J. D. I., alias v. State of Alabama

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Rel:07/08/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 CR-10-0534 J.D.I. v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal BURKE, from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CC-10-1426) Court Judge. The offender identity, sentenced appellant, J.D.I., pleaded guilty t o one c o u n t o f o b s t r u c t i n g j u s t i c e a violation to two as imprisonment; youthful by u s i n g o f § 13A-8-194, A l a . Code years' a that 1975. a false He was sentence was CR-10-0534 suspended, probation. The and he was ordered to serve one year of supervised 1 evidence established that on July 26, M o n t g o m e r y P o l i c e O f f i c e r L o n n i e B a r n e s was on in passed the being Dalraida area d r i v e n by of J.D.I. M o n t g o m e r y when he i n the w i n d s h i e l d all across t h e way testified obstruct in the that he believed the seat. potential windshield traffic in could safety easily depending He also crack on how testified windshields issues; shatter. he vehicle there was could he line potentially was that to advise noted tint a O f f i c e r Barnes 2 that a from below the diagonally . stopped cars with cracked the running the w i n d s h i e l d J.D.I.'s v i s i o n , driver's routine patrol O f f i c e r Barnes noted that large crack 2010, positioned he routinely the d r i v e r s of that O f f i c e r Barnes a cracked conducted stop to warn J.D.I. of the p o t e n t i a l dangers operating a motor v e h i c l e w i t h a cracked a involved windshield. J . D . I . was a l s o o r d e r e d t o p a y a $50 a s s e s s m e n t t o t h e Alabama C r i m e V i c t i m s C o m p e n s a t i o n Fund and c o u r t c o s t s . Upon f u l l p a y m e n t o f t h e s e m o n e y s , J . D . I . ' s p r o b a t i o n was t o be s u s p e n d e d , p r o v i d e d he d i d n o t v i o l a t e t h e o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s o f his probation. 1 O f f i c e r B a r n e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e c r a c k r a n f r o m b e l o w t h e t i n t l i n e a c r o s s t h e w i n d s h i e l d , b u t he was not c e r t a i n . (R. 24.) 2 2 CR-10-0534 Officer J.D.I.'s Barnes driver's stated that Barnes testified that point but he license and p r o o f d i d n o t have that forward. a unit driver's the t r a f f i c check then asked J.D.I. of the database existence Officer of several Barnes was a w a r e warrants because (R.14.) J.D.I. Officer gave Barnes J.D.I. arrested At insisted was, i n f a c t , an o r a l him. of at least that warning ( R . 5.) real a from Officer subsequent name misdemeanor and t h e warrants. one o f t h e o u t s t a n d i n g to serve the warrant the false h i s real himself. name he h a d g i v e n t o name. Officer Barnes f o r the cracked windshield and 3 the suppression hearing, a crack i n the windshield windshield. t o change of b i r t h ; J.D.I.'s outstanding he h a d t r i e d Officer a s k e d J . D . I . f o r h i s name, f o r h i s date confirmed J.D.I. license. s t o p began O f f i c e r Barnes and asked f o r of insurance. t h e name h e p r o v i d e d was n o t " o n f i l e . " Barnes was got out of h i s p a t r o l He denied that J.D.I. that testified ran diagonally the crack covered that there across the the entire I t i s u n c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d whether O f f i c e r Barnes a r r e s t e d J . D . I . b a s e d on t h e o u t s t a n d i n g misdemeanor w a r r a n t s o r f o r t h e new o f f e n s e o f o b s t r u c t i o n b y u s e o f a f a l s e identity. 3 3 CR-10-0534 surface his of the w i n d s h i e l d vision i n any Tawanda hearing. and d e n i e d she Thrasher First, denied also she that testified testified extend over J.D.I. i t obstructed provides that a unconstitutionally on § 32-5-215(a), for the cracked provide his that vague, windshield probable cause 4 in the of the w i n d s h i e l d , view. She to state that the crack d i d of the must and t h a t A l a . Code suppression crack the d r i v e r ' s § 32-5-215(a), windshield the the surface the e n t i r e surface claims at that the f u l l s u b s e q u e n t l y changed her testimony not obstructed way. windshield extended across but that the crack windshield. A l a . Code be 1975, unobstructed, O f f i c e r Barnes's 1975 t o j u s t i f y which is reliance his traffic stop was a m i s t a k e o f l a w t h a t c o u l d n o t f o r the t r a f f i c stop that resulted i n arrest. I. On a p p e a l , 1975, J.D.I. contends that i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. § 3 2 - 5 - 2 1 5 ( a ) , A l a . Code Specifically, he argues A l t h o u g h J . D . I . r e f e r s t o p r o b a b l e cause as t h e s t a n d a r d t o be a p p l i e d i n determining whether the o f f i c e r could properly a f f e c t a t r a f f i c stop, reasonable suspicion i s the proper standard. 4 4 CR-10-0534 that the vehicle At to s t a t u t e does with the a cracked hearing suppress the argued that not i t a c r i m i n a l act to drive a windshield. on h i s motion evidence the make to suppress, r e s u l t i n g from the statute relied upon J.D.I. traffic by sought stop. Officer He Barnes c r i m i n a l i z e s o n l y w i n d s h i e l d cracks t h a t o b s t r u c t the d r i v e r ' s view; therefore, because c e r t a i n t y t h a t the crack v i e w , he the should statute obstruct the not is Officer Barnes phrased driver's not say i n the w i n d s h i e l d o b s t r u c t e d have been s t o p p e d . not could clear He view," but J.D.I.'s argued that conditionally, because i.e., rather is with "could in present t e n s e , " o b s t r u c t s t h e d r i v e r ' s c l e a r v i e w , " he d i d violate i t . T h u s , he reliance on argued at the § 32-5-215(a) to justify J . D . I . was d r i v i n g was reasonable s u s p i c i o n f o r the t r a f f i c arrest. The trial hearing, the a m i s t a k e of law court denied Officer stop of not Barnes's the vehicle t h a t c o u l d not provide stop that r e s u l t e d i n h i s J.D.I.'s motion to suppress, stating: "I am d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s , [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] , b e c a u s e t h e o f f i c e r had e v e r y r e a s o n t o s t o p t h e v e h i c l e . He h a s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e crack w e n t a l l t h e way a c r o s s . He w e n t up t h e r e t o tell t h e guy you h a v e a c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d . You know, that i s a v i o l a t i o n i f i t o b s t r u c t s your view, which 5 the CR-10-0534 l i k e y o u s a i d maybe t h e c o u r t w i l l s a y t h a t ' s n o t a well-written ( s i c . ) l a w . Who knows what obstructs t h e v i e w m e a n s . B u t we h a v e g o t w h a t we h a v e g o t . The o f f i c e r s a i d i t c o u l d o b s t r u c t h i s v i e w . He had e v e r y r e a s o n a t t h a t p o i n t t o say I need t o see y o u r driver's license. " I a g r e e w i t h y ' a l l . B u t I am n o t t h e one who c a n make t h e l a w a b o u t t h e w i n d s h i e l d . T h a t ' s g o t t o go down t h e s t r e e t . So t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s c a n t e l l us. They might agree w i t h you, Richard, and say, y e a h , t h a t i s a v a g u e l a w . I t i s n o t c l e a r . We n e e d t o g e t r i d o f t h a t l a w b e c a u s e I w i l l p u t on the r e c o r d we h a v e h a d a l o t o f o f f i c e r s l a t e l y p u l l i n g f o l k s o v e r w i t h c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d s . Do t h e y p u l l e v e r y o n e o v e r ? No. Do t h e y p u l l y o u o v e r e v e r y t i m e ? No. B u t t h e p o i n t i s t h e y a r e p u l l i n g f o l k s o v e r . And we t h e c o u r t s n e e d some g u i d a n c e a n d the p o l i c e o f f i c e r s need the g u i d a n c e . " (R. 39-40.) Defense counsel is clear 40.) The 5 statute [of that trial argued, "But I just you i t ' s clear that i t ' s got to court then and stated i s unclear C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ] to someone can j u s t be go stopped continued that even i f we she and know, t h e law obstruct." (R. argued "want[ed] the f u r t h e r and have got that the [C]ourt r u l e on whether j u s t a crack on a S e c t i o n 3 2 - 5 - 2 1 5 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , e n t i t l e d "Windshields m u s t be u n o b s t r u c t e d ; w i n d s h i e l d w i p e r s ; t i n t i n g " s t a t e s , i n pertinent p a r t , that "[n]o person shall d r i v e any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, or other nontransparent m a t e r i a l upon the f r o n t w i n d s h i e l d , s i d e w i n g s , or s i d e or r e a r windows o f such v e h i c l e w h i c h o b s t r u c t s the d r i v e r ' s c l e a r v i e w o f the h i g h w a y o r any i n t e r s e c t i n g h i g h w a y . " 5 6 CR-10-0534 passenger side analogize that J.D.I. entered justice, or to the just a person a guilty reserving muffler plea for example walking to the appeal the because down t h e offense issue of I would street." obstruction argued during 6 of the hearing. However, 215; J.D.I. therefore was he not convicted lacks of standing violating to § 32-5¬ challenge its constitutionality. In Peak v. 2011] ___ analogously So. C i t y of Tuscaloosa, 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. [Ms. CR-09-0805, A p r i l App. 2011), this 29, court stated: " [ B ] e c a u s e P e a k was n e v e r c h a r g e d w i t h o r c o n v i c t e d of v i o l a t i n g § 13-51(6) [of the T u s c a l o o s a M u n i c i p a l C o d e ] , he h a s no s t a n d i n g t o c h a l l e n g e t h a t s e c t i o n . See J . L . N . v . S t a t e , 894 So. 2d 7 3 8 , 741 n. 3 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2002) ('In a d d i t i o n to c h a l l e n g i n g § 1 5 - 2 0 - 2 6 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, u n d e r w h i c h he was i n d i c t e d , the a p p e l l a n t a l s o appears to argue t h a t §§ 1 5 - 2 0 - 2 3 , 1 5 - 2 0 - 2 5 , and 15-20-26(a), (c), and ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975, a r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . However, he was not charged with v i o l a t i n g any of those provisions of the [Community N o t i f i c a t i o n Act]. Therefore, he d o e s n o t h a v e s t a n d i n g t o challenge those provisions, and we will not review his constitutional challenges regarding those A l t h o u g h a t one p o i n t , J . D . I . s e e m e d t o c h a l l e n g e the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s t a t u t e , i t was on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t was n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d t o a l l v i o l a t o r s . This raises an equal-protection rather than a void-for-vagueness challenge. 6 7 CR-10-0534 p r o v i s i o n s . ' ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 894 So. 2 d 751 ( A l a . 2004 ) ; a n d S t a t e v . W i l k e r s o n , 54 A l a . A p p . 104 , 1 0 5 , 305 So. 2 d 378 , 380 (1974 ) ('"As a g e n e r a l r u l e , i n c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s , a c c u s e d has the r i g h t to assert the i n v a l i d i t y of the law, regulation, or rule under which he is being p r o s e c u t e d [ b u t ] ... [a]n a c c u s e d a f f e c t e d by one p o r t i o n o f a s t a t u t e may n o t p l e a d t h e i n v a l i d i t y o f a n o t h e r p o r t i o n o f t h e same s t a t u t e n o t applicable t o h i s c a s e ..."' ( q u o t i n g 16 C . J . S . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law § 8 4 ) ) . See a l s o B y r d v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 7 - 0 1 1 3 , May 1, 2 0 0 9 ] So.3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009); a n d T a y l o r v . S t a t e , 442 So. 2 d 128 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 19 8 3 ) . " So. 3d at . Moreover, J.D.I. did unconstitutionally vague; facts fell of which his case prohibits windshield. He not argue that h i s argument within driving a argued that the purview vehicle the counsel that terms as required argued that not by constitute the statute. the language h i s f a c t s d i d not i n d i c a t e of the the an the obstructed argued that a was statute, O f f i c e r Barnes had not p r o v e n in material" of with c r a c k o b s t r u c t e d h i s v i e w , a n d he a l s o did statute addressed whether the windshield the that a crack "nontransparent In of the s t a t u t e fact, was defense clear and a v i o l a t i o n of the unambiguous statute. T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f § 3 2 - 5 - 2 1 5 , A l a . Code 1975, i s not p r o p e r l y before this 8 court. CR-10-0534 II. J.D.I. proof that effectuate also argues that Officer a traffic Barnes the State had presented reasonable insufficient suspicion to stop. "'[B]ecause a r o u t i n e t r a f f i c stop i s a l i m i t e d form o f s e i z u r e , i t i s a n a l o g o u s t o an investigative d e t e n t i o n , a n d we h a v e t h e r e f o r e h e l d t h a t a t r a f f i c s t o p w i l l be g o v e r n e d b y t h e s t a n d a r d s e t f o r t h i n T e r r y v . O h i o , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S . C t . 1 8 6 8 , 20 L . E d . 2d 889 [ ( 1 9 6 8 ) ] . ' J . T . C . v . S t a t e , 990 S o . 2 d 4 4 4 , 447 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) . " ' " T e r r y s e t s up a t w o - p r o n g t e s t o f the reasonableness of investigatory d e t e n t i o n s a n d w e a p o n s s e a r c h e s . F i r s t , we must decide whether the detention was j u s t i f i e d at i t sinception Second, the officer's actions must be reasonably r e l a t e d i n scope to the circumstances which justified the i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the f i r s t place. At both stages, the reasonableness o f t h e o f f i c e r ' s s u s p i c i o n s i s j u d g e d by an objective standard taking the t o t a l i t y of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s and i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the o f f i c e r s into account." United S t a t e s v . J o h n s o n , 364 F. 3d 1 1 8 5 , 1 1 8 9 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2004) ( q u o t a t i o n s and c i t a t i o n s omitted).' " U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Sanchez, (10th C i r . 2008)." State v. E l l i s , , 468, [Ms. C R - 0 9 - 0 0 8 3 , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) . 470 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2008) 9 519 F. 3d October 1208, 1212-13 1, 2 0 1 0 ] See S t a t e v . D a v i s , So. 3d 7 So. 3d ("'"Reasonable s u s p i c i o n is a CR-10-0534 less demanding White, 301 496 U.S. (1990), standard than 325, 110 requiring only a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d and detained 1280, of one's the 2412, 2416, Alabama 110 criminal activity," App.), L.Ed. detaining officers objective basis for suspecting Webb cert. v. State, denied, contends that because having vehicle does not should not have s t o p p e d him. argued that Code that cause," 500 the 500 So. v. 2d "have person So. 2d 2d 1282 1986).'"). J.D.I. on S.Ct. (Ala. Crim. 1281 (Ala. 330, probable 1975, the which cracked violate The any a cracked law, prosecutor windshield violated windshield Officer and § Officer Barnes Barnes 32-5-215, states: "§ 32-5-215. Windshields must windshield wipers; tinting. be unobstructed; " ( a ) No p e r s o n s h a l l d r i v e a n y m o t o r v e h i c l e with any sign, poster, or other nontransparent m a t e r i a l upon the f r o n t w i n d s h i e l d , s i d e w i n g s , or s i d e or r e a r windows of such v e h i c l e w h i c h o b s t r u c t s the d r i v e r ' s c l e a r view of the highway or any i n t e r s e c t i n g highway. " ( b ) The w i n d s h i e l d on be e q u i p p e d w i t h a d e v i c e or other moisture from the shall be so constructed o p e r a t e d by t h e d r i v e r o f shall every motor v e h i c l e s h a l l f o r c l e a n i n g r a i n , snow, windshield, which device as t o be c o n t r o l l e d or the v e h i c l e . "(c) E v e r y w i n d s h i e l d w i p e r upon a motor v e h i c l e be m a i n t a i n e d i n g o o d w o r k i n g o r d e r . 10 Ala. CR-10-0534 " ( d ) No p e r s o n s h a l l o p e r a t e a m o t o r v e h i c l e w h i c h has a w i n d s h i e l d , s i d e w i n g , or r e a r window w h i c h has t i n t i n g t o t h e e x t e n t o r m a n u f a c t u r e d i n s u c h a way t h a t o c c u p a n t s o f t h e v e h i c l e c a n n o t be e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d or r e c o g n i z e d through the s i d e w i n g or r e a r windows from o u t s i d e the motor v e h i c l e . " ( e ) The p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t apply to the manufactured t i n t i n g of w i n d s h i e l d s of motor v e h i c l e s or to c e r t i f i c a t e s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , decals, or other papers required by law to be d i s p l a y e d on s u c h w i n d s h i e l d o r w i n d o w s . " 7 Although equipment in automotive provision ("All type ... brakes vehicle horn dealing include properly shall ("No t o be be with itself. person shall operating condition vehicle shall working order order a t a l l t i m e s be no e.g., § 32-5-212 ); § such order of a of t h i s state on s u c h v e h i c l e is in 32-5-213 be with ("Every ("Every motor equipped with 32-5-216 equipped " ) ; § 32-5-215(c) working o p e r a t e any v e h i c l e " ) ; § that is i n good i n use and there See, when o p e r a t e d u p o n a h i g h w a y s h a l l working requiring upon t h e highways o r more o f t h e t i r e s i n good operation provisions maintained licensed the maintained, windshield § 32-5-210 required unsafe be f o r the when one statutes automobiles parts such ...."); other ("Every a muffler motor i n good windshield wiper Subsection ( d ) of t h i s statute was declared to u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a g u e b y t h i s c o u r t i n Timmons v. C i t y M o n t g o m e r y , 641 S o . 2 d 1263 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1993). 7 11 a be of CR-10-0534 upon a motor vehicle shall be maintained i n good working order."). In fact, possibility the the legislature of cracks, without appears Section accept the condemning them as i l l e g a l , language o f § 32-5-218, which a d d r e s s e s motor v e h i c l e s . to 32-5-218(b) safety by glazing i n states: " ( b ) The t e r m ' s a f e t y g l a z i n g m a t e r i a l s ' means glazing materials so constructed, treated, or combined with other materials as to reduce substantially, i n comparison with ordinary sheet glass or plate glass, the l i k e l i h o o d of i n j u r y to persons by o b j e c t s from e x t e r i o r sources or by these s a f e t y g l a z i n g m a t e r i a l s when t h e y may be c r a c k e d o r broken." The clear language of obstruction of windshields application of nontransparent that the driver's provision J.D.I.'s cracks that obstructions 32-5-215 due t o m o i s t u r e , materials was a r g u e d at t r i a l Despite within this tinting, the and t h e It i s this as j u s t i f y i n g any p o s s i b l e i n windshields addresses on t h e w i n d s h i e l d c l e a r view i s obstructed. vehicle. or dings § latter the stop of legislative are not included as intent, improper statute. "'The touchstone of l e g i s l a t i v e construction i s to ascertain and e f f e c t u a t e the intent of the l e g i s l a t u r e as e x p r e s s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e . ' Horn v . C i t i z e n s H o s p . , 425 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 5 , 1 0 7 0 ( A l a . 1 9 8 2 ) (emphasis added). This Court gives e f f e c t to the 12 so CR-10-0534 i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e as e x p r e s s e d i n t h e p l a i n , unambiguous language of the s t a t u t e . Jefferson C o u n t y Comm'n v . E d w a r d s , 32 S o . 2 d 5 7 2 , 586 ( A l a . 200 9)." Ex parte (Ala. Catlin, [Ms. 1 1 0 0 6 7 1 , May 2011)(Cobb, 13, 2011] C.J., concurring So. 3d specially). "It i s a w e l l established p r i n c i p l e of statutory interpretation that '[w]here the meaning of the p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e i s c l e a r , i t must be c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o i t s p l a i n l a n g u a g e . ' Ex p a r t e U n i t e d S e r v . S t a t i o n s , I n c . , 628 S o . 2 d 5 0 1 , 504 (Ala. 1993). ' P r i n c i p l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i n s t r u c t t h i s Court to i n t e r p r e t the p l a i n language o f a s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y w h a t i t s a y s a n d t o engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y i f t h e language i n t h e s t a t u t e i s a m b i g u o u s . ' E x p a r t e P r a t t , 815 So. 2 d 5 3 2 , 535 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . " ' " ' [ C ] r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s must be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d , to avoid ensnaring behavior that i s not clearly proscribed.'" United S t a t e s v . B r i d g e s , 493 F. 2 d 9 1 8 , 922 ( 5 t h C i r . 1974). "'"In U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B o s t o n & M. RR Co., 380 U.S. 157 , 85 S . C t . 8 68 , 87 0 , 13 L.Ed. 2 d 728 (1 9 6 5 ) , t h e Supreme Court stated: "'"'A c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e i s t o be construed strictly, not l o o s e l y . Such a r e t h e t e a c h i n g s of our cases from U n i t e d States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L . E d . 37 [ ( 1 8 2 0 ) ] , down t o t h i s day. C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l s a i d in that case: 13 CR-10-0534 "'"'"The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, i s , p e r h a p s , n o t much less old than construction itself. I t i s founded on t h e tenderness of the law f o r the r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; a n d on t h e p l a i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e power o f punishment i s vested i n the l e g i s l a t i v e , not i n the j u d i c i a l d e p a r t m e n t . " I d . , p. 95. "'"'The fact that a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y may b e w i t h i n t h e same g e n e r a l classification and p o l i c y o f t h o s e c o v e r e d does not n e c e s s a r i l y b r i n g i t w i t h i n the ambit of the criminal prohibition. United States v. W e i t z e l , 2 4 6 U.S. 5 3 3 , 38 S . C t . 3 8 1 , 62 L . E d . 872 [ ( 1 9 1 8 ) ] . ' "'"Moreover, 'one " i s not to be s u b j e c t e d t o a p e n a l t y u n l e s s t h e words o f the s t a t u t e p l a i n l y impose i t , " Keppel v. T i f f i n S a v i n g s B a n k , 197 U.S. 3 5 6 , 3 6 2 , 25 S . C t . 4 4 3 , 49 L . E d . 790 [ ( 1 9 0 5 ) ] . " [ W ] h e n c h o i c e h a s t o b e made b e t w e e n t w o r e a d i n g s o f w h a t c o n d u c t C o n g r e s s h a s made a c r i m e , it i s a p p r o p r i a t e , b e f o r e we c h o o s e t h e harsher alternative, to require that Congress s h o u l d have spoken i n language t h a t i s c l e a r and d e f i n i t e . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . U n i v e r s a l C . I . T . C r e d i t C o r p . , 34 4 U.S. 218, 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 , 73 S . C t . 2 2 7 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 , 97 L.Ed. 260 [(1952)].' United States v. C a m p o s - S e r r a n o , 404 U.S. 2 9 3 , 2 9 7 , 92 S . C t . 4 7 1 , 4 7 4 , 30 L . E d . 2 d 457 (1971)." "'Bridges, 493 F. 2 d a t 9 2 3 . 14 CR-10-0534 C r a w f o r d v. , State, (Ala. Crim. Alabama with as [Ms. state CR-09-1227, A p r i l App. law law of the 2011] So. 3d 2011). does not a c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d . Thus, to the 29, prohibit Officer driving Barnes a was S t a t e of Alabama. Moreover, the vehicle mistaken City of M o n t g o m e r y d o e s n o t h a v e an o r d i n a n c e p r o s c r i b i n g d r i v i n g w i t h a c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d , nor an officer has been does to stop a v e h i c l e i t have an for safety ordinance reasons allowing w h e r e no law violated. According Montgomery, to § 27-41, Code of Ordinances, City of Alabama: " I t s h a l l be t h e d u t y o f t h e t r a f f i c d i v i s i o n , w i t h s u c h a i d as may be r e n d e r e d b y o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e p o l i c e department, to enforce the s t r e e t traffic regulations of t h i s city and a l l of the state v e h i c l e laws a p p l i c a b l e to s t r e e t t r a f f i c i n t h i s city, t o make a r r e s t s f o r t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n s , to i n v e s t i g a t e a c c i d e n t s and t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e c i t y t r a f f i c e n g i n e e r and o t h e r o f f i c e r s o f t h e c i t y i n the administration of the traffic laws and in developing ways and means to improve traffic c o n d i t i o n s , and t o c a r r y o u t t h o s e d u t i e s s p e c i a l l y i m p o s e d upon s u c h d i v i s i o n by t h i s c h a p t e r and t h e o r d i n a n c e s of t h i s c i t y . " Further, pursuant of the o f f i c e r s are assigned by to § 27-45(a), of the p o l i c e the chief of "[i]t department, police, 15 to shall or such enforce be the duty officers as a l l street CR-10-0534 traffic laws applicable of t h i s city to street and a l l o f t h e s t a t e traffic i n this city." vehicle There laws a r e no s p e c i f i c o r d i n a n c e s r e l a t e d t o t h e e q u i p m e n t on o r o p e r a t i o n a l condition of vehicles Montgomery. i n t h e Code Moreover, neither the M o n t g o m e r y C i t y Code h a s a g e n e r a l Smith, App. (No. C A 2 0 0 7 - 0 5 - 0 6 4 , 2008)(not reported to spider and endanger September i n N.E.2d) crack someone, the wide, courts windshield of a vehicle j u s t i f i e s Op. at October F. was United 5, 2 0 0 5 ) ( D . S u p p . 2d) (crack sufficient safety So. 3). hazard 2 d 284 vehicle to States Utah, v. establish under Utah law whether (holding crack 16 nor the v. prohibited condition statement that the to 2 feet concerns long, although "Ohio Sandoval, crack i n the under t h i s a stop" a l a w . Mn. (No. 1:05CR47 DS, Division)(not reported t h a t was o v e r 24 i n c h e s probable Traffic windshield to of Dist. Ct. i s i n such unsafe Northern i n windshield ( F l a . 2007) for a as City Cf. State 2, 2 0 0 8 ) ( O h i o (where safety appellate Code law. was 1 1/2 f e e t presented disagree Alabama officer's i n the windshield 12 i n c h e s Ordinances, safety anyone from d r i v i n g a v e h i c l e t h a t as of cause Code); that only f o r stop may i f the crack long as H i l t o n v. S t a t e , "an o f f i c e r in a 961 stop a poses a CR-10-0534 safety hazard. 316.610 An officer [ F l a . Code] t o is stop not a vehicle for just crack under the 'not of (1)."); State 2010)(N.M. Ct. App. subsection February 4, (officer's stop for crack a in material cracked violated the under any section windshield i n p r o p e r adjustment or r e p a i r ' p r o v i s i o n mistake nontransparent authorized v. Granados, 2010) citing upon the windshield statute (not statute be 29,875, reported windshield could (No. in P.3d) prohibiting to justify the ignored because the prohibiting driving an unsafe vehicle). Because a m i s t a k e as States U.S. v. Court the traffic to the of stop law, the Appeals Chanthasouxat, 342 of by Officer s t o p was the F.3d Barnes improper. Eleventh 1271 (11th was As Circuit Cir. based the United stated 2003): "In the case b e f o r e us, the o f f i c e r ' s m i s t a k e was one of law. Relying on [United States v.]Lopez-Soto[, 205 F . 3 d 1101 (9th C i r . 2000)] and [ U n i t e d S t a t e s v.] L o p e z - V a l d e z [ , 178 F . 3 d 282 (5th Cir. 1999)], the Defendants argue t h a t under the F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t , an o f f i c e r ' s m i s t a k e o f l a w c a n n o t provide the objective grounds for reasonable s u s p i c i o n or probable cause r e q u i r e d to j u s t i f y a t r a f f i c stop. "In Lopez-Soto, the officer stopped the defendant because, based on his police academy t r a i n i n g , the o f f i c e r m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the Baja California v e h i c l e code r e q u i r e d t h a t each 17 on in CR-10-0534 v e h i c l e ' s r e g i s t r a t i o n s t i c k e r be v i s i b l e f r o m t h e r e a r of the v e h i c l e . In f a c t , the code r e q u i r e d t h a t the sticker 'be placed on the upper r i g h t hand c o r n e r o f t h e w i n d s h i e l d . ' L o p e z - S o t o , 205 F . 3 d at 1105 ( c i t i n g L e y de T r a n s i t o y T r a n s p o r t e s a r t . 44 (Baha California, Mex.)) (internal quotations o m i t t e d ) . The N i n t h C i r c u i t h e l d t h a t t h e s t o p 'was not o b j e c t i v e l y grounded i n the g o v e r n i n g law' and t h u s was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , e v e n t h o u g h t h e o f f i c e r ' s ' m i s t a k e n v i e w o f t h e l a w [was h e l d ] i n g o o d f a i t h . ' Id. at 1106. "In Lopez-Valdez, an officer stopped the d e f e n d a n t f o r a b r o k e n t a i l l i g h t . The p l a s t i c c o v e r o f t h e t a i l l i g h t was b r o k e n , b u t t h e b u l b i t s e l f was i n t a c t . 178 F. 3d a t 2 8 4 - 8 5 . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e o f a p r e v i o u s c a s e r e g a r d i n g t h e same s t a t u t e t e n y e a r s earlier, the Fifth Circuit noted that 'no w e l l - t r a i n e d Texas p o l i c e o f f i c e r c o u l d reasonably believe that white l i g h t appearing with red light through a cracked red t a i l l i g h t lens c o n s t i t u t e d a v i o l a t i o n o f t r a f f i c l a w . ' I d . a t 289. Therefore, t h e t r a f f i c s t o p was n o t ' o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e . ' I d . a t 289 n. 6. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t h e l d t h a t the g o o d - f a i t h e x c e p t i o n to the exclusionary r u l e s h o u l d n o t be e x t e n d e d t o c o v e r an officer's m i s t a k e of law. I d . at 289. "In the present case, O f f i c e r C a r t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e he w r o t e t h e c i t a t i o n , he b e l i e v e d , b a s e d on i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m h i s t r a i n i n g o f f i c e r and the city magistrate and his h i s t o r y of having written over 100 tickets for 'improper or no rear-view mirror' that the B i r m i n g h a m C i t y Code r e q u i r e d v e h i c l e s to have i n s i d e r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r s . Despite the government's arguments to the c o n t r a r y , we see no ambiguity on the face of e i t h e r the Alabama s t a t u t e or the Birmingham o r d i n a n c e . The B i r m i n g h a m l a w m e r e l y r e q u i r e s t h a t a d r i v e r be a b l e to ' o b t a i n a view of the s t r e e t to the rear by l o o k i n g backward from the d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n ' or have 'a m i r r o r so l o c a t e d as t o r e f l e c t t o t h e d r i v e r a 18 CR-10-0534 v i e w o f t h e s t r e e t s f o r a d i s t a n c e o f a t l e a s t 200 f e e t of the r e a r of the v e h i c l e . ' Birmingham C i t y Code § 1 0 - 1 1 - 5 . U n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f this ordinance, d r i v e r s who can l o o k b a c k w a r d f r o m the d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n t o see out a b a c k window w o u l d not be r e q u i r e d t o h a v e a n y r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r . B u t e v e n i f a r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r i s r e q u i r e d because the d r i v e r c a n n o t ' o b t a i n a v i e w o f t h e s t r e e t t o t h e r e a r by l o o k i n g backward from the d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n , ' the ordinance says nothing about r e q u i r i n g t h a t the m i r r o r be on t h e i n s i d e o f t h e v e h i c l e . "The Alabama statute requires a rear-view m i r r o r , b u t s p e c i f i e s o n l y t h a t t h e m i r r o r be 'so l o c a t e d as t o r e f l e c t t o t h e d r i v e r a v i e w o f the h i g h w a y f o r a d i s t a n c e o f a t l e a s t 200 f e e t t o t h e r e a r of s u c h m o t o r v e h i c l e . ' A l a . Code § 32-5-214 (2002). Again, there i s no requirement that the mirror be inside the vehicle. Admittedly, the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e d r i v e r be a b l e t o s e e 200 feet to the r e a r of h i s v e h i c l e c r e a t e s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t , but s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e does not assume t h a t this requirement can only be met by an inside rear-view m i r r o r , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n f o r O f f i c e r C a r t e r t o make s u c h an a s s u m p t i o n . The magistrate's f e e s c h e d u l e f o r ' i m p r o p e r o r no r e a r - v i e w mirror' also says nothing about requiring an inside rear-view mirror. fi " I n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M i l l e r , 146 F. 3d 2 7 4 , 278 (5th C i r . 1998), the F i f t h C i r c u i t noted t h a t ' [ i ] t s h o u l d go w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t p e n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d . ' The t r a f f i c s t o p a t i s s u e i n M i l l e r was b a s e d on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o l o n g e d u s e o f h i s l e f t t u r n s i g n a l w i t h o u t t u r n i n g l e f t or moving i n t o t h e l e f t l a n e . I d . a t 2 7 6 . The o f f i c e r b e l i e v e d t h i s was an infraction and p u l l e d the defendant over. A f t e r obtaining consent f o r a search, the officer found marijuana i n M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e . The F i f t h C i r c u i t h e l d t h a t , because the defendant's 19 CR-10-0534 conduct was 'not a violation of Texas law, no o b j e c t i v e b a s i s f o r probable cause j u s t i f i e d the stop of M i l l e r . ' I d . a t 27 9. T h u s , t h e stop was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , and t h e d r u g e v i d e n c e w o u l d have t o be excluded unless 'Miller's consent to the search ... cured t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t a i n t on the e v i d e n c e . ' I d . The c o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h a t " ' [ t ] h e r u l e a r t i c u l a t e d by the Supreme C o u r t i n W h r e n [ v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 517 U.S. 806 (1996)] provides law enforcement o f f i c e r s broad leeway to conduct searches and s e i z u r e s r e g a r d l e s s of whether their s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t corresponds to the l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s . But the f l i p s i d e of t h a t leeway i s t h a t the l e g a l justification must be objectively grounded.' "Id. 342 F.3d App. at Ct. crack did (footnote in not omitted)." 1277-79. 1117, the 884 Cf. N.E.2d windshield prove the length s t a t u t e , because offense; r a t h e r the violated supplied the the law (2008) proper of the Jackson Jackson, (officer's although crack was the as not charged necessary Mass. stop for a prosecution required by the with that s t a t u t e had o f f i c e r ' s b e l i e f t h a t the the 71 been reasonable suspicion to stop). Moreover, to 550 was relevant justify Commonwealth v. and the reasonableness his good faith of the officer's i n attempting 20 to belief adhere to as the CR-10-0534 law have those been of t h i s held not s t o p . As to apply further to stated the circumstances in Chanthasouxat: "We agree with the government that taken together, Officer Carter's training, the city magistrate's statement to O f f i c e r C a r t e r r e g a r d i n g t h e l a w , and h i s h i s t o r y o f h a v i n g w r i t t e n more t h a n 100 t i c k e t s f o r l a c k o f an i n s i d e r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r make O f f i c e r C a r t e r ' s m i s t a k e o f l a w r e a s o n a b l e . The d i s t r i c t court credited Officer Carter's testimony that, f o r the reasons mentioned, Officer Carter b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e B i r m i n g h a m Code r e q u i r e d inside r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r s . We do n o t q u e s t i o n t h a t f i n d i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e , we n o t e t h a t O f f i c e r C a r t e r ' s m i s t a k e o f l a w was m o r e j u s t i f i e d t h a n t h e m i s t a k e s a t i s s u e in Lopez-Soto, Lopez-Valdez, and Miller. In L o p e z - S o t o , t h e o f f i c e r ' s m i s t a k e o f l a w was based only on incorrect police academy training. In L o p e z - V a l d e z , the p o l i c e o f f i c e r had the b e n e f i t of an i d e n t i c a l c a s e f r o m t e n y e a r s e a r l i e r . I n M i l l e r , t h e o f f i c e r h a d no o b j e c t i v e r e a s o n f o r h i s m i s t a k e of law. In c o n t r a s t , O f f i c e r C a r t e r had not m e r e l y been t r a i n e d t h a t the f a i l u r e t o h a v e an inside rear-view mirror violated the Birmingham traffic code, but i n a d d i t i o n , a c i t y m a g i s t r a t e had told him the same t h i n g . Most significantly, he had w r i t t e n m o r e t h a n 100 t i c k e t s f o r t h i s particular 'violation.' "Nonetheless, the government's argument is m i s g u i d e d b e c a u s e i t p r o p o s e s t h a t we a s k t h e w r o n g q u e s t i o n : i . e . , whether O f f i c e r C a r t e r ' s mistake of l a w was r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . We w o u l d answer t h a t q u e s t i o n i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . However, t h e c o r r e c t q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r a m i s t a k e o f l a w , no m a t t e r how r e a s o n a b l e o r u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , c a n p r o v i d e the o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable grounds f o r reasonable s u s p i c i o n o r p r o b a b l e c a u s e . A n d t o t h a t q u e s t i o n we j o i n t h e F i f t h and N i n t h C i r c u i t s i n h o l d i n g t h a t a 21 like CR-10-0534 m i s t a k e of law cannot p r o v i d e r e a s o n a b l e suspicion or probable cause to j u s t i f y a t r a f f i c stop. "We also agree with the Fifth Circuit, Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289, and the Ninth C i r c u i t , L o p e z - S o t o , 205 F. 3d a t 1 1 0 6 , that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule e s t a b l i s h e d b y U n i t e d S t a t e s v . L e o n , 468 U.S. 897, 104 S . C t . 3 4 0 5 , 82 L . E d . 2d 677 ( 1 9 9 8 ) s h o u l d n o t be e x t e n d e d t o e x c u s e a v e h i c u l a r s e a r c h b a s e d on an officer's mistake of law. The Ninth Circuit explained that " ' t h e r e i s no g o o d - f a i t h e x c e p t i o n t o t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e f o r p o l i c e who do n o t a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h g o v e r n i n g l a w . To c r e a t e an e x c e p t i o n h e r e w o u l d d e f e a t t h e p u r p o s e of the exclusionary rule, f o r i t would r e m o v e t h e i n c e n t i v e f o r p o l i c e t o make c e r t a i n t h a t they p r o p e r l y understand the law t h a t t h e y are e n t r u s t e d to e n f o r c e and obey.' " L o p e z - S o t o , 205 F.3d a t 1106 (internal citation o m i t t e d ) . We a l s o n o t e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l u n f a i r n e s s o f holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that i g n o r a n c e o f t h e l a w i s no e x c u s e , ' B r y a n v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 524 U.S. 184, 196, 118 S . C t . 1 9 3 9 , 1 9 4 7 , 141 L . E d . 2d 197 ( 1 9 9 8 ) , w h i l e a l l o w i n g t h o s e 'entrusted t o e n f o r c e ' t h e l a w t o be i g n o r a n t o f i t . " 342 F.3d 1271, See also Hilton federal law as courts 1279-80 v. (11th State, C i r . 2003) 961 have d e t e r m i n e d So. 2d that "an to what c o n s t i t u t e s a t r a f f i c reasonable, cannot provide reasonable suspicion (footnote 294-95 (noting officer's violation, no o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable [and] in 22 strict omitted). that mistake of matter how grounds for 'mistake of law' CR-10-0534 cases, the conduct that of the was Although at violation determined traffic determination suspicion mistake of S t a t e s v. court least that stop law not one based of was on of circuit, a i f mistake for stop an is 'objectively 455 be in federal courts the has F.3d 824, an of probable the believed to statutorily prohibited"). whether Washington, acknowledged officer circuit " [ i ] n our existed law the officer law, cause judged reasonable 827 the or by makes legal reasonable whether one,'" the United (8th C i r . 2006), that " o t h e r c i r c u i t s have h e l d t h a t a p o l i c e officer's m i s t a k e o f l a w c a n n e v e r be o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable. See U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M c D o n a l d , 453 F.3d 958 (7th C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ('We agree w i t h the m a j o r i t y of c i r c u i t s to have c o n s i d e r e d the i s s u e t h a t a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ' s mistake of law cannot support probable cause to c o n d u c t a s t o p . ' ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. T i b b e t t s , 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2005) ( ' [ F ] a i l u r e to understand t h e law by t h e v e r y p e r s o n c h a r g e d w i t h enforcing i t is not objectively reasonable.'); U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C h a n t h a s o u x a t , 342 F . 3 d 1 2 7 1 , 1279 (11th C i r . 2003) (no matter how reasonable or understandable a m i s t a k e of law, i t cannot p r o v i d e the ' o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable grounds f o r reasonable suspicion or p r o b a b l e cause'); United States v. T w i l l e y , 222 F . 3 d 1 0 9 2 , 1096 ( 9 t h C i r . 2000) ( ' [ I ] n t h i s c i r c u i t , a b e l i e f b a s e d on a misunderstanding of the law cannot constitute the reasonable suspicion required for a constitutional traffic s t o p . ' ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M i l l e r , 146 F . 3 d 2 7 4 , 279 ( 5 t h C i r . 1998) ( w h e r e o f f i c e r was m i s t a k e n about 23 a the CR-10-0534 law the 455 F. 'no o b j e c t i v e b a s i s stop')." 3d at 827 Moreover, Appeals n. in f o r p r o b a b l e cause 1. Washington, the f o r the E i g h t h C i r c u i t United addressed person hung from i n or equipment driving upon such a vehicle vehicle, of the v e h i c l e , "with except i n such States a traffic on a c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d w h e r e t h e N e b r a s k a a justified statute any required a m a n n e r as prohibited placed to obstruct t h e r o a d and c o n d i t i o n o f t r a f f i c b e h i n d s u c h v e h i c l e . " not fall mistake the within of stop law was court determined the was gambit based proper. understanding of the was justification no legal of on the deciding was full i f the view that traffic the grounds, officer's and that there stop, the court stated: "[W]e a r e n o t c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a n y 'counterintuitive and c o n f u s i n g ' motor s t a t u t e s t h a t m i g h t prohibit c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d s . R a t h e r , § 60-6,256 c l e a r l y does not p r o h i b i t the conduct O f f i c e r A n t o n i a k thought i t did, a n d t h i s i s an u n u s u a l c a s e as t h e g o v e r n m e n t 24 455 officer's reasonable unreasonable f o r the and a l t h o u g h a c r a c k does statute, objectively In statute that or windshield of The having a clear or or p e r m i t t e d to prevent a t 826. of based or F.3d o p e r a t o r from stop object i n t e r f e r e w i t h the view of the o p e r a t o r through the the Court CR-10-0534 c o n c e d e s t h a t no o t h e r m o t o r s t a t u t e o r o r d i n a n c e forbids cracked windshields. Moreover, the government has n o t p r e s e n t e d any e v i d e n c e o f p o l i c e manuals or t r a i n i n g materials, state case law, l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y , o r any o t h e r s t a t e custom o r practice that would create some objectively reasonable basis f o r the t r a f f i c stop. "Consequently, the d i s t r i c t court erred i n adopting the magistrate judge's conclusion that O f f i c e r A n t o n i a k ' s m i s t a k e o f l a w was o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e b a s e d on A n t o n i a k ' s ' t r a i n i n g and p a s t experiences of prior traffic citation cases i n v o l v i n g c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d s . ' T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t A n t o n i a k was t r a i n e d b y t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t t o make s t o p s o n t h e b a s i s o f c r a c k e d w i n d s h i e l d s . A n t o n i a k ' s own p a s t p r a c t i c e s w e r e b a s e d on t h e same m i s t a k e o f l a w a n d do n o t c r e a t e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r future s t o p s . The d i s t r i c t court also erred i n adopting the magistrate judge's statement that the m i s t a k e o f l a w was o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e b e c a u s e i t w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l e f o r an o f f i c e r t o b e l i e v e t h a t having a cracked w i n d s h i e l d must violate some traffic law i n Nebraska. The concept of an o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e m i s t a k e o f l a w c a n n o t be so unmoored f r o m a c t u a l l e g a l a u t h o r i t y . Where t h e r e i s a b a s i s i n s t a t e l a w f o r an o f f i c e r ' s a c t i o n a n d some a m b i g u i t y or state custom t h a t caused the o f f i c e r t o make t h e m i s t a k e , i t may b e o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e . S e e [ U n i t e d S t a t e s v . ] M a r t i n , 411 F . 3 d [998] a t 1001-02 [ ( 8 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ] . H o w e v e r , i n t h e absence o f such e v i d e n c e , o f f i c e r s cannot a c t upon misunderstandings o f c l e a r s t a t u t e s o r , worse y e t , t h e i r own n o t i o n s o f w h a t t h e l a w o u g h t t o b e . " 455 F.3d a t 827-28. In evidence make the present indicating traffic stops case, that based the State Officer on Barnes cracked 25 failed t o i n t r o d u c e any had been windshields. trained Nor to was CR-10-0534 there any belief other that he reasonable. many drivers' improper was and because a such a stop was this of Accordingly, being stopped we r e v e r s e Montgomery C i r c u i t R E V E R S E D AND concurs t h a t he h a d made have traffic for safety obstructed stop was standard. suspicion that the also The s t o p J.D.I. had involved i n criminal activity. improper, motion J.D.I.'s to and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n as should the r u l i n g have been suppressed. and remand t h e case to the Court. REMANDED. W e l c h , P . J . , a n d Windom a n d K e l l u m , J., Barnes's objectively windshields reasonable s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d result was could reasonable t h e law or had been the stop a Officer testified the cracks Therefore, on that on c r a c k e d under the o b j e c t i v e l y Because suppress make based vision. indicating Barnes merely stops not based violated could Officer traffic reasons evidence specially. 26 J J . , concur. Joiner, CR-10-0534 JOINER, Judge, This case violates § the whether turns specially. on 32-5-215(a), obstruction upon concurring whether a A l a . Code crack in a 1975, which windshield p r o h i b i t s an o f a d r i v e r ' s view by a "nontransparent m a t e r i a l front a windshield." crack in a Specifically, windshield i s a the issue i s "nontransparent material." The Court of Appeals issue. In State (2011), that "material" that v. Elmore, held that and t h e r e f o r e applied ability court o f Oregon recently addressed 2 4 1 O r . A p p . 41 9, a crack 250 P . 3 d 4 3 9 i n a windshield i s not p r o h i b i t e d under to "any m a t e r i a l that i s not a a statute p r o h i b i t s or impairs the t o see i n t o o r out of t h e v e h i c l e . " The c o u r t stated: "The d i s p o s i t i v e issue here i s whether, f o r p u r p o s e s o f ORS 8 1 5 . 2 2 0 ( 2 ) , a c r a c k i s ' a n y m a t e r i a l t h a t p r o h i b i t s o r i m p a i r s t h e a b i l i t y t o see i n t o o r out o f t h e v e h i c l e . ' ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) ... "The t e r m 'material' i s not defined i n the statute; c o n s e q u e n t l y , we look to i t s 'plain, n a t u r a l , and o r d i n a r y meaning.' PGE [ v . B u r e a u o f L a b o r & I n d u s . ] , 317 O r . [ 6 0 6 , ] 6 1 1 , 859 P . 2 d 1 1 4 3 [(1993)]. As p e r t i n e n t , ' m a t e r i a l ' i s d e f i n e d t o v a r i o u s l y mean (1) ' t h e b a s i c m a t t e r (as m e t a l , wood, p l a s t i c , f i b e r ) f r o m w h i c h t h e w h o l e o r t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f s o m e t h i n g p h y s i c a l (as a machine, t o o l , b u i l d i n g , f a b r i c ) i s made'; (2) ' t h e f i n i s h e d s t u f f o f w h i c h s o m e t h i n g p h y s i c a l ( a s an a r t i c l e o f c l o t h i n g ) i s made'; o r (3) ' t h e w h o l e o r a n o t a b l e 27 this CR-10-0534 p a r t of the elements or c o n s t i t u e n t s or substance of s o m e t h i n g p h y s i c a l <the s o l i d ~ s of the m i x t u r e w i l l s e t t l e to the bottom of the c o n t a i n e r > or not physical <the ~ o f h i s c h a r a c t e r was basically g o o d > . ' W e b s t e r ' s T h i r d New Int'l Dictionary 1392 (unabridged ed 2002). The essence of those definitions is that 'material' is generally s o m e t h i n g t h a t has p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e . " ' M a t e r i a l , ' i n t h e c o n t e x t o f ORS 815.220(2), u n a m b i g u o u s l y c o n n o t e s s o m e t h i n g t h a t has p h y s i c a l substance f o r two reasons. First, a physical substance i s something t h a t , i n the terms of the statute, may be 'upon a n y vehicle window.' ORS 815.220(2) (emphasis added). Second, the s t a t u t e itself r e f e r s to p a r t i c u l a r items that constitute ' m a t e r i a l ' - - v i z . , 'any s i g n , p o s t e r , o n e - w a y g l a s s , adhesive f i l m , glaze a p p l i c a t i o n ' - - a l l of which are t h i n g s of p h y s i c a l substance. I d . "Applying that c o n s t r u c t i o n to t h i s case, we r e a d i l y conclude t h a t a c r a c k i s not a ' m a t e r i a l . ' A s d e f e n d a n t p o s i t s , 'a c r a c k i s n o t a t a n g i b l e o r p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s e p a r a t e from the window i t s e l f . I t d o e s n o t h a v e i t s own s u b s t a n c e b e y o n d p u r e w i n d o w glass.' Here, the deputy stopped defendant because he saw a crack in defendant's windshield. Accordingly, because the facts, as the deputy actually perceived them, did not satisfy the elements o f ORS 815.220(2), he lacked objective p r o b a b l e cause to stop defendant." Elmore, 241 Or. App. 42 6-27 , 250 P.3d at 443 (footnotes omitted). In at the t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , c o u n s e l f o r J . D . I . a r g u e d as follows suppression hearing: "MR. W H I T E : J u d g e , l e t me a s k y o u t h i s . 'Other nontransparent material.' I s the court f i n d i n g that 28 CR-10-0534 a crack -windshield. I "THE COURT: "MR. WHITE: 'posters.' mean, It i t doesn't doesn't have Well, i t says "THE COURT: It "MR. "THE COURT: crack "MR. -- WHITE: "THE COURT: "MR. WHITE: "THE COURT: "MR. material, That's And says cracked t o say cracked. 'signs.' I t says Material. WHITE: also say right. i s the Court That's a 'nontransparent.' finding that a crack. i s a nontransparent material? Yes. WHITE: Judge, i s Because I would a substance. "THE COURT: You t h i n k that law covers i t . so. I am argue that saying, no, "MR. WHITE: Well, l e t me j u s t p u t t h i s o n record f o r the court. That other nowhere i n subsection ( a ) , w h i c h I t h i n k t h e o f f i c e r s a i d he was t r a v e l i n g under, does i t say a cracked windshield. "THE COURT: I agree with you. "MR. WHITE: Okay. I t talks about which obstructs. B u t when i t t a l k s a b o u t o b s t r u c t s , i t means s i g n , p o s t e r o r n o n t r a n s p a r e n t m a t e r i a l . So I would argue f o r the court, because i t ' s not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d i n my h u m b l e o p i n i o n . Material, I 29 CR-10-0534 think, a common substance, can a hat, f e e l and anything. down a shirt, touch, But "THE thumb a cat, means And the Judge Court a something that a material, a meteorite, a material. COURT: version a you rock, -¬ is disagreeing. "MR. WHITE: Okay. I u n d e r s t a n d you a r e . I respect that. I want the that's another issue t h a t I h a v e i s t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f non under s u b s e c t i o n 32-5-215(a) nowhere, anywhere, u n l e s s I have m i s s e d i t , does i t mention under s u b s e c t i o n (a) a cracked windshield. "THE COURT: I t doesn't. I t doesn't. Okay. You're e x a c t l y r i g h t . T h a t ' s why we n e e d t o t a k e i t up on a p p e a l . T h e r e i s a b o u t 20 i s s u e s i n t h i s one l i t t l e suppression h e a r i n g t h a t c o u l d be appealed t h a t t h e y n e e d t o g i v e u s some g u i d a n c e o n . So g e t right." (R. 44-46.) Based hearing on and defense the reasoning Oregon i n Elmore, a today 32-5-215(a), A l a . Because a material," that cracked encourage 32-5-215, the Ala. the a crack and cracked Code driver's v i s i b i l i t y I a argument a p p l i e d by I agree that "nontransparent holding counsel's I at the suppression Court of Appeals in a windshield concur windshield with does the not not Court's violate § impair a 1975. windshield might nonetheless or pose other s a f e t y h a z a r d s on Alabama Code is of Legislature 1975, to 30 to include, consider as a the road, amending violation § of CR-10-0534 subsection driver's (a), a crack clear view of i n a windshield the highway highway." 31 "which or any obstructs the intersecting

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