Jerry Devane Bryant v. State of Alabama

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REL: 02/04/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 CR-08-0405 J e r r y Devane Bryant v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal KELLUM, Court Judge. Jerry Devane Correctional dismissal pursuant from H o u s t o n C i r c u i t (CC-97-403.60) Bryant, Facility, appeals of h i spetition t o Rule an inmate on d e a t h the circuit court's f o rp o s t c o n v i c t i o n 3 2 , A l a . R. C r i m . P. row a t Holman relief summary filed CR-08-0405 In 1998, Bryant was c o n v i c t e d of H o l l i s made c a p i t a l b e c a u s e i t was of the murder of committed d u r i n g the course a k i d n a p p i n g , s e e § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d sentenced to death. and sentence 702 ( A l a . Crim. This Court on d i r e c t affirmed appeal. 1999). App. Bryant The Bryant's v. State, Alabama remanded trial 951 the case to this c o u r t f o r a new So. 2d 724 Court's C r i m . App. again ( A l a . 2002). sentence. Supreme this trial. 2003). sentenced Id. Court Bryant S t a t e s Supreme 2, 2007. trial. 951 v. remanded State, Supreme death, (opinion on and this return Court to the Bryant, with the Supreme the case 951 So. for a 2d Court Bryant affirmed t o remand). The o f j u d g m e n t on S e p t e m b e r 29, 2006. The Court subsequently denied c e r t i o r a r i 5 4 9 U.S. 1324 raising numerous claims, 2 including several was his Alabama issued United r e v i e w on (2007). B r y a n t t i m e l y f i l e d h i s R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n o n S e p t e m b e r 2007, new 732 ( A l a . r e v i e w , and t h i s Court B r y a n t v. Alabama, 2d sentence, the case A f t e r a new p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l , to So. Ex p a r t e In accordance Court denied c e r t i o r a r i a certificate April penalty-phase instructions, penalty-phase C o u r t t o remand was conviction affirmed Bryant's c o n v i c t i o n , but reversed h i s death and Donald claims 26, of CR-08-0405 ineffective and On a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. a motion to dismiss Bryant's February 21, Institutional Fair Rule numerous request action 2008, B r y a n t Files, 32 items. on February his and 389.) 26, 21, (C. 426.) 2008, original i n which petition, he expanding factual pleadings, well. State filed amended p e t i t i o n on May the State's and on O c t o b e r 3, of his circuit answer and discovery court case-action on an request, October simply Discovery Order denied." circuit court issued an a motion which 13, motion 2008, stating (C. 756.) order with on of filed on On a the the case- raised them claims a response 21, in with to dismiss August on as the to 2008, for reconsideration was denied by the a notation on the "Motion to O c t o b e r 27, summarily 3 denied claims a motion to dismiss filed to i s postjudgment some Bryant of requested raised additional 2008. motion 2 0 0 8 , he summary and 2008. an amended p e t i t i o n on answer and 21, This filed 10, he notation denied. answer Necessary court r e a s s e r t e d the additional The a an for Discovery wherein circuit with Bryant January Information The 2008, filed a "Motion Hearing," summary s t a t i n g " M o t i o n not p r e t r i a l . " March (C. State p e t i t i o n on filed Records, Evidentiary The Reconsider 2008, the d i s m i s s i n g a l l the CR-08-0405 claims i n Bryant's claims were face, insufficiently or were p r o c e d u r a l l y reconsider denied on amended p e t i t i o n on on November D e c e m b e r 3, D e c e m b e r 4, facts sentence of the pleaded, barred. 21, 2008. 2008, Bryant the grounds were m e r i t l e s s Bryant which filed filed the that on the their a motion circuit a notice of to court appeal 2008. In our o r i g i n a l the death on 1 crime opinion affirming Bryant's conviction initially as imposed, this Court s e t out and the follows: "The State's evidence tended to show the following. On J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 , D o n a l d H o l l i s and h i s c o u s i n B e r t B r a n t l e y d r o v e f r o m N e w v i l l e t o an Auto Zone a u t o m o b i l e p a r t s s t o r e i n Dothan, where Brantley purchased transmission fluid sealer to repair his car. B r a n t l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and Hollis left Newville in Hollis's car at a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7:00 p.m. A f t e r l e a v i n g Auto Zone, a t a b o u t 8:00 p.m., H o l l i s and B r a n t l e y were d r i v i n g down W h e a t S t r e e t i n D o t h a n w h e n t h e y h e a r d s o m e o n e w h i s t l e a t them. Brantley t e s t i f i e d that Hollis t u r n e d h i s c a r around and t h e n s t o p p e d , and that B r y a n t a n d a n o t h e r man, Ricky Vickers, approached the car. Soon a f t e r , Vickers left, and Hollis, B r a n t l e y , and B r y a n t had a c o n v e r s a t i o n . According t o B r a n t l e y , B r y a n t a s k e d him and H o l l i s i f t h e y had been d r i n k i n g , and H o l l i s s a i d t h a t t h e y had n o t , b u t t h a t he w o u l d g o b u y some b e e r . Bryant told H o l l i s t o g e t t h e b e e r a n d t o come b a c k a n d p i c k h i m B e c a u s e B r y a n t ' s amended p e t i t i o n i n c l u d e d a l l t h e c l a i m s from his original petition, the circuit court's order a d d r e s s e d t h e c l a i m s as f o u n d i n t h e amended p e t i t i o n . 1 4 CR-08-0405 up i n 30 m i n u t e s . A f t e r buying the beer, Hollis r e t u r n e d a n d p i c k e d up B r y a n t , a n d t h e t h r e e men drove around w h i l e B r a n t l e y and Bryant drank beer. " B r a n t l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t they drove t o h i s house i n N e w v i l l e , where t h e t h r e e o f them went i n s i d e , drank beer, and t a l k e d . Brantley said that Bryant mentioned d o i n g some d r u g s , b u t t h a t H o l l i s a n d B r a n t l e y t o l d B r y a n t t h a t t h e y d i d n o t do d r u g s . The t h r e e men t h e n l e f t B r a n t l e y ' s h o u s e a n d d r o v e back t o Dothan. A f t e r d r i v i n g around Dothan f o r a w h i l e , H o l l i s drove B r y a n t b a c k t o t h e house where t h e y h a d p i c k e d h i m up. Brantley t e s t i f i e d that when t h e y r e a c h e d t h e h o u s e , B r y a n t d i d n o t g e t o u t o f t h e c a r a n d t h a t B r y a n t s a i d he h a d s o m e t h i n g he wanted t o t a l k t o H o l l i s about. H o l l i s asked Bryant what i t was, b u t B r y a n t d i d not say anything. B r a n t l e y f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he s a i d he w o u l d t u r n h i s head and l o o k o u t t h e window w h i l e B r y a n t talked to Hollis. B r a n t l e y s a i d t h a t he t h e n h e a r d a g a s p , a n d w h e n h e t u r n e d b a c k a r o u n d , B r y a n t , who was i n t h e b a c k s e a t , was h o l d i n g a g u n t o H o l l i s ' s head. According t o Brantley, Bryant said, 'This i s what i t ' s a l l a b o u t . ' (R. 4 5 8 . ) Bryant told Brantley to get out of the car. Brantley i n i t i a l l y r e f u s e d , b u t when B r y a n t became a n g r y a n d s a i d t o him, ' N i g g e r , g e t o u t o f t h e c a r , ' B r a n t l e y g o t o u t of t h e c a r and s t o o d b e s i d e t h e passenger's door f o r several minutes. (R. 4 5 9 . ) H o l l i s t h e n r o l l e d down h i s w i n d o w a n d t o l d B r a n t l e y t h a t he w o u l d be b a c k i n a few m i n u t e s . H o l l i s and Bryant drove o f f . " B r a n t l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e w a i t e d a r o u n d 10 m i n u t e s f o r H o l l i s t o r e t u r n , b u t t h a t he g o t s c a r e d and w a l k e d t o a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n down t h e r o a d . B r a n t l e y used the telephone a t the s e r v i c e s t a t i o n to call his sister t o come and p i c k h i m up. B r a n t l e y a l s o t r i e d t o reach H o l l i s by c a l l i n g him on H o l l i s ' s c e l l u l a r t e l e p h o n e . Brantley t e s t i f i e d t h a t Bryant answered t h e telephone and t o l d B r a n t l e y that Hollis was w i t h Bryant's brother. Bryant w a n t e d t o k n o w w h e r e B r a n t l e y was s o t h a t h e c o u l d 5 CR-08-0405 come a n d g e t h i m . B r a n t l e y c a l l e d H o l l i s ' s c e l l u l a r telephone s e v e r a l more t i m e s ; each time he g o t Bryant. B r a n t l e y t o l d B r y a n t t h a t he was g o i n g t o t e l e p h o n e t h e p o l i c e , a n d B r y a n t s a i d t h a t he d i d not want any t r o u b l e . Brantley's sister then a r r i v e d t o p i c k B r a n t l e y u p , and they telephoned t h e police. " R i c k y V i c k e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e e v e n i n g o f J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 , he saw B r y a n t l e a v e w i t h H o l l i s i n Hollis's c a r . Vickers t e s t i f i e d that later that same n i g h t B r y a n t r e t u r n e d t o h i s h o u s e i n H o l l i s ' s c a r , b u t t h a t B r y a n t was a l o n e . V i c k e r s l a t e r went riding with Bryant i n t h e c a r , and Bryant told V i c k e r s t h a t H o l l i s was w i t h a f r i e n d o f B r y a n t ' s . B r y a n t and V i c k e r s went t o ' M i c k e y ' s , ' a n i g h t c l u b . When B r y a n t a n d V i c k e r s l e f t t h e c l u b , t h e p o l i c e were s t a n d i n g around H o l l i s ' s c a r . V i c k e r s walked o f f , and B r y a n t p i c k e d him up s e v e r a l b l o c k s away from the club i n H o l l i s ' s c a r . Vickers testified t h a t B r y a n t h a d s a i d he w a n t e d h i m t o h e l p h i m do something. Vickers stated that Bryant t o l d him that B r y a n t h a d done s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h a t he 'had t o k i l l the v i c t i m . ' (R. 524.) Vickers testified that B r y a n t h a d a gun a n d t o l d h i m t h a t i f he d i d n o t h e l p h i m , he was ' g o i n g t o do V i c k e r s . ' (R. 5 2 6 . ) T h e t w o men t h e n w e n t b a c k t o V i c k e r s ' s h o u s e , w h e r e they each g o t a p a i r o f gloves. Bryant then drove to where Hollis's body was located. Vickers t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r B r y a n t p u t some c l o t h e s a n d towels i n the trunk of Hollis's c a r , they put H o l l i s ' s body i n t h e trunk. " V i c k e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a n d B r y a n t d r o v e t o G r e e n w o o d , F l o r i d a , t o t h e home o f R a y m o n d M a t h i s . Mathis rode around with Bryant and V i c k e r s i n Hollis's c a r , and Bryant and Mathis discussed s e l l i n g H o l l i s ' s c e l l u l a r telephone. According to V i c k e r s , M a t h i s s a i d t h a t h e knew s o m e o n e who w o u l d give them crack i n exchange f o r t h e c e l l u l a r telephone. After Bryant traded H o l l i s ' s cellular t e l e p h o n e f o r c r a c k , t h e men r e t u r n e d t o M a t h i s ' s 6 CR-08-0405 h o u s e , a n d B r y a n t t o l d M a t h i s t h a t t h e r e was a b o d y i n the trunk. B r y a n t w a n t e d t o know w h e r e he c o u l d dump t h e b o d y . B r y a n t , V i c k e r s , and M a t h i s left M a t h i s ' s h o u s e , d r o v e down a d i r t r o a d , a n d d u m p e d H o l l i s ' s body. B r y a n t and V i c k e r s t h e n d r o v e to Tallahassee, Florida, where they tried unsuccessfully to s e l l Hollis's car. Bryant and V i c k e r s r e t u r n e d t o Dothan, and abandoned H o l l i s ' s c a r , a f t e r c l e a n i n g t h e i n s i d e a n d w i p i n g away any fingerprints. Vickers t e s t i f i e d that they then l o o k e d f o r t h e ' o t h e r guy' ( B r a n t l e y ) b e c a u s e B r y a n t believed that Brantley could identify him. According to Vickers, Bryant planned to kill Brantley. Raymond M a t h i s t e s t i f i e d t o essentially t h e same f a c t s a s d i d V i c k e r s . "Lori Ann Andrews, Bryant's girlfriend, testified t h a t on January 29, 1997, Bryant and V i c k e r s a r r i v e d at her apartment i n a b l a c k car t h a t she had n e v e r seen b e f o r e . B r y a n t a s k e d h e r i f she w o u l d p i c k h i m up a t h i s m o t h e r ' s h o u s e i n a few minutes. Bryant and V i c k e r s l e f t , and Andrews p i c k e d B r y a n t up as he h a d r e q u e s t e d , a n d t h e y w e n t back to her apartment. Andrews f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p o l i c e came t o h e r a p a r t m e n t to arrest B r y a n t t h a t e v e n i n g , and t h a t when t h e y k n o c k e d on the door, Bryant t r i e d to g i v e her a set of keys. The k e y s w e r e l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a t t r i a l as b e l o n g i n g to H o l l i s . "Testimony at t r i a l further revealed that a b l o o d s t a i n on B r y a n t ' s b l u e j e a n s was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a m i x t u r e of B r y a n t ' s b l o o d and H o l l i s ' s b l o o d . B l o o d s t a i n s found i n s i d e the trunk of H o l l i s ' s car a n d on t h e b u m p e r a n d t a i l l i g h t o f t h e c a r w e r e consistent with Hollis's blood. "In h i s statement to p o l i c e , Bryant initially d e n i e d any i n v o l v e m e n t i n H o l l i s ' s m u r d e r . However, he eventually admitted to being with H o l l i s in H o l l i s ' s c a r , b u t he c l a i m e d t h a t H o l l i s l e f t w i t h a 'guy n a m e d T e r r y J o h n s o n ' a n d t h a t h e l e t B r y a n t 7 CR-08-0405 use h i s c a r . B r y a n t s a i d t h a t he saw J o h n s o n l a t e r t h a t n i g h t a n d t h a t J o h n s o n h a d a s k e d h i m t o move H o l l i s ' s body. B r y a n t s t a t e d t h a t he a g r e e d t o do i t f o r a s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f c o c a i n e , a n d he g o t Vickers t o h e l p him dump t h e b o d y in Florida. B r y a n t d e n i e d s h o o t i n g H o l l i s , b u t s a i d t h a t h e was w i t h J o h n s o n when J o h n s o n s h o t H o l l i s . When g i v i n g h i s s t a t e m e n t , B r y a n t was a s k e d why i t t o o k s o many s h o t s ( t h r e e s h o t s t o t h e head) t o k i l l t h e v i c t i m . According to testimony from the police officer t a k i n g the statement, Bryant said 'Man, I don't know, I t h i n k I n e e d h e l p . S o m e t i m e s I am j u s t n o t Jerry.' (R. 788.) According to the o f f i c e r , Bryant then put h i s h e a d down, c o v e r e d his ears, and r e f u s e d to t a l k anymore." 951 So. 2d at 706-08. Standard "[W]hen the is presented in a Rule 1098 in a resolves appeal when 601 ... So. appeal 2d we Review undisputed questions i s de of novo." the the judge petition.'" Boyd App. 1118, (Ala. Crim. the that court's and '[t]he (Ala. Crim. reviewed appellate court Ex p a r t e W h i t e , trial 1119 an review 792 So. "However, where t h e r e a r e d i s p u t e d disputed facts, i s whether and law, postconviction proceeding denied 1122 are ( A l a . 2001). those he 1113, w i t h pure 32 p r o c e e d i n g 2d 1097, facts facts of 2003) circuit standard abused v. of his State, (quoting E l l i o t t App. record for plain 8 the 1992)). court review on discretion 913 v. "On So. 2d State, direct e r r o r ; however, the CR-08-0405 plain-error standard of review does not apply proceeding a t t a c k i n g a death sentence." So. 3 d 4 1 8 , 424 Moreover, principle if is App. t h a t we may a f f i r m i s correct at the t r i a l would totally of a Rule f o r any reason." constraints which support omitted affirmative suffice was 32 McNabb v . That that rule "require some omitted, to affirm might, 881 So. 2 d 1 0 1 3 , 32 p r o c e e d i n g s , 1020 of the basis a s when "the language of Rule burden on t h e S t a t e t o p l e a d a n y g r o u n d 32.2] ... has created the narrow a i f available for a judgment." ( A l a . 2003). State, general an a f f i r m a n c e , s u c h defense petition Liberty I n s . Co., v. U n i v e r s i t y o f A l a b a m a H e a l t h S e r v s . P.C., Rule level, otherwise consideration, Life 13 2008). the denial l i m i t e d only by due-process that v. S t a t e , Ferguson So. 2d 3 1 3 , 333 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) . notice 32 "there e x i s t s a l o n g - s t a n d i n g and w e l l - r e a s o n e d the denial 991 (Ala. Crim. t o a Rule Nat'l Found., In the context of 32.3 [ p l a c i n g t h e of preclusion due-process i n Rule constraint d i s c u s s e d i n L i b e r t y N a t i o n a l , " McNabb, 991 So. 2 d a t 3 3 4 , b y making the p r e c l u s i o n s i n Rule prohibiting this Court preclusions f o r the f i r s t 32.2 a f f i r m a t i v e from sua time 9 on sponte appeal. defenses applying See Ex and those parte CR-08-0405 Clemons, with 1041915, May Thus, 2007). [Ms. although the equal death force to p e n a l t y has 4, 2007] preclusions a l l cases, 901 (Ala. Crim. So. 2d 14, 19 App. (Ala. 3d i n Rule 1999) Nicks v. (Ala. 32.2 i n c l u d i n g those been imposed,'" 895, So. i n which State, ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v. Crim. App. 1993)), "apply 783 the So. Tarver, only i f 629 those a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s a r e a s s e r t e d by t h e S t a t e or f o u n d by circuit c o u r t may this Court apply t h e m on raised in the appeal. claims 2d I. Before petition Bryant addressing and specific on a p p e a l , we makes proceedings the on and appeal Bryant's f i r s t address p r e l i m i n a r y arguments regarding procedural the conduct e r r o r s he claims made i n s u m m a r i l y d i s m i s s i n g h i s a m e n d e d of the Rule the c i r c u i t 32 court petition. A. First, Bryant amended p e t i t i o n , he must p l e a d ultimately p. 20.) circuit to contends t h a t , i n summarily d i s m i s s i n g h i s the circuit "improperly b l u r r e d what s u r v i v e s u m m a r y d i s m i s s a l w i t h w h a t he prove to win Specifically, court's court order on the Bryant to merits." argues "conclusions 10 (Bryant's that of brief, references fact" and must in at the "factual CR-08-0405 conclusions and allegations" show t h a t t h e c i r c u i t burden of proof proceedings. i n making opinions on Bryant which him at substantially court the improperly pleading assistance-of-counsel claims o f some without mere placed stage a l s o argues that the c i r c u i t f i n d i n g s on t h e m e r i t s evidentiary hearing are of court a the erred of h i s i n e f f e c t i v e - first a f f o r d i n g h i m an and an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o v e t h o s e claims. He f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t , i n m a k i n g some o f i t s f i n d i n g s o n t h e merits, the c i r c u i t court improperly "overstat[ed] the burden of proof" t o e s t a b l i s h i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel Strickland v. Washington, brief, p. 23.) at postjudgment It be to this summarily dismissed which this Crim. Court App. raised that (1984). these (Bryant's arguments Therefore, in his they a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n " c l a i m may because the p e t i t i o n e r has o n l y i n Ford pleading the burden 835 S o . 2 d 1 0 7 7 , 1 0 8 0 explained 668 are f o r review. at the i n i t i a l the p e t i t i o n e r State, U.S. reconsider. Court i s well settled h i s burden of proof v. Bryant motion properly before 466 under 2001): 11 stage, App. t o meet a stage to plead." (Ala. Crim. v. S t a t e , failed not at Johnson 2001) . As 831 S o . 2 d 641 ( A l a . CR-08-0405 " [ A ] t t h e p l e a d i n g s t a g e o f R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s , a Rule 32 p e t i t i o n e r does not have the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, at the pleading stage, a p e t i t i o n e r m u s t p r o v i d e o n l y 'a c l e a r a n d s p e c i f i c statement of the grounds upon w h i c h relief is sought.' R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. Once a p e t i t i o n e r h a s met h i s b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g s o a s t o a v o i d summary d i s p o s i t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , Ala. R. Crim. P., he i s then entitled to an opportunity to present evidence i n order to s a t i s f y h i s burden of p r o o f . " 831 So. 2d at 644. However, the burden t o R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. o f p l e a d i n g ... to relief." petition o f p l e a d i n g i s a h e a v y one. C r i m . P., the f a c t s "contain a clear of law shall proceedings." So. and C r i m . P., specific i s sought, 2d 1113 not As be this (Ala. Crim. sufficient Court App. to burden petitioner statement A bare r i g h t has been v i o l a t e d the requires that including the f a c t u a l b a s i s of those grounds. a constitutional has necessary to e n t i t l e the R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. g r o u n d s upon w h i c h r e l i e f of "the p e t i t i o n e r Pursuant full of the disclosure allegation that and mere c o n c l u s i o n s warrant any e x p l a i n e d i n Boyd v. further State, 2003): "'Rule 32.6(b) r e q u i r e s t h a t the p e t i t i o n i t s e l f d i s c l o s e t h e f a c t s r e l i e d upon i n s e e k i n g r e l i e f . ' B o y d v . S t a t e , 746 So. 2 d 3 6 4 , 406 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1999). In o t h e r words, i t i s not the p l e a d i n g of a conclusion 'which, i f true, entitle[s] the 12 the 913 CR-08-0405 p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . ' L a n c a s t e r v . S t a t e , 638 So. 2 d 1370 , 1373 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1993). I t i s the allegation of f a c t s i n p l e a d i n g which, i f true, e n t i t l e [ s ] a p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . A f t e r f a c t s are pleaded, which, i f t r u e , e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to relief, the petitioner i s then entitled to an o p p o r t u n i t y , as p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 3 2 . 9 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts." 913 So. 2d at 1125. "The b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g u n d e r R u l e 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) i s a h e a v y one. C o n c l u s i o n s u n s u p p o r t e d by s p e c i f i c f a c t s w i l l not s a t i s f y the requirements of R u l e 32.3 a n d R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) . The f u l l f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e c l a i m must be included i n the petition itself. I f , assuming every f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n i n a Rule 32 petition to be true, a court cannot determine whether the p e t i t i o n e r is entitled to r e l i e f , t h e p e t i t i o n e r has n o t s a t i s f i e d t h e burden o f p l e a d i n g u n d e r R u l e 32.3 a n d R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) . See B r a c k n e l l v . S t a t e , 883 S o . 2 d 724 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2003)." Hyde v. State, Moreover, , 2d cases i n which State, [Ms. (Ala. Crim. the c i r c u i t confuse So. 344, 356 "the p l e a d i n g requirements to c a p i t a l T a y l o r v. 950 the o f R u l e 32 CR-05-0066, O c t o b e r App. of 2010). After conclude pleading with 1, applied the 2006). apply equally heavy burden 13 of imposed." 2010] So. 3d thoroughly reviewing that the c o u r t d i d not the burden A l t h o u g h at times i n a r t f u l l y worded, the c i r c u i t properly App. t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y has been c o u r t ' s o r d e r , we burden (Ala. Crim. of proof. court's order p l e a d i n g as set forth CR-08-0405 above. Therefore, 2 confused the Bryant's burden of argument pleading with that the the circuit burden of court proof is meritless. In a d d i t i o n , a c i r c u i t summarily dismiss merits the Crim. of P., a claims court may, i n some postconviction petition raised therein. Rule circumstances, based 32.7(d), on Ala. the R. provides: " I f the court determines that the p e t i t i o n i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c , or i s precluded, or f a i l s t o s t a t e a c l a i m , o r t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e o f f a c t or law e x i s t s which would e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r t o r e l i e f u n d e r t h i s r u l e a n d t h a t no p u r p o s e w o u l d b e s e r v e d by any further proceedings, the court may e i t h e r dismiss the p e t i t i o n or grant leave to f i l e an amended p e t i t i o n . L e a v e t o amend s h a l l be f r e e l y granted. Otherwise, the court s h a l l d i r e c t t h a t the proceedings c o n t i n u e and s e t a d a t e f o r h e a r i n g . " We n o t e t h a t B r y a n t a r g u e s i n h i s r e p l y b r i e f t h a t i f t h e p l e a d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s o f R u l e 32 a r e a s s t r i n g e n t a s e x p l a i n e d above then those requirements are fundamentally unfair, a r b i t r a r y , a n d d e n y h i m due p r o c e s s . H o w e v e r , "an a p p e l l a n t may n o t r a i s e a new i s s u e f o r the f i r s t time i n a r e p l y brief." Woods v . S t a t e , 845 So. 2d 8 4 3 , 846 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2002). "As a g e n e r a l r u l e , i s s u e s r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e in a reply brief are not properly subject to appellate review." Ex p a r t e P o w e l l , 796 So. 2d 4 3 4 , 436 (Ala. 2001). B e c a u s e t h i s i s s u e was n o t r a i s e d i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t o r i n B r y a n t ' s i n i t i a l b r i e f b u t was r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n B r y a n t ' s r e p l y b r i e f , i t i s not p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court f o r r e v i e w a n d w i l l n o t be considered. 2 14 CR-08-0405 "'Where a s i m p l e relief shows reading that, of the p e t i t i o n assuming every t o be t r u e , i t i s o b v i o u s l y c i r c u i t court v. State, (quoting without merit 608 S o . 2 d 3 4 5 , 3 4 7 - 4 8 CR-04-1226, March App. (a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n dismissed [when] Moreover, proceeding trial or other effectiveness observed." of those Ex p a r t e (emphasis added) See a l s o Hodges v . S t a t e , [Ms. So. claim need 3d , i s "due ( A l a . Crim. t o be not over the t r i a l or of the attorneys hold based other at the a hearing on upon conduct that 5 9 1 S o . 2 d 4 6 2 , 463 the he ( A l a . 1991). " ' " I n some c a s e s , r e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e e v e n t s a t i s s u e b y t h e j u d g e who presided a t t h e o r i g i n a l c o n v i c t i o n may e n a b l e h i m summarily to dismiss a motion for postconviction relief." L i t t l e v. S t a t e , 426 S o . 2 d 5 2 7 , 529 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) . "If the circuit judge has personal knowledge of the a c t u a l f a c t s underlying the a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e p e t i t i o n , he may deny the petition without further proceedings so long as he states the reasons f o r the d e n i a l i n a w r i t t e n order." 15 summarily on i t s f a c e " ) . presided attorneys Hill, Bishop App. the conduct proceeding the (Ala. Crim. i t i s meritless and observed t h a t p e t i t i o n . '" ( A l a . 1992) 23, 2007] " a j u d g e who of the p e t i t i o n or i s precluded, 592 S o . 2 d 6 6 4 , 667 1991)(Bowen, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ) . 2007) allegation [may] s u m m a r i l y d i s m i s s B i s h o p v. S t a t e , for post-conviction CR-08-0405 S h e a t s v. State, 556 So. ( A l a . C r . App. 1989).'" Ray v. State, (quoting 646 Norris v. So. 2d 161, State, 579 162 So. 1991) on Bryant's court 35 this App. 1994 ) (Ala. Crim. case, the judge and over h i s second penalty-phase f i n d no e r r o r on who who the we same j u d g e App. was i n summarily dismissing presided the p a r t of the some o f Bryant's circuit claims on the 3 Finally, court Crim. petition Therefore, merits. 34, 10 95 original trial over Bryant's trial. In 10 94 , (Ala. 2d (Bowen, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ) . ruled 2d we reject improperly ineffective applied assistance supra. Strickland, a petitioner performance was by prejudice, a reasonable As a of Strickland, prejudiced Bryant's argument stricter counsel that burden than to that e x p l a i n e d more t h o r o u g h l y must deficient; counsel's petitioner and establish: (2) deficient must p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , but that (1) the establish below, To in under counsel's petitioner that for counsel's circuit espoused that performance. establish the was establish there alleged is a errors, A l t h o u g h we f i n d i t u n n e c e s s a r y t o r e a c h t h e m e r i t s o f the c l a i m s the c i r c u i t c o u r t a d d r e s s e d , t h i s does not a l t e r the c i r c u i t court's a b i l i t y to summarily dismiss a Rule 32 p e t i t i o n on t h e m e r i t s . 3 16 CR-08-0405 the result of explained pleading the in proceeding Part II this have been opinion, the different. heavy As burden of as s e t f o r t h a b o v e a p p l i e s t o i n e f f e c t i v e - a s s i s t a n c e - of-counsel claims. its that order claims of do the facts not exactly after that the circuit alleged by assistance h a v e made a n y Strickland, believe Although the ineffective necessarily trial, of would thoroughly circuit Bryant of difference" teach the court's in the specific applied in the an argument to the contrary is of his "would not outcome order, we of the used language in do not i n c o r r e c t burden assess Bryant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel Bryant's some counsel reviewing court statements i n claims, to and meritless. B. Bryant also considering a his piecemeal cumulatively. "Alabama law contends that the has court ineffective-assistance-of-counsel basis," instead (Bryant's does not of brief, permit i n e f f e c t i v e - a s s i s t a n c e c l a i m , " and Court circuit 'condemned and a l l the at He p. 25.) piecemeal in claims considering claims argues treatment "on that of an t h a t " [ t ] h e A l a b a m a Supreme rejected' 17 erred the proposition that a CR-08-0405 trial court error." should Initially, argument his general rules of B o y d v. State, of that Bryant postjudgment 2d although errors substantive specifically cumulative to c l a i m not cannot Court in v. State, the entitled a his claim court in his from raised in this 2d argument review. 18 a App. claim 2003). at cumulative the effect i . e . , both to his ineffective- relief, petition expected petition, appeal So. him "The proceedings." numerous be on 716 this he did that the alleged errors entitled cannot R u l e 32 32 petition, not was Rule that his raise of reconsider. assert claims, assert issue Therefore, for did effect not (Ala. Crim. and r a i s e d i n the which Arrington Bryant circuit r a i s e an petition 1997). A to 1123 e f f e c t of h i s c o u n s e l s ' relief. did to claims assistance-of-counsel not apply 1113, alleged cumulative motion preservation So. the of h i s amended p e t i t i o n a l l the numerous 25.) note 913 addition, conclusion a t p. we in In consider brief, (Bryant's not and the the 237, i s not to "[a]n d e n i a l of Rule 239 32 (Ala. properly him address a appellant a Rule 32 petition." Crim. App. before this CR-08-0405 Moreover, Court, i t i s meritless. Supreme (Ala. Ex even i f t h i s Court's 2002), parte argument were p r o p e r l y b e f o r e Bryant's o p i n i o n s i n Ex Ex 540 So. So. 2d 2d 668 of a l l e g e d involved direct errors appeals 951 Alabama So. 2d 724 and 1988), the for examine the c u m u l a t i v e i s misplaced. from the ( A l a . 2001), 941 (Ala. p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s C o u r t must a l w a y s effect on parte Bryant, p a r t e W o o d s , 789 Tomlin, reliance this A l l of those o p i n i o n s capital-murder convictions and s e n t e n c e s of d e a t h -- a p p e a l s t h a t i n v o l v e d s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s t h a t h a d b e e n r a i s e d on a p p e a l , n o t counsel c l a i m s -- applied. See and Rule appeals 45A, ineffective-assistance-of- i n which A l a . R. App. the P. plain-error However, as rule noted above, the p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e does not a p p l y i n a p p e a l s from the dismissal the of Rule 32 petitions, d e a t h p e n a l t y has been imposed, based of on claims substantive even and ineffective i n which B r y a n t ' s argument here i s assistance of counsel, not claims. Furthermore, i t is well settled ineffective-assistance-of-counsel that i n cases consists subcategories, of and, several in claim different f o r purposes 19 is Alabama a that general allegations an claim or of the p l e a d i n g requirements CR-08-0405 in Rule 32.3 [considered] pleaded." App. So. 2004), 2 d 159 State, Crim. and Rule 32.6(b), a [ n ] independent Coral v. S t a t e , overruled 900 S o . 2 d 1 2 7 4 , 1 2 8 4 grounds, As t h i s [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 0 0 6 6 , O c t o b e r App. subcategory c l a i m t h a t must be on o t h e r ( A l a . 2005). "[e]ach Ex p a r t e Court explained 1, 2 0 1 0 ] sufficiently (Ala. Crim. Jenkins, i n Taylor So. 3d 972 v. (Ala. 2010): "Taylor also contends that the allegations offered i n support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be considered c u m u l a t i v e l y , a n d he c i t e s W i l l i a m s v. T a y l o r , 529 U.S. 362 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . However, t h i s C o u r t has n o t e d : 'Other states and federal courts are not i n agreement as t o whether t h e " c u m u l a t i v e effect" analysis applies to S t r i c k l a n d claims'; t h i s Court h a s a l s o s t a t e d : 'We c a n f i n d no c a s e w h e r e A l a b a m a a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have a p p l i e d t h e c u m u l a t i v e - e f f e c t analysis to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.' B r o o k s v . S t a t e , 929 S o . 2 d 4 9 1 , 514 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2005), q u o t e d i n S c o t t v. S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 2 2 3 3 , M a r c h 2 6 , 2 0 1 0 ] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 1 0 ) ; s e e a l s o McNabb v . S t a t e , 991 S o . 2 d 3 1 3 , 332 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 7 ) ; a n d H u n t v . S t a t e , 940 S o . 2 d 1 0 4 1 , 1 0 7 1 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2005). More t o t h e p o i n t , however, i s t h e f a c t t h a t even when a cumulative-effect analysis i s considered, only claims that are properly pleaded and n o t o t h e r w i s e due t o be s u m m a r i l y d i s m i s s e d a r e considered i n that analysis. A cumulative-effect analysis does not eliminate the pleading r e q u i r e m e n t s e s t a b l i s h e d i n R u l e 3 2 , A l a . R. C r i m . P. A n a n a l y s i s o f c l a i m s o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel, i n c l u d i n g a c u m u l a t i v e - e f f e c t a n a l y s i s , i s p e r f o r m e d o n l y on p r o p e r l y p l e a d e d c l a i m s that are not summarily dismissed for pleading 20 i s CR-08-0405 d e f i c i e n c i e s o r on p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d s . Therefore, e v e n i f a c u m u l a t i v e - e f f e c tt a n a l y s i s w e r e r e q u i r e d -effec by Alabama law, t h a t f a c t o r w o u l d n o t e l i m i n a t e Taylor's obligation to plead each claim of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of counsel i n compliance with the d i r e c t i v e s o f R u l e 32." So. 3d at (emphasis majority of added). Because, as explained below, the Bryant's i n e f f e c t i v e - a s s i s t a n c e - o f - counsel c l a i m s were p r o p e r l y summarily d i s m i s s e d because they were i n s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d e d , a cumulative-error a n a l y s i s here would Bryant's not assistance err encompass a l l of of counsel. Therefore, claims the c i r c u i t i n not considering a l l of Bryant's assistance of counsel of ineffective court claims of d i d not ineffective cumulatively. II. Bryant dismissing contends that the c i r c u i t several of h i s claims of i n e f f e c t i v e counsel because, pleaded and were m e r i t o r i o u s him an to Bryant's that court erred i n summarily he says, evidentiary brief.) t h e most those claims on t h e i r hearing. For the reasons face were assistance of sufficiently and thus (Issues II explained and entitled V.A. below, we find of Bryant's i n e f f e c t i v e - a s s i s t a n c e - o f - c o u n s e l c l a i m s were p r o p e r l y summarily d i s m i s s e d by t h e c i r c u i t However, we in agree with Bryant as 21 to three court. of h i s claims of CR-08-0405 ineffective case assistance f o r further proceedings As n o t e d ineffective of 466 (1) t h a t U.S. a n d we on t h o s e when r e v i e w i n g by the U n i t e d Washington, establish: (2) above, assistance articulated v. of counsel, 668 counsel's remand this claims. a p e t i t i o n e r ' s claims counsel, States must we apply Supreme C o u r t (1984). The the standard in Strickland petitioner p e r f o r m a n c e was of must deficient; t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r was p r e j u d i c e d b y c o u n s e l ' s and deficient performance. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t . This requires showing t h a t c o u n s e l made e r r o r s s o s e r i o u s t h a t c o u n s e l was not f u n c t i o n i n g as t h e ' c o u n s e l ' guaranteed the d e f e n d a n t b y t h e S i x t h Amendment. Second, t h e d e f e n d a n t m u s t show t h a t t h e d e f i c i e n t p e r f o r m a n c e prejudiced the defense. This r e q u i r e s showing t h a t c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r s were so s e r i o u s as t o d e p r i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t o f a f a i r t r i a l , a t r i a l whose r e s u l t i s reliable. U n l e s s a d e f e n d a n t makes b o t h s h o w i n g s , it c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t t h e c o n v i c t i o n o r d e a t h sentence r e s u l t e d from a breakdown i n t h e adversary process that renders the r e s u l t u n r e l i a b l e . " Strickland, 466 U.S. a t 687. "To m e e t t h e f i r s t show t h a t h i s c o u n s e l ' s standard whether prong of the t e s t , representation of reasonableness. counsel's assistance fell t h e p e t i t i o n e r must b e l o w an o b j e c t i v e The p e r f o r m a n c e i n q u i r y must was considering a l l 22 reasonable, be CR-08-0405 the circumstances." (Ala. 1987). Ex p a r t e "'This court Lawley, must avoid evaluate the performance of counsel. circumstances actions before ineffective the case determining So. 2d 1370, using 1372 " h i n d s i g h t " to We m u s t e v a l u a t e a l l t h e at the time whether of counsel counsel's rendered assistance.'" L a w h o r n v . S t a t e , 756 S o . 2 d 9 7 1 , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999) 979 2d surrounding 512 ( q u o t i n g H a l l f o r d v . S t a t e , 629 S o . 6, 9 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1992)). strong presumption that wide range of reasonable 466 U.S. "A conduct must falls indulge a t 689. Strickland, counsel's court professional within the assistance." " J u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y o f c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e must be highly deferential. I t i s a l l too tempting f o r a defendant t o second-guess counsel's a s s i s t a n c e a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n or adverse sentence, and i t i s a l l t o o easy f o r a c o u r t , examining counsel's defense a f t e r it has proved unsuccessful, t o conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. C f . E n g l e v . I s a a c , 456 U.S. 1 0 7 , 133-34 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney p e r f o r m a n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t b e made t o eliminate the d i s t o r t i n g effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's c h a l l e n g e d conduct, and t o e v a l u a t e t h e conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n making the e v a l u a t i o n , a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct f a l l s w i t h i n the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that i s , the d e f e n d a n t must overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t , under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e c h a l l e n g e d a c t i o n 'might be 23 a CR-08-0405 c o n s i d e r e d sound t r i a l s t r a t e g y . ' See M i c h e l v. Louisiana, [350 U.S. 9 1 ] , a t 101 [(1955)]. There a r e c o u n t l e s s ways t o p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i n any g i v e n c a s e . Even the b e s t c r i m i n a l defense attorneys would not defend a p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t i n t h e same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "[T]he purpose of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s review i s not to grade counsel's performance. See Strickland [v. Washington], [ 4 6 6 U.S. 668,] 104 S.Ct. [2052] a t 2065 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; see a l s o W h i t e v. S i n g l e t a r y , 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1992) ('We are not i n t e r e s t e d i n g r a d i n g l a w y e r s ' p e r f o r m a n c e s ; we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n whether the a d v e r s a r i a l process at t r i a l , i n f a c t , w o r k e d a d e q u a t e l y . ' ) . We r e c o g n i z e that ' [ r ] e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an a r t , a n d an a c t o r o m i s s i o n t h a t i s u n p r o f e s s i o n a l i n one c a s e may be sound or even b r i l l i a n t i n another.' Strickland, 104 S . C t . a t 2 0 6 7 . D i f f e r e n t l a w y e r s h a v e d i f f e r e n t g i f t s ; t h i s f a c t , as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m c a s e t o c a s e , means t h e r a n g e o f w h a t m i g h t be a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r o a c h a t t r i a l must be b r o a d . To s t a t e the obvious: the t r i a l lawyers, i n every case, could have done something more or something different. So, o m i s s i o n s a r e i n e v i t a b l e . But, the i s s u e i s n o t w h a t i s p o s s i b l e o r 'what i s p r u d e n t o r appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.' B u r g e r v . Kemp, 483 U.S. 7 7 6 , 107 S.Ct. 3 1 1 4 , 3 1 2 6 , 97 L . E d . 2 d 638 (1987)." Chandler 2000) v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 218 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th C i r . (footnotes omitted). To establish defendant must that, for counsel's but show the second that there prong is a of the reasonable unprofessional errors, 24 test, "[t]he probability the result of CR-08-0405 the proceeding U.S. at 694. sufficient is not some would "A to enough at for 693. s u c h as reasonable the different." probability one defendant effect "When the been undermine confidence conceivable Id. have at a on the defendant issue -- including independently that did the not In warrant of claim in a Rule true when assistance i t of evidence death." addition, as 32 that, the Id. noted petition comes to at a of and "It had proceeding." death question absent the court, -- the Id. errors the a to would i s whether errors, the have mitigating sentence extent the i t concluded circumstances 695. above, the i s a heavy pleading a burden one. claim of This of pleading is a equally ineffective counsel. "To s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d an a l l e g a t i o n o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l , a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n e r n o t o n l y must ' i d e n t i f y the [ s p e c i f i c ] a c t s or o m i s s i o n s of c o u n s e l t h a t are a l l e g e d not to have been the r e s u l t of r e a s o n a b l e p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment,' S t r i c k l a n d v. W a s h i n g t o n , 4 66 U.S. 668 , 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L . E d . 2 d 674 (1984), but a l s o must p l e a d specific f a c t s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he o r she was prejudiced by the a c t s or o m i s s i o n s , i . e . , f a c t s i n d i c a t i n g 'that there i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y that, but for 25 466 probability outcome." challenges appellate aggravating is show t h a t outcome an reweighs balance to i n t h i s case, the there i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y sentencer i n the Strickland, CR-08-0405 counsel's u n p r o f e s s i o n a l e r r o r s , the r e s u l t of the p r o c e e d i n g would have been d i f f e r e n t . ' 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A bare allegation that prejudice occurred without s p e c i f i c facts indicating how the petitioner was prejudiced is not sufficient." Hyde v. State, With Bryant's 950 these claims So. 2d 344, principles in in 356 (Ala. Crim. mind, we App. address 2006). each of turn. A. Bryant that not to trial contends that counsel conducting at his he first adequate v o i r d i s c o v e r t h a t one trial dire j u r y , was b i a s e d . the following pleaded were ineffective who to t h i s claim 4 Bryant for order u l t i m a t e l y sat I n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , respect his of the j u r y v e n i r e i n v e n i r e m e m b e r , J.K., his with sufficiently on alleged claim: "Mr. Y a r b r o u g h f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y v o i r d i r e a juror [J.K.] who failed to respond to Mr. Y a r b r o u g h ' s q u e s t i o n as t o w h e t h e r a n y o f t h e v e n i r e h a d t i e s t o l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o r knew a n y o n e i n l a w The r e c o r d s from B r y a n t ' s d i r e c t appeals r e f l e c t t h a t B r y a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l b y D e r e k Y a r b r o u g h , D e b o r a h S e a g l e , a n d Gene S p e n c e r . On h i s f i r s t a p p e a l , B r y a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d b y M i c h a e l C r e s p i , D e a n n a H i g g i n b o t h a m , and John Byrd. At h i s second penalty-phase t r i a l , Bryant was r e p r e s e n t e d by M i c h a e l C r e s p i and J o h n B y r d . On a p p e a l f r o m the second penalty-phase t r i a l , B r y a n t was represented by M i c h a e l C r e s p i and Deanna H i g g i n b o t h a m . See H u l l v . S t a t e , 607 So. 2 d 3 6 9 , 371 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1992) (noting that this c o u r t may t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f i t s own r e c o r d s ) . 4 26 CR-08-0405 enforcement. Had Mr. Yarbrough adequately questioned [J.K.], Mr. Yarbrough would have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h i s i n d i v i d u a l had a p p l i e d t o the Drug Enforcement Agency and been d e n i e d a j o b and that t h i s d e n i a l a f f e c t e d him f o r the rest of h i s life. Mr. Y a r b r o u g h w o u l d have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t e v e r since his rejection, this juror harbored an obsession w i t h law enforcement. Mr. Y a r b r o u g h w o u l d h a v e a l s o d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h i s j u r o r was a p o l i c e f a n a t i c who d r o v e t h e same make a n d m o d e l o f c a r s a s unmarked p o l i c e c a r s , kept numerous p o l i c e s c a n n e r s i n h i s c a r , and f o l l o w e d t h e p o l i c e t o crime scenes. Mr. Y a r b r o u g h w o u l d h a v e e a s i l y d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h i s j u r o r had p r e c o n c e i v e d ideas about t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s of f e l l o w o f f i c e r s o f t h e l a w . Mr. Y a r b r o u g h w o u l d h a v e l i k e l y d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e p o t e n t i a l j u r o r was s o m e o n e who a d v o c a t e d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t a n d p o s s e s s e d p o t e n t i a l b i a s e s worthy o f d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n from t h e jury. "However, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y v o i r d i r e t h e v e n i r e member t o s e e i f t h e r e w e r e a n y prejudices t h a t might ultimately d i s q u a l i f y the v e n i r e member f o r c a u s e . In fact, this venire member h i m s e l f was s u r p r i s e d t o h a v e b e e n l e f t o n the jury. This was clearly an a b d i c a t i o n o f counsel's duty to guarantee h i s c l i e n t a r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l b y a d e q u a t e l y p e r f o r m i n g a v o i r d i r e on the j u r y panel and s e r i o u s l y p r e j u d i c e d B r y a n t . Trial counsel's enumerated f a i l u r e s i n voir dire d e n i e d Bryant h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r and impartial jury. T h e r e was no s t r a t e g i c r e a s o n f o r such errors and B r y a n t s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d a new trial." (C. 461-62.) T h i s c l a i m was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d e d . Bryant did repeatedly stated not "adequately" First, i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n question 27 juror J.K., that he although counsel failed to CR-08-0405 specifically counsel that So. s h o u l d have would e.g., identify have asked revealed Beckworth 3d what v. additional q u e s t i o n s he the v e n i r e , any State, bias [Ms. ( A l a . C r i m . App. o r J.K. on the p a r t CR-07-0051, 2009). Second, law enforcement failed to counsel asked asked by on the Finally, that allege knew what this issue Bryant had an made of and sufficiently alleged feelings bias that would would have strike against" bare and have resulted J.K. law law counsel's Beckworth, allege that were this issue. allegations enforcement, he had officers failed that to J.K.'s "rose to the l e v e l f o r cause exercising So. a 3d a t c o u n s e l would have f o r cause or used a peremptory 28 i f any, of f e l l o w supported a challenge in his indicating law enforcement he any, on enforcement," facts i f conclusory with ties enforcement," court the t r u t h f u l n e s s specific about B r y a n t d i d not even J.K. trial 2009] anyone "had questions, the "advocated allege law 1, See, although Bryant questions, or what "obsession" ideas about law," in additional "preconceived the anyone p r o s e c u t o r or while J.K. or particular, o f J.K. May a l l e g e d that c o u n s e l asked the v e n i r e whether to in believes strike or of that peremptory . Indeed, challenged t o remove J.K. from CR-08-0405 the jury h a d c o u n s e l known o f J . K . ' s "preconceived We that facts However, these Bryant alleges i n his brief factual additional, on a p p e a l v. S t a t e , 2001) ("Although claim. i nhis therefore, they are not p r o p e r l y facts regarding his counsel i n his brief include them court."). 23, State, requirements this ineffective Court, those i n Rule under Rule more See, App. specific assistance of allegations are not f o r review because Bearden d i d not petition (Ala. Crim. (Ala. Crim. claim (Ala. Crim. to include Hodges v. S t a t e , So. 3d Because of in his original 950 S o . 2 d 344 was p r o p e r claims Court See a l s o 2007] attempts to this properly before this n o t be c o n s i d e r e d . 825 S o . 2 d 8 6 8 , 872 Bearden more regarding this b e f o r e t h i s Court f o r review and w i l l Bearden and were n o t i n c l u d e d allegations p e t i t i o n o r amended p e t i t i o n ; e.g., " o b s e s s i o n " and ideas." note specific, alleged failed 32.3 and R u l e 32.7(d). the circuit [Ms. C R - 0 4 - 1 2 2 6 , M a r c h App. 2 0 0 7 ) , App. to before a n d Hyde v . 2006). satisfy 32.6(b), the pleading summary dismissal 5 A l t h o u g h t h i s was n o t t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s s u m m a r y d i s m i s s a l o f t h i s c l a i m -- t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i s m i s s e d the c l a i m as m e r i t l e s s -- we may n o n e t h e l e s s a f f i r m t h e 5 29 CR-08-0405 B. Bryant amended trial contends petition and trial ineffective Bryant's and investigate expert; found and sufficiently claim that trial the that blood retain trial s p a t t e r at a failed to circuit 991 So. to have the two and he counsel the killed where trial were two and See for he failed to Hollis (2) failed retain used a was to DNA condoms to r e t a i n c o n d o m s t e s t e d f o r DNA. c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t on t h i s g r o u n d . 2 d 313 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2007). first that (1) expert; investigate his his argues scene in preparing on h i s b l u e j e a n s a n d a t t h e s c e n e w h e r e H o l l i s was expert the blood-spatter the b l o o d found (3) his at penalty-phase Specifically, 6 pleaded counsel properly investigating pleaded to he counsel at h i s second trials. investigate killed his f o r not sufficiently that a DNA 7 McNabb v. State, In h i s o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n , Bryant s p l i t this claim into t w o s e p a r a t e c l a i m s -- o n e r e l a t i n g t o t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d one r e l a t i n g t o t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s s e c o n d penalty-phase t r i a l . I n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , B r y a n t merged t h e t w o i n t o a s i n g l e c l a i m , a n d we a d d r e s s i t a s s u c h . 6 A l t h o u g h i n m a k i n g h i s a r g u m e n t on a p p e a l B r y a n t r e f e r s i n h i s b r i e f t o p a r a g r a p h s 64-77 o f h i s amended p e t i t i o n , he m a k e s o n l y t h e a b o v e t h r e e a r g u m e n t s on a p p e a l . Those t h r e e arguments are c o n t a i n e d i n paragraphs 66-71 o f t h e amended petition. Paragraphs 64 a n d 65 a r e i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r a g r a p h s setting f o r t h law and do n o t contain separate claims of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. Paragraphs 72-77 i n t h e 7 30 CR-08-0405 In facts his with amended respect petition, to t h i s Bryant alleged the following claim: " B o t h t r i a l and r e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e the [lack of] p h y s i c a l evidence i n the case. N e i t h e r Mr. Y a r b r o u g h n o r Mr. C r e s p i ever r e t a i n e d a b l o o d s p a t t e r e x p e r t who could analyze t h e c r i m e s c e n e and B r y a n t ' s c l o t h i n g t o determine w h e t h e r t h e b l o o d s p a t t e r f o u n d was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t y p e of wounds D o n a l d H o l l i s s u s t a i n e d . Trial t e s t i m o n y r e v e a l e d t h a t b l o o d s p a t t e r was f o u n d on a b u i l d i n g , on t r e e s , a n d on t h e g r o u n d i n t h e a r e a where the murder o c c u r r e d . During the t r i a l and r e s e n t e n c i n g t r i a l , the medical examiner t e s t i f i e d that Donald H o l l i s was shot three times at c l o s e range. H o w e v e r , o n l y a m i n u s c u l e a m o u n t o f b l o o d (a d r o p t h e s i z e o f an e r a s e r on a p e n c i l ) was f o u n d on Bryant's clothing. And, the S t a t e c o u l d not even c o n c l u s i v e l y demonstrate t h a t the minuscule amount of blood was Hollis' blood, but r a t h e r was a c o m b i n a t i o n o f H o l l i s ' and B r y a n t ' s b l o o d . In s p i t e of the gross contradiction between the State's e v i d e n c e and m e d i c a l t e s t i m o n y , n e i t h e r t r i a l nor resentencing counsel retained a blood spatter expert to independently analyze the crime scene and Bryant's c l o t h i n g to determine whether the blood spatter found on B r y a n t was consistent with the t y p e s o f wounds D o n a l d H o l l i s s u s t a i n e d . "Had t r i a l o r r e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l p r o c u r e d a b l o o d s p a t t e r e x p e r t to examine the e v i d e n c e , the e x p e r t would have c o n d u c t e d t e s t s to r e c r e a t e the crime. B a s e d on t h a t r e c r e a t i o n , t h e e x p e r t may h a v e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p e r s o n who shoots another at c l o s e p r o x i m i t y s h o u l d have a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f amended p e t i t i o n i n c l u d e a d d i t i o n a l c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g c o u n s e l ' s alleged f a i l u r e to investigate other possible leads besides the three Bryant argues on appeal, but Bryant makes no a r g u m e n t i n h i s b r i e f on a p p e a l a b o u t t h o s e c l a i m s . S e e P a r t II.G. of t h i s o p i n i o n . 31 CR-08-0405 blood on h i s person. Or the expert may have testified t h a t w h e r e t h e gun s h o t wounds c r e a t e b l o o d s p a t t e r i n t h e p a t t e r n a s on a n d p r o x i m i t y t o t h e b u i l d i n g a t t h e l o c a t i o n w h e r e H o l l i s was shot, t h e s h o o t e r w o u l d h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f b l o o d on his clothing o r , a t a minimum, more t h a n a minuscule drop of blood that cannot even be a t t r i b u t e d s o l e l y to the v i c t i m . Counsels' failure to p r o c u r e a b l o o d s p a t t e r e x p e r t f e l l below the o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d o f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s and seriously prejudiced Bryant because the expert may have presented p o t e n t i a l l y exculpatory evidence. But f o r counsel's f a i l u r e to c a l l a blood s p a t t e r expert, there i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that Bryant would have been a c q u i t t e d or would have a v o i d e d a death sentence. At the time of B r y a n t ' s original and r e s e n t e n c i n g t r i a l s , numerous b l o o d s p a t t e r e x p e r t s were a v a i l a b l e to t e s t i f y , including Captain Tom B e v e l , owner o f TBI LLC l o c a t e d i n O k l a h o m a , and Gary R i n i , f o r e n s i c science c o n s u l t a n t l o c a t e d i n Cleveland, Ohio. Had counsel followed these investigative leads, both trial counsel and r e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l c o u l d have u n c o v e r e d evidence t h a t c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e w h i c h may have undermined the S t a t e ' s a b i l i t y to sentence Bryant to death. _i _ _ j_ i _ "... A s o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h i s A m e n d e d P e t i t i o n , t h e C o u r t has d e n i e d B r y a n t d i s c o v e r y of p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e but once d i s c o v e r y i s a l l o w e d , B r y a n t f u l l y intends to r e t a i n a f o r e n s i c expert to i n v e s t i g a t e the b l o o d s p a t t e r evidence. "During the f i r s t trial, the S t a t e ' s expert testified that as a result of DNA testing he b e l i e v e d t h e t i n y b l o o d s p o t f o u n d on B r y a n t ' s p a n t s was a m i x t u r e o f B r y a n t ' s and t h e v i c t i m ' s b l o o d . The e x p e r t , h o w e v e r , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he c o u l d n o t be absolutely sure. Mr. Y a r b r o u g h p r e s e n t e d no e x p e r t i n h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f to c o n t r a d i c t or p r o v i d e the j u r y an a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e b l o o d a n d t o whom i t b e l o n g e d . Furthermore, resentencing 32 CR-08-0405 c o u n s e l d i d n o t p r e s e n t an e x p e r t on DNA evidence. A DNA e x p e r t w o u l d h a v e e v a l u a t e d t h e v i a b i l i t y o f obtaining a positive DNA m a t c h on such a small amount o f b l o o d . Had t h e DNA e x p e r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o o b t a i n a r e l i a b l e DNA r e s u l t on t h i s s a m p l e , i t w o u l d h a v e r e m o v e d t h e one p i e c e o f p h y s i c a l evidence t y i n g Bryant to H o l l i s ' homicide. As o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h i s Amended P e t i t i o n , t h e C o u r t has r e f u s e d B r y a n t d i s c o v e r y of p h y s i c a l evidence but once d i s c o v e r y i s a l l o w e d , B r y a n t f u l l y i n t e n d s to retain a forensic expert to investigate DNA evidence. "Furthermore, both trial and resentencing c o u n s e l (as w e l l as t h e p o l i c e ) b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e c r i m e was s e x u a l l y motivated, but n e i t h e r counsel conducted an adequate investigation into any p o s s i b l e connections r e g a r d i n g the s e x u a l undertone of t h i s c r i m e . Two u s e d c o n d o m s w e r e f o u n d a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e c r i m e t h a t u n d o u b t e d l y c o n t a i n e d DNA o f a person or persons i n v o l v e d i n the crime, but c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o g e t t h e condoms t e s t e d , o r file appropriate motions regarding t h i s evidence. "The failure of both trial counsel and r e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l t o p r e s e n t an e x p e r t on DNA evidence is below the objective standard of reasonableness and seriously prejudiced Bryant b e c a u s e t h e e x p e r t may have p r e s e n t e d e x c u l p a t o r y evidence. According t o Mr. Yarbrough's notes, Cellmark Diagnostics, Inc., a forensic laboratory l o c a t e d i n G e r m a n t o w n , M a r y l a n d , was a v a i l a b l e and w i l l i n g t o do DNA t e s t i n g on t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s case. But for counsel's failure to c a l l a DNA expert, there i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that Bryant would have been a c q u i t t e d or would have a v o i d e d a death sentence. Had counsel followed these investigative leads, both trial counsel and resentencing counsel could have challenged the a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e l i e d on b y t h e S t a t e t o sentence Bryant to death." 33 CR-08-0405 (C. 465-68.) With counsel to be respect this at h i s second m e r i t l e s s on penalty-phase for to not was The what trial, only sentence be a l r e a d y been determined attacked investigation should phase have at and the evidence conducted trial -- a State's evidence punishment he Court held has circumstance" capital trial. 2009). In and second of should that to be Ex his addition, of at the the 24 penalty-phase correctly denied Bryant's receive trial and could trial. The a DNA So. is trial request the counsel penalty-¬ challenged the not Alabama not a penalty 3d to expert crime, the second as second specifically second the claim guilt his and doubt Bryant's on r e s i d u a l d o u b t . at However, Court the asserted that his guilt Lewis, Bryant's should in his petition, considered this Bryant expert "[r]esidual parte issue at penalty-phase presented receive. to find Bryant's Bryant alleged we i n the f i r s t blood-spatter w o u l d h a v e , as B r y a n t had i t relates penalty-phase i t s face. trial as his capital-murder conviction. crime had from claim 540, Supreme mitigating phase 544 h e l d on t h a t the t r i a l for a jury what of a (Ala. appeal court instruction Therefore, this claim i s meritless insofar 34 CR-08-0405 as i t r e l a t e s to Bryant's counsel at h i s second penalty-phase trial. However, Bryant's counsel sufficiently not with merely respect at h i s f i r s t pleaded make a have retained available believed had at bare they experts been of these Bryant's experts specific facts pleading requirements him evidentiary to with an this his specific c l a i m t o be Bryant and explained request, who could that have Bryant to i n Rule opportunity hearing. 35 these he and t e s t i f i e d to the lack fail to prove to possibly claims and In court's pleaded 32.3 were what how we He should alleged and t h e c i r c u i t Bryant respect counsel prejudiced h i s defense. claims did of law. experts trial), to constitutional believed c o u l d have d i s c o v e r e d conclude i t relates on i t s f a c e . of h i s f i r s t information we find that he the discovery Therefore, as o r s t a t e mere c o n c l u s i o n s retained, additional entitle we allegation from such experts of claim trial, naming the time the nature denial specific (even those testimony of the this and m e r i t o r i o u s r i g h t s had been v i o l a t e d identified to Rule these of light blanket see what alleged. sufficiently to satisfy 32.6(b) claims the and to at an CR-08-0405 C. Bryant claim also that his trial ineffective evidence he contends a motion made t o p o l i c e . facts before his f i r s t the request was counsel knew present evidence first sufficiently at his first investigating t o suppress Specifically, indicating that pleaded h i s trial were and p r e s e n t i n g the f i r s t he a r g u e s statement t h a t he he h a d r e q u e s t e d pleaded a lawyer i n t e r r o g a t i o n t h e n i g h t he was a r r e s t e d , ignored about statement he counsel f o r not properly t o support sufficient that by t h e p o l i c e , the request of that but failed request o r h i s second and that his trial to investigate or i n order statement, that t o suppress that made t o p o l i c e t h e next day. In with h i s amended respect to this petition, Bryant alleged the following claim: "During t h e p r e - t r i a l phase o f Bryant's t r i a l , Mr. Yarbrough moved to suppress the second interrogation ( c a p t u r e d on t a p e ) c o n d u c t e d b y t h e Dothan Police Department on J a n u a r y 30, 1997. Counsel was g r a n t e d a h e a r i n g on h i s m o t i o n t o suppress Bryant's second statement. Counsel, however, f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t c r i t i c a l evidence t h a t unquestionably would have resulted in the s u p p r e s s i o n o f t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t ( t a k e n on J a n u a r y 29, 1997 a n d u n r e c o r d e d , b u t about which Sgt. S t a n l e y was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y ) and c o u l d have affected t h e outcome on t h e m o t i o n t o suppress 36 CR-08-0405 ruling. Specifically, Counsel f a i l e d to present e v i d e n c e by S h e i l i a h Gayle B r y a n t McCree t h a t B r y a n t h a d a s k e d f o r an a t t o r n e y p r i o r t o t h e J a n u a r y 29 police interrogation. Although McCree d i d not o v e r h e a r any p a r t o f t h e s e c o n d interrogation on J a n u a r y 30, h e r t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g w h a t o c c u r r e d with respect to the first statement would have buttressed Bryant's multiple requests during the second i n t e r r o g a t i o n f o r a lawyer. "On t h e n i g h t o f J a n u a r y 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 , t h e n i g h t o f B r y a n t ' s f i r s t i n t e r r o g a t i o n by the Dothan P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , he phoned h i s s i s t e r Sheiliah Gayle B r y a n t McCree. T h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n t o o k p l a c e on s p e a k e r p h o n e w i t h S g t . S t a n l e y i n t h e room. Bryant told Sheiliah Bryant t h e y were a c c u s i n g him of c a p i t a l murder. She a d v i s e d B r y a n t t o a s k f o r a n a t t o r n e y a n d n o t t o s a y a n y t h i n g u n t i l he r e c e i v e d one. The speakerphone remained on a f t e r s h e and B r y a n t s a i d goodbye. She t h e n h e a r d B r y a n t a s k f o r c i g a r e t t e s and a l a w y e r . The p o l i c e t o l d Bryant they would get him a lawyer, but continued the i n t e r r o g a t i o n a n d t o l d h i m he n e e d e d t o 'answer their questions.' After approximately thirty s e c o n d s , s o m e o n e r e a l i z e d t h e s p e a k e r was s t i l l o n , and ended the call. Ms. McCree t o l d Bryant's a t t o r n e y what she had o v e r h e a r d . That a t t o r n e y had to withdraw due to a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . Ms. McCree s u b s e q u e n t l y t o l d c o u r t a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y s Mr. M o t l e y a n d Mr. Y a r b r o u g h a b o u t t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n t h a t she had o v e r h e a r d [ . ] Ms. McCree's t e s t i m o n y a b o u t what she o v e r h e a r d and S g t . Stanley's r e f u s a l to honor Bryant's e x e r c i s e of h i s r i g h t c e r t a i n l y p r o v i d e d grounds f o r e x c l u d i n g the e n t i r e t y of Bryant's January 29, 1997 statement. W i t h o u t t h a t s t a t e m e n t , t h e S t a t e w o u l d h a v e h a d no basis for asserting t h a t B r y a n t made a comment d u r i n g t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n w h i c h t h e p o l i c e t o o k as an admission of k i l l i n g Hollis. (According to Sgt, Stanley, i n response to Stanley's q u e s t i o n regarding why B r y a n t s h o t H o l l i s t h r e e t i m e s a n d w h a t was on B r y a n t ' s mind, Bryant responded ' I d o n ' t know, I 37 CR-08-0405 think I Jerry.') need help... . Sometimes I am just not "In a d d i t i o n , d u r i n g t h e second interrogation, w h i c h was t a p e - r e c o r d e d , B r y a n t c o n s i s t e n t l y asked for a lawyer. The p o l i c e i g n o r e d h i s r e q u e s t s and continued asking him questions, despite Bryant's very c l e a r and repeated i n v o c a t i o n of h i s r i g h t t o counsel. "In spite of being i n possession of such c r i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , M r . Y a r b r o u g h f a i l e d t o move to suppress the f i r s t (un-recorded) statement, t o call Ms. M c C r e e to testify at the suppression hearing, and t o i n t r o d u c e t h i s c r i t i c a l p i e c e o f evidence o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n under Miranda v . A r i z o n a , 384 U.S. 4 3 6 ( 1 9 6 6 ) . Subsequently, the m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t was d e n i e d in substantial part (the f i r s t 66 p a g e s o f t h e written transcript from the January 30, 1997 interrogation were not suppressed, even though B r y a n t h a d r e q u e s t e d a l a w y e r numerous t i m e s p r i o r to page 66 of the transcript) and Bryant's i n t e r r o g a t i o n and s t a t e m e n t s were a d m i t t e d a t t r i a l through Sgt. Stanley's testimony. Had Mr. Y a r b r o u g h c a l l e d Ms. M c C r e e t o t e s t i f y , t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e likelihood that the court would have excluded Bryant's statements from trial. Ms. Bryant's t e s t i m o n y would have demonstrated t h a t Bryant sought c o u n s e l i m m e d i a t e l y upon a r r e s t and t h e r e f o r e none o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s h e made w e r e v o l u n t a r y a n d f r e e l y given. "Mr. Y a r b r o u g h ' s failure to provide critical evidence at the suppression hearing prejudiced B r y a n t because B r y a n t ' s statements were a d m i t t e d a t trial. Mr. Y a r b r o u g h ' s a c t i o n s c a n n o t be a t t r i b u t e d to reasonable t r i a l strategy. "But f o r c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e c r i t i c a l evidence at the suppression hearing there i s a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t B r y a n t would have been 38 CR-08-0405 a c q u i t t e d or would have avoided a death s e n t e n c e . Mr. Y a r b r o u g h ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e c r u c i a l e v i d e n c e to exclude Bryant's statement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel that severely prejudiced Bryant." (C. 474-76.) We also meritorious counsel's find on this its face. omission performance -- not claim that not that f i r s t s t a t e m e n t was -- prejudiced be he by he alleged to confession argue with to the his that first specific facts satisfy the pleading requirements 32.6(b) and claim at an entitle evidentiary him with to an hearing. 39 deficient statement of h i s r i g h t his how first negating statement Therefore, sufficiently to specificity specificity -- crime. first in violation omission that with and to to t e s t i f y to e s t a b l i s h that would l i k e l y have been s u p p r e s s e d thereby ability pleaded constituted suppress h i s obtained counsel's alleged believed calling his sister and sufficiently Bryant moving to p o l i c e and counsel to respect in Rule opportunity he was statement the State's included Bryant to to a pleaded this claim to 32.3 and Rule to prove this CR-08-0405 D. Bryant contends trial counsel second that at he his first penalty-phase adequately sufficiently trial impeach R i c k y trial were pleaded his and trial ineffective Vickers's claims counsel that at his for failing and that testimony, trial c o u n s e l at h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e failing which to adequately ultimately first led challenge to Vickers's Vickers's t r i a l being read to the unavailability testimony j u r y at the second from to for -¬ Bryant's penalty-phase trial. In with his respect amended to these petition, Bryant alleged the following claims: "Mr. Yarbrough failed to properly impeach State's witness Ricky Vickers [at h i s f i r s t trial] by: (1) n o t p o i n t i n g o u t t h e m a j o r i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s b e t w e e n p r i o r s t a t e m e n t s made b y V i c k e r s ; (2) not adequately exploring what the State offered to Vickers in exchange for his cooperation and testimony; (3) n o t r e v e a l i n g V i c k e r s ' [ s ] previous felony convictions; and (4) not pointing out Vickers'[s] general lack of character for truthfulness. "Vickers gave a statement to Sergeant Jim Stanley on January 30, 1997 and gave another s t a t e m e n t t o S e r g e a n t D a v i d J a y on J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1997. 40 CR-08-0405 Both these statements d i f f e r e d from each o t h e r f r o m t h e s t o r y t h a t V i c k e r s u l t i m a t e l y t o l d on stand during Bryant's o r i g i n a l trial. and the "For example, a t t r i a l , V i c k e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t B r y a n t d r o v e t o t h e h o u s e o f a p e r s o n who V i c k e r s identified at trial as being Raymond Mathis. V i c k e r s s a i d t h a t B r y a n t and M a t h i s d i s c u s s e d t h e sale of the c e l l phone, following which Mathis c a r r i e d t h e p h o n e t o 'some g u y ' i n e x c h a n g e f o r some dope. I n h i s J a n u a r y 29 a n d 3 0 , 1997 s t a t e m e n t s t o the p o l i c e , V i c k e r s never mentioned anything about going to Raymond Mathis's house or Mathis's i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h t h e c e l l phone. In fact, i n h i s January 29 and 30 statements, Vickers never m e n t i o n e d a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c e l l phone ( o t h e r t h a n B r y a n t t a l k i n g on t h e c e l l phone) o r B r y a n t s e l l i n g t h e c e l l p h o n e u n t i l J a n u a r y 3 0 , when t h e p o l i c e a s k e d w h e t h e r B r y a n t s t i l l h a d t h e c e l l p h o n e when t h e y l e f t t h e b o d y on t h e d i r t r o a d . In response, V i c k e r s gave v a r y i n g answers b e f o r e f i n a l l y s e t t l i n g on s a y i n g t h a t he t h o u g h t , b u t c o u l d n o t be s u r e s i n c e h e was o n d r u g s , t h a t B r y a n t h a d p u l l e d o f f a t a s t o r e a n d g i v e n a man s t a n d i n g o n t h e c o r n e r a t t h e s t o r e t h e c e l l p h o n e i n e x c h a n g e f o r some d r u g s . In h i s J a n u a r y 31 s t a t e m e n t , V i c k e r s g a v e y e t a d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n of the event. Vickers said that B r y a n t went t o M a t h i s ' s house, gave M a t h i s t h e c e l l phone, M a t h i s gave B r y a n t d i r e c t i o n s t o t h e house o f a woman, M a t h i s w e n t i n t o t h e woman's h o u s e , a n d when M a t h i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e c a r , h e no l o n g e r h a d t h e c e l l p h o n e b u t d i d h a v e some d o p e . A g a i n , Mr. Yarbrough did not highlight any of these inconsistencies. "Vickers also t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l that Mathis t o l d him and B r y a n t where t h e y c o u l d l e a v e a body; knew t h e r e was a b o d y i n t h e c a r ; r o d e w i t h t h e m a n d 41 CR-08-0405 i d e n t i f i e d t h e d i r t road where t h e y c o u l d l e a v e t h e body, and g o t o u t o f t h e c a r and watched while V i c k e r s and B r y a n t removed t h e body from t h e t r u n k and placed i t on t h e h i l l . I n h i s J a n u a r y 29 statement t o the p o l i c e , Vickers never mentioned anything about Mathis's involvement i n moving t h e body. " A t t r i a l , V i c k e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e was w i t h B r y a n t when B r y a n t p a r k e d t h e c a r . I n h i s J a n u a r y 30 s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p o l i c e , V i c k e r s o u t r i g h t d e n i e d b e i n g w i t h B r y a n t when B r y a n t p a r k e d t h e c a r . I n t h a t same s t a t e m e n t , V i c k e r s a l s o s a i d t h a t h e d i d n o t , a t any t i m e d u r i n g t h e n i g h t , h o l d t h e gun t h a t Bryant allegedly had been h o l d i n g or possessed d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e t i m e h e was w i t h V i c k e r s . Inh i s January 31 s t a t e m e n t , however, V i c k e r s admitted h o l d i n g t h e gun. "Mr. Y a r b r o u g h a l s o f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y e x p l o r e what t h e S t a t e o f f e r e d t o V i c k e r s i n exchange f o r h i s cooperation and testimony. W h i l e Mr. Y a r b r o u g h d i d q u e s t i o n V i c k e r s , Mr. Y a r b r o u g h ' s e x a m i n a t i o n was g r o s s l y i n a d e q u a t e . M r . Y a r b r o u g h ' s e x a m i n a t i o n o f V i c k e r s on t h i s i s s u e c o n s i s t e d o f w h e t h e r he h a d been c o n v i c t e d o f s e l l i n g dope and b r i e f q u e s t i o n i n g r e g a r d i n g whether c a p i t a l murder charges had been dropped against Vickers i n exchange for his testimony. Mr. Y a r b r o u g h f a i l e d t o q u e s t i o n a n d impeach V i c k e r s u s i n g h i s p r i o r bad a c t s which would have r e v e a l e d V i c k e r s [ ' s ] e x t e n s i v e h i s t o r y o f drug use and would have emphasized Vickers['s] overwhelming incentive to cut a deal with the prosecutor. "Although the police initially questioned V i c k e r s f o r murder, t h e State subsequently reduced the charge t o h i n d e r i n g p r o s e c u t i o n . The D i s t r i c t 42 CR-08-0405 Attorney's standard procedure when seeking the c o o p e r a t i o n o f a w i t n e s s who h a d o t h e r criminal c h a r g e s p e n d i n g was t o g e t t h e g u i l t y p l e a p r i o r t o the witness's testimony and then schedule the s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g f o r some t i m e a f t e r t h e c a s e i n which the witness would t e s t i f y . D e p e n d i n g o n 'how good' the prosecutor determined the witness's testimony t o be, t h e p r o s e c u t o r would determine t h e recommended s e n t e n c e f o r t h e w i t n e s s i n h i s c r i m i n a l case. T h e p r o s e c u t o r f o l l o w e d t h e same procedure when d e a l i n g w i t h V i c k e r s . T r i a l c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e to d i s c o v e r and impeach R i c k y V i c k e r s ' s t e s t i m o n y i n t h i s r e g a r d c o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d s t r a t e g i c . "Mr. Yarbrough also failed to call character witnesses to t e s t i f y to Vickers'[s] character f o r t r u t h f u l n e s s ; r e s i d e n t s o f t h e Bottoms neighborhood w o u l d h a v e t e s t i f i e d t h a t V i c k e r s h a d an a c u t e d r u g problem and t h e r e f o r e h i s s t a t e m e n t s were u n r e l i a b l e and t h a t h e was g e n e r a l l y a n u n t r u t h f u l person. These c h a r a c t e r w i t n e s s e s would have a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t V i c k e r s was c l e a r l y u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f drugs d u r i n g h i s testimony a t t r i a l . "But f o r Mr. Y a r b r o u g h ' s failures described above, t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t B r y a n t would have been a c q u i t t e d o r would have a v o i d e d a death sentence. Mr. Yarbrough's deficient performance f e l l below the o b j e c t i v e standard of reasonableness a n d p r e j u d i c e d B r y a n t b e c a u s e Mr. Yarbrough p e r m i t t e d b i a s e d and u n r e l i a b l e testimony against Bryant. "Resentencing counsel failed to effectively challenge the State's proffer of Ricky Vickers's t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t i n s t e a d of l i v e testimony because 43 CR-08-0405 R i c k y V i c k e r s was 'unavailable' to t e s t i f y under Ala. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). (R. 1 1 - 1 9 ; R. 316-18 Remand.) The A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a t e d i n E x parte Scroggins, 727 So. 2 d 131 (Ala. 1998), t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n m u s t make 'a g o o d f a i t h e f f o r t t o o b t a i n the presence of the d e c l a r a n t at t r i a l ' in o r d e r t o o f f e r t h e s t a t e m e n t o f a w i t n e s s who i s n o t present at trial and satisfy the right of confrontation. The State must exercise due d i l i g e n c e i n i t s attempt to procure the presence of a witness. J o h n s o n v . S t a t e , 623 So. 2 d 444 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . The c o u r t i m p o s e s a h i g h standard f o r p r o v i n g t h a t s u c h due d i l i g e n c e t o o k p l a c e . The p a r t y seeking to introduce the d e c l a r a n t ' s statement has to show t h a t i t i s unable to procure the d e c l a r a n t ' s a t t e n d a n c e e i t h e r by l e g a l p r o c e s s or by other reasonable means. W i l l i a m s v. C a l l o w a y , 281 Ala. 2 4 9 , 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 201 So. 2 d 5 0 6 , 508 (Ala. 1967). "Resentencing counsel was ineffective for f a i l i n g to demonstrate to the Court t h a t the State did n o t e x e r c i s e due d i l i g e n c e i n i t s search for Ricky Vickers. On t h e f i r s t day of [the second penalty-phase] t r i a l , the State i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t w o u l d be o f f e r i n g t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f V i c k e r s ' s p r i o r t r i a l t e s t i m o n y b e c a u s e V i c k e r s c o u l d n o t be l o c a t e d d u r i n g the previous weekend. (R. 11-12 Remand.) Resentencing counsel never pointed out that the S t a t e d i d n o t e x e r c i s e due d i l i g e n c e i n p r o c u r i n g Vickers for t r i a l . Resentencing counsel f a i l e d to p o i n t out t h a t the 'Bottoms', the n e i g h b o r h o o d where V i c k e r s r e s i d e d , spans j u s t a c o u p l e o f s t r e e t s and thus i t would have been v e r y easy f o r the Houston County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e to canvass the neighborhood in search of V i c k e r s . Resentencing counsel d i d not argue t h a t the S t a t e had f a i l e d t o meet t h e due d i l i g e n c e s t a n d a r d by q u e s t i o n i n g o n l y t h o s e p e o p l e 44 CR-08-0405 c l o s e s t t o V i c k e r s , who whereab his whereabouts s e c r e t . had s t r o n g motives to keep "In fact, r e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l was aware of V i c k e r s ' s w h e r e a b o u t s and knew o f i n d i v i d u a l s who could t e s t i f y to Vickers's location. In f a c t , i n a r e c e n t i n t e r v i e w w i t h V i c k e r s , he s t a t e d t h a t he remembers b e i n g i n t h e Bottoms and t h a t he was a c c e s s i b l e at the time t h a t Bryant's resentencing hearing occurred. This alone, e s t a b l i s h e s the f a c t t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t e x e r c i s e due d i l i g e n c e i n attempting to procure Vickers for trial. Resentencing c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e because they s h o u l d have r e q u e s t e d a r e c e s s t o p r o c u r e w i t n e s s e s , including Vickers himself, to t e s t i f y to Vickers's w h e r e a b o u t s and d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d not e x e r c i s e due d i l i g e n c e i n i t s s e a r c h f o r V i c k e r s . "While r e s e n t e n c i n g counsel d i d not bear the burden of producing V i c k e r s f o r t r i a l , resentencing c o u n s e l d i d have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o demonstrate that the State's search f o r V i c k e r s f e l l below the s t a n d a r d o f due d i l i g e n c e . R e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e because they d i d not c h a l l e n g e whether t h e S t a t e h a d met i t s b u r d e n t o show t h a t V i c k e r s was 'unavailable' when the facts clearly d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t V i c k e r s was a v a i l a b l e t o t e s t i f y . This f a i l u r e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y acute because V i c k e r s ' s hearsay testimony i s the only evidence linking B r y a n t t o the a l l e g e d s a l e of H o l l i s ' s c e l l phone. The s a l e of the cell p h o n e i s one of only two a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r s on w h i c h t h e S t a t e r e l i e d i n seeking the death penalty. Removal of V i c k e r s ' s h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y was c r u c i a l t o B r y a n t ' s defense. "Resentencing c o u n s e l was also ineffective by not impeaching V i c k e r s ' s t r i a l testimony w i t h p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s made b y V i c k e r s on s e v e r a l 45 CR-08-0405 o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g s t a t e m e n t s made t o p o l i c e on J a n u a r y 2 9 a n d 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 . Resentencing counsel only focused on V i c k e r s ' s prior convictions to impeach V i c k e r s ; this was n o t e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e V i c k e r s ' s p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s were r e v e a l e d during his t r a n s c r i p t testimony. (R. 3 8 6 - 3 9 5 Remand.) In fact, the State d i d n o t even object to the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f an a d d i t i o n a l c o n v i c t i o n b e c a u s e he didn't think the admission of a d d i t i o n a l convictions w o u l d 'make a b i g d i f f e r e n c e a n y w a y . ' (R- 3 9 2 - 9 5 Remand.) Resentencing counsel acted ineffectively because he d i d not offer Vickers'[s] prior i n c o n s i s t e n t statements t o p o l i c e that demonstrate t h a t V i c k e r s c l e a r l y c h a n g e d h i s s t o r y on a number of occasions. (A f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n o f V i c k e r s ' [ s ] i n c o n s i s t e n t statements i s l o c a t e d a t [paragraphs] 91 t o 9 3 , s u p r a [ a s q u o t e d a b o v e ] ) . "But f o r counsel's failure to effectively challenge the state's proffer of Vickers'[s] testimony and h i s f a i l u r e to properly impeach Vickers, there i s a reasonable likelihood that Bryant would have avoided a death sentence. Counsel's d e f i c i e n t performance fell below the o b j e c t i v e standard o f reasonableness and p r e j u d i c e d Bryant by a l l o w i n g biased testimony against Bryant." (C. 476-83.) In trial denying the claim d i d not e f f e c t i v e l y circuit court a vigorous stated (C. 7 5 9 . ) trial counsel cross-examine i n i t s order cross-examination complained of." that that of Vickers Ricky Vickers, "[t]he record first the reflects on a l l o f t h e a r e a [ s ] However, t h e c i r c u i t 46 at h i s court d i d not CR-08-0405 s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s the numerous t h i n g s B r y a n t a l l e g e d i n h i s amended petition credibility, could nor did have been i t make used any to finding counsel's performance i n t h i s counsel's performance prejudiced Bryant. say the that Bryant's circuit petition. court In regard and Rule 32.6(b). counsel and he that he a d d i t i o n , we Bryant believed was actually s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded to s a t i s f y addressed testimony omissions in defense. Therefore, prove claim this In unavailability statements the the State's at Bryant an specific the trial claim did that not or effectively to p o l i c e , the case the and credibility is entitled evidentiary t o an counsel effectively claim in was 32.3 omissions by performance, importance how of counsel's prejudiced his opportunity court at challenge impeach V i c k e r s 47 claim to hearing. trial circuit cannot requirements i n Rule constituted deficient attacking Vickers's denying penalty-phase to this whether we this that whether or Therefore, s p e c i f i c a l l y pleaded i n his p e t i t i o n Vickers's Vickers's regarding deficient find the alleged attack stated with his second Vickers's his in i t s prior order: CR-08-0405 " D e f e n s e c o u n s e l made e v e r y e f f o r t t o [ k e e p o u t of evidence Vickers's testimony from his first trial] a t the second t r i a l u n s u c c e s s f u l l y before t h i s Court. S u c h i s s u e i s d e e m e d m o o t a s s u c h was decided a d v e r s e l y t o the Defendant on t h e i s s u e s raised before the Appellate Court. The f a c t t h a t V i c k e r s m i g h t have been p r e s e n t somewhere i n t h e C i t y o f Dothan a t t h e a c t u a l time o f t r i a l , a l t h o u g h unknown to the Police, does not contravene requirements of u n a v a i l a b i l i t y . " (C. 759.) First, portion of the circuit the claim court that d i d not counsel was address at a l l that ineffective f o r not introducing into evidence Vickers's p r i o r statements to p o l i c e to impeach h i s t e s t i m o n y . was sufficiently 32.3 and Rule pleaded 32.6(b). That p o r t i o n o f t h e c l a i m , to satisfy Bryant the requirements alleged the s p e c i f i c o f c o u n s e l t h a t he b e l i e v e d c o n s t i t u t e d d e f i c i e n t -- the police failure to introduce Vickers's ( w h i c h c o n t e n t was of Bryant's p e t i t i o n ) how the failure only found evidence to exist, fully one of t h e two p r e j u d i c e d him. 48 performance statements -- a n d a l l e g e d s p e c i f i c f a c t s whose i n Rule omission s e t out i n the facts t o impeach V i c k e r s , of prior however, portion indicating t e s t i m o n y was aggravating to the circumstances CR-08-0405 Second, the c i r c u i t c o u r t found t h a t p o r t i o n of the claim relating to counsel's challenge to Vickers's u n a v a i l a b i l i t y be moot b e c a u s e trial to i t had been c o u r t and t h i s C o u r t . recognize evidence that he claimed to the trial Vickers's unavailability, impact of that Therefore, we addressed this specific deficient facts cannot say indicating thus satisfying Rule how by both the court and but and on additional should this have Court the evidence address relation two-pronged S t r i c k l a n d the c i r c u i t court Bryant that in regard, this in been, regarding i t d i d not s p e c i f i c a l l y that was based he and pleading requirements test. sufficiently identified believed p r e j u d i c e d by to constituted alleged that the specific performance, 32.6(b). Accordingly, the not, counsel he rejected was Moreover, of performance was under claim. omissions claim additional counsel's performance and However, t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t f a i l e d Bryant's that presented the raised to Bryant prove h i s claim that t r i a l is entitled to i n Rule an opportunity counsel at h i s second 49 32.3 and to penalty-phase CR-08-0405 trial or d i d not e f f e c t i v e l y effectively police challenge impeach V i c k e r s a t an e v i d e n t i a r y Vickers's with his prior unavailability statements to hearing. E. Bryant that trial counsel ineffective Kentucky, In with contends for at not 476 U.S. to this he sufficiently h i s second adequately 79 h i s amended respect that pleaded penalty-phase arguing (1986), Bryant trial Batson were v. motion. petition, their his claim alleged the following claim: "When f o u r o f s e v e n A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n j u r o r s w e r e s t r u c k by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d u r i n g t h e resentencing j u r y v e n i r e , Mr. C r e s p i f a i l e d t o e f f e c t i v e l y a r g u e that a Batson violation occurred. Mr. Crespi o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r o r s w e r e s t r u c k o n l y because o f race and t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s statements and questions indicated an intent to discriminate against African-American jurors. "Mr. C r e s p i h a d t h e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o make a prima f a c i e case o f p u r p o s e f u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and a c t e d i n e f f e c t i v e l y b y n o t d o i n g s o . The f a c t s t h a t Mr. Crespi could have brought to the Court's a t t e n t i o n b u t f a i l e d t o do s o i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g : the venire f o r Bryant's trial consisted of 80 members; e i g h t e e n members o f t h e j u r y v e n i r e w e r e A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n , a r a t i o o f 23%; t h e p r o s e c u t i o n eliminated the A f r i c a n Americans q u i c k l y , using four 50 CR-08-0405 of t h e i r f i r s t nine s t r i k e s to e l i m i n a t e a l l but three A f r i c a n Americans. These f a c t s demonstrate a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e c a u s e i t shows t h a t t h e C o u r t and t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s t r u c k 80% o f A f r i c a n Americans from Bryant's j u r y v e n i r e . " F u r t h e r m o r e , Mr. C r e s p i p r a c t i c e s c r i m i n a l l a w i n Houston County and i s t h e r e f o r e f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e prosecutors involved in Bryant's case, yet resentencing counsel f a i l e d to mention to the Court t h a t Houston County p r o s e c u t o r s have a h i s t o r y of Batson v i o l a t i o n s . A p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have found t h a t the Houston County p r o s e c u t o r i n v o l v e d i n B r y a n t ' s case, Gary Maxwell, C h i e f A s s i s t a n t t o the D i s t r i c t Attorney for Houston County, discriminated in violation of Batson i n at least seven reported cases. S e e M c C r a y v . S t a t e , 738 S o . 2 d 9 1 1 , 914 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) ; A s h l e y v . S t a t e , 651 S o . 2 d 1096, 1101 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 4 ) ; A n d r e w s v. S t a t e , 624 So. 2d 1095, 1099 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1993); W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 620 S o . 2 d 8 2 , 86 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 9 9 3 ) ; R o g e r v . S t a t e , 593 S o . 2 d 141 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) ; F r i e d m a n v . S t a t e , 654 So. 2 d 50 ( A l a . C r i m , A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) ; B u s h v . S t a t e , 615 S o . 2 d 137 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) . Had Mr. C r e s p i b r o u g h t this issue before the court he would have e s t a b l i s h e d a prima f a c i e case of discrimination b a s e d on p a s t c o n d u c t b y t h e s t a t e ' s a t t o r n e y i n using peremptory strikes to eliminate African Americans from the j u r y v e n i r e . Ex p a r t e B r a n c h , 526 S o . 2 d 6 0 9 , 6 2 2 - 2 3 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . " R e s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e b y f a i l i n g t o argue t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n had a h i s t o r y of u s i n g peremptory challenges solely to remove African-American jurors. Resentencing counsel's deficient performance fell below the objective s t a n d a r d of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s and p r e j u d i c e d Bryant 51 CR-08-0405 b e c a u s e Mr. C r e s p i p r e v e n t e d B r y a n t f r o m o b t a i n i n g a fair and i m p a r t i a l jury, and t h e r e f o r e Bryant s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l . ... " (C. 462-64.) This alleged c l a i m was in percentage number his clearly petition not s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded. statistics of African-Americans struck and percentage -by the Bryant number and t h e S t a t e and t h e o f A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s on t h e v e n i r e -¬ and p o i n t e d o u t t h e Houston County D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s Office history State, 24 So. (Ala. of r a c i a l 3 d 480 jurors," the ( A l a . Crim. App. 2006), cited therein. allegation indicated he f a i l e d the there State was a aff'd, a 24 So. 3d statements and questions against African-American discriminatory and q u e s t i o n s by intent. Nor d i d he indicating that the African-Americans lack only of jurors, the characteristic meaningful 540 A l t h o u g h h e made a t o a l l e g e what s t a t e m e n t s shared African-American "the State's to discriminate indicated a l l e g e any f a c t s by that an i n t e n t State See, e.g., Lewis v. and t h e cases 2009), bare discrimination. dire race, that directed at or that African-American jurors and 52 voir of struck CR-08-0405 Caucasian j u r o r s were t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y . coupled with history of establish Sharifi the a prima v. in State, dismissal of simply not 993 907 ( A l a . C r i m . App. So. 2d Bryant failed f a c i e case of of its c l a i m was to racial peremptory proper plead See, to e.g., 2008). sufficient discrimination strikes, under Rule even Office sufficient discrimination. use this are Attorney's of because State's District f a c i e case i n d i c a t i n g a prima the County discrimination, Therefore, facts Houston Statistics, summary 32.7(d). F. B r y a n t a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t he additional claims in his he sufficiently of i n e f f e c t i v e amended p e t i t i o n . pleaded s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded several a s s i s t a n c e of counsel raised Specifically, the following Bryant contends claims: (1) T h a t D e r e k Y a r b r o u g h was i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e he d i d n o t h a v e t h e r e q u i s i t e f i v e y e a r s ' experience i n t r y i n g c r i m i n a l c a s e s r e q u i r e d by § 13A-5-54, A l a . Code 1975; (2) T h a t Y a r b r o u g h ' s i n e x p e r i e n c e r e s u l t e d i n his "ineffectively challeng[ing] the State's i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i t s c a s e during t h e g u i l t p h a s e o f Mr. Bryant's trial" (Bryant's b r i e f , a t p. 98); 53 that CR-08-0405 (3) T h a t Y a r b r o u g h d i d n o t b r i n g t o t h e trial court's a t t e n t i o n or preserve f o r a p p e l l a t e review "the f a c t t h a t a j u r o r and a key w i t n e s s , Sergeant Jim S t a n l e y of the Dothan P o l i c e , had c o n t a c t d u r i n g trial" ( B r y a n t ' s b r i e f , a t p. 9 9 ) ; (4) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s s e c o n d p e n a l t y phase t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not effectively i n v e s t i g a t i n g and p r e s e n t i n g m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e ; (5) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s s e c o n d p e n a l t y phase t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not c h a l l e n g i n g "key a s p e c t s o f t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e " ( B r y a n t ' s b r i e f , a t p. 1 0 0 ) ; (6) T h a t c o u n s e l on a p p e a l from h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not r a i s i n g on a p p e a l c l a i m s o f p r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c o n d u c t ; and (7) T h a t c o u n s e l on a p p e a l from h i s second penalty-phase trial were ineffective for not "effectively and adequately challeng[ing] the S t a t e ' s c a s e on a p p e a l " ( B r y a n t ' s b r i e f , a t p. 1 0 1 ) . However, satisfy Although the Bryant's argument requirements i n Rule in this regard fails 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. to P. B r y a n t makes a c u r s o r y a r g u m e n t , p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d in P a r t I.A. of t h i s an improper 32 proceedings, o p i n i o n , t h a t the circuit court applied burden of proof at the p l e a d i n g stage he does nothing else but simply of the state, Rule in c u r s o r y f a s h i o n , t h e c l a i m s f r o m t h e p e t i t i o n he b e l i e v e s w e r e 54 CR-08-0405 s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded with citations t o e i t h e r t h e page i n t h e r e c o r d where t h e c l a i m s a r e l o c a t e d o r t o t h e numbers in located. claims amended petition wherein the paragraph claims He m a k e s no a r g u m e n t r e g a r d i n g why he b e l i e v e s were specific his number sufficiently authority pleaded nor does he cite are these to any i n s u p p o r t of h i s argument t h a t t h e c l a i m s w e r e i m p r o p e r l y d i s m i s s e d -- h i s o n l y c i t a t i o n t o a u t h o r i t y i n this entire This Court State, Crim. portion recently of addressed [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 0 0 6 6 , App. his brief October a i s to similar 1, 2 0 1 0 ] Strickland, issue supra. i n Taylor So. 3d (Ala. 2010): "We a r e a w a r e t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n o f R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) t o f i n d a w a i v e r o f a r g u m e n t s i n an a p p e l l a t e b r i e f has been limited to those cases i n which the appellant presents general assertions and p r o p o s i t i o n s o f l a w w i t h f e w o r no c i t a t i o n s t o r e l e v a n t l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , r e s u l t i n g i n an a r g u m e n t consisting of undelineated general propositions unsupported by sufficient legal authority or argument. Although Rule 28(a)(10) i s to be c a u t i o u s l y a p p l i e d , i t has been a p p l i e d r e c e n t l y by t h e A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t a n d b y t h i s C o u r t when appropriate. E.g., Ex parte Theodorou, [Ms. 1090393, June 30, 2010] So. 3d ( A l a . 2010); J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y Comm'n v . E d w a r d s , 32 S o . 3 d 572 ( A l a . 2 0 0 9 ) ; S l a c k v . S t r e a m , 988 S o . 2 d 516 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) ; James v. S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 4 - 0 3 9 5 , M a r c h 2 6 , 55 v. CR-08-0405 2010] So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2006) ( o p i n i o n on remand f r o m A l a b a m a Supreme Court); Scott v. State, [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 2 2 3 3 , M a r c h 6, 2 0 1 0 ] So. 3d (Ala. C r i m . App. 2010); B a k e r v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-06-1723, Dec. 18, 2009] So. 3d (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 9 ) ; L e e v . S t a t e , 44 S o . 3 d 1 1 4 5 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009); Bush v. S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 3 - 1 9 0 2 , May 2 9 , 2 0 0 9 ] So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) ; a n d F r a n k l i n v . S t a t e , 23 S o . 3 d 694 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) . "In Scott v. S t a t e , this Court stated: "'"Recitation of allegations without c i t a t i o n t o any l e g a l a u t h o r i t y and w i t h o u t adequate r e c i t a t i o n of the f a c t s relied upon has been deemed a w a i v e r of the arguments l i s t e d . " Hamm v . S t a t e , 913 S o . 2 d 4 6 0 , 486 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) . "An appellate court w i l l consider only those i s s u e s p r o p e r l y d e l i n e a t e d as such and w i l l not search out e r r o r s which have n o t been properly preserved or assigned. This s t a n d a r d has been s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p l i e d t o briefs containing general propositions devoid of d e l i n e a t i o n and s u p p o r t from a u t h o r i t y or argument." Ex p a r t e R i l e y , 464 S o . 2 d 9 2 , 94 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) (citations omitted). "When a n a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o c i t e any authority f o r an argument on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , t h i s C o u r t may a f f i r m t h e judgment as t o t h a t issue, for i t is n e i t h e r t h i s Court's duty nor i t s f u n c t i o n t o p e r f o r m an a p p e l l a n t ' s l e g a l r e s e a r c h . " C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m v. B u s i n e s s R e a l t y I n v . C o . , 722 S o . 2 d 7 4 7 , 752 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) . ' 56 CR-08-0405 " S c o t t v. S t a t e , So. 3d a t . S e e a l s o Hamm v . S t a t e , 913 S o . 2 d 4 6 0 , 486 n . l l ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2002) ('Applying the federal counterpart to A l a b a m a ' s R u l e 2 8 , A l a . R. A p p . P., t h e U n i t e d States Court of Appeals f o r the Eighth Circuit s t a t e d , "[W]e r e g u l a r l y d e c l i n e t o c o n s i d e r c u r s o r y or summary arguments that are unsupported by citations to legal authorities. See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W a d l i n g t o n , 233 F . 3 d 1 0 6 7 , 1081 ( 8 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . G o n z a l e s , 90 F . 3 d 1 3 6 3 , 1 3 6 9 ( 8 t h Cir.1996); s e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . D u n k e l , 927 F . 2 d 9 5 5 , 956 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ( ' J u d g e s a r e n o t l i k e pigs, hunting for truffles buried i n briefs.')." U.S. v. Stuckey, 255 F . 3 d 528, 531 (8th C i r . 2001).'). "As t h e S t a t e c o r r e c t l y a r g u e s i n i t s b r i e f o n a p p e a l , many ' a r g u m e n t s ' i n T a y l o r ' s b r i e f c o n s i s t o f l i t t l e more t h a n a c u r s o r y summary o f t h e c l a i m s f r o m t h e p e t i t i o n . ... II "Clearly, Taylor's cursory summary of the a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e p e t i t i o n -- w i t h a c i t a t i o n o n l y t o t h e p a r a g r a p h s o f t h e p e t i t i o n i n many a r g u m e n t s of t h e b r i e f , and i n other p o r t i o n s o f t h e b r i e f o n l y t o paragraphs o f t h e p e t i t i o n and u n d e l i n e a t e d g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f l a w -- d o e s n o t c o m p o r t w i t h Rule 28(a)(10). F o r many o f t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n the b r i e f , Taylor presents no d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e facts o r t h e law i n t h e form o f an argument demonstrating why t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l o f t h e s p e c i f i c c l a i m s was i n e r r o r . A c c o r d i n g l y , we hold that Taylor has waived f o r purposes of a p p e l l a t e review i n t h i s Court those arguments i n his brief ... that fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10)." 57 CR-08-0405 So. 3d at Here, claims . t o o , we in his find that petition Bryant's with facts or law i n the form these c l a i m s were no c u r s o r y summary o f specific discussion o f a n a r g u m e n t a s t o why improperly summarily he of dismissed, with t o page or p a r a g r a p h numbers, and w i t h o n l y a citation to comply with ineffective be Rule legal authority 28(a)(10). is not Therefore, the believes citations general the only single sufficient those a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l s e t out above claims to of a r e deemed t o waived. Moreover, even i f Bryant's brief in this regard did s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s i n R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , we h a v e t h o r o u g h l y reviewed Bryant's amended p e t i t i o n claims of i n e f f e c t i v e insufficiently 32.3 and claims Rule was proper we find that assistance of counsel l i s t e d pleaded 32.6(b) and to satisfy and, thus, under Rule the 58 above were requirements summary d i s m i s s a l 32.7(d). a l l the in of Rule those CR-08-0405 G. Finally, we note that Bryant raised several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in petition in brief that Specifically, amended he does Bryant not pursue raised the his following additional his on claims amended appeal. in petition: (1) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l w e r e ineffective for not attempting to rehabilitate v e n i r e m e m b e r s who were removed by the t r i a l court during general qualifications; (2) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l w e r e ineffective f o r not "tak[ing] exception" to the trial c o u r t ' s removal of veniremembers from the p a n e l (C. 4 6 2 ) ; (3) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l w e r e i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not o b j e c t i n g to the f a c t t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s on t h e c h a l l e n g e s f o r c a u s e w e r e n o t b e i n g i n c l u d e d i n t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l ; (4) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l w e r e i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not o b j e c t i n g to the t r i a l c o u r t ' s striking of a v e n i r e m e m b e r when, he said, that veniremember had been r e h a b i l i t a t e d ; his (5) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d a t second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r 59 his CR-08-0405 not p r o p e r l y investigating powder-residue expert; and retaining a gun¬ (6) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d a t h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether Bryant t y p i c a l l y c a r r i e d the t y p e o f gun u s e d t o k i l l Hollis; (7) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d a t h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r n o t i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h e t h e r H o l l i s was w i t h a woman a t an a p a r t m e n t a t the time the p o l i c e spoke with Bryant outside of Mickey's nightclub; (8) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d a t h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not investigating and finding a woman named " S q u e a k y " who w a s a l l e g e d l y w i t h B r y a n t a t t h e t i m e the police spoke with him outside of Mickey's nightclub; (9) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d a t h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r not i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether H o l l i s and B r a n t l e y were f a m i l i a r with t h e neighborhood i n which they picked up B r y a n t , w e r e h o m o s e x u a l , a n d o f t e n " t r o l l e d " t h a t n e i g h b o r h o o d l o o k i n g f o r s e x u a l p a r t n e r s (C. 4 7 0 ) ; (10) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s f i r s t t r i a l a n d at h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r n o t i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h e t h e r R a y m o n d M a t h i s was also known a s T e r r y J o h n s o n o r whether a Terry J o h n s o n , who, B r y a n t c l a i m e d , l i v e d i n D o t h a n a n d h a d a n e x t e n s i v e c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , was t h e p e r s o n who h a d s h o t H o l l i s ; 60 CR-08-0405 (11) T h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l a t h i s s e c o n d penaltyphase t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r n o t c h a l l e n g i n g t h e trial court's submission to the jury of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed f o r p e c u n i a r y gain; (12) T h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l o n a p p e a l f r o m h i s f i r s t t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r n o t r a i s i n g i n t h e m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l a n d t h e n o n a p p e a l a c l a i m t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e ; and (13) T h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l o n a p p e a l f r o m h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r n o t r a i s i n g i n a motion f o r a new t r i a l a n d t h e n o n a p p e a l a c l a i m t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e . B e c a u s e none o f t h e s e c l a i m s on appeal, they are c o n s i d e r e d by t h i s So. 2d issues 91, 93 a r e argued by Bryant i n h i s b r i e f deemed Court. and will not See, e.g., B r o w n l e e v. S t a t e , ( A l a . Crim. not l i s t e d abandoned and argued App. 1 995) ("We will not be 666 review in brief."). III . Bryant contends dismissing Maryland, defense his 373 claim U.S. f o r DNA that the c i r c u i t 83 testing that the (1963), by t h e two 61 court State not used erred in violated summarily Brady turning over condoms found to v. the at the CR-08-0405 scene of H o l l i s ' s sufficiently face, and In with respect He maintains that pleaded i n h i s petition, entitled his murder. him amended to this t o a new petition, was this claim meritorious was on i t s trial. Bryant alleged the following claim: "The S t a t e a l s o [ ] v i o l a t e d B r a d y b y f a i l i n g t o t u r n o v e r u s e d condoms f o u n d a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e c r i m e , s o c o u n s e l c o u l d p u r s u e DNA testing. The f i r s t prong of Brady i s s a t i s f i e d because the used condoms w e r e n o t t u r n e d o v e r t o t r i a l c o u n s e l when he r e q u e s t e d them f r o m t h e p o l i c e . In f a c t the p o l i c e destroyed or l o s t c o n t r o l o f t h e condoms b e f o r e t h e d e f e n s e h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o t e s t them. The s e c o n d p r o n g o f B r a d y i s s a t i s f i e d b e c a u s e t h e DNA evidence would demonstrate the nature of the a c t i v i t i e s at the crime scene, i n d i c a t i n g consensual s e x was t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e v i s i t a n d n o t k i d n a p p i n g as s u g g e s t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . The t h i r d p r o n g o f Brady is satisfied because the condoms are a m a t e r i a l p i e c e o f e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t t h e v i c t i m 8 B r y a n t r a i s e d two B r a d y c l a i m s i n h i s p e t i t i o n . He d o e s not p u r s u e on a p p e a l t h e f i r s t c l a i m -- t h a t t h e State v i o l a t e d B r a d y by n o t p r o d u c i n g R i c k y V i c k e r s as a w i t n e s s f o r the second penalty-phase t r i a l . Therefore, that claim i s deemed a b a n d o n e d and w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d by t h i s C o u r t . S e e , e . g . , B r o w n l e e v . S t a t e , 666 So. 2 d 9 1 , 93 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1995) ("We w i l l n o t r e v i e w i s s u e s n o t l i s t e d a n d a r g u e d in b r i e f . " ) . 8 62 CR-08-0405 was n o t k i d n a p p e d o r t h a t t h e r e was a p e r s o n o t h e r than Bryant a t the crime scene a t the time of the murder. Finally, the Brady claim is not procedurally b a r r e d because trial counsel never c o n f i r m e d t h a t e v i d e n c e was destroyed. The very n a t u r e o f t h e c l a i m -- t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o t u r n o v e r i n f o r m a t i o n -- i m p l i c i t l y p r e c l u d e s a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c l a i m was a v a i l a b l e to t r i a l counsel at t r i a l o r on a p p e a l . As s u c h , Mr. B r y a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e e x c u l p a t o r y and impeachment evidence in violation of Brady and Giglio [ v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 405 U.S. 150 (1972),] i s c o g n i z a b l e and s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d b y t h i s C o u r t . To d a t e , B r y a n t h a s b e e n d e n i e d d i s c o v e r y b y this C o u r t ; t h e r e f o r e , B r y a n t cannot c o n f i r m or deny the d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e condoms." (C. 504.) In 9 i t s response asserted that this (5), A l a . R. Crim. to Bryant's c l a i m was P., amended p e t i t i o n , the State p r e c l u d e d by R u l e 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) because i t c o u l d have been, but and was We n o t e t h a t B r y a n t m a k e s a much m o r e e x t e n s i v e a r g u m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h i s c l a i m i n h i s b r i e f o n a p p e a l -- s p a n n i n g some 15 p a g e s -- t h a n he d i d i n h i s a m e n d e d p e t i t i o n , and he includes detailed factual allegations in his brief. However, b e c a u s e t h e f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s and arguments B r y a n t i n c l u d e s i n h i s b r i e f on a p p e a l w e r e n o t i n c l u d e d i n h i s p e t i t i o n o r amended p e t i t i o n , t h e y a r e n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t and w i l l n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d . See B e a r d e n v . S t a t e , 825 So. 2 d 868 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2001). 9 63 CR-08-0405 not, raised and addressed at trial and on appeal. In i t s o r d e r , t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t f o u n d t h i s c l a i m t o be i n s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded. We agree w i t h b o t h t h e S t a t e and the c i r c u i t court. "To [ e s t a b l i s h ] a B r a d y v i o l a t i o n , a d e f e n d a n t m u s t show t h a t '"(1) the p r o s e c u t i o n suppressed evidence; (2) t h e e v i d e n c e was favorable to the d e f e n d a n t ; a n d (3) t h e e v i d e n c e was m a t e r i a l t o t h e issues at t r i a l . " ' J o h n s o n v . S t a t e , 612 S o . 2d 1288, 1293 ( A l a . C r . App. 1992), q u o t i n g Stano v. D u g g e r , 901 F . 2 d 8 9 8 , 899 (11th C i r . 1990), cert. denied, Stano v. S i n g l e t a r y , 516 U.S. 1122, 116 S.Ct. 9 3 2 , 133 L . E d . 2 d 859 (1996) . See S m i t h v . S t a t e , 675 S o . 2 d 100 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 5 ) . '"The evidence i s material only i f there i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , had the e v i d e n c e been d i s c l o s e d t o the defense, the r e s u l t of the p r o c e e d i n g would have been d i f f e r e n t . A 'reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y ' is a p r o b a b i l i t y s u f f i c i e n t to undermine confidence i n the outcome."' J o h n s o n , 612 S o . 2 d a t 1 2 9 3 , q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B a g l e y , 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S . C t . 3 3 7 5 , 3 3 8 3 , 87 L . E d . 2 d 481 (1985)." Freeman v. State, However, So. 2d 383 as 722 this (Ala. Crim. So. 2d 806, Court App. 810 ( A l a . C r i m . App. e x p l a i n e d i n Payne v. 1998). State, 1999): " B e c a u s e t h i s B r a d y c l a i m was f i r s t p r e s e n t e d i n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n , P a y n e c a n o b t a i n r e l i e f o n l y i f it involves 'newly discovered evidence.' Newly 64 791 CR-08-0405 d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e i s d e f i n e d under Rule 32.1, A l a . R. C r i m . P., a s f o l l o w s : "'Subject to the l i m i t a t i o n s of Rule 3 2 . 2 , a n y d e f e n d a n t who h a s b e e n c o n v i c t e d of a criminal o f f e n s e may institute a proceeding in the court of original c o n v i c t i o n t o s e c u r e a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f on the ground that: " ' "'(e) Newly d i s c o v e r e d m a t e r i a l f a c t s e x i s t which require that the c o n v i c t i o n or s e n t e n c e be v a c a t e d by t h e c o u r t , b e c a u s e : " ' ( 1 ) The f a c t s r e l i e d u p o n w e r e n o t known b y p e t i t i o n e r o r p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o u n s e l at the time of t r i a l or sentencing or i n time to f i l e a p o s t - t r i a l motion pursuant t o R u l e 24, o r i n t i m e t o be i n c l u d e d i n any previous collateral proceeding and c o u l d n o t have been d i s c o v e r e d by any o f those times through the exercise of reasonable diligence; "'(2) The facts are not c u m u l a t i v e t o o t h e r f a c t s t h a t were to the " ' ( 3 ) The impeachment f a c t s do n o t m e r e l y evidence; merely known; amount " ' ( 4 ) I f t h e f a c t s h a d b e e n known a t time of t r i a l or of sentencing, the 65 CR-08-0405 r e s u l t probably would and have been different; "'(5) The facts establish that p e t i t i o n e r i s innocent of the crime f o r w h i c h p e t i t i o n e r was c o n v i c t e d o r s h o u l d not have received the sentence that petitioner received.' "Rule 3 2 . 1 ( e ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. We note that b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n j u n c t i v e 'and' b e t w e e n (4) a n d (5), Payne must meet a l l f i v e p r e r e q u i s i t e s o f R u l e 3 2 . 1 ( e ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., i n o r d e r t o p r e v a i l . " 791 So. 3d a t 397. Here, that the Bryant two failed used evidence under Rule even mention in condoms 32.1(e) . -- i n fact, he well that A discovered not only d i d Bryant not he a d m i t t e d h i s counsel at h i s f i r s t in his amended petition d i s c o v e r y o f t h e condoms. request unaware. Indeed, newly indicating aware o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e two u s e d stated requested constituted facts R u l e 3 2 . 1 ( e ) i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , h i s amended p e t i t i o n was, to plead sufficient discovery Brady of violation evidence involves 66 that Counsel of his trial condoms counsel could not very which counsel "the discovery, was after CR-08-0405 trial, of i n f o r m a t i o n f a v o r a b l e to the accused that had known t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n b u t unknown t o t h e d e f e n s e . " States v. Bagley, Contrary to evidence i s not purposes of 473 Bryant's the U.S. 667, apparent 678 (1985) belief, e q u i v a l e n t of United (emphasis "not added). turn[ing] suppressing evidence f a i l e d t o p l e a d any facts indicating t h e two u s e d condoms w e r e unknown t o t h e d e f e n s e and t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d newly d i s c o v e r e d evidence o b t a i n e d a f t e r h i s this claim i s precluded by b e c a u s e i t c o u l d h a v e b e e n , b u t was at trial (Ala. May and on C r i m . App. 1, 2009] over" for Brady. Because Bryant trial, been appeal. 2009); So. 3d 1 0 See Rule n o t , r a i s e d and D a v i s v. Beckworth 32.2(a)(3) v. State, State, (Ala. Crim. App. 44 [Ms. that they first and (5) addressed So. 3d 1118 CR-07-0051, 2009); Smith v. We note that, c o n t r a r y to Bryant's assertion in h i s p e t i t i o n , whether the State destroyed or l o s t evidence i s a te eviden s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t i s s u e from whether t h e S t a t e s u p p r e s s e d evidence. The k e y i s s u e i n a B r a d y c l a i m i s w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n s e was aware o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e , not whether the e v i d e n c e had been d e s t r o y e d . 10 67 CR-08-0405 State, [Ms. CR-05-0561, September 26, 2008] ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2008); M a d i s o n v. S t a t e , Crim. App. 2006); and Boyd v. C r i m . App. 2 0 0 3 ) . was State, So. 999 S o . 2 d 5 6 1 ( A l a . 913 So. 2d T h e r e f o r e , summary d i s m i s s a l proper under Rule 3d 1113 ( A l a . of this claim 32.7(d). IV. Bryant summarily argues also dismissing that meritorious evidentiary three contends claims their hearing. the h i s claims h i s claims on that were face circuit of juror sufficiently and court thus we in misconduct. pleaded entitled I n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , of juror misconduct; erred address and him were to Bryant each He an raised i n turn. A. First, first trial, Bryant Bryant alleged that, during voir dire for his j u r o r J.K. f a i l e d t o a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s t r u t h f u l l y . alleged the following with 68 respect to this claim: CR-08-0405 " B r y a n t ' s r i g h t t o a f a i r a n d i m p a r t i a l j u r y was violated due to a juror's failure to respond t r u t h f u l l y t o q u e s t i o n s on v o i r d i r e . When a j u r o r f a i l s t o t r u t h f u l l y a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s on v o i r dire the defendant i s deprived of h i s r i g h t to wisely e x e r c i s e peremptory s t r i k e s . E x p a r t e O ' L e a r y , 438 So. 2 d 1372, 1373 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ; Ex p a r t e L e d b e t t e r , 404 S o . 2 d 7 3 1 , 733 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) ; T o m l i n v. S t a t e , 695 S o . 2 d 1 5 7 , 169 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 6 ) ; s e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s V. P e r k i n s , 748 F . 2 d 1 5 1 9 , 1 5 3 1 ( 1 1 t h Cir. 1984). "This j u r o r ' s f a i l u r e to respond t r u t h f u l l y to c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s p o s e d b y d e f e n s e c o u n s e l on v o i r d i r e v i o l a t e d B r y a n t ' s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s a n d a fair and i m p a r t i a l j u r y under the F i f t h , Sixth, Eighth, and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , and A l a b a m a S t a t e Law. S e e T o m l i n v . S t a t e , 695 S o . 2 d 1 5 7 , 169 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 6 ) ; McDonough Power E q u i p m e n t v . G r e e n w o o d , 464 U.S. 5 4 8 , 556 (1984) (finding constitutional violation where jurors deliberately d e c e i v e c o u r t about a matter which would c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d basis f o r challenge of juror). "Juror [J.K.] did not disclose material i n f o r m a t i o n on v o i r d i r e . During the o r i g i n a l t r i a l i n 1997, t r i a l c o u n s e l a s k e d i f any j u r o r h a d any connection t o law enforcement. While J u r o r [J.K.] indicated t h a t he knew s o m e o n e i n v o l v e d i n law e n f o r c e m e n t , he c o m p l e t e l y f a i l e d t o m e n t i o n t h a t he was a d e p u t y r e s e r v e o f f i c e r . His f a i l u r e to reveal that he was a reserve officer prevented Mr. Yarbrough from asking additional questions to 69 CR-08-0405 uncover whether Juror [ J . K . ] c o u l d be i m p a r t i a l i n s p i t e o f h i s b a c k g r o u n d as a r e s e r v e d e p u t y . In fact, Juror [J.K.] has had a long history of i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h law enforcement. J u r o r [J.K.] had applied to the Drug E n f o r c e m e n t A g e n c y and been d e n i e d a j o b and t h a t [ s i c ] t h i s d e n i a l a f f e c t e d him for the r e s t of h i s l i f e . J u r o r [ J . K . ] was obsessed with law e n f o r c e m e n t and c l e a r l y c o u l d n o t be an i m p a r t i a l member o f t h e j u r y . Juror [J.K.] i s a p o l i c e f a n a t i c [ , ] d r i v e s t h e same make a n d m o d e l a s unmarked p o l i c e c a r s , keeps numerous p o l i c e s c a n n e r s i n h i s c a r , and f o l l o w s t h e p o l i c e t o c r i m e s c e n e s . Juror [J.K.] i s c l e a r l y s o m e o n e who would have a d v o c a t e d law e n f o r c e m e n t and possessed potential b i a s e s w o r t h y [ s i c ] and t a i n t e d t h e j u r y w i t h his views. Juror [J.K.'s] misconduct was only d i s c o v e r e d upon i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e l a t e d t o Bryant's R u l e 32 P e t i t i o n . "The m i s c o n d u c t o f t h e j u r o r d e p r i v e d B r y a n t o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , i n c l u d i n g h i s r i g h t t o be t r i e d b y an i m p a r t i a l j u r y a n d h i s r i g h t s t o due process, a f a i r trial, an impartial jury, equal p r o t e c t i o n , and a r e l i a b l e s e n t e n c i n g p r o t e c t e d by t h e F i f t h , S i x t h , E i g h t h , and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , and A l a b a m a law." (C. 505-06.) 1 1 We n o t e t h a t , a g a i n , B r y a n t i n c l u d e s more s p e c i f i c f a c t s i n h i s b r i e f on a p p e a l t h a n he d i d i n h i s a m e n d e d p e t i t i o n . However, b e c a u s e t h o s e f a c t s were not i n c l u d e d i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , t h e y a r e not p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t and w i l l not 11 70 CR-08-0405 T h i s c l a i m was alleged that J.K. not s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded. failed to mention r e s e r v e o f f i c e r " w h e n t h e q u e s t i o n was had any connection e x a c t l y when J . K . J.K. was he was a deputy reserve i n his past. at the time The fact "was Bryant a deputy a s k e d w h e t h e r any t o law enforcement, Bryant a reserve o f f i c e r some p o i n t that Although f a i l e d to allege officer, i . e . , whether of Bryant's that juror J.K. may trial or at have been a reserve o f f i c e r a t some p o i n t i n h i s p a s t d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y constitute the failure phrased by Bryant amended petition juror had any in only to his answer petition. generally connection truthfully to law be c o n s i d e r e d i n e v a l u a t i n g t h i s 825 So. 2 d 868 ( A l a . C r i m . App. that the Bryant claim. 2001). alleged counsel enforcement." See question asked 1 2 in his " i f any However, B e a r d e n v. as he State, We note that, i n i t s order, the c i r c u i t court phrased t h e q u e s t i o n as f o l l o w s : "Does a n y o n e , e i t h e r t h e m s e l v e s , or a close f a m i l y member, or a good friend, work in law enforcement?" (C. 761.) However, t h a t i s not the q u e s t i o n Bryant a l l e g e d i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n was not answered truthfully, and we will not look beyond Bryant's actual pleadings i n order to create a claim. 12 71 CR-08-0405 f a i l e d t o p l e a d e x a c t l y w h a t t h e q u e s t i o n was was not answered p r o p o u n d e d by petition the -- counsel was juror's truthfully -- by as The phrased ambiguous, "connection" J.K. at to best, law c o u n s e l w a n t e d t o know i f a n y by know i f any lives. In examining juror's failure of exact the pleadings failed any a j u r o r had are simply addition, sufficient voir even dire, is Bryant failed indicating prejudice. I n Hooks v. Crim. 2008), Court App. this to the law wanted based their on a phrasing Bryant's indicate that bare J.K. dire. Bryant's pleadings f a i l e d t o answer to of to point in claim critical. plead S t a t e , 21 explained: 72 connection a t any during voir t h a t J.K. timing i . e . , whether truthfully, sufficient assuming the amended or whether counsel connection asked not to e s t a b l i s h any allegedly in his enforcement, t o answer q u e s t i o n s question Bryant juror-misconduct to answer t r u t h f u l l y In during j u r o r had question regarding enforcement at the time of the t r i a l to t h a t he b e l i e v e d truthfully sufficient So. 3d were 772 facts (Ala. CR-08-0405 "To prevail on a c l a i m o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t , the p e t i t i o n e r m u s t e s t a b l i s h t h a t he ' m i g h t h a v e b e e n prejudiced' by the jurors' failure to respond t r u t h f u l l y t o a q u e s t i o n p o s e d on v o i r d i r e . See E x parte Stewart, 659 So. 2 d 122 (Ala. 1993). "'It i s t r u e t h a t the p a r t i e s i n a case are entitled to true and honest a n s w e r s t o t h e i r q u e s t i o n s on v o i r d i r e , s o t h a t t h e y may exercise their peremptory strikes wisely. See F a b i a n k e v . W e a v e r , 527 So. 2 d 1253 ( A l a . 1988) . H o w e v e r , n o t every failure to respond properly to questions propounded during voir dire " a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e s [the defendant] t o a new t r i a l or r e v e r s a l of the cause on appeal." F r e e m a n v . H a l l , 286 A l a . 161, 1 6 6 , 238 So. 2 d 3 3 0 , 335 (1970); see a l s o Dawson v. S t a t e , [710 So. 2 d 472] at 474 [ ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ] ; a n d R e e d v . S t a t e , [547 So. 2 d 596 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ] . As s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y , the proper standard to apply i n determining w h e t h e r a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a new trial in this circumstance is "whether the d e f e n d a n t m i g h t have been p r e j u d i c e d by a v e n i r e m e m b e r ' s f a i l u r e t o make a p r o p e r response." Ex p a r t e S t e w a r t , 659 So. 2d [122] a t 124 [(Ala. 1993)]. Further, the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a p a r t y might have been p r e j u d i c e d , i . e . , whether t h e r e was probable p r e j u d i c e , i s a matter w i t h i n the t r i a l court's discretion.' "Ex p a r t e D o b y n e , 805 (footnote omitted)." So. 2d 73 763, 771-72 (Ala. 2001) CR-08-0405 21 S o . 3 d a t 7 8 0 - 8 1 . The m i g h t - h a v e - b e e n - p r e j u d i c e d a l t h o u g h on i t s f a c e a l i g h t than simply showing that standard, actually juror misconduct question whether the j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n might is answered rather the not by a bare by an e x a m i n a t i o n case." 2001). Ex Thus, temporal parte showing of occurred. have been of juror 809 " [ i ] n applying this remoteness requires the So. "[T]he affected 2d but particular 865, s t a n d a r d we matter more misconduct, of the circumstances Apicella, standard, 871 ( A l a . look inquired to a t 'the about, the ambiguity of the q u e s t i o n propounded, t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s inadvertence or w i l l f u l n e s s answer, failure the materiality of the matter a t 781 (quoting Crim. App. Jenkins, Here, of in falsifying the juror overruled 972 S o . 2 d 1 5 9 although recollect, i n q u i r e d about.'" DeBruce v. S t a t e , 2003), to or i n f a i l i n g on and to the H o o k s , 21 S o . 2 d 890 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 7 8 ( A l a . other grounds, Ex parte (Ala. 2005)). the matter connection t o law enforcement inquired about -- i s m a t e r i a l , 74 -- the as n o t e d jurors' above, CR-08-0405 the q u e s t i o n propounded petition) was (as p h r a s e d by Bryant to in his ambiguous, Bryant failed the p e r i o d of J.K.'s reserve-deputy Bryant made no allegation whatsoever reveal his reserve-deputy s t a t u s was indicating intentional. that this 32.3 and claim was Under these claim Rule proper J.K.'s i n any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we satisfies 32.6(b). that plead the any facts status, and failure to willful or simply cannot pleading requirements Therefore, under Rule way amended summary d i s m i s s a l say in Rule of this 32.7(d). B. Second, second Bryant penalty-phase argued that, trial, during deliberations the jury at h i s foreman coerced the i n t o v o t i n g f o r d e a t h by i n s i n u a t i n g t h a t by c a s t i n g any vote the the jurors following w o u l d be violating with respect to this the law. Bryant jury other alleged claim: "The c o e r c i o n o f j u r o r s b y t h e j u r o r f o r e p e r s o n during the sentencing phase of Bryant's trial v i o l a t e d B r y a n t ' s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s a n d a f a i r and impartial jury as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, E i g h t h , and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments o f the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, and Alabama law. See Hallmark v Allison, 451 So. 2d 270, 271-72 (Ala. 1984); C l a r k - M o b i l e C o u n t i e s Gas D i s t . v . R e e v e s , 628 So. 2 d 3 6 8 , 370 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; A l a . C o n s t . A r t . I , § 6; 75 CR-08-0405 see a l s o A l a . Code § 1 5 - 1 7 - 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) (establishing j u r y m i s c o n d u c t as a ground f o r g r a n t i n g a motion f o r a new t r i a l i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s ) . "A j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t c l a i m i s c o g n i z a b l e where the misconduct 'might have u n l a w f u l l y influenced t h a t j u r o r a n d o t h e r s w i t h whom h e d e l i b e r a t e d , a n d might have unlawfully influenced i t s verdict rendered.' R o a n v . S t a t e , 1 4 3 S o . 2 d 4 5 4 , 460 ( A l a . 1 9 3 2 ) ; E x P a r t e T r o h a , 462 S o . 2 d 9 5 3 , 954 ( A l a . 1984). Even i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which t h e evidence i s ambiguous, i t s u f f i c i e n t l y s u p p o r t s t h i s 'light' burden. T r o h a , 462 S o . 2 d a t 9 5 4 . I f a s h o w i n g i s made t h a t t h e v e r d i c t m i g h t h a v e b e e n a f f e c t e d b y the misconduct, the misconduct need n o t have a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d o r dominated t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . See Holland v . S t a t e , 588 S o . 2 d 5 4 3 , 549 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1991). "There were several instances of juror misconduct that occurred during Bryant's resentencing trial. F i r s t , there i s evidence that the j u r y foreperson c o e r c e d o t h e r members o f t h e jury t o vote f o r death. At the beginning of jury d e l i b e r a t i o n s , o n e woman i n d i c a t e d t h a t s h e c o u l d not vote t o put Bryant t o death. The jury foreperson responded t o h e r and s t a t e d that during j u r y v o i r d i r e she had i n d i c a t e d t h a t she would be able t o impose t h e death p e n a l t y , i n s p i t e o f h e r religious beliefs. The f o r e p e r s o n went on t o s a y t h a t e i t h e r t h e j u r o r was l y i n g now o r h a d l i e d t o the prosecutor, w h i c h was a g a i n s t the law. The foreperson's c o e r c i v e manner c a u s e d a s e c o n d j u r o r on t h e p a n e l t o b e l i e v e t h a t a v o t e a g a i n s t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was a g a i n s t t h e l a w , t h e r e b y p r o m p t i n g t h a t j u r o r t o v o t e f o r d e a t h , when i n f a c t that j u r o r d i d n o t want t o g i v e B r y a n t a d e a t h s e n t e n c e . " (C. 507-08.) 76 CR-08-0405 This claim upon w h i c h "matters simply not So. 13, granted. bring under up issue the 653 'extraneous law, and 2009] Jackson So. 3d at law o f j u r o r s and s t a t e m e n t s they S h a r r i e f v. G e r l a c k , " R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. consideration v. the 652). jury,' State, , [Ms. ( A l a . C r i m . App. the jury, without regard to t h e i r propriety are not "[T]he facts." debates Sharrief, Thus, " a f f i d a v i t [ s or t e s t i m o n y ] showing influenced the jury's d e l i b e r a t i o n s affidavits c o n c e r n i n g 'the debates the this jury while exception." deliberating CSX law, which Transp., by 798 (quoting discussions or lack So. thereon' do not Dansby, 659 of thereof, 2d at 653. that extraneous and d i s c u s s i o n s the November 2009) and a protected [are] a d m i s s i b l e ; I n c . v. 77 are CR-06-1026, supra by Evid., Alabama of which Sharrief, extraneous are the the of law that s u f f i c i e n t t o impeach a v e r d i c t , and discussions inquiry." because ' d i s t i n c t i o n , under facts,' be settled in their deliberations ( A l a . 2001). important of f a c t or It i s well Alabama and d i s c u s s i o n s j u r y o r j u r o r s may from a material deliberating their decision." recognizes 'debates be jurors improper 2d 646, between to state could the debates make w h i l e 798 relief that protects fails facts however, of the fall So. case within 2d 35, CR-08-0405 41 ( A l a . 1995) ( q u o t i n g 2d 5 5 1 , 557 misconduct, Alabama (Ala. 1991)). Power Co. v . T u r n e r , In terms the allegedly coercive of this claim 575 So. of juror s t a t e m e n t s made b y t h e j u r y foreperson a n d t h e i m p a c t t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s may h a v e h a d o n t h e jury i t s deliberations i n Therefore, basis Jones not extraneous facts. they a r e i n s u l a t e d from i n q u i r y and cannot form t h e of a valid As are this claim Court v. S t a t e , forrelief noted under R u l e 32. i n addressing a similar 753 So. 2 d 1174 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . issue 1999): "[W]e r e j e c t J o n e s ' s c l a i m t h a t h i s ' d e a t h s e n t e n c e was t h e r e s u l t o f c o e r c i v e i n f l u e n c e s b r o u g h t i n t o the j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s which were o u t s i d e t h e scope of t h e evidence and j u d i c i a l c o n t r o l . ' (Appellant's b r i e f a t p . 97.) S p e c i f i c a l l y , he argues t h a t a juror's statement that ' i f we g i v e h i m l i f e that maybe i n a f e w y e a r s t h a t he w o u l d b e up f o r p a r o l e ' improperly persuaded others t o sentence him t o death. (R. 2 7 5 - 7 6 . ) " T e s t i m o n y a t t h e R u l e 32 h e a r i n g i n d i c a t e d t h a t before reaching i t s 12-0 advisory verdict recommending a sentence o f death, t h e j u r y v o t e d several times. S e v e r a l b a l l o t s r e s u l t e d i n a 10-2 determination t o recommend d e a t h . One o f t h e t w o individuals who initially voted against death t e s t i f i e d t h a t she changed h e r vote i n favor o f death after J.M. made the statement regarding parole. "'A j u r o r c a n n o t i m p e a c h h i s v e r d i c t b y l a t e r e x p l a i n i n g why o r how t h e j u r o r a r r i v e d a t h i s o r her d e c i s i o n . ' A d a i r v . S t a t e , 641 So. 2 d 3 0 9 , 313 (Ala. C r . App. 1993). 78 i n CR-08-0405 " M o r e o v e r , R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , p e r t i n e nntt p a r t : ertine in provides, "'Upon an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f a verdict or indictment, a j u r o r may not t e s t i f y i n impeachment of the v e r d i c t or i n d i c t m e n t as t o any m a t t e r o r s t a t e m e n t o c c u r r i n g during the course of the j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s or the e f f e c t of anything upon t h a t o r any o t h e r j u r o r ' s m i n d o r e m o t i o n s as i n f l u e n c i n g t h e j u r o r as t o assent to or d i s s e n t from the v e r d i c t or indictment or concerning the j u r o r ' s mental processes i n connection therewith, except t h a t a j u r o r may t e s t i f y on t h e q u e s t i o n whether extraneous p r e j u d i c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n was improperly brought to the jury's a t t e n t i o n o r whether any o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e was i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r upon any juror. N o r may a juror's affidavit or e v i d e n c e o f any s t a t e m e n t by t h e juror concerning a matter about which the j u r o r would be p r e c l u d e d from testifying be received f o r these purposes.' "We f i n d no m e r i t t o J o n e s ' s c l a i m b e c a u s e i t was b a s e d o n p r o h i b i t e d t e s t i m o n y . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the c l a i m would d e s t r o y the i n t e g r i t y of the j u r y system, encourage the introduction of unduly influenced juror testimony after trial, and discourage jurors from freely deliberating, and i n h i b i t t h e i r reaching a v e r d i c t without fear of p o s t - t r i a l harassment, p u b l i c i t y , or s c r u t i n y . See E x p a r t e N e a l , 731 So. 2 d 621 ( A l a . 1999); and B a r b o u r v . S t a t e , 673 S o . 2 d 4 6 1 , 4 6 9 - 4 7 0 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) , a f f ' d , 673 S o . 2 d 473 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 518 U.S. 1 0 2 0 , 116 S . C t . 2 5 5 6 , 135 L . E d . 2 d 1074 753 So. (1996)." 2d a t 1203-04 consideration of this (footnote omitted). claim of 79 juror Similarly, misconduct -- here, which a is CR-08-0405 based e n t i r e l y on t h e d e b a t e "would and d e l i b e r a t i o n s d e s t r o y t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e j u r y system, introduction of unduly influenced and discourage their jurors reaching harassment, Therefore, or law of the jury a verdict p u b l i c i t y , or this claim upon dismissal from which was p r o p e r encourage juror testimony after freely deliberating, without fear scrutiny." 753 fails to state relief could under Rule of So. a material be granted, 32.7(d). and -¬ the trial, inhibit post-trial 2d a t 1204. issue of fact and summary 1 3 C. Finally, Bryant argued second penalty-phase t r i a l , of extraneous previously convictions, jury's respect facts, sentenced that, that t o death the t r i a l to this court had f o r h i s capital-murder which, Bryant claimed, u n l a w f u l l y sentencing verdict. ath i s t h e j u r y foreman informed t h e j u r y specifically Bryant during deliberations Bryant alleged influenced the following the with claim: A l t h o u g h t h i s was n o t t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l o f t h i s c l a i m -- t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t f o u n d t h e c l a i m t o b e i n s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d e d -- we may n o n e t h e l e s s a f f i r m t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t on t h i s g r o u n d . S e e , e . g . , McNabb v . S t a t e , 991 S o . 2 d 3 1 3 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 7 ) . 1 3 80 CR-08-0405 " S e c o n d , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s same f o r e p e r s o n brought extraneous information into the jury deliberations. This information related to Bryant's previous trial, and the foreperson used this information to coerce reluctant jurors to vote for death. The f o r e p e r s o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t B r y a n t ' s d e a t h s e n t e n c e was a foregone c o n c l u s i o n because Judge Jackson had p r e v i o u s l y s e n t e n c e d B r y a n t t o death. The f o r e p e r s o n s h o u l d n o t h a v e k n o w n a b o u t B r y a n t ' s previous death sentence and the jury certainly should not have considered this incredibly prejudicial information during deliberations. "This is significant because i n making the d e c i s i o n t o impose the death p e n a l t y , the j u r y a c t s as a u n i t . See E x p a r t e M c N a b b , 887 S o . 2 d 998, 1006 ( A l a . 2004). T h u s [ , ] t h e m i s c o n d u c t o f one o f i t s members c a n n o t be s e g r e g a t e d . The prejudicial atmosphere c r e a t e d by t h e m i s c o n d u c t of even one j u r o r i s i m p o s s i b l e t o e r a d i c a t e and injuriously a f f e c t e d the s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the defendant. See H o l l a n d , 588 S o . 2 d a t 5 4 7 . " (C. 508.) T h i s c l a i m was alleged that extraneous the not s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded. jury foreperson i n f o r m a t i o n -- that informed Bryant had Although the Bryant jurors previously of been s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h b a s e d on e a r l i e r c a p i t a l - m u r d e r c o n v i c t i o n s -- he made information nothing more "coerce[d] He f a i l e d t o a s s e r t how on the jury, than a reluctant bare allegation jurors vote for in relation o r e v e n t o name a s i n g l e j u r o r who 81 this death." many a l l e g e d l y " r e l u c t a n t j u r o r s " w h a t t h e v o t e o f t h e j u r y was death sentence, to that to were the he b e l i e v e d CR-08-0405 was "reluctant" for death based failed Rule to vote on t h e e x t r a n e o u s to satisfy 32.6(b), under Rule f o r death b u t who nonetheless information. the pleading requirements a n d summary d i s m i s s a l of this voted T h e r e f o r e , he i n Rule 32.3 a n d c l a i m was proper 32.7(d). V. Finally, Bryant erred i n summarily claims for relief V.F. contends dismissing court the several circuit of erred Specifically, i n summarily court ( I s s u e s V.B. Bryant argues dismissing the following (1) T h a t h e was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l at h i s second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l as a r e s u l t o f p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct; (2) That he was denied his right c o n f r o n t a t i o n a t h i s second penalty-phase t r i a l a result of Ricky Vickers's absence; to as (3) T h a t h e was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l when h e was a l l e g e d l y q u e s t i o n e d b y p o l i c e a f t e r h e h a d a s k e d f o r an a t t o r n e y ; t h e S t a t e v i o l a t e d Batson v. Kentucky, (1986), a t h i s second penalty-phase 82 - that the claims: (4) T h a t 476 U.S. 79 t r i a l ; and also the substantive i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n . i n Bryant's brief.) circuit that CR-08-0405 (5) That Alabama's method of execution c o n s t i t u t e s c r u e l and u n u s u a l punishment. 1 4 Bryant argues that these sufficiently pleaded entitled t o an We were him find c l a i m s i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n were m e r i t o r i o u s on thus and evidentiary i t unnecessary s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded b e c a u s e we Bryant's claims petition, were precluded and and and hearing. to address under Rule in precluded by claims (1) by but were n o t , whether 32.3 Rule as various and on these and claims Rule (3), set addressed out Therefore, summary d i s m i s s a l appeal, provisions as 32.2(a)(5), because r a i s e d and (5), i t s brief set they 32.6(b) out above, are these Rule 32.2. above, c o u l d have are been, claims (2), precluded a d d r e s s e d on o f t h e s e c l a i m s was to that in on a p p e a l , a n d 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 4 ) , b e c a u s e t h e y were r a i s e d and Rule face agree w i t h the S t a t e ' s argument i n i t s response Specifically, (4), their by Rule appeal. proper under 32.7(d). We n o t e t h a t B r y a n t d o e s n o t p u r s u e i n h i s b r i e f on appeal the f i n a l c l a i m i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n that the cumulative e f f e c t of a l l the claims i n h i s p e t i t i o n e n t i t l e d h i m t o a new t r i a l . T h e r e f o r e , t h a t c l a i m i s deemed a b a n d o n e d a n d w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d b y t h i s C o u r t . See, e . g . , Brownlee v . S t a t e , 666 S o . 2 d 91 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1995). 14 83 CR-08-0405 VI. For the reasons circuit court present evidence following his trial as motion set counsel were (1) t h a t his Ricky trial for Part challenge II.D. of t h i s Because Bryant the counsel not at properly opinion; (2) trial were ineffective evidence and opinion; trial testimony and counsel Vickers's DNA that f o r not to support s t a t e m e n t h e made t o p o l i c e , (3) that a as trial a t h i s second f o r f a i l i n g to adequately and t h a t trial second p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e adequately support to and a this trial Vickers's to expert p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l were i n e f f e c t i v e impeach opportunity I I . B . of t h i s the f i r s t at h i s f i r s t hearing and p r e s e n t i n g I I . C . of the case t o the a blood-spatter at h i s f i r s t i n Part Bryant ineffective i n Part investigating remand t h i s evidentiary and r e t a i n i n g to suppress out an afford in his petition: s e t out counsel properly at trial investigating expert, f o r i t to claims first s t a t e d a b o v e , we unavailability, counsel at for f a i l i n g to as s e t o u t i n opinion. is entitled t o an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g on t h e s e c l a i m s , h e may a l s o b e e n t i t l e d t o d i s c o v e r y relating to these court claims. Therefore, on remand, 84 the c i r c u i t shall CR-08-0405 reevaluate i t s denial of Bryant's r e l a t e s to the a b o v e - l i s t e d c l a i m s , discovery i t deems n e c e s s a r y claims. In discovery i s not on the this to suggest and grant i t may -- standard set out parte Land, So. 2d but, by 847 as we point out that as t h e circuit rather, the (Ala. 2000), court's Supreme as these postconviction i s g o v e r n e d by Alabama i t whatever notation summary d e n y i n g B r y a n t ' s d i s c o v e r y cause 775 request f o r a proper r e s o l u t i o n of p r o h i b i t e d -- case-action appears regard, 1 5 discovery the Court request goodin Ex follows: "We agree w i t h the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals that 'good c a u s e ' i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e standard by which to judge p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i s c o v e r y motions. In fact, other courts have adopted a similar 'good-cause' or 'good-reason' standard for the postconviction discovery process. See [State v.] M a r s h a l l , [148 N . J . 89, 690 A . 2 d 1 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ] ; S t a t e v . L e w i s , 656 So. 2 d 1248 ( F l a . 1 9 9 4 ) ; P e o p l e ex r e l . D a l e y v . F i t z g e r a l d , 123 I l l . 2 d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N . E . 2 d 131 (1988). As n o t e d by the Illinois Supreme C o u r t , the good-cause standard guards a g a i n s t p o t e n t i a l abuse of the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n discovery process. See Fitzgerald, supra, 123 I l l . 2 d a t 1 8 3 , 121 I l l . D e c . 937, 526 N . E . 2 d a t 135. We also agree that New Jersey's Marshall case provides a good w o r k i n g framework f o r reviewing Because the circuit court must r e c o n s i d e r Bryant's discovery request on r e m a n d , we pretermit discussion of B r y a n t ' s c l a i m on a p p e a l t h a t t h e c i r c u i t court erred in d e n y i n g him d i s c o v e r y p e n d i n g the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s r e t u r n t o our remand. 1 5 85 CR-08-0405 d i s c o v e r y m o t i o n s and o r d e r s i n c a p i t a l c a s e s . In a d d i t i o n , we a r e b o u n d b y o u r own rule that 'an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g m u s t b e h e l d on a [ p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f ] w h i c h i s m e r i t o r i o u s on i t s face, i.e., one which contains matters and allegations (such as ineffective assistance of counsel) which, i f t r u e , e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to relief.' Ex p a r t e B o a t w r i g h t , 471 So. 2 d 1 2 5 7 , 1258 (Ala. 1985). "We emphasize that this holding -that p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i s c o v e r y m o t i o n s a r e t o be j u d g e d by a good-cause standard -does not automatically a l l o w d i s c o v e r y u n d e r R u l e 3 2 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., and t h a t i t does not expand the d i s c o v e r y procedures w i t h i n R u l e 32.4. A c c o r d L e w i s , s u p r a , 656 So. 2d a t 1250, w h e r e i n t h e F l o r i d a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d that the good-cause standard did not affect Florida's rules relating to postconviction procedure, which are s i m i l a r to ours. By adopting t h i s s t a n d a r d , we a r e o n l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t , upon a p e t i t i o n e r ' s showing of good cause, may exercise its inherent authority to order discovery in a proceeding for postconviction relief " 775 So. The findings 2d at 852 circuit of accordance (footnote court Rule grant Bryant whatever s h a l l be this shall fact regarding with filed opinion with and f i n d i n g s of f a c t , omitted). also each of the 32.9(d), relief this shall issue Ala. R. specific above-listed claims P., and i t deems n e c e s s a r y . Due Court within include the a t r a n s c r i p t of the 86 Crim. written 180 days of the circuit court's i t in may return date of written evidentiary hearing, and CR-08-0405 any other evidence received or relied on b y the court on remand. Based circuit on t h e f o r e g o i n g , court this f o rproceedings REMANDED WITH cause i s remanded t o t h e consistent with this opinion. DIRECTIONS. Welch, P.J., concurs. Windom, 87 J . , concurs i n the r e s u l t .

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