u n t y j a i l t h a t same Woodward 8 attorneys i s also told reflected h i s father during t o l d h i m t h a t t h e y were g o i n g that call to get a that h i s "cell-phone s p e c i a l i s t " who w o u l d a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e h i s l o c a t i o n certain trial, c a l l s were made. Thus, Woodward's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t on A u g u s t 22, 2008, t h a t he h a d h a d v e r y l i t t l e t i m e t o attempt t o h i r e For an e x p e r t a l l the trial an e x p e r t was i n a c c u r a t e , foregoing d i s c r e t i o n i n the t r i a l the when reasons, we at best. find no abuse of c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o h a l t or t o suspend t o e n a b l e Woodward t o a t t e m p t t o s e c u r e o r p r o d u c e witness. Woodward f a i l e d t o meet any o f t h e t h r e e r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o a continuance, this a n d he i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f on a p p e a l as t o issue. IV. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l allowed Officer Houts's widow, Ashley c o u r t e r r e d when i t Houts, to testify e x t e n s i v e l y about h e r husband's background and h i s c h a r a c t e r A r e c o r d i n g a n d a t r a n s c r i p t o f Woodward's t e l e p h o n e c a l l were a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e the t r i a l c o u r t . (C. 1260, R. 1722.) 8 62 CR-08-0145 and about her l a s t moments w i t h her husband b e f o r e Woodward c o n t e n d s t h a t A s h l e y ' s t e s t i m o n y was he died. improper v i c t i m - impact t e s t i m o n y t h a t i s p r o h i b i t e d d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of a capital t r i a l . Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s o b j e c t i o n A s h l e y ' s t e s t i m o n y , and be he acknowledges t h a t t h i s c l a i m must reviewed for p l a i n e r r o r . "Although [plain-error] the failure review, to i t will prejudice." S a l e v. S t a t e , 8 So. 2008) . "To rise must not error 'substantial prejudicial State, So. during 778 2d 237 The to the only rights,' impact So. weigh the 209 i t will not against any 3d 330, of claim (Ala. Crim. plain error, the affect must jury's preclude 345 seriously but on 2d 199, level object a also have App. claimed defendant's deliberations." ( A l a . C r i m . App. of an unfair Hyde v. 1998), a f f ' d , 778 ( A l a . 2000). Alabama Supreme Court has held that victim-impact statements "are a d m i s s i b l e d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of a c r i m i n a l t r i a l o n l y i f the statements are r e l e v a n t to a m a t e r i a l i s s u e of the g u i l t phase. Testimony t h a t has no p r o b a t i v e v a l u e on any m a t e r i a l q u e s t i o n o f f a c t or i n q u i r y i s i n a d m i s s i b l e . See C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e § 21.01 ( 4 t h ed. 1 9 9 1 ) , c i t i n g , i n t e r a l i a , F i n c h e r v. S t a t e , 58 A l a . 215 (1877) (a f a c t t h a t i s i n c a p a b l e o f a f f o r d i n g any 63 CR-08-0145 reasonable inference i n reference to a material fact or i n q u i r y i n v o l v e d i n t h e i s s u e c a n n o t be g i v e n i n evidence). I f t h e s t a t e m e n t s a r e n o t m a t e r i a l and r e l e v a n t , they are not a d m i s s i b l e . " Ex p a r t e Crymes, 630 So. 2d 125, 126 ( A l a . 1993). "[T]he i n t r o d u c t i o n of v i c t i m impact evidence d u r i n g the g u i l t p h a s e o f a c a p i t a l m u r d e r t r i a l can r e s u l t i n r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i f the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t p r o b a b l y d i s t r a c t e d the j u r y and k e p t i t f r o m p e r f o r m i n g i t s d u t y o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e guilt or innocence of the defendant e v i d e n c e and t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w . " 999, 1006 ( A l a . 1995) . The based on t h e a d m i s s i b l e Ex p a r t e R i e b e r , 663 So. Court i n Ex parte Rieber 2d also said: "However, i n Ex p a r t e Crymes, 630 So. 2d 125 ( A l a . 1993), a p l u r a l i t y of t h i s Court h e l d i n a c a p i t a l m u r d e r c a s e i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e imprisonment w i t h o u t p a r o l e t h a t a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n can be u p h e l d i f t h e r e c o r d c o n c l u s i v e l y shows t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e v i c t i m impact e v i d e n c e d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of the t r i a l d i d not affect the outcome o f t h e trial or otherwise p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of the defendant." 663 So. 2d a t First, evidence. 1005. much o f A s h l e y ' s t e s t i m o n y was She explained that Officer not v i c t i m - i m p a c t Houts was working o v e r t i m e on t h e day he was s h o t ; t h a t he a l w a y s t e l e p h o n e d h e r halfway through h i s s h i f t b u t t h a t he d i d n o t c a l l 64 her that CR-08-0145 day and she l a t e r f o u n d o u t t h a t he had n o t c a l l e d h e r he had b e e n s h o t ; a f t e r he was and he that because t h a t she went t o t h e h o s p i t a l t o be w i t h s h o t and died two t h a t he days never regained after he was him consciousness; shot. Ashley also i d e n t i f i e d an a u t o p s y p h o t o g r a p h o f O f f i c e r H o u t s t o i d e n t i f y him. The foregoing testimony c i r c u m s t a n c e s l e a d i n g up death days Houts as properly later, the victim admitted. 2236, A p r i l 29, We and was not t h e r e f o r e , was See, the relevant So. Stanley to inadmissible. any stationed Houts had before he recently left and purchased f o r work on identify Officer That v. testimony State, was [Ms. CR-062011). that some o f in the Ashley's case For example, the S t a t e both military the Houts's issue Officer the prove ( A l a . C r i m . App. 3d Woodward, h o w e v e r , relevant to to O f f i c e r to shooting. t e s t i m o n y t h a t A s h l e y and in relevant c r i m e and e.g., 2011] agree w i t h testimony to the i t was of was an the H o u t s met while overseas; exercise m o r n i n g he was elicited t h e y were that machine and, Officer and that s h o t he had j o k e d w i t h A s h l e y about her p u t t i n g the machine t o g e t h e r ; and t h a t O f f i c e r H o u t s d o n a t e d p l a s m a on a r e g u l a r b a s i s and he and Ashley both had a policy 65 to give of themselves that to CR-08-0145 others. Ashley Although was this irrelevant, e n t i r e t y , we testimony having the State examined the elicited record in i t s conclude t h a t the i r r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of d i d not otherwise p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t o f Woodward's. j u r y was g u i l t y unless doubt. The sympathy, the deny Woodward a i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t c o u l d not fair a l s o i n s t r u c t e d not emotion to allow affect i t s verdict. A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t d i d i n Ex p a r t e We trial or f i n d Woodward State proved h i s g u i l t beyond a j u r y was or to Ashley's testimony The operate from reasonable prejudice, note, as the Rieber: "It i s p r e s u m e d t h a t j u r o r s do n o t l e a v e their common s e n s e a t t h e c o u r t h o u s e d o o r . I t would e l e v a t e f o r m o v e r s u b s t a n c e f o r us t o h o l d , b a s e d on the record before us, that [Woodward] d i d not r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e j u r o r s were t o l d what t h e y p r o b a b l y had a l r e a d y s u s p e c t e d -¬ t h a t [ O f f i c e r H o u t s ] was n o t a 'human i s l a n d , ' b u t a u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l whose m u r d e r had i n e v i t a b l y had a profound impact on [his] children, spouse, parents, f r i e n d s , or dependents (paraphrasing a p o r t i o n of J u s t i c e Souter's o p i n i o n c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e j u d g m e n t i n Payne v. T e n n e s s e e , 501 U.S. 808, 838 (1991))." 663 So. 2d a t Although 1006. some o f A s h l e y ' s testimony was irrelevant, f i n d t h a t i t d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e outcome o f t h e t r i a l , did not prejudice Woodward's substantial rights, 66 we that i t and that CR-08-0145 allowing i t d i d not rise Woodward i s due no r e l i e f to the on t h i s level of plain error. claim. V. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l permitted Tiffany Surles to testify court that e r r e d when i t Woodward p o s s e s s i o n o f h e r c a r on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e s h o o t i n g . t h a t S u r l e s d i d n o t have p e r s o n a l was i n He s a y s knowledge o f t h a t f a c t , and t h a t h e r t e s t i m o n y was p r e j u d i c i a l b e c a u s e i t went d i r e c t l y t o the c r u c i a l question o f w h e t h e r Woodward was d r i v i n g h e r c a r on t h e d a y o f t h e s h o o t i n g . S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e e v e n i n g o f S e p t e m b e r 27, 2006, she a n d h e r m o t h e r went t o c h u r c h . S u r l e s s a i d she a n d Woodward a r g u e d when she r e t u r n e d home b e c a u s e he was s u p p o s e d t o have gone t o c h u r c h w i t h h e r b u t h a d w a n t e d t o do s o m e t h i n g else that night. S u r l e s s a i d t h a t "one t h i n g l e d t o a n o t h e r , " and Woodward l e f t their apartment f o r a w h i l e , and spent the n i g h t there. but returned S u r l e s s a i d t h a t on t h e m o r n i n g o f September 28, 2006, w h i l e she was i n t h e s h o w e r , Woodward the apartment. her C h e v r o l e t left S u r l e s s a i d t h a t Woodward h a d h a d t h e k e y s t o I m p a l a on t h e p r e v i o u s e v e n i n g , a n d t h a t when he 67 CR-08-0145 l e f t t h a t m o r n i n g , she d i d n o t have t h e k e y s a n d Woodward d i d not leave the keys. Surles asked testified Walker apartment that t o help she t e l e p h o n e d h e r move she s h a r e d w i t h Wendy W a l k e r a n d her belongings Woodward. Surles t h e y u s e d W a l k e r ' s c a r t o move t h e b e l o n g i n g s did n o t have h e r own c a r a t t h e t i m e . from the testified that because Surles The p r o s e c u t o r asked S u r l e s where h e r c a r was, a n d she s t a t e d , " I g u e s s M a r i o h a d it." (R. 851.) know." Woodward o b j e c t e d (R. 851.) The t r i a l court Woodward d i d n o t move t o s t r i k e Woodward's preserve 695 this issue Surles's untimely, f o r review. the objection. answer. and i t f a i l e d to See, e . g . , R o p e r v. S t a t e , made a f t e r an answer i s g i v e n , not preserve State, the issue 624 So. 2d 230, 234 Chambers v. State, 1978)("The g e n e r a l and was overruled "She d o e s n ' t So. 2d 244, 246 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996) ("'An o b j e c t i o n t o a question, will objection and s t a t e d : a responsive and t h e t r i a l f o r review.'" ( A l a . Crim. 356 So. 2d i s n o t t i m e l y and (quoting App. 1 9 9 3 ) ) ) ; 767, 768 ( A l a . Crim. rule i s , that, after a question answer g i v e n , S c o t t v. an o b j e c t i o n and App. i s asked, comes t o o l a t e , c o u r t w i l l n o t be p u t i n e r r o r i n t h e a b s e n c e o f 68 CR-08-0145 a motion t o exclude or s t r i k e , the motion."). a n d a l s o an a d v e r s e r u l i n g on T h e r e f o r e , o u r r e v i e w o f Woodward's argument t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d S u r l e s t o t e s t i f y t h a t she " g u e s s e d " Woodward h a d h e r c a r on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e murder i s f o r p l a i n e r r o r o n l y . Rule 45A, A l a . R. App. P. "A w i t n e s s may n o t t e s t i f y t o a m a t t e r u n l e s s e v i d e n c e i s introduced has sufficient personal t o support knowledge a finding of the matter. that the witness Evidence to prove p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e may, b u t n e e d n o t , c o n s i s t o f t h e w i t n e s s ' s own t e s t i m o n y . " Rule 602, A l a . R. E v i d . s e t t l e d t h a t a w i t n e s s can t e s t i f y or impressions Williams v. where State, he 375 had So. " I t i s also to h i s beliefs, the opportunity 2d 1257 d e n i e d , 375 So. 2d 1271 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) . " thoughts, to and 6.9 witness which phrased who he Evidence, § h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e testifies may testify "even i n s u c h t e r m s as ' I t h i n k ' cert. S h e r i d a n v . S t a t e , 591 See a l s o W. Alabama observe. (Ala.Cr.App.), So. 2d 129, 133 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991) . J . Hoffman, well (3d e d . Schroeder 2006) (a the facts about i f h i s testimony i s or 'I b e l i e v e . ' However, a w i t n e s s may n o t engage i n p u r e s p e c u l a t i o n [and a] w i t n e s s 69 CR-08-0145 may testify t o h i s own they are based beliefs, on h i s own R u l e 701, A l a . R. thoughts or impressions i f knowledge.")(footnotes omitted). Evid., provides: " I f t h e w i t n e s s i s n o t t e s t i f y i n g as an e x p e r t , the w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y i n the form of o p i n i o n s or inferences is limited to those opinions or i n f e r e n c e s w h i c h a r e (a) r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d on t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e w i t n e s s and (b) h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r understanding of the w i t n e s s ' s testimony or the determination of a f a c t i n i s s u e . " The relevant A d v i s o r y Committee's Notes to Rule 701 provide, i n part: "Traditional common l a w , including that i n A l a b a m a , g e n e r a l l y has p r e c l u d e d a l a y w i t n e s s f r o m g i v i n g an o p i n i o n . The l a w has r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e w i t n e s s p l a c e a l l the f a c t s b e f o r e the t r i e r of f a c t , t h u s p l a c i n g t h e t r i e r o f f a c t i n j u s t as good a p o s i t i o n as t h e w i t n e s s t o draw a c o n c l u s i o n i n the matter. Indeed, i t has been said that p e r m i t t i n g a l a y w i t n e s s t o g i v e an o p i n i o n p r e e m p t s the r o l e a s s i g n e d to the j u r o r s . B o a t w r i g h t v. S t a t e , 351 So. 2d 1366 ( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) ; C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s Alabama E v i d e n c e § 127.01(2) ( 4 t h ed. 1991). "The r u l e e x c l u d i n g o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e has b e e n under consistent attack through the years. P r o f e s s o r Morgan a r g u e d t h a t i t m e r e l y f u r n i s h e s t h e basis for both foolish appeals and foolish reversals. E. Morgan, B a s i c P r o b l e m s o f E v i d e n c e 220 (1963) . Dean Wigmore a r g u e d f o r i t s t o t a l abolition. 7 J . Wigmore, Wigmore on E v i d e n c e § 1929 (Chadbourn r e v . 1978). C r i t i c i s m of t h i s rule f i n a l l y l e d t o Fed. R. E v i d . 701, w h i c h v e s t s t h e t r i a l court with d i s c r e t i o n to permit l a y witnesses to g i v e o p i n i o n s but o n l y under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . 70 CR-08-0145 "Alabama Rule of Evidence 701, l i k e i t s i d e n t i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t under t h e F e d e r a l Rules of Evidence, permits l a y witnesses to give opinions w h e n e v e r two c o n d i t i o n s a r e met. F i r s t , t h e o p i n i o n must be r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d upon t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e witness. T h i s i s no more t h a n a r e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e ' f i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e r u l e , ' f o u n d i n A l a . R. E v i d . 602, t a i l o r e d t o o p i n i o n s . No l a y w i t n e s s may g i v e an o p i n i o n b a s e d upon f a c t s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s d i d n o t p e r s o n a l l y observe. Second, a l a y w i t n e s s with f i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e may g i v e an o p i n i o n o n l y i f i t i s h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r understanding of the witness's testimony or to the determination of a fact i n i s s u e . A f a i r amount o f d i s c r e t i o n i s v e s t e d i n t h e t r i a l judge r e g a r d i n g the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether opinions are h e l p f u l . I t i s c l e a r , however, t h a t o p i n i o n s s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d as n o t b e i n g h e l p f u l i f t h e y a r e ' m e a n i n g l e s s a s s e r t i o n s w h i c h amount t o l i t t l e more t h a n c h o o s i n g up s i d e s . ' F e d . R. E v i d . 701 a d v i s o r y c o m m i t t e e ' s n o t e . " R u l e 701, A l a . R. E v i d . , A d v i s o r y Surles testified, Committee's Notes. essentially, that s h e was inferring t h a t Woodward t o o k h e r k e y s a n d h e r c a r on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e murder. Her t e s t i m o n y was r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d on h e r f i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e t h a t Woodward h a d u s e d h e r c a r t h e n i g h t b e f o r e and he k e p t t h e k e y s t h e r e a f t e r , t h a t he h a d l e f t t h e i r apartment t h e f o l l o w i n g m o r n i n g , a n d t h a t h e r c a r was n o t a v a i l a b l e when she w a n t e d t o move h e r b e l o n g i n g s testimony regarding determination from t h e i r apartment. Her h e r i n f e r e n c e was h e l p f u l t o t h e j u r y ' s of a fact i n i s s u e , t h a t i s , whether Woodward was d r i v i n g S u r l e s ' s v e h i c l e l a t e r t h a t d a y when O f f i c e r H o u t s 71 CR-08-0145 stopped the Impala. Surles's as t h e r e s u l t o f testimony. The the No p l a i n e r r o r o c c u r r e d t r i a l c o u r t has s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g admissibility of evidence, and i t s ruling on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e w i l l be r e v e r s e d o n l y when t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f an abuse o f t h a t e.g., Ex p a r t e Even i f Woodward review, we discretion is Loggins, would had have discretion. 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 preserved found this no abuse issue n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f ( A l a . 2000) . for appellate i n the t r i a l i n the admission of the testimony See, here. court's Woodward on t h i s c l a i m o f e r r o r . VI. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l admitted in Officer admitted the i n t o evidence the videotape occurred patrol f r o m t h e d a s h b o a r d camera c a r and t h a t i t erred t h e enhanced v e r s i o n of t h a t v i d e o . State establish Houts's c o u r t e r r e d when i t failed that to they or that authenticate accurately the videotapes disagree. 72 the He a r g u e s videotapes reproduced when i t and the events had n o t been altered. that to that We CR-08-0145 A g e n t C h r i s Gruhn w i t h t h e A l a b a m a S t a t e P o l i c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s m u r d e r he was a d e t e c t i v e with t h e Montgomery P o l i c e Department. He a n d h i s p a r t n e r r e s p o n d e d t o t h e c a l l t h a t an o f f i c e r h a d been s h o t , a n d t h e y were t h e f i r s t officers a t t h e scene o f t h e s h o o t i n g . Gruhn s t a y e d w i t h O f f i c e r H o u t s u n t i l and p r e p a r e d t o t r a n s p o r t the paramedics a r r i v e d O f f i c e r Houts t o t h e h o s p i t a l . that time, another o f f i c e r , the Agent At S e r g e a n t Simmons, h a d a r r i v e d a t scene and mentioned t h e i n - c a r v i d e o camera, and Agent Gruhn s a i d t h a t he went t o H o u t s ' s p a t r o l c a r a n d v i e w e d t h e v i d e o r e c o r d e d by t h e i n - c a r dash A g e n t Gruhn t e s t i f i e d camera. a b o u t t h e camera s y s t e m i n p a t r o l cars: " I n s i d e t h e p a t r o l c a r s , t h e y have a MDT. What t h a t i s , i s a M o b i l e Data T e r m i n a l . I t ' s a laptop t h a t ' s mounted i n t h e v e h i c l e . And w i t h that, o f f i c e r s c a n u t i l i z e t h a t when t h e y s t o p a v e h i c l e or r u n a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . They c a n g e t r e a l - t i m e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the system, driver's license, r e g i s t r a t i o n , that sort of thing." (R. 814.) Agent terminal Gruhn identified photographs of the mobile data ("MDT") i n O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s v e h i c l e a n d o f t h e s c r e e n o f t h a t MDT -- d e p i c t i n g t h e l i c e n s e t a g d a t a t h a t was on t h e 73 CR-08-0145 s c r e e n when o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g . that the MDT standard (R. h a r d w i r e d i n t o the i n Montgomery 816.) video was v e h i c l e and P o l i c e Department A g e n t G r u h n was He testified was "pretty patrol vehicles." a s k e d t o e x p l a i n f u r t h e r how system i n the p a t r o l cars operated, and he the testified: "They're q u i t e s i m p l e . I n s i d e of the p a t r o l car t h e r e ' s a v i e w i n g monitor over the r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r . The a c t u a l r e c o r d e r i s i n t h e t r u n k . And i n t h i s c a s e , i t ' s a VHS recorder. And t h e camera i s mounted. And i t comes o u t t h r o u g h t h e w i n d s h i e l d . And i t ' s b a s i c a l l y , j u s t a t h r e e - p i e c e , p o r t a b l e , VHS camera, a l i t t l e b i t more modern. But i t a l l operates o f f of i t s i n t e r n a l system of the car's power." (R. 818.) A g e n t Gruhn t e s t i f i e d on the Officer d i s p l a y monitor, t h a t the video like a VCR. Simmons o p e r a t e d t h e v i d e o , was p l a y i n g , and car to view the played back further stated He can be that announced t h a t the video t h a t i s when A g e n t Gruhn went t o t h e p a t r o l video with O f f i c e r Simmons. Agent Gruhn i d e n t i f i e d S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 16 as t h e v i d e o t a p e c o l l e c t e d f r o m Houts's vehicle. Officer H o u t s ' s v e h i c l e on had He reviewed i t again said that the he day had of the s i n c e t h a t day, 74 viewed and the video in shooting, that he t h a t i t was a fair CR-08-0145 and a c c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e v i d e o t a p e he h a d v i e w e d on the day o f t h e s h o o t i n g . Kevin Police Murphy t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was t h e D e p u t y C h i e f o f f o r t h e Montgomery Police Department a n d t h a t he h a d been t h e commander o f t h e P a t r o l D i v i s i o n on t h e d a y O f f i c e r H o u t s was s h o t . standard p a t r o l the shooting, Murphy He t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e e q u i p m e n t i n s i d e t h e car Officer including H o u t s was d r i v i n g an MDT e x p l a i n e d how t h e camera unit and a on t h e d a y o f video camera. operated: "The v i d e o camera i s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e b l u e lights. The moment t h e b l u e l i g h t s come on, t h e video camera i s programmed t o i n s t a n t l y start recording. I t r e c o r d s t r a f f i c s t o p s . I t can r e c o r d anything. You c a n p u l l up t o a b u i l d i n g . And i f you t u r n on y o u r b l u e l i g h t s , t h e camera t u r n s on. You d o n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o have t h e b l u e l i g h t s on t o a c t i v a t e t h e camera. The o f f i c e r c a n , a l s o , m a n u a l l y , touch a b u t t o n and s t a r t r e c o r d i n g w i t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y h a v i n g t h e b l u e l i g h t s o n . B u t i f you t u r n t h e b l u e l i g h t s on, t h e camera w i l l come on automatically." (R. 1029.) Agent A l Mattox of t h e ABI testified that he was r e q u e s t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e i n Montgomery t o v i e w t h e v i d e o c a p t u r e d b y t h e i n - c a r d a s h b o a r d camera i n Officer Houts's p a t r o l State's Exhibit car. Agent 16 as t h e v i d e o 75 Mattox then identified he h a d v i e w e d a c o u p l e of CR-08-0145 weeks e a r l i e r i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s to be t h e o r i g i n a l When the State objected, videotape sought o f f i c e a n d t h a t he b e l i e v e d from O f f i c e r to introduce Houts's v e h i c l e . the videotape Woodward i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , as f o l l o w s : " [ T h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s ] f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a proper foundation -- C o r p o r a l Mattox has j u s t testified, i n t h a t Agent Mattox he saw i t a t their o f f i c e b u t d o e s n ' t know i f i t ' s t h e same one o r n o t , t h a t was the original video." (R. 1187.) He a l s o objected on t h e ground t h a t the State had "not e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t ' s a and accurate nobody d e p i c t i o n o f what h a p p e n e d b e c a u s e t h e y ' v e h a d t o show t h a t i t is." (R. 1188.) The t r i a l considered the l e g a l requirements f o r the admission r e c o r d i n g o f an e v e n t , says, the State presenting court of a tape- a n d i t o v e r r u l e d Woodward's o b j e c t i o n s . Woodward now a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l he fair failed court erred to authenticate e i t h e r a witness to t e s t i f y because, the videotape that the videotape a c c u r a t e l y r e p r o d u c e d t h e e v e n t s he o r she h a d w i t n e s s e d , a witness to t e s t i f y that the videotape the foregoing required ways, Woodward to establish a proper 76 continues, chain or had n o t been a l t e r e d . Because t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o a u t h e n t i c a t e t h e v i d e o of by of i n either the State custody was f o r the CR-08-0145 videotape, concludes, which i t d i d not the videotape do. should Therefore, n o t have been Woodward admitted at trial. As we have n o t e d i n p r e v i o u s p o r t i o n s o f t h i s o p i n i o n , a trial court i s afforded s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n determining the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence, court's and t h i s C o u r t w i l l judgment o r e x e r c i s i n g of that d i s c r e t i o n reverse a only when t h e r e h a s b e e n a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f an abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . E.g., Ex p a r t e L o g g i n s , Rule 901(a), authentication 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . Ala. R. Evid., requirement "is provides satisfied that by the evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support a f i n d i n g that the matter i n question i s what i t s p r o p o n e n t c l a i m s . " Rule 9 0 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t ] e s t i m o n y t h a t a m a t t e r i s what i t i s c l a i m e d to be" i s sufficient requirements In of t h i s Ex p a r t e a u t h e n t i c a t i o n "conforming with the ( A l a . 1993), the rule." Fuller, 620 So. 2d 675 A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h e two methods f o r l a y i n g t h e foundation for the videotapes, and s i m i l a r admissibility of sound recordings, evidence: "The p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e o f a s o u n d r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium b y 77 CR-08-0145 which a scene or event i s recorded (e.g., a p h o t o g r a p h , m o t i o n p i c t u r e , v i d e o t a p e , e t c . ) depends upon t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I f t h e r e i s no q u a l i f i e d and c o m p e t e n t w i t n e s s who can t e s t i f y t h a t t h e s o u n d r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium a c c u r a t e l y and r e l i a b l y r e p r e s e n t s what he o r she s e n s e d a t t h e time in question, then the 'silent witness' f o u n d a t i o n must be l a i d . Under t h e ' s i l e n t w i t n e s s ' t h e o r y , a w i t n e s s must e x p l a i n how t h e p r o c e s s o r m e c h a n i s m t h a t c r e a t e d t h e i t e m w o r k s and how t h e p r o c e s s o r mechanism e n s u r e s r e l i a b i l i t y . When t h e ' s i l e n t w i t n e s s ' t h e o r y i s used, the p a r t y s e e k i n g t o have t h e s o u n d r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e must meet t h e s e v e n - p r o n g V o u d r i e [ v. S t a t e , 387 So. 2d 248 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 0 ) , ] t e s t . R e w r i t t e n t o have more g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n , the Voudrie standard r e q u i r e s : "(1) a s h o w i n g t h a t t h e d e v i c e o r p r o c e s s o r mechanism t h a t p r o d u c e d t h e i t e m b e i n g o f f e r e d as e v i d e n c e was c a p a b l e o f r e c o r d i n g what a w i t n e s s w o u l d have s e e n o r h e a r d had a w i t n e s s b e e n p r e s e n t at the scene or event r e c o r d e d , or "(2) a s h o w i n g t h a t t h e o p e r a t o r o f t h e p r o c e s s o r mechanism was c o m p e t e n t , device "(3) e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the a u t h e n t i c i t y and c o r r e c t n e s s of the r e s u l t i n g r e c o r d i n g , photograph, videotape, etc., "(4) a s h o w i n g t h a t no d e l e t i o n s have b e e n made, "(5) a recording, preserved, showing of photograph, changes, a d d i t i o n s , t h e manner i n w h i c h videotape, etc., "(6) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r s , o r p i c t u r e d , and 78 or the was persons CR-08-0145 "(7) f o r c r i m i n a l c a s e s o n l y , a s h o w i n g t h a t any s t a t e m e n t made i n t h e r e c o r d i n g , t a p e , e t c . , was voluntarily made w i t h o u t any k i n d o f c o e r c i o n o r improper inducement. "On t h e o t h e r h a n d , when a q u a l i f i e d and competent w i t n e s s can t e s t i f y that t h e sound r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium a c c u r a t e l y a n d r e l i a b l y r e p r e s e n t s what t h e w i t n e s s s e n s e d a t t h e t i m e i n q u e s t i o n , then the foundation r e q u i r e d i s t h a t f o r the ' p i c t o r i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' t h e o r y . Under t h i s theory, the party o f f e r i n g t h e i t e m must p r e s e n t sufficient evidence to meet the 'reliable r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' s t a n d a r d , t h a t i s , t h e w i t n e s s must t e s t i f y t h a t t h e w i t n e s s has s u f f i c i e n t personal knowledge o f t h e scene o r events p i c t u r e d o r t h e sounds r e c o r d e d and t h a t t h e i t e m o f f e r e d a c c u r a t e l y and r e l i a b l y r e p r e s e n t s t h e a c t u a l s c e n e o r s o u n d s . " 620 So. 2d a t 678. The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e Fuller explained the b a s i s f o r t h e " s i l e n t - w i t n e s s " t h e o r y : "The ' s i l e n t w i t n e s s ' t h e o r y i s t h a t a p h o t o g r a p h , etc., i s a d m i s s i b l e , e v e n i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an observing or sensing w i t n e s s , because the process o r mechanism b y w h i c h t h e p h o t o g r a p h , e t c . , i s made ensures reliability and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . In e s s e n c e , t h e p r o c e s s o r mechanism s u b s t i t u t e s f o r the w i t n e s s ' s senses, and because t h e p r o c e s s o r mechanism i s e x p l a i n e d b e f o r e t h e p h o t o g r a p h , e t c . , i s admitted, the t r u s t placed i n i t s t r u t h f u l n e s s comes f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , h a d a w i t n e s s b e e n there, the witness w o u l d have s e n s e d what t h e photograph, e t c . , records." 620 So. 2d a t 678. 79 CR-08-0145 Here, the State relied on t h e s i l e n t - w i t n e s s t h e o r y t o e s t a b l i s h the predicate f o r admission presented the reliability process the testimony of the video-recording system of the p a t r o l required Voudrie altered. and i t f r o m A g e n t G r u h n a n d Murphy t o e s t a b l i s h and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s i n video videotape of thevideotape, had been c a r , and i t s a t i s f i e d standards, i n c l u d i n g a showing t h a t t h e preserved and that i t had n o t been 9 Because the videotape testimony of was p r o p e r l y a u t h e n t i c a t e d b y t h e the law-enforcement officers through the " s i l e n t - w i t n e s s t h e o r y " and because t h e S t a t e e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the v i d e o camera i n t h e p a t r o l t h a t was c a p a b l e of accurately c a r was a r e l i a b l e recording mechanism the shooting, the S t a t e was n o t r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h a c h a i n o f c u s t o d y videotape. App. 2002). H a r r i s o n v. S t a t e , 869 So. 2d 509, The v i d e o t a p e for the 515 ( A l a . C r i m . was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d a t Woodward's trial. Woodward court's has f a i l e d substantial t o show discretion a n y abuse of the i n the admission trial of the T h e v i d e o t a p e does n o t c o n t a i n a s t a t e m e n t b y Woodward, so c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e v e n t h r e q u i r e m e n t o f V o u d r i e -- a s h o w i n g t h a t any s t a t e m e n t made i n t h e r e c o r d i n g was made v o l u n t a r i l y -- was n o t n e c e s s a r y . 9 80 CR-08-0145 videotape testimony. r e l i e f on t h i s Therefore, c l a i m of he i s not entitled to any error. VII. Woodward n e x t argues that during the State's rebuttal c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t a t t h e g u i l t p h a s e t h e p r o s e c u t o r commented on h i s f a i l u r e prove his t o t e s t i f y and i m p l i e d t h a t he had a b u r d e n t o innocence. D u r i n g r e b u t t a l c l o s i n g argument the S t a t e b e g a n : "He w a n t s h i s s c i e n c e b u t he d o e s n ' t . He w a n t s t o p r e d i c t what I'm g o i n g t o s a y . He can r e a d my m i n d . L a d i e s and g e n t l e m e n , smoke s c r e e n s . That's a l l y o u ' v e h e a r d f o r t h e l a s t 20 m i n u t e s , smoke screens. He w a n t s t o a t t a c k t h e c a s e b u t c a n ' t do i t , any l o g i c a l , e v i d e n t i a r y way. " I s a t t h e r e , and I t r i e d t o t h i n k , l o o k a t t h i s case from the r e v e r s e . We s p e n t a l o t o f t i m e t a l k i n g a b o u t what c o n n e c t s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e crime. What e v i d e n c e , b e f o r e you, f r o m w i t n e s s e s , e x h i b i t s , common s e n s e , d i s c o n n e c t t h e defendant from the c r i m e ? What?" (R. 1322.) Woodward o b j e c t e d : "We 1322.) trial The Woodward's attempting to have no b u r d e n h e r e . " c o u r t o v e r r u l e d the objection at shift the trial burden of (R. objection. was that proof the State was t o him, while his o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l a l s o i n c l u d e s a c l a i m t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r made a p r o h i b i t e d comment on h i s f a i l u r e 81 to t e s t i f y . Because CR-08-0145 Woodward d i d not object at t r i a l on the ground a r g u m e n t c o n s t i t u t e d a comment on h i s f a i l u r e that the to t e s t i f y , we r e v i e w t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e argument f o r p l a i n e r r o r o n l y . Q u e s t i o n s about the p r o p r i e t y o f c o u n s e l ' s statements i n c l o s i n g argument a r e m a t t e r s f o r t h e b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e trial court. Feb. 5, See, e . g . , G o b b l e 2 0 1 0 ] ___ 2010) ( q u o t i n g A c k l i n C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ) . So. 3d v. S t a t e , ___ , v. S t a t e , ___ 2d 36, 64 App. 790 So. 2d 975, 1002 ( A l a . every legitimate "and may e x a m i n e , c o l l a t e , and t r e a t t h e e v i d e n c e i n h i s own way." So. ( A l a . Crim. A p r o s e c u t o r may a r g u e i n f e r e n c e from the e v i d e n c e [Ms. CR-05-0225, ( A l a . Crim. App. shift T a y l o r v . S t a t e , 666 1994). A prosecutor's a r g u m e n t s a r e t o be e x a m i n e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e c o m p l e t e closing arguments whole. The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i s n o t w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t was and i n the c o n t e x t o f the e v i d e n c e p r e j u d i c e d by infected a the t r i a l conviction b u t whether t h e comment " s o w i t h u n f a i r n e s s as t o make t h e r e s u l t i n g a denial 477 U.S. 168, 169 comment, as a o f due p r o c e s s . " Darden v. Wainwright, (1986). The p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment was d i r e c t e d t o t h e s t r e n g t h o f the S t a t e ' s case and t o t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g weakness 82 i n the CR-08-0145 defense's theory o f the case, on the prosecutor's case. The inferences comment 372, 423-24 therein. also the burden of proof, as See, e . g . , M i n o r v. S t a t e , 914 So. ( A l a . Crim. App. 2004), and cases cited Thus, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s c o n s i d e r a b l e discretion We from a l l the e v i d e n c e i n the d i d not s h i f t Woodward a r g u e d a t t r i a l . 2d a n d i t was a f a i r comment b a s e d when i t o v e r r u l e d Woodward's o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l . hold that Woodward's f a i l u r e the argument to testify, was not a comment as Woodward a r g u e s on on appeal. See, e.g., A r t h u r v. S t a t e , 711 So. 2d 1031, 1049 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996). jury that We n o t e , the State too, that the t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the had the burden a r g u m e n t s o f c o u n s e l were n o t e v i d e n c e , of proof, that the a n d t h a t t h e j u r y was n o t t o draw any a d v e r s e i n f e r e n c e s f r o m Woodward's f a i l u r e t o testify. Jurors instructions. a r e presumed to follow C a l h o u n v. S t a t e , the t r i a l court's 932 So. 2d 923, 962 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) . No e r r o r , p l a i n o r o t h e r w i s e , is n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f occurred here, on t h i s VIII. 83 claim. a n d Woodward CR-08-0145 Woodward reversal next when argues that i t refused to the trial instruct d e c i s i o n s h o u l d n o t be d e t e r m i n e d court the jury erred to that i t s b y t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s c a l l e d by the p a r t i e s . Woodward's fourth written requested jury instruction stated: "Your d e c i s i o n on t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e s h o u l d n o t be d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f y i n g f o r or against a party. You s h o u l d c o n s i d e r a l l t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n e v i d e n c e to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h o f t h e w i t n e s s e s you c h o o s e t o b e l i e v e or not b e l i e v e . You may f i n d t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a s m a l l e r number o f w i t n e s s e s on one s i d e i s more c r e d i b l e t h a n t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a g r e a t e r number o f w i t n e s s e s on t h e o t h e r s i d e . "At a l l t i m e s , the burden o f p r o o f the S t a t e t o p r e s e n t p r o o f beyond a doubt." r e m a i n s on reasonable (C. 941.) During the charge " D e f e n s e number f o u r , witnesses have self-evident, witnesses." conference I'm n o t g o i n g testified they're (R. 1283.) f o r the not to the t r i a l to give that. defendant, weigh Woodward court the stated: When no i t ' s pretty number of the objected to the court's f a i l u r e to give the requested j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r the t r i a l 84 CR-08-0145 court charged the j u r y . We f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision. "A trial court has broad discretion in f o r m u l a t i n g i t s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , p r o v i d i n g they are an a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e l a w a n d f a c t s o f the c a s e . Coon v. S t a t e , 494 So. 2d 184 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986). When r e q u e s t e d c h a r g e s a r e e i t h e r fairly and s u b s t a n t i a l l y covered by the trial judge's o r a l charge o r are c o n f u s i n g , m i s l e a d i n g , u n g r a m m a t i c a l , n o t p r e d i c a t e d on a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the evidence, argumentative, abstract, or a misstatement o f the law, the t r i a l judge may p r o p e r l y r e f u s e t o g i v e such charges. Ex p a r t e W i l h i t e , 485 So. 2d 787 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . " Ward v. S t a t e , This Court 610 So. 2d 1190, 1194 has upheld a trial defendant's request f o r a v i r t u a l l y ( A l a . C r i m . App. court's identical 1992). refusal jury charge: "The r e f u s a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t e d c h a r g e number 8 was p r o p e r l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l judge. T h a t c h a r g e was: "'The w e i g h t of the evidence i s not n e c e s s a r i l y d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f y i n g on e i t h e r s i d e . The j u r y s h o u l d c o n s i d e r a l l t h e f a c t s and circumstances i n evidence to determine which of the witnesses are worthy of g r e a t e r credence. The j u r y may f i n d t h a t the testimony of a smaller number o f w i t n e s s e s on one s i d e i s more c r e d i b l e t h a n the t e s t i m o n y o f a g r e a t e r number o f w i t n e s s e s on t h e o t h e r s i d e . ' " T h i s c h a r g e a t t e m p t s t o e x p r e s s , i n an awkward f a s h i o n , t h e c o n c e p t t h a t t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l i s not the b a s i s f o r determining 85 of a CR-08-0145 t h e i s s u e o f g u i l t s i n c e a f a c t may be e s t a b l i s h e d as f i r m l y b y t h e t e s t i m o n y o f one w i t n e s s as b y t h e t e s t i m o n y o f an e n t i r e community. S m i t h v. S t a t e , 338 So. 2d 1030 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 6 ) , cert. d e n i e d , 338 So. 2d 1033 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) ; Mann v . S t a t e , 20 A l a . App. 540, 103 So. 604 ( 1 9 2 5 ) . However, disparity i n t h e number of witnesses is a c i r c u m s t a n c e n o t t o be o v e r l o o k e d , e s p e c i a l l y where the witnesses have h a d an equal chance f o r o b s e r v a t i o n and a r e o f e q u a l c r e d i b i l i t y a n d t h e j u r y may p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s testifying. 88 C.J.S. T r i a l , S e c t i o n 369 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; 23A C.J.S. C r i m i n a l Law, S e c t i o n 1248 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . "We a l s o f i n d t h e c h a r g e somewhat c o n f u s i n g i n t h a t i t d i s c u s s e s t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses." W h i t e v. S t a t e , 410 So. 2d 135, 137 ( A l a . C r i m . App. B a s e d on t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n W h i t e , here clearly the t r i a l d i d n o t e r r when i t r e f u s e d t o g i v e requested charge. As t h i s C o u r t n o t e d was a m i s s t a t e m e n t o f t h e l a w a n d was c o n f u s i n g . McMillian v. State, 448 So. 2d 463 1981). i n White, Woodward's t h e charge See a l s o ( A l a . Crim. 1 9 8 4 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t " d i s p a r i t y i n t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s circumstance court App. is a t h e j u r y may p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r i n r e a c h i n g i t s verdict"). Because charge, of the t r i a l court p r o p e r l y refused the requested Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f on t h i s error. 86 claim CR-08-0145 Penalty-phase Issues IX. Woodward Amendment next right argues to an that he was individualized denied his sentence Eighth because, he s a y s , when d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s e n t e n c e f o r Woodward, the trial capital c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d the cases i n v o l v i n g argues t h a t the t r i a l determining Code 1975, imposed the murder of a p o l i c e i n other officer. He c o u r t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of other cases i n h i s sentence because, sentences he also violated § 13A-5-53(b), says, p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y d u t y o f t h i s C o u r t and n o t o f a t r i a l c o u r t . Ala. review i s the Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s i s s u e i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t , so we r e v i e w t h e a r g u m e n t for plain error The of only. l a w i s c l e a r t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who has b e e n convicted c a p i t a l m u r d e r i s e n t i t l e d t o an i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i s b a s e d on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d and on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r . 462 U.S. 862 (1983). Alabama d e c i d i n g upon t h e p r o p e r s e n t e n c e the trial court circumstances must i t finds determine to exist 87 law Z a n t v. establishes Stephens, that, in i n a c a p i t a l - m u r d e r case, whether outweigh the the aggravating mitigating CR-08-0145 circumstances i t finds to exist, a n d i t must consideration the advisory v e r d i c t of the jury. imposed on defendant's trial App. an alleged sentence, accomplice The s e n t e n c e bearing on a n o t be c o n s i d e r e d by a Crim. 1982), a f f ' d , 438 So. 2d 352 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . p r i n c i p l e s were n o t v i o l a t e d i n t h i s A review and no into C o u l t e r v. S t a t e , 438 So. 2d 336 ( A l a . court. and i t s h o u l d has take of the t r i a l i t s oral case. c o u r t ' s thorough pronouncement The f o r e g o i n g of the death sentencing sentence order a t the conclusion of the f i n a l sentencing hearing d i s c l o s e s that the trial court's sentence was based p r e s e n t e d a t both phases o f the t r i a l solely on the evidence a n d on t h e t e s t i m o n y a n d evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e f i n a l s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g and t h a t i t took i n t o account the j u r y ' s advisory v e r d i c t . sentencing order the t r i a l In i t s w r i t t e n c o u r t made f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , made s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and the m i t i g a t i n g overriding circumstances, the jury's recommended imprisonment without p a r o l e . trial court relied on and e x p l a i n e d i t s reasons f o r sentence of life T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e improper evidence sentencing determination or that, i n weighing 88 i n reaching i t s the aggravating CR-08-0145 circumstances and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e s e n t e n c e i m p o s e d i n any o t h e r c a s e s . record discloses that sentencing Woodward t o w h i c h he was Although we i t considered To t h e c o n t r a r y , received the the individualized entitled. f i n d t h a t Woodward r e c e i v e d an note t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n individualized sentence, we i n c o r r e c t l y argued the t r i a l c o u r t i n i t s amended s e n t e n c i n g memorandum t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t had a d u t y u n d e r § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, to a d d r e s s w h e t h e r t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s s e n t e n c e was or excessive in that review of t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f a d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s t o be p e r f o r m e d by this cases. Court, compared The subject A proportionality to other disproportionate involved similar when to statute c l e a r l y provides to review review by i s not § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975. So. 2d 216 sentences t h e A l a b a m a Supreme a duty See ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) ; Ex p a r t e f o r the Tomlin, 2003). court to State's 909 However, Woodward d i d n o t memorandum, n o r Near the hearing of the i t s closing trial court, 89 the in 2d 283, i n the its 460 286 trial sentencing argument. argument a t the So. object argument d i d he move t o s t r i k e end before erroneous court. a l s o Ex p a r t e Thomas, (Ala. the trial Court. State the sentencing mentioned the CR-08-0145 sentencing memorandum and i t s c i t a t i o n t o other cases. It argued: "Our memorandum b r i e f shows t h e C o u r t e v e r y c a s e we c o u l d f i n d i n w h i c h a l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r h a s been k i l l e d i n t h e S t a t e o f Alabama and p r o s e c u t e d f o r c a p i t a l murder. T h e r e were some 23 c a s e s . Of t h o s e c a s e s , n e a r l y h a l f -- 10 -- a j u r y recommended l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e , a judge overrode. And n o t one o f t h o s e c a s e s was r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e o f t h e o v e r r i d e . Some were r e v e r s e d -- a n d we p o i n t e d t h a t o u t i n o u r memorandum -- b e c a u s e o f e r r o r s o r u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r s and o t h e r t h i n g s . But, c l e a r l y , the law of t h i s s t a t e i s t h a t t h i s Court can override. And when y o u compare o u r c a s e t o t h e f a c t s of other cases, t h i s f i t s r i g h t i n . In f a c t , o n l y two c a s e s t h a t we c o u l d f i n d where a l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r was k i l l e d , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , t h e defendants got l i f e without parole. One, t h e v i c t i m s came t o t h e S t a t e a n d s a i d , S t a t e , r e q u e s t l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e . The S t a t e d i d . The Judge t o l d the j u r y . And t h e y came b a c k , l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e . The o t h e r one, [ c a s e name o m i t t e d ] , apparently, according to the opinion i n t h i s l a s t paragraph, s t a t e s t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e j u r y came b a c k l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e because of the evidence of mental disease or d e f e c t which i s not present here. Those two c a s e s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . " (R. 1 7 7 7 - 7 8 . ) ( E m p h a s i s added.) As noted argument. a b o v e , Woodward d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e S t a t e ' s In fact, argument t o t h e t r i a l i n h i s opening statement during h i s c o u r t a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g Woodward s t a t e d : "Your Honor, t h e d e f e n d a n t w o u l d n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e e n t i r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f [the p r o s e c u t o r ' s ] 90 grounds f o r a j u r y CR-08-0145 override." (R. 1779.) He a l s o a r g u e d t h a t s e v e r a l d e f e n d a n t s who h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f k i l l i n g l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s h a d been s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r o l e . Later i n h i s argument cases i n which to the t r i a l Alabama's appellate judgments i n which t h e t r i a l of life imprisonment without imposed a death sentence, challenge court, when courts discussing had reversed judge overrode a j u r y ' s v e r d i c t the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole and Woodward e v e n a r g u e d : "And I w o u l d t h e S t a t e t o come up w i t h c a s e s where t h e j u r i e s -¬ where t h e J u d g e s -- a r e j u s t ignoring jury verdicts." (R. 1786.) Thus, a r e v i e w of the record i n d i c a t e s that the State's primary p u r p o s e i n e v e n d i s c u s s i n g o t h e r c a s e s was t o p r o v i d e support f o r i t s argument t h a t t h e t r i a l to c o u r t was authorized o v e r r i d e t h e j u r y ' s s e n t e n c e recommendation and s h o u l d so i n Woodward's c a s e ; trial do Woodward, t o o , i n h i s a r g u m e n t t o t h e court encouraging the court not to override the j u r y ' s verdict mentioned other cases involving jury-verdict Court that the t r i a l court d i d not overrides. It i s clear to this r e l y on e i t h e r p a r t y ' s r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r c a s e s i n d e t e r m i n i n g 91 CR-08-0145 of the proper sentence f o r Woodward. The t r i a l court set forth c l e a r l y i t s findings regarding aggravating circumstances and the m i t i g a t i n g weighing of those circumstances, factors T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n and i t s discussed i t s to reach i t s sentencing d e c i s i o n . that the t r i a l court r e l i e d cases i n r e a c h i n g t h a t s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n . on o t h e r Apart from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g that the trial court r e l i e d Woodward's sentence, we on improper note, factors too, that p r e s u m e d t o know a n d t o f o l l o w t h e l a w . i n determining trial judges See, e . g . , Ex p a r t e Slaton, 680 So. 2d 909 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; B e l i s l e v . S t a t e , 3d ( A l a . Crim. 256 2008). We presume App. 2 0 0 7 ) , that aff'd, the t r i a l are 11 So. 11 So. 3d 323 ( A l a . court d i d not r e l y on f a c t o r s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e mandated i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g s t a t u t e . We a r e aware -- as Woodward a r g u e s a p p e a l -- t h a t t h e t r i a l f o r the f i r s t t i m e on court noted a t the c o n c l u s i o n of i t s s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r t h a t "a d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e murder of a police officer disproportionate." (C. 994.) the had trial aggravating court not This statement already circumstances is clearly outweighed 92 unusual was made stated the that or after the mitigating CR-08-0145 c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g the j u r y ' s s e n t e n c i n g recommendation, which i s the s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e d f o r the i m p o s i t i o n of a sentence. §§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , 13A-5-48, A l a . Code 1975. Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l , 852 this the Court that sentences have murder a police of So. 2d 833 been trial p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y review. not demonstrate court's imposed officer that ( A l a . 2002) . in d i d not See also I t i s clear to statement other death cases that death involving constitute an the improper The t r i a l c o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t a l s o does the trial court's weighing of the a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r its d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the proper sentence in this b a s e d on i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f any o t h e r c a s e s . case was A t most, the trial c o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t s u m m a r i z e s a r g u m e n t s made by b o t h t h e State and Woodward t o t h e e f f e c t that the murder of o f f i c e r s had r e s u l t e d i n d e a t h s e n t e n c e s See S o c k w e l l v. State, 675 So. 2d 4, f o r the 30 police defendants. (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)(reference i n sentencing order to extraneous matters d i d not r e q u i r e that trial r e v e r s a l where s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r d i d n o t court considered extraneous i m p o s i t i o n o f s e n t e n c e ) , a f f ' d , 675 So. 2d 38 a case p r e s e n t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s v e r y s i m i l a r 93 matter reflect in the ( A l a . 1994). to those In here, CR-08-0145 Harris v. S t a t e , 2 So. 3d 880, 930 t h i s C o u r t f o u n d no p l a i n e r r o r . ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007), H a r r i s was f o u n d g u i l t y o f c a p i t a l murder f o l l o w i n g t h e s h o o t i n g deaths o f s i x v i c t i m s , and the j u r y recommended without parole. verdict for The t r i a l a sentence of life imprisonment court overrode the j u r y ' s advisory and, i n i t s s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r , e x p l a i n e d i t s r e a s o n s i t s decision, i n c l u d i n g a review of other cases: "In i t s o r d e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t o u t l i n e d i t s r e a s o n s for o v e r r i d i n g t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t recommending a sentence of l i f e without p a r o l e . I t added t h a t i t h a d s e e n no c a s e i n w h i c h a d e f e n d a n t h a d k i l l e d s i x v i c t i m s p u r s u a n t t o one scheme o r c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t . I t c i t e d a number o f c a s e s w i t h m u l t i p l e v i c t i m s -¬ a l l o f w h i c h i n v o l v e d f e w e r t h a n s i x v i c t i m s -- i n which the t r i a l courts overrode the juries' recommendations f o r l i f e i n p r i s o n without the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole. In each case, t h i s C o u r t upheld the t r i a l courts' d e c i s i o n s to override the j u r i e s ' r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . As t h e t r i a l c o u r t p o i n t e d out, when compared w i t h t h e f a c t o f s i m i l a r c a s e s , a t a s k the j u r y c o u l d n o t u n d e r t a k e , 'the o n l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s e n t e n c e i n t h i s c a s e w o u l d be t o sentence H a r r i s to l i f e without p a r o l e i n s t e a d of death.' ... " H a r r i s v. S t a t e , 2 So. 3d a t 930. F i n d i n g no p l a i n e r r o r i n H a r r i s , we l i k e w i s e f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i s o l a t e d statement i n t h i s case. The c a s e s Woodward r e l i e s on, i n c l u d i n g Ex p a r t e T o m l i n , 909 So. 2d 283 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , a n d A p i c e l l a v. S t a t e , 945 So. 2d 94 CR-08-0145 485 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) , a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Tomlin, the t r i a l I n Ex p a r t e c o u r t overrode t h e j u r y ' s recommendation o f l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t p a r o l e b a s e d on t h e s e n t e n c e on T o m l i n ' s c o d e f e n d a n t . dismissal imposed In A p i c e l l a , t h i s Court reversed the of a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n Rule 32, A l a . R. Crim. p e t i t i o n a n d remanded t h e c a s e f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s P., based on p l e a d i n g s t h a t r e v e a l e d t h a t a t r i a l j u d g e m i g h t have b a s e d his override of a jury's imprisonment s e n t e n c i n g recommendation w i t h o u t p a r o l e on t h e s e n t e n c e imposed of life on t h e codefendant. In issue view of the f a c t i n the t r i a l indicates that the t r i a l other defendants circumstances this the court that and Woodward that d i d not raise nothing i n the this record court considered the sentences of i n w e i g h i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g i n order to determine the proper sentence i n c a s e , we f i n d no e r r o r a n d c e r t a i n l y no e r r o r r i s i n g t o l e v e l o f p l a i n e r r o r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g any o f Woodward's substantial rights. X. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n a n d consideration of e x h i b i t s that 95 were not i n t r o d u c e d a t the CR-08-0145 sentencing hearing before the jury and that were not the s u b j e c t of a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e i n the p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n report he the says, PSI ("PSI") v i o l a t e d § 13A-5-47, A l a . Code 1975, that statute permits and a trial e v i d e n c e a b o u t any part s u b j e c t of a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e . because, court to consider of the PSI Specifically, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d n o t have a d m i t t e d only t h a t was the Woodward a r g u e s i n t o evidence or c o n s i d e r e d a u d i o r e c o r d i n g s and t r a n s c r i p t s o f t e l e p h o n e c a l l s Woodward made f r o m t h e jail. Woodward o b j e c t e d the to the a d m i s s i o n of these e x h i b i t s a t sentencing before the hearing trial o n l y t h a t t h e e x h i b i t s were i r r e l e v a n t . preserve f o r review t h e c l a i m he now argument for plain error only. We c o u r t , but he Therefore, makes, and we find no argued he d i d n o t review error or plain error. Section 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, provides: "Before making the sentence d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the trial court shall order and receive a written p r e - s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t . The r e p o r t s h a l l c o n t a i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s c r i b e d by l a w o r c o u r t r u l e f o r f e l o n y c a s e s g e n e r a l l y and any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i f i e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . No p a r t o f t h e r e p o r t s h a l l be k e p t c o n f i d e n t i a l , and t h e p a r t i e s s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o r e s p o n d t o i t and t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t o t h e c o u r t a b o u t any p a r t o f t h e r e p o r t which i s the s u b j e c t of f a c t u a l d i s p u t e . The 96 the CR-08-0145 r e p o r t a n d any e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i t s h a l l be made p a r t o f t h e r e c o r d i n t h e c a s e . " Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e l i m i t s t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t can be a d m i t t e d a t a sentence before the judge t o o n l y that evidence addressing any p a r t o f t h e P S I t h a t i s t h e s u b j e c t o f a factual dispute. He f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975, s t a t i n g t h a t p r o b a t i v e , received at sentencing any the sentencing hearing before r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e s h a l l be hearing the j u r y . applies only Woodward does n o t c i t e t o c o n t r o l l i n g precedent f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . reveals only authority that to the directly Our contradicts research Woodward's argument. First, sentencing the United States a u t h o r i t y must Supreme C o u r t h a s h e l d consider a l l evidence that offered a as m i t i g a t i n g , t h a t i s , "any a s p e c t o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r o r record and any o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the offense that the d e f e n d a n t p r o f f e r s as a b a s i s f o r a s e n t e n c e l e s s t h a n d e a t h . " Lockett See as v. O h i o , 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)(footnote a l s o E d d i n g s v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. t h e S t a t e may n o t by s t a t u t e p r e c l u d e c o n s i d e r i n g any m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r , refuse to 104, 114 consider, as a (1982)("Just the sentencer n e i t h e r may t h e matter 97 omitted). of law, any from sentencer relevant CR-08-0145 mitigating evidence."). sentencing authority, In Alabama the and the jury's recommendation t h a t i s not b i n d i n g (a), ( e ) , A l a . Code 1975; 826-27 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . Ex advisory on parte trial the is verdict judge. Carroll, I f , as Woodward now judge the is a § 13A-5-47 852 So. 2d 821, a r g u e s , § 13A-5-47(d) excludes a l l relevant evidence except that evidence concerning a factual dispute argument is defendant hearing that could before concerned a in no be a the PSI, a logical extension additional mitigation admitted trial factual into judge dispute evidence unless in proffered at that the of a by too, Woodward's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t u t e c o u l d r e s u l t i n the e x c l u s i o n relevant proffered mitigation and a sentencing evidence, PSI. that of create reversible error b e c a u s e i t m i g h t deny a s e n t e n c e r r e l e v a n t information about a defendant's c h a r a c t e r or background, i n v i o l a t i o n of and i t s progeny. Lockett 1 0 We a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t i n B o y d v. S t a t e , 746 So. 2d 364, 398 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n d i c t a t h a t § 13A-5-47, Ala. Code 1975, does not provide for the p r e s e n t a t i o n of m i t i g a t i o n evidence at a s e n t e n c i n g hearing before the t r i a l court. " B e c a u s e o b i t e r d i c t u m i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , not e s s e n t i a l to the judgment of the c o u r t which s t a t e s the d i c t u m , i t i s not the law of the case e s t a b l i s h e d by t h a t j u d g m e n t . G r a y v. R e y n o l d s , 553 So. 2d 79, 81 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . " Ex p a r t e W i l l i a m s , 838 So. 2d 1028, 1031 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . 10 98 CR-08-0145 Second, Woodward's inconsistent Alabama. trial with Both judge the interpretation current practice parties in a of a t the capital the in capital 852 So. 2d 833 CR-08-1954, Nov. 2010); So. 3d 5, case routinely present ( A l a . C r i m . App. [Ms. CR-05-1297, May 2007) ( o p i n i o n on [Ms. 3d McGahee v. 15, So. So. 3d 2011] So. 2d 1065, S t a t e , 885 So. 1071 2d 191 the sentencing "Trial penalty-phase App. ( A l a . Crim. on other 3d App. grounds, ( A l a . 2011); ( A l a . Crim. rendered 2005) . App. 2003), ineffective f a i l e d to present a d d i t i o n a l testimony hearing counsel [Ms. State, ( A l a . C r i m . App. when r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m t h a t c o u n s e l had a s s i s t a n c e when he parte 27, 2010] 2 0 1 0 ) ; W a s h i n g t o n v. 30, 2008] 1071607, A p r i l Ex (Ala. Crim. r e t u r n t o remand), r e v ' d S c o t t v. S t a t e , 937 In So. could before have hearing before the trial called more the trial judge, we witnesses judge, at stated: at the w i t h the hope t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n w o u l d have c o n v i n c e d t h e j u d g e t o a g r e e w i t h t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n and t o 99 in the ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ; M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e , 2010] is additional E.g., M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-06-0827, Aug. , cases sentencing hearing before t e s t i m o n y not n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d to the PSI. Carroll, statute trial sentence CR-08-0145 McGahee t o l i f e imprisonment without p a r o l e . " 221 (footnote omitted). for t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t has may judge. a t the aggravating before trial PSI in -- (Ala. F.3d returned trial 1043, i t s advisory judge orders report, hears evidence 2d 70 argument broad at -- that admission the the of 1997), the the sentencing capital- a l l evidence hearing i n a sentence hearing held while before t o § 13A-5-47, A l a . Code 1975, concerning i n Alabama. ( A l a . Crim. and further concerning factual disputes i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the o v e r a l l t h e o r y of So. 1050 t o § 13A-5-45, A l a . Code 1975, to that evidence c a p i t a l cases 695 the only court held pursuant limited has 306 factors."). allows a j u r y pursuant of jury investigation Woodward's sentence admission Haley, receive a d d i t i o n a l evidence statute to v. phase, and m i t i g a t i n g Finally, relevant the sentencing a r g u m e n t s , and may the Brownlee a presentence sentencing Appeals sentencing e.g., also recognized of at additional C i r . 2002)("After receives States Court 2d that See, verdict United So. be a d m i t t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e evidence (11th The 885 1995), a f f ' d , a p p e l l a n t argued 100 that the 695 trial is the sentencing F o r e x a m p l e , i n B u s h v. App. in the So. State, 2d 138 court had CR-08-0145 c o n s i d e r e d i m p r o p e r i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t when i t overrode the j u r y ' s s e n t e n c i n g determined that the trial recommendation. court had properly i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and This Court considered stated: "We are c o n v i n c e d a f t e r r e v i e w i n g the r e c o r d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s use o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t in determining the appellant's sentence was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h § 13A-5-45(d), which s t a t e s : "'Any e v i d e n c e w h i c h has probative v a l u e and i s r e l e v a n t t o s e n t e n c e s h a l l be r e c e i v e d a t the sentence h e a r i n g r e g a r d l e s s of i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y under the e x c l u s i o n a r y rules of evidence, provided that the defendant i s accorded a f a i r opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. This subsection shall not be construed to a u t h o r i z e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f any e v i d e n c e secured i n v i o l a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the United States or the State of Alabama.'" B u s h v. S t a t e , 695 So. 2d 199, So. 2d a t 92. See 218-19 ( A l a . C r i m . App. a l s o Hyde v. S t a t e , 1998) 5-45(d) and § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, (quoting both § 778 13A- when d i s c u s s i n g t h e evidence used a t a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e the t r i a l c o u r t ) , aff'd, 778 So. Therefore, 2d 237 ( A l a . 2000). c o n t r a r y t o Woodward's a r g u m e n t on 13A-5-47(b) does n o t exclude from admission 101 appeal, a l l evidence § at CR-08-0145 the sentencing hearing before the trial evidence t h a t concerns a f a c t u a l dispute judge i n the except for PSI. F i n d i n g no g e n e r a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e v i d e n c e u n r e l a t e d t o a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e i n t h e P S I , we as t o h i s n e w l y r a i s e d c l a i m on We and hold, i n the t r a n s c r i p t s of r e j e c t Woodward's argument appeal. a l t e r n a t i v e , that telephone calls the audio recordings Woodward made from Montgomery j a i l were r e l e v a n t t o i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d PSI t h a t was -- r e l a t e d to the p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i n g Woodward's u p b r i n g i n g relationship l o v e d him. with The his own in a dysfunctional c h i l d r e n , whom he the i n the circumstances family and his loved and who t e l e p h o n e c a l l s i n c l u d e d i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t went to the sources of h i s f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to h i s c h i l d r e n and t h e i r m o t h e r s , and the c a l l s i n c l u d e d i n f o r m a t i o n calling i n t o q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r Woodward's f a t h e r had b e e n as a b u s i v e Woodward as Woodward had p o r t r a y e d . admitted The e v i d e n c e was e v e n u n d e r Woodward's c o n s t r i c t e d v i e w o f to properly § 13A-5- 47(b). B e c a u s e we not f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r , we e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f on this XI. 102 h o l d t h a t Woodward i s claim. CR-08-0145 Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o m m i t t e d e r r o r when, a t t h e f i n a l then considered the s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , i t a d m i t t e d and report of the court-ordered e v a l u a t i o n o f Woodward c o n d u c t e d b e f o r e During p r e t r i a l his plain proceedings mental trial. Woodward filed a notice of i n t e n t t o pursue a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y by reason o f mental disease or defect, and t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r e d Woodward t o undergo a m e n t a l - h e a l t h e v a l u a t i o n . t h e e v a l u a t i o n and d e t e r m i n e d Dr. G l e n K i n g conducted t h a t Woodward was c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l a n d t h a t , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e , Woodward was not suffering from a serious mental illness or defect that r e n d e r e d him i n c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e n a t u r e and q u a l i t y or wrongfulness of h i s actions. Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e an i n s a n i t y defense a t t r i a l . At the sentencing hearing before State offered Dr. K i n g ' s court admitted report into judge evidence. trial Woodward. should n o t have a d m i t t e d t h e r e p o r t i n t o e v i d e n c e b e c a u s e he n e v e r presented now argues that objection The the from Woodward the r e p o r t without the t r i a l the t r i a l court any e v i d e n c e a b o u t h i s m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n a n d t h e S t a t e h a d no basis the f o r the admission of 103 report. He cites Rule CR-08-0145 11.2(b)(2), Woodward A l a . R. C r i m . also consideration privilege Smith, that argues that P., i n s u p p o r t the t r i a l 451 U.S. 454 Dr. K i n g c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n and of the report v i o l a t e d against self-incrimination, (1981). o f h i s argument. his Fifth Amendment a n d he c i t e s E s t e l l e v. Specifically, d i d not i n f o r m him t h a t Woodward the r e s u l t s e v a l u a t i o n c o u l d be u s e d a g a i n s t h i m a t s e n t e n c i n g . claims of the Woodward a l s o argues t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n o f Dr. K i n g ' s r e p o r t p r e j u d i c e d h i m b e c a u s e , he s a y s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e l i e d on t h e r e p o r t i n sentencing him t o death. R u l e 1 1 . 2 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., g o v e r n s t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of testimony about mental examination. statements made b y a d e f e n d a n t during a Rule 11.2(b)(2), p r o v i d e s : "(2) The r e s u l t s o f m e n t a l e x a m i n a t i o n s made pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of this rule [providing f o r examination of the defendant's mental c o n d i t i o n a t the time o f t h e o f f e n s e ] and t h e results of similar examinations regarding the defendant's mental c o n d i t i o n a t the time o f the o f f e n s e c o n d u c t e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 11.4 s h a l l be admissible i n evidence on t h e i s s u e of the defendant's mental c o n d i t i o n a t the time o f the o f f e n s e o n l y i f t h e defendant has n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y withdrawn h i s o r h e r p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y by reason o f mental disease or defect. Whether t h e e x a m i n a t i o n is conducted with or without the defendant's c o n s e n t , no s t a t e m e n t made b y t h e d e f e n d a n t d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a n y e x a m i n a t i o n , no t e s t i m o n y b y an e x a m i n i n g p s y c h i a t r i s t o r p s y c h o l o g i s t b a s e d upon 104 CR-08-0145 such a statement, d e r i v e d from the admitted against proceeding, except c o n d i t i o n on w h i c h Woodward d i d n o t language of occurred i n the report. See Although admitted the Rule and no o t h e r e v i d e n c e directly defendant's statement shall be t h e d e f e n d a n t i n any criminal on an i s s u e r e s p e c t i n g m e n t a l t h e d e f e n d a n t has t e s t i f i e d . " testify at t r i a l . 11.2(b) ( 2 ) , we admission o f Dr. must King's forensic rose to the level of that plain error forensic evaluation 3d 43 evaluation should a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , we error conclude Ex p a r t e B r o w n f i e l d , 44 So. the A p p l y i n g the ( A l a . 2009). not have been must c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r plain error. Woodward's f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t w e i g h s h e a v i l y a g a i n s t him i n o u r r e v i e w f o r plain App. error. Roberts v. S t a t e , 735 So. 2d 1244 ( A l a . Crim. 1997). "The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m under the p l a i n - e r r o r d o c t r i n e i s s t r i c t e r than the standard used i n reviewing an issue that was p r o p e r l y r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l . As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s o n l y i f the e r r o r i s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y egregious' and i f i t 'seriously affect[s] the f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n of j u d i c i a l proceedings.' See Ex p a r t e P r i c e , 725 So.2d 1063 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ; B u r g e s s v. S t a t e , 723 So.2d 742 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 723 So.2d 770 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ; J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 620 So.2d 679, 701 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1 9 9 2 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 620 So.2d 709 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , on remand, 620 So.2d 714 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . " 105 CR-08-0145 H a l l v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 113, 121-22 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . Woodward King's e s t a b l i s h that r e p o r t was p l a i n e r r o r . assertion that cannot on a p p e a l , the t r i a l sentencing First, the sentencing court relied determination, the admission of Dr. c o n t r a r y t o Woodward's order does n o t d i s c l o s e on D r . K i n g ' s and t h e s e n t e n c i n g report order in i t s does n o t r e f e r t o t h e r e p o r t o r t o any e v i d e n c e d e r i v e d f r o m s t a t e m e n t s Woodward made t o D r . K i n g d u r i n g h i s e v a l u a t i o n o f Woodward. Therefore, any e r r o r r e l i a n c e on D r . K i n g ' s record. i n the t r i a l court's improper r e p o r t was n o t p l a i n on t h e f a c e o f t h e Second, a l t h o u g h the State twice mentioned Dr. King's r e p o r t i n i t s argument t o t h e t r i a l hearing, alleged once s t a t i n g t h a t D r . K i n g ' s court at the sentencing r e p o r t p r o v e d Woodward was a d r u g d e a l e r a n d once s t a t i n g t h a t Woodward t o l d D r . K i n g t h a t he s t o p p e d a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l b e c a u s e he c h o s e t h e s t r e e t s o v e r s c h o o l , e v i d e n c e o f Woodward's d r u g d e a l i n g a n d c h o i c e o f a life other on t h e s t r e e t s i n s t e a d o f i n s c h o o l was o b v i o u s evidence presentence presented report w h i l e he was i n j a i l at the t r i a l and t h e t e l e p h o n e -- p a r t i c u l a r l y calls Woodward -- a n d n o t o n l y f r o m D r . K i n g ' s 106 from the placed report. CR-08-0145 Therefore, t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t was n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y egregious and integrity, or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n of the j u d i c i a l i t d i d not seriously affect the f a i r n e s s , proceedings. T h e r e was no p l a i n e r r o r as t o t h i s i s s u e , a n d Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f on t h i s claim. XII. Woodward overrode argues that the the j u r y ' s advisory d e a t h b e c a u s e , he s a y s , trial sentence the t r i a l court erred when i t and s e n t e n c e d h i m t o c o u r t d i d n o t have a p r o p e r basis to override the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . Specifically, Woodward argues t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e t h e j u r y d i d n o t hear and t h a t t h e trial court undermine relied a on i n sentencing mitigating circumstance Woodward d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e t r i a l or the court's error only. f i n d i n g s , s o we him t o death he had d i d not proffered. court's sentencing review this issue order for plain See R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P. S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code 1975, commonly r e f e r r e d t o as A l a b a m a ' s j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e statute, states: " I n d e c i d i n g upon t h e s e n t e n c e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances i t finds to exist outweigh the m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t f i n d s t o e x i s t , and i n doing so t h e t r i a l court shall consider the recommendation o f t h e j u r y c o n t a i n e d i n i t s a d v i s o r y 107 CR-08-0145 unless pursuant to 13A-5-46(g). While the jury's recommendation c o n c e r n i n g s e n t e n c e s h a l l be g i v e n c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i t i s n o t b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t . " In Ex parte Carroll, 852 So. 2d 833 (Ala. 2002), A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n due the a jury's a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t i n d e c i d i n g the proper sentence, pursuant to § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code 1975: "We t a k e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u r t h e r e x p l a i n t h e effect of a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment without the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole. Such a recommendation i s t o be t r e a t e d as a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance. The w e i g h t t o be given t h a t m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s h o u l d d e p e n d upon t h e number o f j u r o r s recommending a s e n t e n c e o f life imprisonment without parole, and a l s o upon the strength of the factual basis for such a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n i n t h e f o r m o f i n f o r m a t i o n known t o 852 So. In judicial 2d a t 836 order override extensively order. to The from trial (footnote omitted). address Woodward's of jury's the court the circuit claim recommendation, court's thorough stated, in relevant 108 regarding part: we the quote sentencing CR-08-0145 "Mitigating Factors "The D e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-51, and t h e C o u r t h e a r d no e v i d e n c e t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t any o f t h e s t a t u t o r y f a c t o r s are applicable. S p e c i f i c a l l y t h i s Court finds the following statutory mitigating f a c t o r s were n o t p r o v e n : 1. There was no e v i d e n c e t h a t D e f e n d a n t has no s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y o f p r i o r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y : i n f a c t he has c o n v i c t i o n s f o r M a n s l a u g h t e r and [Possession of M a r i j u a n a , F i r s t Degree]. 2. There was no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e D e f e n d a n t was u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e . 3. The V i c t i m was not a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the Defendant's conduct or c o n s e n t e d t o i t ; O f f i c e r H o u t s was s i m p l y d o i n g h i s job. 4. The D e f e n d a n t was n o t an a c c o m p l i c e i n t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d by a n o t h e r p e r s o n and h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n was n o t r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r ; he a c t e d alone. 5. The D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t a c t u n d e r e x t r e m e duress or under the substantial domination of a n o t h e r p e r s o n . 6. The c a p a c i t y o f t h e D e f e n d a n t t o a p p r e c i a t e the c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct or to c o n f o r m h i s c o n d u c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f l a w was not substantially i m p a i r e d ; he has vehemently maintained that he has never suffered mental i n f i r m i t i e s and a m e n t a l e v a l u a t i o n s u p p o r t e d h i s c o n t e n t i o n . 7. The age o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c r i m e was n e a r l y t h i r t y - t h r e e y e a r s o f age. " P u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 13A-5-52, D e f e n d a n t d i d offer evidence o f two non-statutory mitigating f a c t o r s : h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s c h i l d r e n and h i s dysfunctional family. "Defendant has f i v e c h i l d r e n by f o u r women. T h r e e o f t h e c h i l d r e n and one o f t h e i r m o t h e r s t e s t i f i e d a t t h e h e a r i n g . The g i s t o f t h e t e s t i m o n y was t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t was a good f a t h e r , v i s i t e d w i t h h i s c h i l d r e n , p u r c h a s e d c l o t h e s f o r them, and 109 CR-08-0145 t o o k them p l a c e s . He a l s o e n c o u r a g e d them w e l l i n s c h o o l and s t a y o u t o f t r o u b l e . t o do T h e r e was t e s t i m o n y a b o u t D e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d h o o d . His f a t h e r was i n t h e A i r F o r c e u n t i l he was d i s c h a r g e d f o r d e a l i n g d r u g s . The f a m i l y s e t t l e d i n Montgomery. Defendant's mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p a r e n t ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p was s t o r m y -- s e v e r a l t i m e s she moved h e r c h i l d r e n w i t h h e r t o D e t r o i t , c i t i n g physical and emotional abuse t o h e r and h e r children. Defendant's f a t h e r supported the f a m i l y by s e l l i n g d r u g s u n t i l he s e r v e d f i v e y e a r s i n federal prison f o r s e l l i n g marijuana. The p a r e n t s d i v o r c e d soon a f t e r t h e f a t h e r was r e l e a s e d f r o m p r i s o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t when D e f e n d a n t was a b o u t f o u r t e e n y e a r s o l d , D e f e n d a n t was b a n i s h e d f r o m t h e home b y h i s f a t h e r f o r a vague i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g t h e f a m i l y dog. Incredibly, D e f e n d a n t was n o t a l l o w e d t o r e t u r n home e v e n when t h e f a t h e r was s e n t t o p r i s o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s a c a d e m i c career had already t e r m i n a t e d d e s p i t e the f a c t the D e f e n d a n t e a r n e d A's a n d B's e a r l y i n h i s a c a d e m i c career. "The third mitigating factor recommendation o f t h e j u r y f o r l i f e without the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole l3A-5-47(e)]. i s t h e 8-4 imprisonment [see S e c t i o n "This Court considered a l l the evidence o f f e r e d i n s u p p o r t o f these t h r e e m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s and finds their existence. "Weighing t h e F a c t o r s "Section 13A-5-47 mandates t h a t this Court u n d e r t a k e an i n d e p e n d e n t w e i g h i n g o f t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sentence. Turning first to the m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s , t h e C o u r t i s underwhelmed by Defendant's f a m i l y s i t u a t i o n . Defendant's very young c h i l d r e n l i k e h i m ; he b o u g h t them c l o t h e s , 110 CR-08-0145 t o o k them p l a c e s , a n d was a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e on them. What young c h i l d does n o t a d o r e a p a r e n t ? As f o r b e i n g a p r o v i d e r , D e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d t o do a b a r e minimum f o r h i s b r o o d . He d i d n o t p r o v i d e a home f o r any o f them o r t h e i r m o t h e r s . He l i v e d i n an a p a r t m e n t w i t h y e t a n o t h e r woman. When h i s c h i l d r e n v i s i t e d , t h e y met a t D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r ' s house. B u y i n g c l o t h e s f o r h i s c h i l d r e n on o c c a s i o n i s hardly being a responsible parent. He d i d n o t pay c h i l d support; the weight of the evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t he l a c k e d a l e g i t i m a t e o c c u p a t i o n t h a t w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e means t o s u p p o r t f a m i l i e s . "Counsel f o r Defendant suggested t h a t Defendant was a good f a t h e r b e c a u s e he t o l d h i s c h i l d r e n t o s t a y i n s c h o o l a n d make good g r a d e s . I f a c t i o n s do, i n d e e d , s p e a k l o u d e r t h a n w o r d s , t h e n D e f e n d a n t made a v e r y poor p a r e n t i n g r o l e model. D e f e n d a n t was convicted of possession of nearly a pound of marihuana. H i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y r e v e a l s numerous weapons c h a r g e s as a j u v e n i l e , a n d h i s t i m e i n p r i s o n was r i f e with infractions ranging from narcotics to assault. " L i k e w i s e , Defendant's evidence of problems i n h i s own c h i l d h o o d does n o t w i t h s t a n d c l o s e s c r u t i n y . H i s m o t h e r a n d s i s t e r p o r t r a y e d D e f e n d a n t ' s y o u t h as r e p l e t e w i t h b e a t i n g s a n d v e r b a l abuse f r o m h i s father. The d e f e n s e c o n t e n d e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s f a t h e r ' s abuse r u i n e d h i s a c a d e m i c c a r e e r a n d t h a t the f a t h e r e v e n t u a l l y e x p e l l e d Defendant from t h e house. "On t h e o t h e r hand, no d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f t h e abuse was i n t r o d u c e d . H i s t r u n c a t e d a c a d e m i c c a r e e r may w e l l have been t h e r e s u l t o f h i s b r i n g i n g weapons t o s c h o o l , n o t t h e r e s u l t o f f a m i l y i s s u e s . D u r i n g an e s t r a n g e m e n t i n t h e m a r r i a g e . D e f e n d a n t ' s mother s e n t h e r c h i l d r e n back t o Alabama t o l i v e w i t h t h e i r f a t h e r f o r t h e summer. What k i n d o f mother sends h e r c h i l d r e n t o l i v e a l o n e , u n p r o t e c t e d w i t h an a b u s i v e man? In a d d i t i o n , i ts t r a i n s l o g i c 111 CR-08-0145 to accept the s t o r y t h a t Defendant's f a t h e r e v i c t e d him. Even a f t e r t h e f a t h e r went o f f t o p r i s o n f o r f i v e y e a r s , Defendant's mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s i n f l u e n c e was so s t r o n g t h a t D e f e n d a n t c o u l d n o t r e t u r n home. Y e t , a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h i s Court, the p r o s e c u t i o n i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r r e p o r t e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t had r u n away f r o m home two y e a r s a f t e r t h e f a t h e r a l l e g e d l y e v i c t e d him. "Finally, in recordings of telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n s f r o m j a i l b e t w e e n D e f e n d a n t and h i s f a t h e r , a p i c t u r e emerged o f a c o n c e r n e d p a r e n t who rued h i s son's r e j e c t i o n of h i s a d v i c e to t r a v e l a d i f f e r e n t road. The C o u r t a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e s e conversations occurred long after the alleged eviction and that father and son could have r e c o n c i l e d i n t h e i n t e r i m , b u t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s do n o t mesh w i t h t h e p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by t h e d e f e n s e a t t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . W h i l e D e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d h o o d was n o t t h e s t u f f o f f a i r y t a l e s , h i s y o u t h a p p e a r s more i d y l l i c t h a n t h o s e o f o t h e r s he c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y . One f r i e n d e v e n d e s c r i b e d him as ' s p o i l e d , ' n o t i n g t h a t he l i v e d i n a n i c e house w i t h a swimming p o o l . The C o u r t a l s o n o t e s t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s s i b l i n g s have managed t o l e a d p r o d u c t i v e l i v e s . "Even v i e w e d i n t h e k i n d e s t p o s s i b l e l i g h t , t h e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by D e f e n d a n t i s n o t v e r y persuasive. However, when e x p o s e d t o t h e g l a r e o f all the evidence, these m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s are s u b s t a n t i a l l y diminished. "The t h i r d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r i s t h e one w h i c h gives this Court the most p a u s e : the jury's recommendation of l i f e w i t h o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e by 8-4 vote. The C o u r t was genuinely impressed w i t h the j u r y . F o l l o w i n g the e x t e n s i v e v o i r d i r e , t h e C o u r t was c o n v i n c e d , and s t i l l i s , t h a t t h e s e j u r o r s were i n t e l l i g e n t , conscientious citizens. 112 CR-08-0145 "However, t h i s C o u r t has a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n which the j u r y d i d not hear, r e b u t t i n g the evidence a b o u t t h e f i r s t two m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s . Defendant has an e x t e n s i v e c r i m i n a l r e c o r d i n v o l v i n g f i r e a r m s and t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a l a r g e q u a n t i t y o f m a r i h u a n a . He a c c u m u l a t e d an i m p r e s s i v e l i s t o f d i s c i p l i n a r y c i t a t i o n s while incarcerated. I t i s unlikely that t h e j u r y w o u l d have c o n s i d e r e d D e f e n d a n t t o be a v i a b l e c a n d i d a t e as a r o l e m o d e l f o r h i s c h i l d r e n i f t h e j u r o r s had h e a r d t h i s t e s t i m o n y . " M o r e o v e r , t h e j u r y was t o l d by D e f e n d a n t ' s w i t n e s s e s d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase t h a t Defendant was a p r o v i d e r f o r h i s c h i l d r e n and t h e v a r i o u s mothers. Witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t Defendant worked f o r a r e a l t y company, i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y , and f o r h i s f a t h e r . The e v i d e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t c a s t s a s t r o n g d o u b t on t h e p o r t r a y a l o f D e f e n d a n t as a r e s p o n s i b l e f a t h e r w o r k i n g t o p r o v i d e f o r h i s c h i l d r e n . D e f e n d a n t has n e v e r p a i d t a x e s o r f i l e d a t a x r e t u r n . T h e r e i s no r e c o r d w i t h the S t a t e of h i s h a v i n g ever h e l d a l e g i t i m a t e job. How t h e n does he p r o v i d e f o r h i s children? After his release from p r i s o n for M a n s l a u g h t e r , he was c o n v i c t e d o f p o s s e s s i n g a l m o s t a pound of m a r i j u a n a . His recorded conversations from j a i l p l a y e d at the s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t l e n d c r e d e n c e t o t h e b e l i e f t h a t he was s t i l l i n v o l v e d i n the n a r c o t i c s t r a d e . " F i n a l l y , when t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d w i t h a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y , the Court observed t h a t s e v e r a l of the j u r o r s were v i s i b l y d i s t r a u g h t . S i n c e t h e e v i d e n c e o f D e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t was overwhelming, the Court s u r m i s e s t h a t a t l e a s t some o f t h e j u r o r s were d a u n t e d by t h e t a s k w h i c h t h e y knew t h e y w o u l d f a c e upon a finding of guilt. Then, during the s e n t e n c i n g phase, the j u r y heard from Defendant's children. Unquestionably, w i s e l y , and apparently e f f e c t i v e l y , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was p l a y i n g , i n p a r t , to the sympathies of the j u r o r s . In a r g u i n g f o r a recommendation of l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e , counsel f o r 113 CR-08-0145 D e f e n d a n t a s k e d t h e j u r y w h e t h e r t h e y w o u l d be a b l e to l o o k i n t o t h e eyes o f Defendant's c h i l d r e n a f t e r t h e i r d e c i s i o n . I t was a p o w e r f u l , e m o t i o n a l a p p e a l to c i t i z e n s who were f a c e d w i t h a most awesome decision." (C. 1 0 0 0 - 0 3 . ) ( E m p h a s i s added.) Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n Woodward was a poor parenting role undermine t h e m i t i g a t i n g circumstance family and that circumstance, h i s family Woodward s a y s , loved model that d i d not properly t h a t Woodward l o v e d h i s him. That was u n d i s p u t e d . mitigating Woodward also argues t h a t the t r i a l court's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t the telephone conversations jail he h a d w i t h d i d not undermine h i s father while the m i t i g a t i n g Woodward h a d h a d a d i f f i c u l t upbringing. Woodward was i n circumstance This that newly r a i s e d c l a i m o f e r r o r i s b a s e d on an u n r e a s o n a b l e p a r s i n g o f p o r t i o n s of the sentencing order that as a w h o l e . the t r i a l order a n d n o t on a c o n s i d e r a t i o n I t i s significant court's override t o note a t the o u t s e t of the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t was b a s e d on f a r more t h a n t h e two s t a t e m e n t s on w h i c h now focuses hear. t h a t were r e l a t e d t o e v i d e n c e A f t e r reviewing the t r i a l we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l Woodward the j u r y d i d not court's very thorough court meticulously 114 of the complied order, with CR-08-0145 Alabama law r e g a r d i n g o v e r r i d e o f a j u r y ' s recommendation and t h a t i t s s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n had a proper b a s i s . trial In fact, the court at the j u d i c i a l sentencing hearing stated that i t was aware o f a n d h a d r e a d Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l . (R. 1740-41.) The t r i a l c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e j u r y ' s a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t as a mitigating circumstance recommendation great weight. that the jury and i t gave the The c o u r t m e n t i o n e d d i d not hear, jury's evidence and i t e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l how t h a t evidence undermined t h e m i t i g a t i n g evidence p r o f f e r e d by Woodward -- e v i d e n c e t h e t r i a l afforded little weight. argument to the t r i a l understanding that c o u r t had a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d i t Woodward, h i m s e l f , i n h i s c l o s i n g court at the hearing, expressed h i s the a d d i t i o n a l evidence might c o u r t ' s s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d he e n c o u r a g e d n o t t o g i v e t h a t e v i d e n c e any w e i g h t . 1 1 Woodward impact the the court stated: "The j u r y vote for life [is] entitled to d e f e r e n c e , b u t we do a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t s u c h a v o t e may be u n d e r m i n e d b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f e v i d e n c e t o w h i c h t h e j u r y was n o t e x p o s e d . You've h e a r d a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e h e r e t o d a y t h a t we d o n ' t d i s p u t e the j u r y d i d n ' t hear. However, a g a i n , Judge, t h i s e v i d e n c e does n o t r i s e t o t h e l e v e l t o a g g r a v a t e "The w e i g h t t o be a t t a c h e d t o t h e a g g r a v a t i n g a n d t h e m i t i g a t i n g evidence i s s t r i c t l y w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the sentencing authority." S m i t h v. S t a t e , 908 So. 2d 273, 298 (Ala. C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) . 11 115 CR-08-0145 t h i s o f f e n s e o r t o i g n o r e t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and up w i t h a j u r y o v e r r i d e . come " " "No e v i d e n c e was w i t h h e l d f r o m t h e j u r y t h a t w o u l d a c t u a l l y s e r v e as a b a s i s f o r o v e r r i d i n g . J u d g e , I w o u l d s u b m i t t o you, t h e j u r y c o u l d have h e a r d a l l o f t h i s , w h e t h e r o r n o t he was on a c h i l d s u p p o r t o r d e r , w h e t h e r o r n o t he was a good f a t h e r o r w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e ' s t a x r e c o r d s somewhere i n t h e s t a t e s i n c e t h e p a s t number o f y e a r s . I don't t h i n k t h a t w o u l d have c h a n g e d t h e j u r y ' s m i n d . Those aren't aggravating factors, regardless. T h e y ' r e f a c t o r s -- T h e y ' r e e x p l a n a t i o n s a b o u t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s l i f e h i s t o r y and t h e way he was g r o w i n g up and t h e way he's b e e n as a f a t h e r o r as an e m p l o y e e . And t h e y ' r e j u s t t h i n g s t h a t -- We a d m i t , J u d g e , he's not a p e r f e c t f a t h e r or the most tax-paying, productive citizen. But those a r e n ' t r e a s o n s when someone's a l r e a d y going to get l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e t o p u t them on d e a t h row." (R. 1783-84.) (Emphasis added.) The t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r c l e a r l y e x p l a i n s how jury did not hear diminished a r g u m e n t s Woodward o f f e r e d . that the trial even p r i m a r i l y court's -- on The the evidence m i t i g a t i n g evidence an adequate o v e r r i d e was that evidence. basis for 116 and order also c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s not As based solely -- or demonstrated i n the above-quoted p o r t i o n s of the s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r , the t r i a l provided the i t s override of the court jury's CR-08-0145 advisory verdict. r e l i e f on t h i s Therefore, Woodward i s not e n t i t l e d to claim of error. XIII. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l permitted court e r r e d when i t L o r i Holsomback, t h e v i c t i m ' s s i s t e r , t o t e s t i f y i n r e b u t t a l a t t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e i n a manner Woodward s a y s exceeded the Specifically, overruled daughter limitations he a r g u e s that h i s objections "thought Jesus on victim-impact the t r i a l court testimony. erred t o Holsomback's t e s t i m o n y could that when i t that her d e l i v e r Christmas presents to O f f i c e r H o u t s i n h e a v e n " b e c a u s e , he s a y s , the testimony d i d not victim's address any (Woodward's b r i e f , specific a t p. loss 106.) to the He argues, too, that e v i d e n c e f a i l e d t o r e b u t any e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d and that the testimony Holsomback was u n d u l y testified in family. the by t h e defense prejudicial. rebuttal at the sentencing h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e j u r y about t h e impact O f f i c e r Houts's death had on h e r two o l d e r uncle. c h i l d r e n , who h a d b e e n c l o s e She s t a t e d t h a t a few weeks b e f o r e to their Christmas i n the y e a r O f f i c e r H o u t s was k i l l e d h e r d a u g h t e r s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e y buy her uncle a Christmas present 117 and p u t i t o u t s i d e so t h a t CR-08-0145 Jesus might take i t to Officer Houts. In response to Woodward's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s t e s t i m o n y t h e p r o s e c u t o r s t a t e d : "They o f f e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a p h o t o g r a p h o f t h e defendant w i t h c h i l d r e n opening Christmas p r e s e n t s . They've i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e o f what C h r i s t m a s was l i k e w i t h o u t him b e i n g t h e r e . T h a t ' s a l l we're t r y i n g t o do t h r o u g h t h e one w i t n e s s . And i t does d i r e c t l y i m p a c t h e r d a u g h t e r and h e r s e l f . " (R. 1622.) The trial Holsomback f u r t h e r daughter court overruled Woodward's testified that she t h a t they c o u l d not send Officer p r e s e n t , and t h a t he was t h a t h e r d a u g h t e r was had not coming back. objection. to explain Houts a u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i t was forever." stated "couldn't (R. 1623.) T h i s C o u r t has u p h e l d t h e a d m i s s i o n o f s i m i l a r testimony o f f e r e d d u r i n g t h e S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l c a s e , and we f i n d no i n the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g h e r e , w h i c h we an abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . C r i m . App. 2007), her Christmas Holsomback t h e n s e v e n y e a r s o l d and she to error have r e v i e w e d f o r I n Woods v. S t a t e , 13 So. 3d 1 ( A l a . t h i s Court stated: " I n Payne v. T e n n e s s e e , 501 U.S. U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d : 808 (1991), the "'[A] S t a t e may p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e t h a t f o r the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and b l a m e w o r t h i n e s s , i t s h o u l d have b e f o r e i t 118 CR-08-0145 at t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase e v i d e n c e o f t h e s p e c i f i c harm c a u s e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t . "[T]he S t a t e has a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n c o u n t e r a c t i n g the m i t i g a t i n g evidence which the defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o p u t i n , by r e m i n d i n g t h e s e n t e n c e r t h a t j u s t as t h e murderer should be considered as an individual, so t o o t h e v i c t i m i s an i n d i v i d u a l whose d e a t h r e p r e s e n t s a u n i q u e l o s s t o s o c i e t y and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o h i s family." Booth [v. M a r y l a n d ] , 482 U.S. [496, 517 (1987)] ( W h i t e , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . By t u r n i n g t h e v i c t i m i n t o a "faceless stranger at the penalty phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l , " [South C a r o l i n a ^ ] G a t h e r s , 490 U.S. [805, 821 (1989)] (O'Connor, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) , B o o t h d e p r i v e s the S t a t e of the f u l l moral f o r c e of i t s e v i d e n c e a n d may p r e v e n t t h e j u r y from having before i t a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n necessary to determine the proper punishment f o r a f i r s t - d e g r e e murder. "501 U.S. a t 825. The Supreme C o u r t f u r t h e r stated: "'We thus h o l d t h a t i f the S t a t e chooses t o p e r m i t t h e a d m i s s i o n of v i c t i m i m p a c t e v i d e n c e and p r o s e c u t o r i a l argument on that subject, t h e E i g h t h Amendment erects no p e r se b a r . A State may l e g i t i m a t e l y conclude t h a t e v i d e n c e about t h e v i c t i m and a b o u t t h e i m p a c t o f t h e m u r d e r on t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n as t o w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s h o u l d be i m p o s e d . There is no reason to treat such evidence d i f f e r e n t l y than other r e l e v a n t evidence i s treated.' "Payne, 501 U.S. a t 827. The Supreme Court recognized that victim-impact evidence ' i s designed to show i n s t e a d e a c h v i c t i m ' s " u n i q u e n e s s as an 119 CR-08-0145 i n d i v i d u a l human b e i n g , " w h a t e v e r t h e j u r y m i g h t t h i n k t h e l o s s t o t h e community r e s u l t i n g f r o m h i s d e a t h m i g h t b e . ' Payne, 501 U.S. a t 823. "Here, t h e t e s t i m o n y p r o v i d e d by t h e o f f i c e r s ' widows was o f f e r e d t o show t h a t e a c h o f f i c e r ' s d e a t h c a u s e d a u n i q u e l o s s t o h i s f a m i l y a n d t o show t h e i m p a c t t h e m u r d e r s h a d on t h e f a m i l y members. Part of t h a t testimony, t h e p o r t i o n a b o u t w h i c h Woods a p p a r e n t l y i s c o m p l a i n i n g h e r e , was e l i c i t e d t o show t h a t O f f i c e r Owen was m a r r i e d a n d h a d c h i l d r e n a n d g r a n d c h i l d r e n , t h a t O f f i c e r B e n n e t t was m a r r i e d a n d had a c h i l d , a n d t h a t O f f i c e r C h i s o l m was m a r r i e d and h a d p l a n n e d t o s t a r t a f a m i l y . This testimony was o f f e r e d i n r e b u t t a l t o t h e e v i d e n c e Woods o f f e r e d as m i t i g a t i o n -- t h a t he was a f a t h e r o f t h r e e c h i l d r e n whom he l o v e d v e r y much. T h i s was legitimate victim-impact evidence, w h i c h we have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t o be a d m i s s i b l e d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l - m u r d e r t r i a l . See, e . g . , B e l i s l e v. S t a t e , 11 So.3d 256, 317 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t p e r m i t t e d t h e witnesses t o t e s t i f y about t h e v i c t i m s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s . Woods v. S t a t e , 13 So. 3d a t 35-36 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ; emphasis added). As hold we h e l d that i n Woods, a n d f o r t h e same r e a s o n s , the t r i a l court discretion here i t admitted rebuttal. We when note, d i d n o t abuse too, that court also and t h e c o u r t gave that i n s t r u c t e d the jury 120 testimony requested t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y s p e c i f i c a l l y about evidence, in that the victim-impact instruction. that now i t s considerable Holsomback's Woodward we i t s verdict The trial should be CR-08-0145 based on prejudice, the evidence and o r any a r b i t r a r y Woodward t h e law, and n o t on passion, factor. i s not e n t i t l e d to relief on this claim of error. XIV. Woodward argues that the trial court erred when i t r e f u s e d t o admit i n t o evidence a t the sentence h e a r i n g the j u r y a videotape before of a m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t t a l k i n g f o u r o f Woodward's c h i l d r e n a n d two o f h i s nephews. with He s a y s that the video depicted the c h i l d r e n r e c a l l i n g fun experiences they had had w i t h him. Woodward a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h a t they He f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w o u l d have a "glimpse missed provided o f f a m i l y members who d i d n o t t e s t i f y , " a l o n g "expressions with o f a f f e c t i o n f o r Mr. Woodward," a n d t h a t t h e r e i s a s t r o n g p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e m i g h t have c h a n g e d t h e v o t e o f a t l e a s t one j u r o r who h a d v o t e d f o r a d e a t h A trial court has substantial discretion whether t o admit evidence a t a s e n t e n c i n g parte sentence. i n deciding hearing. E.g., Ex P e r a i t a , 897 So. 2d 1227, 1231 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . Woodward hearing before argued at the beginning of the the j u r y that the videotape 121 penalty-phase with the c h i l d r e n CR-08-0145 s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d . arguably Woodward a r g u e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h p u t t h e s e young c h i l d r e n on t h e s t a n d l i v e , be a c e r t a i n t r a u m a t i c that and facing l i f e court testimony that parole that and i n c l u d e d sentence father convicted without stated should the videotape the thoughts be offered of the family testimony that statute o r by case law. counsel t h e n s a i d t h a t he was t r y i n g but that murder (R. 1354.) imposed, by t h e s e n t e n c i n g to testify, of c a p i t a l or death." allowed court i t would e f f e c t t o do t h a t i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t they j u s t had t h e i r trial he " c o u l d The unsworn on t h e was not Defense to get the c h i l d r e n to Woodward had t o l d some of the c h i l d r e n ' s m o t h e r s n o t t o come t o c o u r t . The trial c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n when i t e x c l u d e d the videotape t a l k i n g with the c h i l d r e n . that family members' of the m i t i g a t i o n The t r i a l opinions as court to specialist correctly stated sentencing a d m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h a t e v i d e n c e was n o t r e l e v a n t . are not See, e.g., T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 666 So. 2d 36, 51-53 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 4 ) , aff'd, 666 So. 2d 73 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . correctly presented points testimony out in F u r t h e r m o r e , as t h e S t a t e i t s brief at the sentencing 122 on appeal, hearing Woodward from t h r e e o f CR-08-0145 his five children. The c h i l d r e n t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e y h a d w i t h Woodward a n d a b o u t t h e i r him. Thus, that portion of the p r o f f e r e d c u m u l a t i v e a n d w o u l d have b e e n s u b j e c t basis. love f o r evidence to exclusion on was that D o t c h v. S t a t e , 67 So. 3d 936, 973-74 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2010). Finally, even i f we had determined that the trial c o u r t had abused i t s s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n e x c l u d i n g the videotape for from e v i d e n c e , two r e a s o n s : f i r s t , t h e e r r o r w o u l d have b e e n harmless t h e j u r y recommended t h a t Woodward be sentenced t o l i f e i n p r i s o n without the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole. M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , 3d [Ms. CR-06-0827, A u g u s t 27, 2010] ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) , a n d , s e c o n d , t h e t r i a l found Woodward's nonstatutory mitigating admission of the For to r e l i e f relationship circumstance, his children even without court as a the videotape. a l l the foregoing on t h i s with So. r e a s o n s , Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d claim of error. XV. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r s made i m p r o p e r remarks i n t h e i r c l o s i n g arguments t o t h e j u r y a t t h e p e n a l t y phase. Specifically, Woodward 123 argues that the prosecutors CR-08-0145 m i s s t a t e d t h e l a w , p r e s e n t e d p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s , drew improper c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n Woodward and t h e v i c t i m , commented on h i s failure to testify, sentence Woodward to improper a r g u m e n t s -- and argued death. He deterrence argues i n d i v i d u a l l y and as that a the reason allegedly c o l l e c t i v e l y -- might have i n f l u e n c e d t h e j u r y by a f f e c t i n g e v e n one j u r o r ' s v o t e to a r g u e s were i m p r o p e r , only. Rule 45, object to so we A l a . R. any of the comments he App. P. "This c o u r t has concluded p r o s e c u t o r i a l arguments s h o u l d be w e i g h e d as p a r t o f o u r e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e claim on t h e m e r i t s b e c a u s e o f i t s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n s e consider harmful." App. the Kuenzel comments v. in S t a t e , 577 1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 577 So. 2d 531 v. W a i n w r i g h t , 778 F.2d 623, now review t h i s c l a i m f o r p l a i n e r r o r t h a t the f a i l u r e to o b j e c t to improper not as sentencing. Woodward d i d n o t ... to 629 question So. to 2d 474, be 489 particularly ( A l a . Crim. ( A l a . 1991), q u o t i n g Johnson n.6 (11th C i r . 1985). "The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t has s t a t e d that, when considering a prosecutor's closing a r g u m e n t , t h e s t a n d a r d i s w h e t h e r t h e a r g u m e n t '"so i n f e c t e d t h e t r i a l w i t h u n f a i r n e s s as t o make t h e r e s u l t i n g c o n v i c t i o n a d e n i a l o f due process."' D a r d e n v. W a i n w r i g h t , 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) ( q u o t i n g D o n n e l l y v. D e C h r i s t o f o r o , 416 U.S. 637, 643 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) . The argument i s t o be v i e w e d i n i t s 124 did CR-08-0145 e n t i r e t y , and, t o j u s t i f y r e v e r s a l , t h e argument must have r e s u l t e d i n s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant. C o r a l v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d 954, 985 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . " Ex p a r t e Brown, (Ala. [Ms. 1091767, June 30, 2011] So. 3d , 2011). "'"In reviewing allegedly improper prosecutorial comments, conduct, and q u e s t i o n i n g of witnesses, the task of t h i s Court i s t o consider t h e i r impact i n the c o n t e x t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l , and n o t t o view the a l l e g e d l y improper acts i n the abstract. W h i t l o w v. S t a t e , 509 So. 2d 252, 256 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 7 ) ; W y s i n g e r v. S t a t e , 448 So. 2d 435, 438 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 3 ) ; C a r p e n t e r v. S t a t e , 404 So. 2d 89, 97 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1980) ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . M o r e o v e r , t h i s C o u r t has a l s o h e l d t h a t s t a t e m e n t s o f c o u n s e l i n argument t o t h e j u r y must be v i e w e d as d e l i v e r e d i n t h e heat of debate; such statements are u s u a l l y v a l u e d b y t h e j u r y a t t h e i r t r u e w o r t h and a r e n o t e x p e c t e d t o become f a c t o r s i n t h e formation of the v e r d i c t . O r r v. S t a t e , 462 So. 2d 1013, 1016 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) ; S a n d e r s v. S t a t e , 426 So. 2d 497, 509 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) . " ' " B a r b e r v. S t a t e , 952 So. 2d 393, 437-38 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) , q u o t i n g B a n k h e a d v. S t a t e , 585 So.2d 97, 106-07 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) . " Brown aff'd, We v. S t a t e , 11 So. 3d 866, 11 So. 3d 933 note that several occasions 909 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007), ( A l a . 2008). the trial court i n s t r u c t e d the jury on t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y s ' a r g u m e n t s were n o t t o be 125 CR-08-0145 c o n s i d e r e d e v i d e n c e and t h a t t h e c o u r t w o u l d i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y as t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e We have r e v i e w e d prosecution's law. a l l o f Woodward's c l a i m s a r g u m e n t s , and we regarding the f i n d no e r r o r o r p l a i n e r r o r . A. Woodward argues law that misstated the when mitigating circumstances the i t as 17, State mislead characterized "excuses." [Ms. CR-06-0360, Dec. 2010] App. 2010), t h i s Court c o n s i d e r e d So. the his jury proffered I n M c C r a y v. 3d McCray stated, "[didn't] mean squat." State, (Ala. Crim. whether the p r o s e c u t o r i m p e r m i s s i b l y argued t h a t the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances by We found no had offered error in relevant part: " F u r t h e r , when r e a d i n c o n t e x t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s argument t h a t t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s offered by M c C r a y 'don't mean s q u a t ' was c l e a r l y n o t h i n g more t h a n an argument t h a t t h e t h r e e aggravating circumstances offered by the prosecution far o u t w e i g h e d t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f f e r e d by t h e d e f e n s e and t h a t M c C r a y s h o u l d be s e n t e n c e d t o death. This, too, was a proper argument. '"[I]mpeachment o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f a d e f e n d a n t and the matter of impairment of i t s weight are p r o p e r l y m a t t e r s f o r argument o f c o u n s e l B u r g e s s [v. S t a t e ] , 827 So. 2d [134,] 162 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1998) ( q u o t i n g M o s l e y v. S t a t e , 241 A l a . 132, 136, 1 So. 2d 593, 595 ( 1 9 4 1 ) ) . ' F u r t h e r , "[a] p r o s e c u t o r may present an argument t o the jury regarding the a p p r o p r i a t e weight to a f f o r d the m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s 126 and and CR-08-0145 o f f e r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t . " ' V a n p e l t v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-06-1539, December 18, 2009] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) ( q u o t i n g M a l i c o a t v. M u l l i n , 426 F.3d 1241, 1257 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ) . That i s , 'the p r o s e c u t o r , as an a d v o c a t e , may a r g u e t o t h e j u r y that i t should give the defendant's m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e l i t t l e o r no w e i g h t . ' M i t c h e l l [ v . S t a t e , [Ms. CR-06-0827, Aug. 27, 2 0 1 0 ] ] , So. 3d [ , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ] . See a l s o S t a t e v. S t o r e y , 40 S.W.3d 898, 910-11 (Mo. 2001) ( h o l d i n g that no error resulted from the prosecutor's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f m i t i g a t i o n as e x c u s e s b e c a u s e the 'State i s not required t o agree w i t h the defendant that the evidence o f f e r e d during the p e n a l t y phase i s s u f f i c i e n t l y m i t i g a t i n g t o p r e c l u d e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e [ , and] t h e S t a t e i s f r e e t o argue t h a t the evidence i s not m i t i g a t i n g a t all')." M c C r a y v. S t a t e , So. 3d a t Viewing the prosecution's . a r g u m e n t a t a w h o l e , we f i n d no e r r o r and, t h e r e f o r e , no p l a i n e r r o r , i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of some o f Woodward's prosecutor p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i o n as e x c u s e s . The p e r m i s s i b l y asserted that the p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i o n was e n t i t l e d t o no w e i g h t b e c a u s e i t was n o t t r u l y m i t i g a t i n g . B. Woodward argues that t h e one of the prosecutors erred when she a r g u e d t h a t t h e " e x c u s e s " p e r s o n a l l y o f f e n d e d h e r a n d that the rebuttal district that sacrificed attorney she was his erred offended children by when that having 127 she Woodward them argued during had used testify at and the CR-08-0145 sentencing hearing. Woodward d i d n o t o b j e c t t o e i t h e r comment when The j u r y recommended a s e n t e n c e o f i t was made. imprisonment without prosecution's a r g u m e n t s was h a r m l e s s . So. parole; therefore, any The p r o s e c u t o r s opinions regarding the ultimate jury. Rather, impressions of the Having reviewed i n w h i c h t h e y were made, h o w e v e r , we f i n d no e r r o r . the i n the F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 814 2d 925, 948-49 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) . t h e comments i n t h e c o n t e x t error life were n o t s t a t i n g issue prosecutors evidence and personal t o be d e c i d e d were by t h e presenting testimony their proffered by Woodward as m i t i g a t i o n , a n d o f t h e d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y o f c a l l i n g Woodward's young c h i l d r e n t o t e s t i f y . The a r g u m e n t s d i d n o t c r o s s t h e l i n e o f what i s p e r m i s s i b l e , a n d t h e y c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t Woodward's s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o r have an u n f a i r i m p a c t on t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s . C. Woodward n e x t comments t h a t argues t h a t improperly the prosecution encouraged made s e v e r a l t h e j u r y t o impose t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e b a s e d on c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n t h e l i f e Woodward made a n d t h e l i f e objected c h o i c e s t h e v i c t i m made. choices Woodward t o o n l y one o f t h e comments, a n d he d i d n o t r e c e i v e 128 CR-08-0145 an a d v e r s e r u l i n g on t h e o b j e c t i o n ; t h e r e f o r e , we r e v i e w issue for plain error The p r o s e c u t i o n his life that the State this only. a r g u e d t h a t Woodward h a d made c h o i c e s i n supported the three had p r o f f e r e d : that aggravating circumstances Woodward h a d been previously c o n v i c t e d o f a v i o l e n t f e l o n y ; t h a t he k i l l e d O f f i c e r H o u t s t o a v o i d an a r r e s t as an e x - f e l o n i n possession o f a p i s t o l ; and t h a t he k i l l e d O f f i c e r H o u t s t o d i s r u p t t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e law. that The p r o s e c u t i o n placed penalty, him i n the p o s i t i o n including prosecution a r g u e d t h a t Woodward made t h e c h o i c e s choosing from warranted the death f o r O f f i c e r Houts. The a l s o s a i d t h a t O f f i c e r H o u t s h a d made t h e c h o i c e to serve h i s country The death that a n d h i s community. prosecution's the evidence comments were reasonable and t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s inferences summation of the evidence i tb e l i e v e d supported the aggravating-circumstances findings. similar The comments were t o those i n McNair n o t , as Woodward v. S t a t e , has argued, 653 So. 2d 320 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , c o m p a r i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t s t o t h o s e o f the victim's. Even i f we f o u n d t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s comments h e r e t o have b e e n i m p r o p e r , h o w e v e r , we w o u l d have f o u n d , as 129 CR-08-0145 we d i d i n M c N a i r , t h a t t h e comments d i d n o t r i s e t o t h e of p l a i n e r r o r . it was improper references M c N a i r v. S t a t e , 653 So. 2d a t 336-38 f o r the prosecutor to have made level (though numerous t o t h e v i c t i m ' s r i g h t s and i m p l i e d t h a t h i s r i g h t s were t o be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t s , t h e r e m a r k s were u t t e r e d i n t h e h e a t o f d e b a t e and were v a l u e d the j u r y ) . Moreover, as s u c h by t h e j u r y h e r e d i d n o t recommend a d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r Woodward, so any e r r o r i n t h a t r e g a r d w o u l d have been h a r m l e s s . D. Woodward n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t i n i t s r e b u t t a l argument t h e prosecution and he improperly c i t e s Ex p a r t e commented on h i s f a i l u r e Williams, 461 So. 2d 852 f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that a d i r e c t reference f a i l u r e to t e s t i f y requires r e v e r s a l . comment on Woodward's f a i l u r e to to testify, ( A l a . 1984), to a defendant's The p r o s e c u t i o n d i d n o t testify. D u r i n g h i s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e j u r y a t t h e phase defense counsel moral choice argued: "There c a n n o t be a more s t a r k , f o r y o u , l a d i e s and g e n t l e m e n , Look a t h i m s i t t i n g over there. 130 penalty t o have t o make. T h e r e he i s , he s i t s there. CR-08-0145 You didn't get t o hear from him." (R. 1654.) During i t s r e b u t t a l argument t h e S t a t e argued: "What h i t me as I was l i s t e n i n g t o t h e t e s t i m o n y and t o t h e words t o d a y i s , you were b o m b a r d e d w i t h l o t s o f words y e s t e r d a y . And I w r o t e t h i s down: 'You d i d n ' t g e t t o h e a r f r o m t h e d e f e n d a n t . ' But l e t me s u b m i t t o you t h i s : A c t i o n s s p e a k l o u d e r t h a n words; don't they? You're not h e a r i n g t h r o u g h o t h e r people. Look a t what he d i d . Look a t what he d i d with his l i f e . " (R. 1675.) C l e a r l y t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was failure to argument. testify, but T h i s was a permissible c o u n s e l ' s argument. 29, 2011] So. was n o t commenting on Woodward's quoting defense reply S t a n l e y v. S t a t e , 3d i n kind 1135 to own defense [Ms. CR-06-2236, A p r i l ( A l a . C r i m . App. B a l l a r d v. S t a t e , 767 So. 2d 1123, counsel's 2011). See ( A l a . C r i m . App. also 1999) ("A p r o s e c u t o r has a r i g h t t o r e p l y i n k i n d t o t h e argument o f defense counsel. fundamental This 'reply-in-kind' doctrine i s based on fairness."). No e r r o r o c c u r r e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s d i r e c t q u o t a t i o n of defense counsel's statement t o the jury. E. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t , when t h e p r o s e c u t i o n u r g e d t h e j u r y t o s e n t e n c e Woodward t o d e a t h b e c a u s e 131 the death p e n a l t y CR-08-0145 i s a d e t e r r e n t , i t was i m p e r m i s s i b l y a r g u i n g d e t e r r e n c e nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. as a Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d t h e argument t h a t t h e invocation error, of deterrence i n closing b u t he d i s a g r e e s with this argument Court's i s reversible prior holding on that issue. The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s s t a t e d : " [ U ] r g i n g t h e j u r y to render protect a v e r d i c t i n such t h e p u b l i c from from committing Ex p a r t e similar similar Walker, 972 a manner as t o p u n i s h t h e c r i m e , offenses, offenses i s not improper So. 2d 737, 747 S o c k w e l l v. S t a t e , 675 So. 2d 4, 36 We a r e b o u n d b y p r e c e d e n t Court and f i n d and d e t e r no e r r o r i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s sentence quoting App. 1993) . e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e Alabama note, too, t h a t the j u r y d i d not r e t u r n a v e r d i c t the death argument." ( A l a . 2007), ( A l a . Crim. others Supreme comment. We recommending f o r Woodward. Conclusion We have prosecutorial prosecutors examined Woodward's argument d i d not o p i n i o n s , draw i m p r o p e r and allegations have misstate the found law, no of improper error. present The personal c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n Woodward a n d t h e 132 CR-08-0145 victim, or comment Furthermore, deterrence individual comments, on Woodward's the prosecution as a r e a s o n comments failure d i d n o t e r r when t o sentence constituted cumulatively, to also Woodward error; d i d not Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f testify. i t argued t o death. the complained-of constitute on t h i s No error. claim. XVI. Woodward permitted argues that the t r i a l t h e u s e o f an o f f e n s e j u v e n i l e t o support court erred when i t he c o m m i t t e d when he was a an a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance -- t h a t he h a d p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d o f a v i o l e n t f e l o n y , § 13A-5-49(2), Ala. Code 1975. sentencing under capital offenders t o death t h e age o f 18 a t t h e t i m e Simmons, 543 consideration juvenile offense raise He a r g u e s t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment p r o h i b i t s U.S. of a 551 (2005), prior felony i s prohibited as as an a g g r a v a t i n g this an of the offense, and circumstance. p l a i n error only. 133 he committed indirect argument i n t h e t r i a l i f the offender court, use Roper contends when was he of a v. that was a juvenile Woodward so we r e v i e w d i d not i t for CR-08-0145 The State Woodward's presented trial evidence to establish at the penalty that Woodward phase had a of prior c o n v i c t i o n f o r m a n s l a u g h t e r , a n d Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e d t o t h e j u r y t h a t he h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f m a n s l a u g h t e r a n d t h a t t h a t c o n v i c t i o n c o u l d be u s e d as an a g g r a v a t i n g 1368.) as The j u r y f o u n d t h a t a g g r a v a t i n g d i d the t r i a l judge circumstance. circumstance i n h i s sentencing to exist, order. Although Woodward was a j u v e n i l e when he c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e , tried as an a d u l t a n d was years' imprisonment. properly considered circumstance. convicted (C. 918.) by the t r i a l Y a n c e y v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) . The o p i n i o n he was and s e n t e n c e d Therefore, (R. to 15 t h e c o n v i c t i o n was court as an aggravating 65 So. 3d 452, 477-78 ( A l a . i n Y a n c e y was r e n d e r e d years after t h e d e c i s i o n i n Roper; the r e a s o n i n g then, a n d i t does n o t now, p r o h i b i t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , as an aggravating circumstance, of a p r i o r i n Roper d i d n o t adult conviction f o r a c r i m e o f v i o l e n c e , e v e n i f t h e c r i m e was c o m m i t t e d when t h e o f f e n d e r was u n d e r t h e age o f 18. expressed 2006), i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W i l k s , 464 F.3d 1240 ( 1 1 t h C i r . i n which the United Eleventh We a g r e e w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g Circuit held that States Court the reasoning 134 of Appeals f o r the i n Roper d i d not CR-08-0145 prohibit using a youthful-offender s e n t e n c e o f an a d u l t o f f e n d e r . The c o n v i c t i o n t o enhance the Court stated: "Roper h e l d o n l y t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment p r o h i b i t s sentencing capital offenders to death i f the o f f e n d e r was u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n a t t h e t i m e of the o f f e n s e . "Our conclusion that youthful offender c o n v i c t i o n s can q u a l i f y as p r e d i c a t e o f f e n s e s f o r s e n t e n c e enhancement p u r p o s e s r e m a i n s v a l i d b e c a u s e Roper does not deal specifically -or even t a n g e n t i a l l y -- w i t h s e n t e n c e enhancement. It is one t h i n g t o p r o h i b i t c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t f o r t h o s e u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n , b u t an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t t h i n g to p r o h i b i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r i o r y o u t h f u l o f f e n s e s when s e n t e n c i n g c r i m i n a l s who continue t h e i r i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y i n t o adulthood. R o p e r does n o t mandate t h a t we w i p e c l e a n t h e r e c o r d s o f e v e r y c r i m i n a l on h i s o r h e r e i g h t e e n t h b i r t h d a y . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W i l k s , Woodward is not 464 F.3d entitled at to 1243. relief on this claim of error. XVII. Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t d e n i e d his m o t i o n f o r a change o f venue b e c a u s e , he says, the trial court f a i l e d to consider inflammatory and p r e j u d i c i a l comments posted articles by version Websites. of readers the He in response local contends to newspapers that 135 the and on Internet in the other online Internet sources, when CR-08-0145 considered pervasive, with traditional prejudicial publicity n e c e s s i t a t e d a change o f Before trial news sources, demonstrated i n Montgomery County venue. Woodward filed a motion for a change venue i n w h i c h he c i t e d numerous news r e p o r t s a b o u t t h e t h e v i c t i m , and t h e p e r p e t r a t o r . has been reported inadmissible." (C. that in the 320.) crime, He s t a t e d t h a t "much o f what media He of also about quoted the case is statements l e t t e r s t o t h e e d i t o r i n t h e l o c a l n e w s p a p e r and f r o m from various I n t e r n e t p o s t i n g s t h a t , he s a i d , showed "a v i s c e r a l h a t r e d " him and w o u l d l e a d one t o c o n c l u d e t h a t he could of not get a f a i r t r i a l i n Montgomery C o u n t y as a r e s u l t o f t h e p r e s u m p t i v e prejudice. (C. 313.) The S t a t e o f Alabama f i l e d a response t o Woodward's m o t i o n and a r g u e d t h a t a change o f venue was warranted. The trial court held a hearing on the a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g Woodward's m o t i o n and t h e a t t a c h e d the State's response, issue, the t r i a l stated that police officer, court and the denied the p u b l i c i t y had parties's the motion. focused motion; exhibits, arguments The not on trial the court on the death of the and t h a t t h e i s s u e o f who had committed the k i l l i n g had not been p r e j u d g e d i n t h e newspapers. 136 (R. 58.) CR-08-0145 Woodward's ruling, -- primary argument on appeal i s that, t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r "new m e d i a i.e., t h e comments consideration of traditional made those on i n so sources" the Internet -- comments addition online in and We disagree. F i r s t , t o t h e e x t e n t Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l to consider Woodward's m o t i o n otherwise. Internet During the hearing received comments when and read both stated, my " I b e l i e v e the Court motion with i t s several court responded, " S e v e r a l . " Woodward the prosecution with another attention online news t o the reader reveals on t h e m o t i o n f o r a change o f attachments," the t r i a l than provided court evaluating f o r a change o f v e n u e , t h e r e c o r d v e n u e , when Woodward i n i t i a l l y has to news s o u r c e s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a change i n venue was r e q u i r e d . failed that article and comments p o s t e d (R. 36.) and t h e t r i a l called after the court court's the a r t i c l e , a r g u i n g t h a t the defense had e s t a b l i s h e d presumptive p r e j u d i c e b a s e d on a l l t h e p u b l i c i t y media a r t i c l e s . Woodward t h e n d i s c u s s e d a n d q u o t e d f r o m many of t h e I n t e r n e t p o s t s and the t r i a l a n d comments a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e court he h a d i n c l u d e d a l o n g w i t h t h e m o t i o n , knowledgeably 137 commented on some o f t h e CR-08-0145 posts, and c l e a r l y stated that 46.) i t had read Woodward's motion. (R. Woodward's primary assertion -- to consider t h e "new" media failed Thus, that the and record the t r i a l sources considered belies court had i n t h e form o f o n l i n e comments a n d p o s t s . Second, to the extent Woodward c o u r t e r r e d when i t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n argues that the f o r a change o f venue b e c a u s e t h e community was s a t u r a t e d w i t h p r e j u d i c i a l publicity, we trial pretrial disagree. "The r i g h t o f an a c c u s e d t o be t r i e d b y a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s guaranteed by the S i x t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h states that 'In a l l c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s , the a c c u s e d s h a l l e n j o y t h e r i g h t t o a speedy and p u b l i c t r i a l , b y an i m p a r t i a l j u r y . A r t i c l e I , § 6 o f t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1901 s t a t e s , i n p a r t : 'That i n a l l c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s , t h e a c c u s e d h a s a r i g h t t o ... a s p e e d y , public t r i a l , b y an impartial jury ' "The Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s h e l d t h a t i f an a c c u s e d c a n n o t o b t a i n an i m p a r t i a l j u r y i n t h e d i s t r i c t where he i s b e i n g t r i e d t h e n t h e c o u r t s h o u l d t r a n s f e r the case t o another d i s t r i c t where t h e j u r o r s a r e f r e e o f b i a s . R i d e a u v. L o u i s i a n a , 373 U.S. 723 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . T h i s g u a r a n t e e h a s a l s o been c o d i f i e d i n t h i s s t a t e i n A l a . Code 1975, § 15-2-20. R u l e 1 0 . 1 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., i s t o t h e same e f f e c t . " Hunt v. S t a t e , aff'd, 642 So. 2d 999, 1042 642 So. 2d 1060 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) . 138 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1993), CR-08-0145 R u l e 1 0 . 1 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., provides: "The b u r d e n i s upon t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n the court that a fair and impartial trial and an of unbiased v e r d i c t c a n n o t be r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d i n t h e c o u n t y i n w h i c h the defendant motion for a i s t o be change tried." of venue A trial court's i s reviewed ruling f o r an on abuse a of discretion. "'Absent a showing of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r change o f venue w i l l n o t be overturned. Ex p a r t e Magwood, 426 So. 2d 929, 931 ( A l a . 1983) . I n o r d e r t o g r a n t a m o t i o n f o r change o f v e n u e , t h e d e f e n d a n t must p r o v e that there existed actual p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t the defendant or that the community was s a t u r a t e d w i t h p r e j u d i c i a l publicity. S h e p p a r d v. M a x w e l l , 384 U.S. 333 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; F r a n k l i n v. S t a t e , 424 So. 2d 1353 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) . Newspaper a r t i c l e s or widespread p u b l i c i t y , w i t h o u t more, a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o g r a n t a m o t i o n f o r change o f v e n u e . A n d e r s o n v. S t a t e , 362 So. 2d 1296, 1298 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1978). Ex p a r t e G r a y s o n , When exists, a 479 defendant the defendant sufficiently prejudicial So. 2d 76, 80 alleges ( A l a . 1985). that must show t h a t prejudicial and pretrial publicity 139 "presumed prejudice" pretrial publicity inflammatory and that is the s a t u r a t e d t h e community where CR-08-0145 the trials was t o be h e l d . (11th C i r . 1985). same thing. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 " ' P u b l i c i t y ' and ' p r e j u d i c e ' a r e n o t t h e Excess publicity does not automatically or n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y was p r e j u d i c i a l . " State, 642 So. 2d a t 1043. presumed bitter p r e j u d i c e must prejudice exists publicity." citing Rather, show that a defendant "a f e e l i n g i n [the county] Holladay 1988), a f f ' d , v. S t a t e , 549 So. 2d 122 Ex p a r t e H o l l a d a y , the t r i a l surrounding court must circumstances. ( 1 9 8 4 ) ; Murphy v. F l o r i d a , 366 U.S. 717 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . "rarely" applicable, ( A l a . Crim. situations." Finally, App. 549 So. 2d 135 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . consider Patton the t o t a l i t y v. Yount, standard of the 467 U.S. 1025 421 U.S. 794 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; I r v i n v . Dowd, The p r e s u m p t i v e - p r e j u d i c e and of the 747 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) , In d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e " p r e s u m e d - p r e j u d i c e " exists alleging o f deep a n d as a r e s u l t Ex p a r t e F o w l e r , 574 So. 2d 745, Hunt v. i s reserved standard i s f o r only "extreme Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d a t 1537. a trial motion i s not l i g h t l y court's ruling on a change-of-venue overturned. "[T]he d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether o r n o t t o grant a m o t i o n f o r change o f venue i s g e n e r a l l y l e f t t o t h e s o u n d d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e b e c a u s e he has t h e b e s t o p p o r t u n i t y t o a s s e s s a n y p r e j u d i c i a l 140 CR-08-0145 p u b l i c i t y a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t and any p r e j u d i c i a l f e e l i n g a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e community w h i c h w o u l d make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o r e c e i v e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . " N e l s o n v. S t a t e , 440 So. 2d 1130, 1132 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 3 ) , q u o t e d i n J o i n e r v. S t a t e , 651 So. 2d 1155, 1156 App. 1994). Woodward presented the trial court anonymous p o s t s f r o m o n l i n e I n t e r n e t s i t e s . with Woodward nothing that some o f t h e comments i n the record anonymous and (Ala. Crim. posters bitter Although were numerous we a g r e e inflammatory, i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e o n l i n e comments were t h e e q u i v a l e n t prejudice" media coverage. with of proof i n the e n t i r e county Rather, by o f t h e "deep resulting from as t h e S t a t e c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t a t t h e h e a r i n g , t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t many o f t h e p o s t i n g s were n o t s u b m i t t e d is b y r e s i d e n t s o f Montgomery C o u n t y , a n d i t c l e a r from e x h i b i t s t h a t the posts represented personal o p i n i o n a n d commentary a n d were n o t c r e a t e d b y news w r i t e r s o r o f f e r e d as news c o v e r a g e . an i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h o s e Nothing i n t h e r e c o r d even w a r r a n t s o n l i n e s t a t e m e n t s were w i d e l y r e a d by Montgomery C o u n t y r e s i d e n t s who made up t h e p o t e n t i a l p o o l o f jurors. posted Furthermore, nothing i n the record i n d i c a t e s that the entries reflected the f i x e d 141 opinions o f anyone who CR-08-0145 might be i n the pool of the potential j u r o r s or even the g e n e r a l p u b l i c i n Montgomery C o u n t y a t t h e t i m e o f Woodward's trial. In So. M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e , 3d ( A l a . Crim. argument held, similar to the [Ms. App. one CR-08-1954, Nov. 2010), this Woodward has Court 5, 2010] rejected r a i s e d here. in relevant part: "Despite McMillan's reference to certain u n f l a t t e r i n g comments made on b l o g s on c e r t a i n Web s i t e s , t h i s a l o n e d i d n o t r e q u i r e a change o f v e n u e . See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Happ, (No. CR2-0 6-12 9 ( 8 ) , November 25, 2008) (S.D. O h i o 2008) (not r e p o r t e d i n F. Supp. 2d) ('the p r e s e n c e o f a web b l o g c o n t a i n i n g n e g a t i v e a r t i c l e s r e g a r d i n g Happ does n o t r e q u i r e a change o f venue t o a n o t h e r d i s t r i c t . The c o v e r a g e on t h a t b l o g has not c r e a t e d an inflammatory, c i r c u s - l i k e atmosphere i n the court-house and t h e Columbus j u r y p o o l . F o l e y [v. P a r k e r ] , 488 F.3d [377] a t 387 [(2007)]. F u r t h e r m o r e , web based c o v e r a g e i s n o t l o c a l i z e d and has an e q u a l p o t e n t i a l t o t a i n t a j u r y p o o l i n any d i s t r i c t . ' ) . Gotbaum v. C i t y of Phoenix, 617 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881-82 (D. Ariz. 2008) ('To be sure, some o f the blog s t a t e m e n t s a r e d i s t u r b i n g l y m a l i c i o u s . The q u e s t i o n b e f o r e the C o u r t , however, i s not whether the b l o g a u t h o r s c o u l d s e r v e as f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r o r s , b u t w h e t h e r an i m p a r t i a l j u r y can be s e l e c t e d f r o m among t h e 1.6 m i l l i o n c i t i z e n s , f r o m f i v e c o u n t i e s , who make up t h e C o u r t ' s j u r y p o o l . ' ) . S t a t e v. B e r e c z , (No. 08CA48, J a n u a r y 21, 2 0 1 0 ) ( O h i o C t . App. 2010) (not r e p o r t e d i n N.E.2d) ('In t h e a b s e n c e o f s h o w i n g r e s u l t i n g b i a s , " p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y -- e v e n p e r v a s i v e , a d v e r s e p u b l i c i t y -- does n o t i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o an u n f a i r t r i a l . " S t a t e v. L u n d g r e n , 73 O h i o S t . 3d 474, 479, 1 9 9 5 - O h i o - 2 2 7 , 653 N.E.2d 304, 142 an We CR-08-0145 q u o t i n g N e b r a s k a P r e s s A s s n . v. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 427 U.S. 539, 5 5 4 . ' ) . " M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e , So. 3d a t Stewart [Stuart] . As i n M c M i l l a n , we f i n d t h a t t h e u n s o l i c i t e d , unreviewed, l a r g e l y anonymous o n l i n e comments d i d n o t r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f s a t u r a t e d , p r e j u d i c i a l media coverage. Moreover, we believe t h a t any r e a d e r s o f t h e comments w o u l d v a l u e t h o s e comments a t t h e i r t r u e w o r t h a n d n o t as "news c o v e r a g e " a t a l l . As f o r Woodward's a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t t h e news a r t i c l e s i n p r i n t and o n l i n e a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d p r o o f t h a t a change o f venue was necessary, we disagree. Certainly the shooting of a Montgomery p o l i c e o f f i c e r d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a t r a f f i c and the a r r e s t generated however, The and upcoming widespread media trial coverage. could not support a f i n d i n g media coverage, of the accused moreover, That fact, o f presumed contained stop shooter alone, prejudice. largely factual r e p o r t s about t h e s h o o t i n g and t h e e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g O f f i c e r Houts's death and about the i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o n . The r e p o r t s were n o t i n h e r e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l , i n f l a m m a t o r y , o r sensational. Furthermore, the p u b l i c i t y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e case diminished substantially i n t h e n e a r l y two y e a r s b e t w e e n t h e s h o o t i n g and t h e time o f t r i a l . 143 "The p a s s a g e o f t i m e t e n d s t o CR-08-0145 b r i n g o b j e c t i v i t y t o a case i n w h i c h t h e r e has been pretrial publicity." (Ala. extensive Ex p a r t e F o w l e r , 574 So. 2d 745, 748-49 1990). The presumptive-prejudice v. L o u i s i a n a , 373 U.S. 723 standard (1963), recognized i n Rideau i s t o be a p p l i e d o n l y i n e x t r e m e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h a d e f e n d a n t c a n show t h a t he o r she c a n n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r trial b e c a u s e t h e community was so saturated with p r e j u d i c i a l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . Woodward d i d n o t make a s h o w i n g t h a t h i s c a s e i s i n t h a t r a r e c a t e g o r y . hold that the t r i a l court d i s c r e t i o n when i t d e n i e d We d i d n o t abuse i t s substantial Woodward's m o t i o n f o r a change o f venue. XVIII. Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l f a i l e d t o conduct a reasonable upon learning during a break that a juror c o u r t e r r e d when i t i n q u i r y i n t o j u r o r misconduct had spoken i n the t r i a l . He t o a news argues that reporter a remand i s r e q u i r e d t o c o n d u c t an i n q u i r y i n t o p o s s i b l e j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t . During a recess near the b e g i n n i n g of the t r i a l the court i n f o r m e d t h e p a r t i e s t h a t a d e p u t y t o l d h i m t h a t he h a d s e e n a reporter for a local television 144 station talking t o one o f CR-08-0145 the jurors. The court stated that reporter not t o t a l k t o the j u r o r s . the the deputy The t r i a l told the court brought r e p o r t e r i n t o t h e c o u r t r o o m and, i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f b o t h p a r t i e s , asked t h e r e p o r t e r about t h e i n c i d e n t . The r e p o r t e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t she knew t h e j u r o r b e c a u s e t h e j u r o r w o r k e d a t a department s t o r e , and t h e y had spoken about t h e j u r o r ' s j o b . The t r i a l c o u r t a s k e d t h e r e p o r t e r i f t h e o n l y t o p i c she and t h e j u r o r h a d d i s c u s s e d was t h e j u r o r ' s j o b , a n d t h e r e p o r t e r assured the court that i t was, a n d she s a i d she w o u l d n o t s p e a k t o t h e j u r o r anymore d u r i n g the t r i a l . (R. 844-45.) A f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t spoke t o t h e r e p o r t e r , Woodward d i d n o t make r a i s e any o b j e c t i o n s o r r e q u e s t any a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n from the t r i a l court failed court. t o conduct Woodward now a reasonable argues that the trial i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the c o n t a c t between t h e j u r o r and t h e r e p o r t e r and t h a t t h e c o u r t failed to protect h i s constitutional rights. no o b j e c t i o n i n t h e t r i a l of for the issue; therefore, Woodward r a i s e d c o u r t about t h e c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n we r e v i e w Woodward's a r g u m e n t plain error. 145 only CR-08-0145 First, failed Woodward t o do and does not argue what what a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s by w o u l d have c o n s t i t u t e d a " r e a s o n a b l e Second, we the find conduct a reasonable that the trial court trial court the i n q u i r y " by trial court i n q u i r y under the the did, court. in circumstances fact, and we f i n d no r e a s o n t o remand t h e c a s e f o r a d d i t i o n a l p r o c e e d i n g s , particularly in i n d i c a t e any did not motion the for of the fact that Woodward d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the t r i a l raise conducted view a an objection inquiry into mistrial at the when trial when not court's inquiry, the matter, and trial court the did trial d i d not court make a completed i t s inquiry. "Whether t h e r e has been a communication w i t h a j u r o r w h e t h e r i t has caused p r e j u d i c e are questions determined the the by discretion." C r i m . App. and Gaffney 1976). a witness mistrial. trial in State, 342 "An u n a u t h o r i z e d So. fact exercise 2d 403, to be of sound 404 (Ala. c o n t a c t between the j u r o r s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e t h e g r a n t i n g o f a I t i s w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r an w i t n e s s was v. court of and improper contact b e t w e e n a j u r o r and p r e j u d i c i a l to the accused." 146 court Ex p a r t e Weeks, to a 456 CR-08-0145 So. 2d 404, 407 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) , q u o t e d i n Knox v . S t a t e , 571 So. 2d 389, 391 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) . " I n H o l l a n d v. S t a t e , 588 So. 2d 543 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991), a case involving alleged juror c o n t a m i n a t i o n , t h i s c o u r t r e v e r s e d because t h e t r i a l c o u r t u n d e r t o o k no i n q u i r y i n t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the a l l e g e d improper communication. We o b s e r v e d that "'[a] motion f o r m i s t r i a l " i s addressed t o the sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and i t s r u l i n g w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f abuse o f discretion." Ex p a r t e J e f f e r s o n , 473 So. 2d 1110, 1114 ( A l a . 1985) ( 1 9 8 6 ) . I n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g j u r o r misconduct, a t r i a l court g e n e r a l l y w i l l n o t be h e l d t o have a b u s e d its discretion "where t h e t r i a l court i n v e s t i g a t e s t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which the r e m a r k was made, i t s s u b s t a n c e , a n d determines that the r i g h t s of the appellant were n o t p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e r e m a r k . " p Bascom v. S t a t e , 344 So. 2d 218, 222 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 7 ) . However, t h e t r i a l j u d g e h a s a duty to conduct a "reasonable i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s claimed to have b e e n c o m m i t t e d " b e f o r e he c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e a c c u s e d have n o t been compromised. P h i l l i p s v. S t a t e , 462 So. 2d 981, 990 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) . ' " H o l l a n d , 588 So. 2d a t 546. What c o n s t i t u t e s a 'reasonable i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s claimed t o have b e e n c o m m i t t e d ' w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r i n each case. A s i g n i f i c a n t part of the d i s c r e t i o n enjoyed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t h i s area l i e s i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e scope o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n that s h o u l d be c o n d u c t e d . " 147 CR-08-0145 Sistrunk v. State, 596 So. 2d 644, 648 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Upon b e i n g i n f o r m e d the juror parties, and the then questioning the the its reporter A f t e r being c o n v e r s a t i o n was reporter reporter, exercised conversation. the by a d e p u t y a b o u t t h e c o n t a c t b e t w e e n trial about assured no trial, and was by the the by content of the reporter that the u n r e l a t e d t o the t r i a l , the c o u r t admonished was satisfied i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the there the informed discretion considerable with i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t Woodward was being court no the i n q u i r y , and s a t i s f i e d as w e l l . c o n v e r s a t i o n was a l l There r e l a t e d to the reason to conduct a d d i t i o n a l i n q u i r y to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e o t h e r j u r o r s w o u l d have b e e n a f f e c t e d by a c o n v e r s a t i o n u n r e l a t e d to the t r i a l . r a i s e any at the Woodward's f a i l u r e o b j e c t i o n t o the scope of the t r i a l time i t was p r e j u d i c e now. We conducted f i n d no weighs to court's inquiry against abuse of d i s c r e t i o n his claim i n the of trial c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to forgo a d d i t i o n a l i n q u i r y i n t o the matter, and court's we failure certainly to find conduct no plain error additional circumstances. 148 i n the inquiry trial under these CR-08-0145 Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f on t h i s claim. XIX. Woodward argues that the t r i a l court violated A r i z o n a , 536 U.S. 584 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , i n s e v e r a l ways. the t r i a l State provide circumstances aggravating pretrial i t intended State to prosecute He a r g u e s t h a t t o prove; of the when directly In aggravating i t permitted the t h e case even though i t d i d n o t a l l e g e t h e circumstances the notice jury's i n the indictment; sentencing a n d when i t recommendation imprisonment without the p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e . is v. c o u r t v i o l a t e d R i n g : When i t f a i l e d t o r e q u i r e t h e to overrode Ring of life Alabama law c o n t r a r y t o Woodward's c l a i m s o f e r r o r . Ring, the United earlier holding (2000), to death-penalty capital cases States i n Apprendi v. cases "are e n t i t l e d Supreme New Court Jersey, applied i t s 530 U.S. and h e l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t s to a jury determination 466 in on a n y f a c t on w h i c h t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n d i t i o n s an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r maximum p u n i s h m e n t . " R i n g , 53 6 U.S. a t 58 9. Alabama's death- p e n a l t y s t a t u t e , w h i c h p r o v i d e s f o r a j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n as to s e n t e n c i n g and p l a c e s u l t i m a t e s e n t e n c i n g a u t h o r i t y i n t h e 149 CR-08-0145 t r i a l c o u r t , was n o t i n v a l i d a t e d b y R i n g . Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936 See, e.g., Ex p a r t e ( A l a . 2003). A. In this L e w i s v. S t a t e , 24 So. 3d 480 Court Woodward now considered, ( A l a . Crim. and r e j e c t e d , t h e f i r s t App. 2 0 0 6 ) , two claims raises: "This Court, in Stallworth v. State, specifically rejected an argument virtually i d e n t i c a l t o L e w i s ' s -- n a m e l y , t h a t ' t h e i n d i c t m e n t [ a g a i n s t him] was v o i d b e c a u s e i t f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e in the indictment the aggravating circumstances' that supported the c a p i t a l offense. 868 So. 2d a t 1186. We r e j e c t e d S t a l l w o r t h ' s a r g u m e n t , h o l d i n g t h a t n e i t h e r R i n g v. A r i z o n a n o r A p p r e n d i v. New J e r s e y m o d i f i e d p r i o r A l a b a m a c a s e l a w , 'which h o l d s t h a t a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s do n o t have t o be a l l e g e d i n the indictment.' 868 So. 2d a t 1186. The i n d i c t m e n t r e t u r n e d a g a i n s t L e w i s a d v i s e d h i m o f t h e c r i m e w i t h w h i c h he was c h a r g e d -- t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e o f murder d u r i n g k i d n a p p i n g , i n v i o l a t i o n o f § 13A-5-40(a)(1), A l a . Code 1975 -- a n d s e t f o r t h t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e t h a t t h e S t a t e was r e q u i r e d t o prove. I n c l u d e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t was the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance of kidnapping i n the f i r s t d e g r e e , t h u s p l a c i n g L e w i s on n o t i c e t h a t , i f c o n v i c t e d , he c o u l d be f a c i n g a d e a t h sentence. Because t h i s s i n g l e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance p l a c e d L e w i s on n o t i c e t h a t , i f c o n v i c t e d o f t h e c h a r g e d offense he c o u l d be f a c i n g a p o t e n t i a l death s e n t e n c e , i t was u n n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e S t a t e t o amend t h e i n d i c t m e n t so t h a t i t i n c l u d e d a l l o f t h e aggravating circumstances the State intended to prove at t r i a l . v. " L i k e w i s e , n e i t h e r R i n g v. A r i z o n a n o r A p p r e n d i New J e r s e y r e q u i r e s t h a t an a c c u s e d be p r o v i d e d 150 CR-08-0145 w i t h advance n o t i c e o f a l l a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s upon w h i c h t h e S t a t e i n t e n d s t o r e l y . Indeed, t h i s C o u r t has s t a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e o t h e r enumerated a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances l i s t e d i n § 13A-5-49 t h a t a r e n o t e l e m e n t s o f a c a p i t a l offense: "'The aggravating circumstances e n u m e r a t e d i n § 13A-5-49 t h a t may l e a d t o the i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y i n a capital case are not elements of the o f f e n s e a n d a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o be s e t f o r t h i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t . D o b a r d v. S t a t e , 435 So. 2d 1338, 1347 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) , a f f ' d , 435 So. 2d 1351 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . A d e f e n d a n t h a s no r i g h t t o a d v a n c e n o t i c e o f t h e s t a t e ' s i n t e n t i o n t o r e l y on any o f the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances. C l a r k v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561, 1566 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) ; K n o t t s v. S t a t e , 686 So. 2d 431 ( A l a . C r i m . App. [ 1 9 9 5 ] ) ; R u f f i n v. S t a t e , 397 So. 2d 277, 282 ( F l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . The l i s t o f a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n § 13A-5-49 i s e x c l u s i v e and p u t s t h e d e f e n d a n t charged w i t h a c a p i t a l f e l o n y on n o t i c e o f t h o s e circumstances a g a i n s t which the defendant may be r e q u i r e d t o d e f e n d . This s t a t u t o r y not ic e s at i sfie s c o ns t i t u t i o n a l requirements.' "Bush v. S t a t e , 695 So. 2d 70, 87 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , a f f ' d , 695 So.2d 138 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) . C f . A r t h u r v. S t a t e , 711 So. 2d 1031 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 6 ) , a f f ' d , 711 So. 2d 1097 ( A l a . 1997) (when a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e l i e d on b y t h e S t a t e a r e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e t h e y must be c h a r g e d i n t h e indictment)." L e w i s v. S t a t e , 24 So. 3d a t 534-35. 151 CR-08-0145 Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f on e i t h e r o f h i s f i r s t two claims for relief; circumstances he r e c e i v e d t h e n o t i c e o f aggravating he was l e g a l l y due. B. The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s a l s o third a r g u m e n t -- t h a t R i n g trial court outweigh that the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. Harris a j u r y and n o t a determine whether the a g g r a v a t i n g Supreme C o u r t i n R i n g in requires r e j e c t e d Woodward's circumstances "The U n i t e d d i d not i n v a l i d a t e i t s e a r l i e r v. A l a b a m a , 513 U.S. 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code 504 (1995), which States holding upheld § 1975 -- commonly r e f e r r e d t o as t h e judicial-override s t a t u t e -- a g a i n s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l attack." T o m l i n v. S t a t e , 909 So. 2d 213, 282 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 909 So. 2d 283 ( A l a . 2003) . Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t i n Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d 1181 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e w e i g h i n g o f t h e aggravating not circumstances and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a f a c t u a l determination is t h a t must be made b y a j u r y , b u t he a r g u e s t h a t t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g was w r o n g . Having faced Waldrop, this previous Court challenges has s t a t e d : 152 to the holding "The decision i n Ex parte i n Ex parte CR-08-0145 Waldrop has been c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l l o w e d and u p h e l d . " v. S t a t e , (Ala. [Ms. CR-06-2236, A p r i l 29, 2011] Crim. App. 2011), CR-06-0827, A u g u s t App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; citing 27, 2010] Spencer v. S t a t e , So. 3d Mitchell So. 3d Stanley v. , , State [Ms. ( A l a . Crim. 58 So. 3d 215, 248 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2 0 0 8 ) ; Yeomans v. S t a t e , 898 So. 2d 878, 903 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004); 2004). Ex p a r t e McNabb, 887 F u r t h e r m o r e , as we a g a i n s t a t e d i n S t a n l e y , t h i s C o u r t i s b o u n d b y Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , of t h e Alabama Supreme 12-3-16, A l a . Code 1975 shall So. 2d 998, 1005-06 ( A l a . govern appeals, Court. Id. at . also and decisions § Court of the courts of and t h e d e c i s i o n s and p r o c e e d i n g s o f such c o u r t s o f shall control o f t h e Supreme Amendment No. jury aggravating be s u b j e c t to the general Court as p r o v i d e d s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e and by C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 328."). unanimously found the existence of two c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- t h a t Woodward h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n c o n v i c t e d of a v i o l e n t f e l o n y , § 13A-5-49(2), and t h a t Woodward hinder See ("The d e c i s i o n s o f t h e Supreme the holdings appeals The as we a r e b o u n d by a l l d e c i s i o n s committed A l a . Code 1975, t h e c a p i t a l murder t o d i s r u p t o r the l a w f u l e x e r c i s e of a governmental 153 function or the CR-08-0145 enforcement aggravating of laws, § 13A-5-49(7), circumstance must A l a . Code 1975. exist i n order O n l y one t o impose a s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( f ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d a j u r y ' s f i n d i n g o f j u s t one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e c o m p l i e s w i t h t h e requirement i n R i n g t h a t a j u r y make a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t makes a d e f e n d a n t eligible f o r the death p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d a t 1188-90. the aggravating and sentencer, the t r i a l mitigating penalty. Ex The p r o c e s s o f w e i g h i n g circumstances was f o r the court, to perform. Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f on any o f t h e R i n g claims. XX. Woodward a r g u e s t h a t A l a b a m a ' s c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g scheme is unconstitutional for several reasons. He argues that e x e c u t i o n o f an o f f e n d e r f o l l o w i n g a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n b y a j u r y of a sentence of l i f e imprisonment without the p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h Amendment a n d t h e n a t i o n ' s e v o l v i n g standards of decency, the death and imposition of Alabama's judicial-override i t results penalty. system He in the argues, has no arbitrary also, that meaningful r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g r o l e s o f j u r i e s and t r i a l c o u r t s , 154 CR-08-0145 and that r e s u l t s i n the a r b i t r a r y , unequal a p p l i c a t i o n of the death sentence. The m a j o r i t y o f Woodward's a r g u m e n t s have been and r e j e c t e d by t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s o f t h i s have a l s o b e e n c o n s i d e r e d Supreme (1995); Court. 12 and r e j e c t e d by t h e U n i t e d Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936 d i s c u s s e d i n M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , So. 3d S t a t e , and some See, e.g., H a r r i s v. A l a b a m a , Ex p a r t e considered ( A l a . C r i m . App. States 513 U.S. ( A l a . 2003). As 504 we [Ms. CR-06-0827 Aug. 27, 2010] 2010): "Initially, this Court notes that the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s does n o t p r o h i b i t vesting the f i n a l sentencing a u t h o r i t y i n the c i r c u i t court. See S p a z i a n o v. F l o r i d a , 468 U.S. [447 (1984)]. F u r t h e r , i n H a r r i s v. A l a b a m a , t h e Supreme Court of the United States held that Alabama's s e n t e n c i n g s t a n d a r d , which (at t h a t time) r e q u i r e d o n l y t h a t the judge c o n s i d e r the j u r y ' s a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n , was ' c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . ' 513 U.S. 504, 511 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . The C o u r t went on t o e x p l a i n t h a t ' t h e E i g h t h Amendment does n o t r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o d e f i n e t h e w e i g h t t h e sentencing j u d g e must accord an a d v i s o r y jury verdict.' I d . a t 512. Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e s i n a f o o t n o t e o f h i s b r i e f t h a t the United States Supreme Court has upheld Alabama's s e n t e n c i n g - o v e r r i d e scheme a g a i n s t an a r b i t r a r i n e s s c h a l l e n g e , c i t i n g H a r r i s v. A l a b a m a , 513 U.S. 504 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . He a r g u e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t H a r r i s s h o u l d be o v e r r u l e d . (Woodward's b r i e f , a t p. 145 n.89.) Of c o u r s e , t h i s C o u r t has no a u t h o r i t y t o o v e r r u l e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . 12 155 CR-08-0145 "Therefore, M i t c h e l l ' s argument t h a t A l a b a m a ' judicial-override provision is unconstitutional i without merit. "Moreover, Alabama's j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e p r o v i s i o n i s not, as M i t c h e l l a s s e r t s , s t a n d a r d l e s s . In rejecting the argument that Alabama's judicial-override provision i s standardless, the A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has h e l d : " ' T h i s C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e A p i c e l l a , 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001), upheld the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of h a v i n g a judge, not the j u r y , determine the punishment i n a c a p i t a l case. I n Ex p a r t e T a y l o r , 808 So. 2d 1215 ( A l a . 2001), t h i s Court h e l d t h a t the c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g procedure s e t f o r t h i n §§ 13A-5-47 and 13A-5-53, A l a . Code 1975, provided sufficient guidance to prevent the a r b i t r a r y and capricious imposition of a death sentence. Specifically, the Court noted t h a t the c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g procedure "ensures t h a t the trial judge is given adequate information and sufficient guidance in d e c i d i n g whether to accept or to r e j e c t a j u r y ' s recommended s e n t e n c e " and t h a t § 13A-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, provided sufficient guidelines f o r an appellate d e t e r m i n a t i o n of "whether a t r i a l judge's o v e r r i d e of the j u r y ' s recommendation i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . " 808 So. 2d a t 1219.' "Ex p a r t e J a c k s o n , 836 So. 2d 979, 989 ( A l a . 2002) . See a l s o Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l , 852 So. 2d 833, 836 ( A l a . 2002) ( e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a n d a r d u n d e r w h i c h t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t must w e i g h a j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f l i f e i n prison without the possibility of parole). Accordingly, M i t c h e l l ' s argument t h a t Alabama's 156 CR-08-0145 j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e provision i s 'standardless' thus ' u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' i s without m e r i t . " M i t c h e l l v. State, So. Woodward c l a i m s and that 3d a t the . (Footnote evolving omitted.) standards of decency " w o r l d o p i n i o n " d e m o n s t r a t e an o p p o s i t i o n t o i m p o s i n g d e a t h s e n t e n c e on sentence of l i f e that judicial life an offender imprisonment without override imprisonment of a U.S. 407 jury's violates (2008), parole. He a l s o a r g u e s recommended s e n t e n c e the R o p e r v. Eighth Simmons, 543 and A t k i n s v. V i r g i n i a , 536 U.S. t h o s e c a s e s do not the f o r whom a j u r y recommended a 304 U.S. (2002). Louisiana, 551 The s u p p o r t Woodward's c l a i m , (2005), r a t i o n a l e of however. I n Kennedy, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t Eighth Amendment p r o h i b i t s t h e child where victim. held imposition 578. crime did not death penalty result in f o r rape the death the of of a the I n R o p e r v. Simmons, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t that t h e age the of Amendment's p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , and he c i t e s Kennedy v. 554 and "[t]he Eighth of death penalty the and Fourteenth on Amendments offenders who o f 18 when t h e i r c r i m e s were c o m m i t t e d . " forbid were u n d e r 543 U.S. at Kennedy, R o p e r , and A t k i n s e a c h l i m i t a p p l i c a t i o n o f the d e a t h p e n a l t y and p r o s c r i b e e x e c u t i o n o f c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s 157 of CR-08-0145 d e f e n d a n t s , b u t none o f t h e c a s e s a p p l y t o t h e d e a t h generally or t o the system of j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e . I n S p a z i a n o v. F l o r i d a , t h e U n i t e d long penalty ago s t a t e d , when r e v i e w i n g States Florida's Supreme C o u r t capital-sentencing statute: "We are not persuaded that placing the responsibility on a t r i a l judge t o impose t h e s e n t e n c e i n a c a p i t a l c a s e i s so f u n d a m e n t a l l y a t odds w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y s t a n d a r d s o f f a i r n e s s and d e c e n c y t h a t F l o r i d a must be r e q u i r e d t o a l t e r i t s scheme and g i v e f i n a l a u t h o r i t y t o t h e j u r y t o make the l i f e - o r - d e a t h d e c i s i o n . " 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984). Kennedy, R o p e r , o r A t k i n s The Supreme C o u r t ' s verdict for judicial in do n o t i n d i c a t e a r e v e r s a l o f t h e Court's p r i o r determination providing opinions that a capital-sentencing override i s constitutional. of Woodward's a jury's system recommended expansive reading of those cases i s unwarranted. The m a j o r i t y of h i s c l a i m s the claims o f t h e a r g u m e n t s Woodward r a i s e s i n s u p p o r t have b e e n c o n s i d e r e d are m e r i t l e s s . and r e j e c t e d , and a l l o f For a l l the foregoing reasons, Woodward's a r g u m e n t s as t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f A l a b a m a ' s capital-sentencing s t a t u t e a r e due t o be XXI. 158 rejected. CR-08-0145 Woodward makes t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the death argument as t o t h e penalty: "Objective evidence of the nation's evolving standards of decency i n d i c a t e s t h a t the death p e n a l t y v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h Amendment. L e g i s l a t u r e s across the country are c l e a r l y moving toward a b o l i t i o n , and t h e a n n u a l e x e c u t i o n t a l l y has f a l l e n i n recent years. Therefore, the death penalty v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h Amendment, a n d r e v e r s a l o f Mr. Woodward's d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s r e q u i r e d . " (Woodward's b r i e f , a t p. 1 4 9 . ) ( F o o t n o t e s omitted.) Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s argument i n t h e t r i a l so we review error. The considered argument 2010] error only, Woodward and r e j e c t e d Supreme C o u r t . 27, i t for plain by raises this cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . Kentucky's lethal Amendment, the United , on Court See M i t c h e l l v . S t a t e , So. 3d a n d we find appeal and by JJ.)." plain has the ( A l a . Crim. been Alabama App. 2 0 1 0 ) , and A d d i t i o n a l l y , when c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r injection States protocol satisfied Supreme C o u r t the Eighth "We begin said, 428 U.S. 153 t h a t c a p i t a l punishment i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . U.S., a t 177 no [Ms. CR-06-0827, Aug. w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e , s e t t l e d by Gregg [v. G e o r g i a , (1976)], court, ( j o i n t opinion of Stewart, Baze v . R e e s , 535 U.S. 35, 47 159 See 428 P o w e l l , and S t e v e n s , (2008). CR-08-0145 Woodward o f f e r s no b i n d i n g precedent i n support argument, and t h i s C o u r t i s n o t f r e e t o reexamine o r binding p r e c e d e n t f r o m h i g h e r c o u r t s on t h i s Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f of h i s overrule issue. on t h i s claim. XXII. Woodward a r g u e s t h a t the cumulative e f f e c t of the errors enumerated i n h i s b r i e f r e q u i r e s and sentence. "[W]hen distinguished reversible), Ex a reversal of h i s conviction no one instance from e r r o r amounts to error not s u f f i c i e n t l y (as p r e j u d i c i a l t o be t h e cumulative e f f e c t cannot warrant p a r t e Woods, 789 So. 2d 941, 942-43 n.1 at a l l reversal." (Ala. 2001). The C o u r t f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d c u m u l a t i v e - e r r o r a n a l y s i s as f o l l o w s : " [ W ] h i l e , u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , no single error among multiple errors may be s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l under R u l e 45, i f t h e a c c u m u l a t e d e r r o r s have ' p r o b a b l y injuriously affected substantial rights of the p a r t i e s , ' then the cumulative e f f e c t of the e r r o r s may r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . " I d . , q u o t i n g R u l e 45, A l a . R. App. P. After applying the [ s u b s t i t u t e d p. 160] CR-08-0145 c u m u l a t i v e - e r r o r s t a n d a r d s e t o u t i n Ex p a r t e Woods, s u p r a , t o Woodward's allegation scrupulously indicating reviewed that aforementioned the of the cumulative record cumulative and error, find effect nonreversible errors no of i n this we have evidence any of case the affected Woodward's s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s a t t r i a l . Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d cumulative t o any r e l i e f on h i s c l a i m o f error. XXIII. As required by § 13A-5-53, A l a . Code a d d r e s s t h e p r o p r i e t y o f Woodward's d e a t h 1975, we sentence. Woodward was c o n v i c t e d o f two c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l murder o f a p o l i c e will o f f i c e r while the o f f i c e r murder, was on d u t y , a v i o l a t i o n o f § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 5 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d m u r d e r b y f i r i n g a weapon f r o m i n s i d e a v e h i c l e , a v i o l a t i o n o f §13A-54 0 ( a ) ( 1 8 ) , A l a . Code 1975. Pursuant reviewed to § 13A-5-53(a), A l a . Code the sentencing proceedings adversely proceedings. considered affecting Woodward's a n d we rights 1975, find we no during have error those Before determining the sentence, the t r i a l court a l l of the available 161 evidence, including the CR-08-0145 presentence the investigation aggravating and r e p o r t , and mitigating s e n t e n c i n g order, the c i r c u i t heard arguments circumstances. about In its court entered w r i t t e n findings o f f a c t s u m m a r i z i n g t h e o f f e n s e and Woodward's p a r t i c i p a t i o n in it. The trial c o u r t a l s o made s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s a b o u t t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The court s t a t e d i t f o u n d two a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s : 1) Woodward was p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f a f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e use o f v i o l e n c e , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975; and or t h r e a t 2) Woodward committed the murder t o d i s r u p t or h i n d e r the e n f o r c e m e n t of laws, § 13A-5-49(7), considered the Ala. Code 1975. statutory mitigating t h a t none a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e . The The trial circumstances c o u r t found court and found nonstatutory m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f f e r e d by Woodward t o e x i s t : 1) t h a t Woodward had a good r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t Woodward grew up in a dysfunctional family. c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e j u r y ' s 8-4 of l i f e with his children; The recommendation f o r a 2 0 0 2 ) , and 852 sentence So. i n d i c a t e d i t gave t h a t f a c t o r most 162 2) trial i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r o l e as t h i r d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r , see Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l , (Ala. and 2d the 833 weight. CR-08-0145 The circuit mitigating thorough court then circumstances weighed and, with the a explanation f o r i t s reasons, aggravating circumstances aggravating well reasoned determined outweighed and and that the the mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and s e n t e n c e d Woodward t o d e a t h . The p r o c e s s of w e i g h i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g a n d m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w e i g h t t o a t t a c h t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- i s a matter that i s s t r i c t l y court. within the d i s c r e t i o n S m i t h v. S t a t e , 908 So. 2d 273, 298 2000). c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r o f f e r e d b y Woodward l i t t l e w e i g h t . The r e c o r d supports circuit court the c i r c u i t court clearly gave ( A l a . C r i m . App. mitigating the trial trial the fully The of the court's findings, f o r i t s thorough a n d we sentencing commend order. The r e c o r d does n o t r e f l e c t t h a t Woodward's s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h was i m p o s e d as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f p a s s i o n , p r e j u d i c e , or any o t h e r arbitrary factor. See § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975. Section 13A-5-53(b)(2), A l a . Code 1975, r e q u i r e s C o u r t t o reweigh t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g in order proper. t o determine We have w h e t h e r Woodward's independently 163 weighed this circumstances death sentence i s the aggravating CR-08-0145 circumstances a n d t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d we find t h a t Woodward's d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s a p p r o p r i a t e . Section Court to excessive 13A-5-53(b)(3), determine A l a . Code whether Woodward's or disproportionate imposed i n s i m i l a r cases. 1975, r e q u i r e s when death compared this sentence to the is penalty Woodward was c o n v i c t e d o f one c o u n t of murder o f a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w h i l e t h e o f f i c e r was on d u t y and a weapon one count vehicle. o f murder Sentences State, firing o f d e a t h have been crimes i n t h i s State. J u l y 29, 2011] by inside a imposed f o r s i m i l a r See A l b a r r a n v. S t a t e , So. 3d from [Ms. CR-07-2147, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 1 ) ; Woods v . 13 So. 3d 1 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ; McNabb v . State, 887 So. 2d 929 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , a f f ' d , 887 So. 2d 998 (Ala. 2004)(all police imposing officers). death Considering sentence i n f o r murder of b o t h t h e crime committed and t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Woodward's d e a t h s e n t e n c e is neither excessive Finally, any error this that nor d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e . C o u r t has s e a r c h e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d f o r may have adversely affected Woodward's s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s , s e e R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P., a n d we have f o u n d none. 164 CR-08-0145 Woodward's c o n v i c t i o n s a n d d e a t h s e n t e n c e a r e due t o b e , and a r e h e r e b y , affirmed. AFFIRMED. Windom, K e l l u m , B u r k e , a n d J o i n e r , J J . , c o n c u r . 165
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