Carolyn Malone v. Steelcase, Inc.

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REL: 09/20/13 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2013 2111256 Carolyn Malone v. S t e e l c a s e , Inc. Appeal from Limestone C i r c u i t (CV-10-900091) Court PER CURIAM. Carolyn Malone awarded h e r w o r k e r s ' her appeals a June 11, 2012, judgment compensation b e n e f i t s b u t a l s o employer, S t e e l c a s e , Inc.("Steelcase"), that allowed t o offset the a w a r d b y c e r t a i n amounts i t h a d p a i d i n s a l a r y t o M a l o n e a f t e r 2111256 her i n j u r y . law. The issue presented Accordingly, we quote t o t h e c o u r t i s s o l e l y one a p o r t i o n of the trial judgment f o r a r e c i t a t i o n of the p e r t i n e n t f a c t s , the trial court's factual determinations court's as w e l l and " T h i s w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n a c t i o n came b e f o r e t h e C o u r t f o r t r i a l on November 30, 2011. The plaintiff, Carolyn Malone, seeks workers' compensation b e n e f i t s f o r a lower back i n j u r y which she a l l e g e s was c a u s e d by an a c c i d e n t on May 21, 2008. The defendant, Steelcase, Inc., disputes [Malone's] claim, denies that [Malone] sustained a c o m p e n s a b l e i n j u r y , and a v e r s t h a t i t i s e n t i t l e d t o a c r e d i t o r o f f s e t p u r s u a n t t o A l a . Code [§]§ and -57 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , f o r wages and b e n e f i t s p a i d to [Malone]. After considering [Malone's] testimony, the testimony of the o t h e r w i t n e s s e s , the m e d i c a l r e c o r d s , and o t h e r e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Court, the Court renders the f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w , and j u d g m e n t e n t r y : THE PARTIES "1. An e m p l o y e r / e m p l o y e e r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s on May 21, 2008, and a l l t i m e s p e r t i n e n t to t h i s a c t i o n . "2. The p a r t i e s a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e A l a b a m a W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t [ ( ' t h e A c t ' ) , § 25-5-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ] . "3. [ M a l o n e ] has b e e n c o n t i n u o u s l y e m p l o y e d [ S t e e l c a s e ] s i n c e May 21, 2008. "4. [ M a l o n e ] has b e e n p a i d wages on a b a s i s s i n c e May 21, 2008. 2 as legal conclusions: "STIPULATIONS OF of by continuous 2111256 "5. A l l m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by [ M a l o n e ] f o r m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n t r e l a t e d t o t h e r e p o r t e d May 21, 2008, i n c i d e n t have b e e n p a i d by [ S t e e l c a s e ] p u r s u a n t t o A l a . Code § 25-5-56 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , and i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A l a . Code § 25-5-77 "6. (1975). [ M a l o n e ' s ] a v e r a g e w e e k l y wage i s $489.20. "FINDINGS OF FACT "1. The p a r t i e s a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n and venue o f t h i s C o u r t . "2. [ S t e e l c a s e ] w i t h the A c t . received notice i n accordance "3. On May 21, 2008, [Malone] was e m p l o y e d i n t h e C9000 d e p a r t m e n t a t S t e e l c a s e . Her j o b i n v o l v e d t h e a t t a c h m e n t o f s m a l l p a r t s t o p a n e l s , w h i c h were p r o c e s s e d on an a s s e m b l y l i n e / c o n v e y o r t y p e s y s t e m . After the p a r t s were a f f i x e d , [Malone] and a c o - w o r k e r moved t h e p a n e l s down t h e l i n e f o r t h e next stage of the p r o c e s s . "4. On May 21, 2008, a t 10:00 a.m., [Malone] was engaged i n a f f i x i n g p a r t s t o 65" X 60" p a n e l s . As she and a c o - w o r k e r were m o v i n g a p a n e l , t h e c o - w o r k e r d r o p p e d one end o f a 65" x 60" p a n e l as [Malone] and a c o - w o r k e r were i n t h e p r o c e s s o f m o v i n g t h e p a n e l f r o m h e r work t a b l e t o an a d j a c e n t conveyer b e l t . [Malone] e x p e r i e n c e d p a i n i n h e r lower back. "5. [Malone] gave w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e i n c i d e n t on May 29, 2008. [Malone] was referred to O c c u p a t i o n a l H e a l t h G r o u p ('OHG') o f D e c a t u r f o r medical treatment. [Malone] was e x a m i n e d by D r . F r e d J . M c M u r t y on May 29, 2008, f o r c o m p l a i n t s o f l o w e r b a c k p a i n . [Malone] was a u t h o r i z e d t o r e t u r n to work with restrictions. [Malone] was s u b s e q u e n t l y t r e a t e d c o n s e r v a t i v e l y a t OHG. 3 2111256 II "8. On September 24, 2008, D r . [ C y r u s ] Ghavam found that [Malone] was a t maximum medical improvement and a u t h o r i z e d h e r t o r e t u r n t o r e g u l a r duty work. He d i d n o t a s s i g n any p h y s i c a l impairment. II "13. On F e b r u a r y 15, 2010, D r . [ K e i t h ] A n d e r s o n c o n f i r m e d D r . Ghavam's S e p t e m b e r 24, 2008, o p i n i o n t h a t [Malone] i s a t maximum m e d i c a l i m p r o v e m e n t . He a s s i g n e d a permanent impairment o f 10% t o t h e body as a w h o l e . "14. [Malone] has maintained continuous employment a t S t e e l c a s e s u b s e q u e n t t o May 2 1 , 2008. Her j o b d u t i e s were accommodated as n e c e s s a r y t o conform w i t h any r e s t r i c t i o n s assigned by h e r treating physicians. She h a s c o n t i n u e d t o w o r k on a f u l l - t i m e b a s i s a n d r e c e i v e d h e r r e g u l a r wage r a t e . Her h o u r l y wage r a t e h a d i n c r e a s e d t o $13 p e r hour a t t h e time o f t r i a l . She h a s n o t s u s t a i n e d any a c t u a l wage l o s s as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c c i d e n t . She i s p h y s i c a l l y c a p a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g t h e p h y s i c a l d u t i e s o f h e r c u r r e n t j o b . Her c u r r e n t j o b i s a combination of functions involving a customer s e r v i c e j o b and a h i n g e assembly j o b . The j o b f u n c t i o n s have b e e n accommodated t o a l l o w [Malone] t o s t a n d and s i t a t v a r i o u s times d u r i n g t h e day. "15. Dr. A n d e r s o n i s o f t h e o p i n i o n , b a s e d on the h i s t o r y p r o v i d e d by [Malone], t h a t h e r lower b a c k c o m p l a i n t s were c a u s e d b y t h e r e p o r t e d a c c i d e n t on May 2 1 , 2008. "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW " [ M a l o n e ] s u s t a i n e d an i n j u r y t o h e r l o w e r b a c k on May 2 1 , 2008, w h i c h a r o s e o u t o f a n d i n t h e c o u r s e o f h e r employment. The l o w e r b a c k i n j u r y 4 2111256 r e s u l t e d i n a permanent p h y s i c a l impairment o f t w e n t y f i v e p e r c e n t (25%) t o t h e body as a w h o l e . B a s e d on t h e a v e r a g e w e e k l y wage o f $489.20 p e r week, t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n r a t e i s $326.15. The w e e k l y c o m p e n s a t i o n r a t e i s $81.54 p e r week ($326.15 x 25%). " [ S t e e l c a s e ] i s e n t i t l e d t o a c r e d i t / o f f s e t , on a week-by-week b a s i s , f o r any c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s due, f o r e a c h week i n w h i c h [Malone] was p a i d wages by [ S t e e l c a s e ] , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A l a . Code § 25-5-57(c)(3) (1975). "JUDGMENT ENTRY " I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , i t i s ORDERED AND ADJUDGED b y t h e C o u r t as f o l l o w s : "A. As a r e s u l t o f h e r May 2 1 , 2008, i n j u r y , [Malone] s h a l l have a n d r e c o v e r a judgment a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t S t e e l c a s e , Inc., f o r permanent p a r t i a l disability compensation a t a weekly compensation r a t e o f $81.54. From and a f t e r F e b r u a r y 15, 2010, t h e d a t e t h a t Dr. A n d e r s o n d e t e r m i n e d that [Malone] was a t maximum m e d i c a l i m p r o v e m e n t , t h r o u g h J u n e 15, 2012, o r a p e r i o d o f 122 weeks, [Malone] i s e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e p h y s i c a l impairment b e n e f i t s a t a r a t e o f $81.54 p e r week o r a t o t a l o f $9,947.88, o f w h i c h [ h e r a t t o r n e y s ] a r e e n t i t l e d t o a f e e .... [Steelcase] i s e n t i t l e d t o a c r e d i t / o f f s e t , i n t h e amount o f $69.30 p e r week, f o r t h e wages p a i d t o [Malone] e a c h week f r o m a n d a f t e r t h e d a t e that she reached maximum medical improvement u n t i l s u c h t i m e s a i d wages c e a s e t o be p a i d . I f s a i d wages c e a s e t o be paid during t h e 300 week period s u b s e q u e n t t o F e b r u a r y 15, 2010, t h e n , and u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , [Malone] s h a l l 5 2111256 be e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e f r o m [ S t e e l c a s e ] $69.30 p e r week f o r t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e 300 weeks due and o w i n g . " ( C a p i t a l i z a t i o n i n o r i g i n a l ; emphasis On appeal, added.) Malone argues t h a t the t r i a l court erred i n awarding Steelcase a s e t o f f or c r e d i t a g a i n s t the b e n e f i t s i t a w a r d e d h e r i n i t s J u n e 11, 2012, j u d g m e n t . Malone argues that the t r i a l c o u r t a p p l i e d an i n c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f § 25-5-57(c)(3), A l a . Code 1975, i n a w a r d i n g S t e e l c a s e a c r e d i t o r o f f s e t a g a i n s t t h e w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n award f o r amounts she received i n s a l a r y while working f o r Steelcase date she Steelcase reached maximum medical argues t h a t the t r i a l 25-5-57(c)(3) Malone d u r i n g the b e n e f i t p e r i o d . each t o f i l e c u r i a e have this improvement for salary i t paid to T h i s c o u r t has a l l o w e d t h e ("AAJ") and AFL-CIO a b r i e f as an a m i c u s c u r i a e . filed briefs ("MMI"). court properly i n t e r p r e t e d § i n awarding i t a c r e d i t Alabama A s s o c i a t i o n f o r J u s t i c e a f t e r the Alabama Both of the amici i n support of Malone's p o s i t i o n i n appeal. We court, note t h a t , i n asserting their t h e p a r t i e s have arguments b e f o r e s t i p u l a t e d that accommodations t o a l l o w Malone t o c o n t i n u e 6 Steelcase i n her this made no employment 2111256 and that Malone's assigned t o Malone parties have "sheltered Malone job by agreed duties her that employment" when she p a i d i n sympathy returned and were doctors. within 1 Malone's that the In the restrictions o t h e r words, employment wages t o work a f t e r h e r the was Steelcase not paid i n j u r y were not f o r her i n j u r y . The p o r t i o n o f t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t ( " t h e A c t " ) , § 25-5-1 credits et to seq., be afforded c o m p e n s a t i o n award the A l a . Code an 1975, employer concerning setoffs against a or workers' provides: "(c) S e t o f f f o r o t h e r r e c o v e r y . In c a l c u l a t i n g amount o f w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n d u e : "(1) The e m p l o y e r may r e d u c e o r a c c e p t an a s s i g n m e n t f r o m an employee of the amount o f b e n e f i t s p a i d p u r s u a n t t o a d i s a b i l i t y plan, retirement plan, or other p l a n p r o v i d i n g f o r s i c k p a y by t h e amount o f c o m p e n s a t i o n p a i d , i f and o n l y i f t h e employer p r o v i d e d the b e n e f i t s or p a i d f o r the p l a n or p l a n s p r o v i d i n g the b e n e f i t s deducted. "(2) The employee s h a l l f o r f e i t t o t h e e m p l o y e r a l l c o m p e n s a t i o n p a i d f o r any p e r i o d t o w h i c h i s a t t r i b u t e d any award o f Given the p a r t i e s ' s t i p u l a t i o n on this issue, we d i s r e g a r d the f i n d i n g i n the judgment t h a t Malone's " j o b d u t i e s were accommodated as n e c e s s a r y t o c o n f o r m w i t h any r e s t r i c t i o n s a s s i g n e d by h e r t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n s . " 1 7 2111256 b a c k pay e i t h e r by a c o u r t , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency, arbitration, or settlement, p r o v i d e d , however, s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s s h a l l n o t be i n c l u d e d h e r e i n . "(3) I f an e m p l o y e r c o n t i n u e s the s a l a r y o f an i n j u r e d employee d u r i n g t h e b e n e f i t p e r i o d or pays s i m i l a r compensation d u r i n g the b e n e f i t p e r i o d , the employer s h a l l be a l l o w e d a s e t o f f i n weeks a g a i n s t t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n owed u n d e r t h i s a r t i c l e . For the purposes of t h i s s e c t i o n , v o l u n t a r y contributions to a Section 125-cafeteria p l a n f o r a d i s a b i l i t y or s i c k pay program s h a l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d as b e i n g p r o v i d e d by t h e e m p l o y e r . " § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) , A l a . Code This 57(c)(3) So. 2d c o u r t has a d d r e s s e d t h e s e t o f f p r o v i d e d i n two 966 awarded 1975. cases. 2002), f o r a permanent e m p l o y e r a r g u e d , among o t h e r the total i n j u r e d worker disability, t h i n g s , t h a t i t was court for a period and was the returned a f t e r her i n j u r y . held: " S e c t i o n 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s t h a t i f an employee r e c e i v e s s a l a r y ' d u r i n g t h e b e n e f i t p e r i o d ... , t h e e m p l o y e r s h a l l be a l l o w e d a s e t o f f i n weeks a g a i n s t t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n owed u n d e r t h i s a r t i c l e . ' As s t a t e d a b o v e , t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s evidence, introduced by t h e employee, that the employee w o r k e d h a l f - d a y s f o r f i v e weeks and one day 8 849 e n t i t l e d to a c r e d i t f o r s a l a r y i t h a d p a i d t h e w o r k e r when she t o work f o r h a l f d a y s 25-5- I n C i t y o f Montgomery v. C a s p e r , ( A l a . C i v . App. benefits in § This 2111256 and that the trial court awarded workers' compensation benefits during that period the employee was w o r k i n g h a l f d a y s . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s calculation of the b e n e f i t s i s i n c o r r e c t . We r e v e r s e t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment and remand t h e c a u s e f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o a l l o w t h e e m p l o y e r a s e t o f f f o r t h e s a l a r y t h e employee r e c e i v e d d u r i n g t h a t five-week-and-one-day p e r i o d . " 849 So. 2d a t 969. A l s o , i n L i b e r t y T r o u s e r s D i v i s i o n o f W a l l s I n d u s t r i e s v. Amos, 738 found So. 2d 1272 that the disability, record treatment under worker and t h i s i n that ( A l a . C i v . App. had suffered a permanent court total court affirmed that determination. The case i n d i c a t e d t h a t , a f t e r r e c e i v i n g m e d i c a l f o r her injury, the worker "light-duty" restrictions. employer's 1999), the t r i a l argument that § This had returned court 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) (3) to work agreed w i t h authorized the i t to r e c e i v e a s e t o f f a g a i n s t t h e p e r m a n e n t - t o t a l - d i s a b i l i t y award for t h e amount i t h a d p a i d i n wages a f t e r t h e w o r k e r returned t o work. More 5 7 ( c ) (3) recently, in our i t s opinion S t e p h e n s , 996 So. 2d 833 had been a l l o w e d supreme in Fort court James ( A l a . 2008). mentioned Operating In t h a t case, § 25-5Co. v. Stephens t o r e t u r n t o f u l l - d u t y employment w i t h a few r e s t r i c t i o n s , b u t S t e p h e n s r e t i r e d on November 29, 2000. 9 The 2111256 trial court awarded Stephens w o r k e r s ' compensation b e n e f i t s b a s e d on i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n that permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y . the t r i a l r e a c h e d MMI 2000, as argument, On a p p e a l , court's determination h a d r e a c h e d MMI, had S t e p h e n s h a d s u f f e r e d a 35% arguing, on June d e t e r m i n e d by Fort James 1999, the disputed o f t h e d a t e on w h i c h S t e p h e n s among o t h e r 7, F o r t James rather trial contended things, Stephens t h a n on M a r c h court. that that Based i t was 23, on entitled that to a s e t o f f u n d e r § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) (3) o f a t o t a l o f 48 weeks f o r wages it had p a i d 2000, Stephens between when S t e p h e n s concluding that determination the June 7, retired. Our evidence 1999, supreme and November court supported the 29, disagreed, trial court's t h a t S t e p h e n s h a d r e a c h e d MMI on M a r c h 23, 2000, and, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t F o r t James was e n t i t l e d t o a s e t o f f u n d e r § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) ( 3 ) o n l y f o r wages i t h a d p a i d t o S t e p h e n s b e t w e e n M a r c h 23, 2000, and November 29, 2000. F o r t James O p e r a t i n g Co. v. S t e p h e n s , 996 So. 2d a t 840. F o r t James O p e r a t i n g Co. v. S t e p h e n s , i s r e l e v a n t to the i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e i n t h a t o p i n i o n o u r supreme c o u r t , in addressing t h e e m p l o y e r ' s argument t h a t i t was e n t i t l e d t o a s e t o f f under § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) ( 3 ) , 10 stated: 2111256 "Section 25-5-57(c)(3), A l a . Code 1975, provides t h a t i f an e m p l o y e e r e c e i v e s a s a l a r y ' d u r i n g t h e b e n e f i t p e r i o d ... t h e e m p l o y e r s h a l l be a l l o w e d a s e t o f f i n weeks a g a i n s t t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n owed u n d e r this article.' I n o r d e r f o r an e m p l o y e e t o r e c e i v e permanent-partial or permanent-total-disability b e n e f i t s , t h e e m p l o y e e must have r e a c h e d MMI. Ex p a r t e P h e n i x R e n t a l C t r . , [873 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2003)]." 996 So. On first 2d a t 840 application for time t h a t the James t h e that the s a l a r y he working" and s a l a r y , no So. salary 2d Stephens's 57(c)(3), that, rehearing, § been paid to concluding by Stephens Fort injured worker therefore, because he be Our a f f o r d e d under § supreme concerning that court the had a t 843. The court Fort not not earned his 25-5-57(c)(3). declined to impermissibly address § 25-5raised rehearing. stated: "[B]ecause Stephens attempts to raise this particular argument f o r the first time i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g , we c a n n o t c o n s i d e r i t . B e c a u s e t h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t i s s u e i n t h e a r e a o f w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w t h a t does n o t a p p e a r t o have b e e n d e f i n i t i v e l y a d d r e s s e d by t h i s C o u r t , we 11 a is a p p l i c a t i o n of S t e p h e n s had the asserted who t h e argument f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p l i c a t i o n f o r Id. for James was an 843. argument paid argued erred i n allowing 25-5-57(c)(3). had c r e d i t should at Stephens supreme c o u r t had s e t o f f under "'sympathy' 996 (emphasis added). 2111256 w i l l await a proceeding i n which t h i s issue i s both squarely before t h i s Court for a d j u d i c a t i o n and adequately b r i e f e d . " 996 So. 2d a t Malone, 843-44. unlike Stephens in Fort James, makes a timely argument on a p p e a l t h a t h e r r e t u r n t o work d i f f e r e d f r o m that of and were the workers in Casper earned through her salary." our l a b o r and However, we decision in this "In Act 1975, the courts construction." App. 2010). the Act'), Ex p a r t e basic Kish, Alabama et ordinary 45 the statute." 1110176, Jan. (quoting Volkswagen of America, So. 3d seq., r u l e s of 772, Id.; 2013] see So. i s t o a s c e r t a i n and legislature in Workers' Ala. 775 i n t e n t of the a l s o Ex parte 3d Inc. statutory enacting the 12 i s to Ankrom, [Ms. (Ala. 2013) Dillard, g i v e e f f e c t to the statute. Civ. legislature in , v. Code (Ala. ( A l a . 1991)) ("'[T]he f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e o f construction reach r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n enacting the the 25-5-1 the g i v e e f f e c t to the 1305 of § a s c e r t a i n and 1301, as a "sympathy a d d r e s s t h a t argument t o terms a r e b o u n d by 11, wages matter. ('the "The her were n o t p r o v i d e d need not construing Compensation Amos b e c a u s e 579 So. 2d statutory intent If possible, of the 2111256 i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s h o u l d be g a t h e r e d f r o m t h e l a n g u a g e of the s t a t u t e Malone liberally itself.'"). correctly construed points to purposes" of the A c t . out that "effectuate A c t . No. the the Act intended is to be beneficial 92-537, § 1, A l a . A c t s 1992; see a l s o H a g g a r d v. U n i r o y a l , I n c . , 423 So. 2d 865, 866 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1982) (citing 309, 178 So. 2d 87 Act i s t o be R e y n o l d s M e t a l s Co. v. G r a y , 278 A l a . (1965)) liberally (same). Steelcase construed, but agrees that the i t argues that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e A c t "'must be one t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e o f the statute Weaver, 871 "fairly So. 2d and 820, reasonably" 824 ( A l a . 2003) D u n l o p T i r e C o r p . , 706 So. 2d 729, 733 t u r n Ex p a r t e 1985)). and parties that maintain the "plain Ex Ex (quoting parte parte ( A l a . 1997), q u o t i n g i n B e a v e r V a l l e y C o r p . , 477 Both unambiguous supports.'" that So. 2d 408, § meaning" w a r r a n t s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e i r f a v o r . 411 ( A l a . 25-5-57(c)(3) of the statute The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t the f o l l o w i n g r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n apply: "The f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g t h e s t a t u t e . Words u s e d i n a s t a t u t e must be g i v e n their natural, plain, o r d i n a r y , and commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g , and where p l a i n language i s used a c o u r t i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t 13 is 2111256 t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f t h e language o f t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, t h e n t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must be g i v e n effect. T u s c a l o o s a County Comm'n v. Deputy S h e r i f f s ' A s s ' n o f T u s c a l o o s a C o u n t y , 589 So. 2d 687 (Ala. 1991)." IMED C o r p . v. Systems Eng'g A s s o c s . C o r p . , 602 So. 2d 344, (Ala. 1992). Malone appeal trial has r a i s e d a number o f a r g u m e n t s i n support of her court erred more i n awarding general i n her b r i e f contention Steelcase a that setoff. a r g u e s t h a t § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( a ) ( 3 ) i . , A l a . Code 1975, o f t e n to 346 on the Malone referred as " t h e r e t u r n - t o - w o r k p r o v i s i o n , " c o n t r o l s i n t h i s c a s e t o determine her compensation. c o u r t ' s judgment 25-5-57(a)(3)i. judgment. The p a r t i e s a g r e e , and t h e demonstrates, that the t r i a l in Section reaching its 25-5-57(a)(3)i. court applied § workers' provides, compensation in pertinent part: " R e t u r n t o Work. I f , on o r a f t e r t h e d a t e o f maximum m e d i c a l i m p r o v e m e n t , ... an i n j u r e d w o r k e r r e t u r n s t o work a t a wage e q u a l t o o r g r e a t e r t h a n the w o r k e r ' s p r e - i n j u r y wage, t h e w o r k e r ' s p e r m a n e n t p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y r a t i n g s h a l l be e q u a l t o h i s o r her p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t and t h e c o u r t s h a l l n o t c o n s i d e r any e v i d e n c e o f v o c a t i o n a l d i s a b i l i t y . " 14 trial 2111256 This court has e x p l a i n e d the purpose of the r e t u r n - t o - work p r o v i s i o n as f o l l o w s : " T h i s c o u r t has h e l d t h a t t h e r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e c r e a t e s a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t an e m p l o y e e who r e t u r n s t o work e a r n i n g t h e same o r a g r e a t e r wage s u f f e r e d no l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y . L a n t h r i p v. W a l - M a r t S t o r e s , I n c . , 864 So. 2d 1079, 1082 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ; Pemco A e r o p l e x v. Moore, 775 So. 2d 215 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ; a n d D i s c o v e r y Zone v. W a t e r s , 753 So. 2d 515, 517 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1999). In those cases, we e x p l a i n e d t h a t an e m p l o y e e may r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n b y e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e employee t r u l y s u f f e r s from i n c a p a c i t y o r t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e ' s h i g h e r p o s t - i n j u r y wages a r e an u n r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r of h i s or her earning capacity. See, e . g . , D i s c o v e r y Zone, 753 So. 2d a t 517 ( q u o t i n g J o h n s o n v. A l a b a m a Power Co., 670 So. 2d 39, 41-42 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) ) . However, i n applying the return-to-work statute i n Discovery Zone, Pemco A e r o p l e x , and L a n t h r i p , t h i s court a p p l i e d caselaw t h a t p r e d a t e d the enactment o f t h e statute. " B e f o r e 1992, when t h e r e t u r n - t o - w o r k statute was e n a c t e d , s e e A l a . A c t s 1992, A c t No. 92-537, § 17, A l a b a m a c a s e l a w h e l d t h a t , when an i n j u r e d e m p l o y e e r e t u r n e d t o work e a r n i n g t h e same o r h i g h e r wages, t h o s e f a c t s r a i s e d a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e employee had not s u s t a i n e d a loss of earning c a p a c i t y , w h i c h p r e s u m p t i o n c o u l d be r e b u t t e d b y evidence independently showing incapacity or e x p l a i n i n g away t h e p o s t - i n j u r y e a r n i n g s as an u n r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r of earning capacity. See, e.g., G o o d y e a r T i r e & R u b b e r Co. v. Downey, 266 A l a . 344, 96 So. 2d 278 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s S t e e l M i n i n g Co. v. R i d d l e , 627 So. 2d 455 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1993) ( a p p l y i n g pre-1992 l a w ) . Because caselaw allowed t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t o be e a s i l y rebutted, i n j u r e d employees r o u t i n e l y r e c e i v e d compensation for loss of earning capacity despite having 15 2111256 e x p e r i e n c e d no a c t u a l wage l o s s . See 1 T e r r y A. Moore, A l a b a m a W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n §§ 13:40-13:51 (1998). Apparently, the l e g i s l a t u r e concluded that the caselaw allowing employees to receive c o m p e n s a t i o n b a s e d on l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y , despite the fact that their injuries d i d not immediately result i n reduced wages, s h o u l d be superseded. In order t o l i m i t compensation i n cases i n w h i c h an i n j u r e d e m p l o y e e r e t u r n s t o work e a r n i n g t h e same o r h i g h e r wages f o l l o w i n g a p e r m a n e n t nonscheduled i n j u r y , the l e g i s l a t u r e r e s o l v e d t h a t , i n such cases, t h e employee's degree o f p h y s i c a l impairment, and n o t h i s o r h e r l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y , s h o u l d be t h e measure f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n . See T. Moore, s u p r a , a t § 13:51. Any r e a d i n g o f t h e return-to-work statute that restores the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of caselaw r e g a r d i n g the presumption of a loss of earning c a p a c i t y c r e a t e d b y an e m p l o y e e ' s r e t u r n i n g t o w o r k e a r n i n g t h e same o r h i g h e r wages w o u l d be t o t a l l y i n a p p o s i t e t o t h e purpose of the s t a t u t e . See A l a . A c t s 1992, A c t No. 92-357, § 1 ( r e q u i r i n g w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w s t o be c o n s t r u e d t o e f f e c t t h e i r p u r p o s e s ) . "The r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e does n o t c r e a t e any presumption t h a t an e m p l o y e e h a s n o t s u s t a i n e d a loss of earning capacity. Rather, the r e t u r n - t o work s t a t u t e c o n c l u s i v e l y s t a t e s t h a t , when an e m p l o y e e r e t u r n s t o work a f t e r r e a c h i n g maximum m e d i c a l improvement and t h e employee i s e a r n i n g t h e same o r h i g h e r wages, l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y s h a l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d i n a s s e s s i n g t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n due t h e e m p l o y e e f o r any p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y . Upon c o n c l u d i n g t h a t the return-to-work s t a t u t e governs t h e amount o f c o m p e n s a t i o n due, a t r i a l c o u r t n e e d n o t u n d e r g o any a n a l y s i s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r an employee's post-maximum-medical-improvement e a r n i n g s reliably indicate the earning capacity of the employee because e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y i s n o t even a t issue. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t D i s c o v e r y Zone, Pemco A e r o p l e x , and L a n t h r i p c o n s t r u e t h e r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e i n c o r r e c t l y by a p p l y i n g p r e - s t a t u t e caselaw 2 16 2111256 i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a r e t u r n t o work a t t h e same o r a h i g h e r wage c r e a t e s o n l y a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e h a s s u f f e r e d no l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y , those cases are o v e r r u l e d . II " U n d e r t h e r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e , an e m p l o y e e may l a t e r p e t i t i o n f o r an a d j u s t m e n t o f h i s o r h e r c o m p e n s a t i o n b a s e d on l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y i f t h e e m p l o y e e l o s e s h i s o r h e r employment f o r one o f the reasons enumerated i n t h e s t a t u t e . See A l a . Code 1975, § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( a ) ( 3 ) i . ( i ) [through] ( v ) . However, t h a t s i t u a t i o n does n o t a p p l y to this case." 2 G r a c e v. S t a n d a r d F u r n i t u r e (Ala. M f g . Co., 54 So. 3d 909, 913-14 C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) . Malone argues determination that § o f h e r award 25-5-57(a)(3)i. controls of permanent-partial-disability b e n e f i t s b e c a u s e t h a t p r o v i s i o n i s more s p e c i f i c 25-5-57(c)(3). This the than the § c o u r t has e x p l a i n e d : " ' S t a t u t e s s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d t o g e t h e r s o as t o h a r m o n i z e t h e p r o v i s i o n s as f a r as p r a c t i c a l . ' Ex p a r t e J o n e s M f g . Co., 589 So. 2d 208, 211 ( A l a . 1991). ' I n t h e e v e n t o f a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n two statutes, a specific statute relating to a specific s u b j e c t i s r e g a r d e d as an e x c e p t i o n t o , a n d w i l l p r e v a i l over, a general s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g t o a broad subject.' I d . " A l a b a m a Dep't o f Revenue v. N a t i o n a l 11 So. 3d 821, 829-30 Peanut F e s t i v a l ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008) . Ass'n, See also C r a w f o r d v. S p r i n g l e , 631 So. 2d 880, 882 ( A l a . 1993) ("Where 17 2111256 statutes i n p a r i materia are general and s p e c i f i c , s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e c o n t r o l s t h e more g e n e r a l C n t y . v. J e n k i n s , s t a t u t e . " ) ; Baldwin 494 So. 2d 584, 588 ( A l a . 1986) s t a t u t e s a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e same s u b j e c t t h e more ("Where two a n d embrace t h e same matter, a s p e c i f i c or p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n i s c o n t r o l l i n g over a general 464 So. provision p r o v i s i o n . " ) ; State 2d 120, 123 v. F r a n k l i n C n t y . Coop., I n c . , ( A l a . C i v . App. of a statute 1985) i s c o n t r o l l i n g over ("A specific a more general p r o v i s i o n i n t h e same s t a t u t e . " ) ; a n d G r e e n v. F a i r f i e l d City Bd. o f Educ. , 365 So. 2d 1217, 1220 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1978) ("[A] s p e c i f i c or p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n i s c o n t r o l l i n g over a general provision."). Malone a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h a t § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( a ) ( 3 ) i . meaningless under the a d v o c a t e d by S t e e l c a s e case. 184, See Ex p a r t e 191 interpretation § and adopted by t h e t r i a l Children's ( A l a . 1998) of ("'"There word, s e n t e n c e , o r p r o v i s i o n Hosp. i s rendered 25-5-57(c)(3) court o f Alabama, i s a presumption [of a statute] i n this 721 So. 2d that every was i n t e n d e d f o r some u s e f u l p u r p o s e , h a s some f o r c e a n d e f f e c t , a n d t h a t some effect i s t o be g i v e n words o r p r o v i s i o n s t o each, and a l s o were used."'"). 18 that no superfluous 2111256 The legislature enacted § 25-5-57(a)(3)i. t o supersede t h e l a w r e g u l a t i n g t h e amount o f p e r m a n e n t - p a r t i a l - d i s a b i l i t y compensation returns owed to an employee who, upon t o work m a k i n g t h e same o r h i g h e r Standard Furniture Mfg. l e g i s l a t u r e recognized Co., 54 reaching wages. So. 3d See G r a c e v. at 913. that j u d i c i a l construction employees benefits to for loss recover of The of the part of t h e A c t a d d r e s s i n g permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y had many MMI, allowed permanent-partial-disability earning capacity even though those e m p l o y e e s w o u l d n o t e x p e r i e n c e any a c t u a l wage l o s s d u r i n g t h e 300-week p e r m a n e n t - p a r t i a l - d i s a b i l i t y p e r i o d . Workers' Compensation Moore, Alabama 1998). To a v o i d t h a t s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e r e s o l v e d i n j u r e d e m p l o y e e s who have r e t u r n e d higher wages "vocational would no disability," longer or §§ See 1 T e r r y (West that t o work m a k i n g t h e same o r receive loss 13:40-13:51 of benefits earning based capacity, w o u l d be l i m i t e d t o p e r m a n e n t - p a r t i a l - d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s measured by t h e i r " p h y s i c a l impairment." "Physical-impairment" benefits A. on but as See G r a c e , s u p r a . under the r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e are analogous to b e n e f i t s f o r l o s s , or l o s s of use, of a s c h e d u l e d member, w h i c h do n o t d e p e n d i n any manner on 19 an 2111256 e m p l o y e e ' s wage l o s s o r i m p a i r m e n t o f e a r n i n g Leach Mfg. Co. v. Puckett, (1969). Those b e n e f i t s , payable based regardless of on the whether 284 like Ala. disability employee d u r i n g the b e n e f i t p e r i o d . Id. r e f l e c t t h a t an e m p l o y e e has 224 So. scheduled b e n e f i t s , physical an 209, capacity. The is 2d should body, receiving full wages payment o f f u l l wages r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e t h a t the c o u r t any l o s s of s h a l l not the be the i n the consider degree of may earning s p e c i f i c a l l y provided evidence, which r e l a t e s s o l e l y to 242 to not s u s t a i n e d c a p a c i t y , b u t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has See that "vocational disability." Notably, the to-work l e g i s l a t u r e could statute to completely have d r a f t e d eliminate any permanent-partial-disability benefits until occurs. See legislature T. Moore, evidently permanent p h y s i c a l supra, decided impairment at § that not return- right to a c t u a l wage l o s s 13:54. an the However, employee otherwise with c o v e r e d by the a the s c h e d u l e " s h o u l d r e c e i v e some remedy i n r e t u r n f o r s a c r i f i c i n g the r i g h t to sue the T h a t remedy w o u l d be applied to cases e m p l o y e r f o r common-law damages." completely eradicated i n which an employee 20 Id. i f § 25-5-57(c)(3) has returned to the 2111256 employment i n w h i c h he o r she was i n j u r e d a n d e a r n s t h e same o r h i g h e r wages. Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , never r e c e i v e physical-impairment b e n e f i t s because h i s o r her c o m p e n s a t i o n w o u l d a l w a y s be c o m p l e t e l y credit. In assessing an e m p l o y e e w o u l d o f f s e t by t h e s a l a r y t h e p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t o f an e m p l o y e e , t h e c o u r t w o u l d be u n d e r t a k i n g a f u t i l e hypothetical exercise. C o m p e n s a t i o n w o u l d be p a y a b l e l o s t h i s o r h e r employment only i f a n d when an e m p l o y e e ( f o r reasons not enumerated i n t h e r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e ) a n d s u f f e r e d an a c t u a l wage l o s s , a n d , at that point, the return-to-work statute provides, c o m p e n s a t i o n w o u l d n o t be b a s e d on p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t , b u t on loss of earning capacity. 2 The legislature A f t e r i t s f i r s t sentence, which i s quoted, i n p a r t , e a r l i e r i n t h i s o p i n i o n , § 25-5-57(a) ( 3 ) i . p r o v i d e s , i n p a r t : 2 "Notwithstanding t h e f o r e g o i n g , i f t h e employee has l o s t h i s o r h e r employment u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o t h e r t h a n any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g w i t h i n a p e r i o d o f t i m e n o t t o e x c e e d 300 weeks f r o m t h e d a t e o f i n j u r y , an e m p l o y e e may p e t i t i o n a c o u r t w i t h i n two y e a r s t h e r e o f f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f h i s o r h e r permanent partial disability rating: " ( i ) The l o s s o f employment i s due t o a labor dispute s t i l l i n active progress i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n w h i c h he o r she i s o r was l a s t e m p l o y e d . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s section only, the term 'labor dispute' 21 2111256 i n c l u d e s any c o n t r o v e r s y c o n c e r n i n g t e r m s , t e n u r e , o r c o n d i t i o n s o f employment, o r c o n c e r n i ng the a s s o c i a t i on or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of persons i n n e g o t i a t i n g , f i x i n g , maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the d i s p u t a n t s stand i n the proximate r e l a t i o n o f e m p l o y e r and e m p l o y e e . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n s h a l l n o t r e l a t e t o a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n an i n d i v i d u a l w o r k e r and h i s o r h e r e m p l o y e r . "(ii) The loss of employment i s v o l u n t a r y , w i t h o u t good c a u s e connected w i t h s u c h work. " ( i i i ) The l o s s o f employment i s f o r a d i s h o n e s t or c r i m i n a l a c t committed i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s o r h e r work, f o r s a b o t a g e , o r an a c t e n d a n g e r i n g t h e s a f e t y of o t h e r s . " ( i v ) The l o s s o f employment i s f o r a c t u a l or t h r e a t e n e d misconduct committed i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s o r h e r work a f t e r p r e v i o u s w a r n i n g t o the employee. " ( v ) The l o s s o f employment i s b e c a u s e a l i c e n s e , c e r t i f i c a t e , p e r m i t , bond, or surety which is necessary for the p e r f o r m a n c e o f s u c h employment and w h i c h he o r she i s r e s p o n s i b l e t o s u p p l y has b e e n revoked, suspended, o r o t h e r w i s e become l o s t t o him or her f o r a cause. "The b u r d e n o f p r o o f i s on t h e e m p l o y e r t o p r o v e , by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e , t h a t an e m p l o y e e ' s l o s s o f employment was due t o one o f t h e c a u s e s ( i ) t h r o u g h (v) a b o v e . A t t h e h e a r i n g , t h e 22 2111256 o b v i o u s l y d i d not i n t e n d t h a t the p h y s i c a l - i m p a i r m e n t b e n e f i t s available payable A under the return-to-work t o an e m p l o y e e u n d e r s u c h more intended rational the exclusive scheme t o amount o f c o m p e n s a t i o n due work making the or not be is that the legislature s t a t u t e as a comprehensive and the control same would circumstances. conclusion return-to-work statute for determining the an method e m p l o y e e who higher wages has after returned reaching to MMI. A c c o r d i n g l y , we h o l d t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e n d t h a t § 25-5-57(c)(3) would apply in situations covered by the r e t u r n - t o - w o r k s t a t u t e b u t t h a t t h e two s t a t u t e s have s e p a r a t e f i e l d s of o p e r a t i o n . in isolation, applied the V i e w i n g t h e l a n g u a g e o f § 2 5 - 5 - 5 7 ( c ) (3) i t is salary understandable credit to t h i s that case. the trial However, court applying t h a t l a n g u a g e t o t h i s f a c t s c e n a r i o p r o d u c e s an irreconcilable conflict return-to-work between § 25-5-57(c)(3) and the c o u r t may c o n s i d e r e v i d e n c e as t o t h e e a r n i n g s e m p l o y e e i s o r may be a b l e t o e a r n i n h i s o r p a r t i a l l y d i s a b l e d c o n d i t i o n , and may c o n s i d e r e v i d e n c e o f v o c a t i o n a l d i s a b i l i t y . The fact e m p l o y e e had r e t u r n e d t o work p r i o r t o h i s o r loss of employment shall not constitute p r e s u m p t i o n o f no v o c a t i o n a l i m p a i r m e n t . ... " 23 the her any the her a 2111256 statute, depriving situations, the l a t t e r of t h e c o u r t must a p p l y n o t t h e more g e n e r a l s t a t u t e . any t h e more s p e c i f i c In such statute, See A l a b a m a Dep't o f Revenue v . N a t i o n a l Peanut F e s t i v a l Ass'n, 11 So. 3d a t 829-30. the t r i a l c o u r t a p p l i e d § 25-5-57(c)(3) physical-impairment effect. Because t o o f f s e t t h e award o f b e n e f i t s due M a l o n e u n d e r t h e r e t u r n - t o - work s t a t u t e , i t s j u d g m e n t i s due t o be r e v e r s e d a n d t h e c a s e remanded f o r t h e e n t r y o f a new j u d g m e n t o m i t t i n g a n y s e t o f f . A c c o r d i n g l y , we r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t a n d remand t h e c a s e for the t r i a l this opinion. court to enter a judgment i n compliance with The r e m a i n i n g a r g u m e n t s a s s e r t e d b y t h e p a r t i e s are p r e t e r m i t t e d . REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , a n d P i t t m a n , Thomas, a n d D o n a l d s o n , J J . , concur. Moore, J . , concurs i n the result, 24 without writing.

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