James Schubert v. Wesley Smith

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REL: 5-3-2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2111217 James Schubert v. Wesley Smith Appeal from Madison C i r c u i t (CV-10-882) Court DONALDSON, J u d g e . James Schubert, the p l a i n t i f f , appeals from a summary judgment i n f a v o r o f Wesley S m i t h , t h e d e f e n d a n t , w i t h respect to c l a i m s o f wantonness a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t Smith a r i s i n g out o f an a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t . We a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t . 2111217 F a c t s and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y Schubert Madison a n d S m i t h were County High School. Smith means o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n paid friends. f o r the rides p r o v i d e d Schubert t o and from because B o t h were s t u d e n t s a t school. t h e two were with Schubert friends, a never and t h e r e c o r d does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t he p u r c h a s e d g a s f o r S m i t h . On September proceeded 5, 2008, Smith i n the d i r e c t i o n and Schubert of a friend's left school house on and Mountain Lane i n M a d i s o n C o u n t y . The w e a t h e r was c l e a r , a n d t h e roadway was d r y . S m i t h was t r a v e l i n g a t a r a t e o f s p e e d i n e x c e s s o f the p o s t e d speed Smith limit o f 25 m i l e s p e r h o u r . Schubert told t o s l o w down b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , a n d S m i t h c o m p l i e d by d e c r e a s i n g speed. A f t e r p r o c e e d i n g over a h i l l and while the v e h i c l e tires of the vehicle vehicle off was e n t e r i n g left turned sideways, t h e ground, into a left t h e roadway. t h e back turn, the back As a r e s u l t , end o f t h e v e h i c l e the lifted a n d t h e e n t i r e v e h i c l e l e f t t h e roadway. The r e a r o f t h e v e h i c l e c r a s h e d i n t o a c o n c r e t e w a l l . The v e h i c l e then rolled over on i t s top. Schubert received serious i n j u r i e s as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c c i d e n t . I n a l e t t e r t o S c h u b e r t dated March 18, 2009, Smith a p o l o g i z e d t o Schubert 2 f o rthe 2111217 accident. of S m i t h f u r t h e r s t a t e d i n t h e l e t t e r t h a t , on t h e day t h e a c c i d e n t , he h a d n o t c a r e d w h e t h e r was mad he d i e d , b e c a u s e he a b o u t some p e r s o n a l i s s u e s he was g o i n g t h r o u g h a t t h e time. On May 13, 2010, Schubert sued Smith a s s e r t i n g c l a i m s of n e g l i g e n c e and w a n t o n n e s s . On J a n u a r y 23, 2012, Smith f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , a s s e r t i n g t h a t A l a b a m a ' s g u e s t statute, § negligence 32-1-2, and m i s c o n d u c t " by entered Smith. a that Smith. summary Schubert Ala. Code there filed was Following judgment 1975, on a motion barred no any evidence claim of "wanton a h e a r i n g , the t r i a l June 12, to a l t e r , 2012, court i n favor Schubert filed a t i m e l y n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h e supreme c o u r t on A u g u s t supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o t h i s p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 22, court, 1975. Standard of Review " T h i s C o u r t ' s r e v i e w o f a summary j u d g m e n t i s de novo. W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o . I n s . Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 ( A l a . 2003) . We a p p l y t h e same s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w as t h e t r i a l court applied. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e movant has made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s and t h a t t h e movant i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . R u l e 3 of amend, o r v a c a t e , w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d on J u l y 12, 2012. 2012. The of 2111217 5 6 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P.; B l u e C r o s s & B l u e S h i e l d o f A l a b a m a v. H o d u r s k i , 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 ( A l a . 2004). In making s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , we must r e v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant. W i l s o n v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 ( A l a . 1986) . Once t h e movant makes a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e b u r d e n t h e n s h i f t s t o t h e nonmovant t o p r o d u c e ' s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ' as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of a genuine issue of m a t e r i a l fact. Bass v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f B a l d w i n C o u n t y , 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ; A l a . Code 1975, § 12-21-12. ' [ S ] u b s t a n t i a l evidence i s evidence of such weight and q u a l i t y t h a t f a i r - m i n d e d p e r s o n s i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t can r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . ' West v. F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r . Co. o f F l a . , 547 So. 2d 870, 871 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . " Dow v. 1035, 1038-39 S c h u b e r t c o n c e d e s t h a t he was a g u e s t i n S m i t h ' s (Ala. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d vehicle, 2004). Discussion thus invoking the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Alabama's g u e s t statute, which bars h i s negligence claim. " I n Ex p a r t e A n d e r s o n , 682 So. 2d 467 ( A l a . 1996), this Court discussed the concept of wantonness in the context of operating an automobile: " ' I n a case s u b j e c t t o the Guest S t a t u t e , a plaintiff's showing of "wanton m i s c o n d u c t " r e q u i r e s more t h a n a s h o w i n g o f some f o r m o f i n a d v e r t e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e d r i v e r ; i t r e q u i r e s a s h o w i n g o f some d e g r e e o f c o n s c i o u s c u l p a b i l i t y . George v. 4 2111217 Champion 1 991). 1nn1 \ Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 852 ( A l a . "'What c o n s t i t u t e s w a n t o n misconduct depends on t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d i n e a c h p a r t i c u l a r case. C e n t r a l Alabama E l e c t r i c C o o p e r a t i v e v. T a p l e y , 546 So. 2d 371 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ; Brown v. T u r n e r , 497 So. 2d 1119 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) ; T r a h a n v. Cook, 288 A l a . 704, 265 So. 2d 125 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . A m a j o r i t y o f t h i s C o u r t , i n Lynn S t r i c k l a n d S a l e s & S e r v i c e , Inc. v. A e r o - L a n e F a b r i c a t o r s , I n c . , 510 So. 2d 142 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , e m p h a s i z e d t h a t w a n t o n n e s s , w h i c h r e q u i r e s some d e g r e e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s on t h e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t i n j u r y i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from h i s a c t o r o m i s s i o n , i s n o t t o be c o n f u s e d w i t h n e g l i g e n c e ( i . e . , mere i n a d v e r t e n c e ) : "'"Wantonness i s n o t m e r e l y h i g h e r degree of c u l p a b i l i t y a than n e g l i g e n c e . N e g l i g e n c e and wantonness, p l a i n l y and s i m p l y , are q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t t o r t c o nce p t s of a c t i o nab l e c u l p a b i l i t y . I m p l i c i t i n wanton, w i l l f u l , or r e c k l e s s misconduct i s an a c t i n g , w i t h k n o w l e d g e o f danger, or w i t h consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some a c t w i l l l i k e l y r e s u l t i n injury "'"Negligence is usually c h a r a c t e r i z e d as an i n a t t e n t i o n , thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a lack o f due c a r e ; whereas w a n t o n n e s s i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as an act which cannot e x i s t w i t h o u t a purpose or design, a conscious or intentional act. ' Simple negligence i s the inadvertent 5 2111217 o m i s s i o n o f d u t y ; and wanton o r wi l l fu l mi s c o n du c t is characterized as such by t h e s t a t e of mind w i t h which the a c t o r o m i s s i o n i s done o r o m i t t e d . ' M c N e i l v. Munson S.S. L i n e s , 184 Ala. 420, [423], 63 So. 992 (1913) II I II "'"'Willful and wanton conduct has a w e l l - d e f i n e d meaning a t law. I t i s sometimes e x p r e s s e d i n terms of " r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d of the s a f e t y of another." Willful and wanton conduct s h o u l d n o t be c o n f u s e d w i t h n e g l i g e n c e . I t has been correctly stated that t h e two c o n c e p t s a r e as "unmixable as o i l and water."' " ' " "'"'...Willfulness or wantonness imports premeditation, or k n o w l e d g e a n d consciousness t h a t the injury is likely to result from the a c t done or from the o m i s s i o n t o a c t , and strictly speaking, i s not w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e t e r m "negligence," which 6 2111217 conveys the idea of i n adve rten ce , as distinguished from p r e m e d i t a t i o n or formed intention.'" "'510 So. 2d a t 145-46 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . See also, Central Alabama Electric C o o p e r a t i v e v. T a p l e y , 546 So. 2d 371 ( A l a . 1989) "682 So. 2d a t 469-70." Phillips ex r e l . Phillips So. 2d 464, 467-68 v. U n i t e d S e r v s . A u t o . A s s ' n , ( A l a . 2008). On a p p e a l , S c h u b e r t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l in 98 8 court erred f i n d i n g t h a t he d i d n o t p r e s e n t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e as t o whether Smith a c t e d wantonly i n the o p e r a t i o n of h i s v e h i c l e on t h e d a t e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . In support constitute material of his substantial fact contention Smith's actions a genuine issue of acted wantonly, Schubert evidence creating as t o w h e t h e r Smith c i t e s B a r k e r v. Towns, 747 So. 2d 907 Allen v. Hill, 758 So. that 2d 574 C o l e m a n v. S m i t h , 901 So. 2d 729 B a r k e r , Towns, t h e d r i v e r , ( A l a . C i v . App. ( A l a . C i v . App. (Ala. 1999), 1999), and C i v . App. 2004) . In f a i l e d t o make a c o m p l e t e s t o p a t a s t o p s i g n . B o t h Towns a n d B a r k e r , t h e p a s s e n g e r , saw a t r u c k a p p r o a c h i n g the i n t e r s e c t i o n a t a h i g h r a t e o f speed. D e s p i t e 7 2111217 the f a c t t h a t the t r u c k had t h e r i g h t - o f - w a y , to enter the intersection trial court's intersection before in the truck an effort arrived. summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r Towns p r o c e e d e d to cross the In overturning the o f Towns, t h i s court stated: " B a r k e r p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o show t h a t Towns e n t e r e d the i n t e r s e c t i o n a f t e r seeing the truck approaching at a high r a t e of speed. In a d d i t i o n , t h e t r u c k d r i v e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d n o t see Towns s t o p a t t h e s t o p s i g n , a n d t h e r e i s no d i s p u t e t h a t the t r u c k d r i v e r had the r i g h t - o f - w a y . These facts constituted substantial evidence supporting t h e wantonness c l a i m ; t h e r e f o r e , t h e i s s u e s h o u l d have b e e n p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y . " Barker, 747 So. 2d a t 909. In A l l e n , c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g whether the d r i v e r , stopped a t a stop reversing the t r i a l Allen, resulted i n this c o l l i d e d with a l l e g i n g that willful o r wanton court's c o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f H i l l . a m i n o r c h i l d , was i n j u r e d i n an a c c i d e n t vehicle Hill, sign Hill, another v e h i c l e . Allen's injuries misconduct. Hill's A l l e n ' s mother were Allen's when caused by mother sued Hill's offered the testimony of Bass, the d r i v e r of the other v e h i c l e i n v o l v e d i n the collision. vehicle B a s s i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a d w i t n e s s e d a p p r o a c h t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t a s p e e d o f 50-60 8 Hill's miles 2111217 per hour. vehicle However, B a s s only after also testified that he saw Hill's i t had e n t e r e d the i n t e r s e c t i o n . Due t o those i n c o n s i s t e n t statements, the t r i a l court granted H i l l ' s motion to strike Bass's judgment f o r H i l l . testimony and entered a summary This court concluded that the t r i a l court had i m p r o p e r l y s t u c k B a s s ' s t e s t i m o n y and t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y "create[d] drove a genuine wantonly issue through of material the fact: intersection. whether A r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r from Bass's t e s t i m o n y t h a t H i l l at jury could d i d not stop t h e s t o p s i g n and drove t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t a h i g h r a t e of speed." In the Hill Allen, 758 So. 2d a t 576. Coleman, t h e m o t h e r o f Coleman, a m i n o r , sued Smith, d r i v e r o f a v e h i c l e i n w h i c h Coleman h a d b e e n a p a s s e n g e r . S m i t h h a d an a c c i d e n t w h i l e d r i v i n g h i s v e h i c l e a t a h i g h r a t e of speed and l o s i n g c o n t r o l o f t h e v e h i c l e a f t e r b e i n g f o r c e d off t h e r o a d b y an o n c o m i n g v e h i c l e . the a c c i d e n t . A t t r i a l , S m i t h moved f o r a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r of l a w b e f o r e t h e c a s e was upon t h e g u e s t s t a t u t e . Coleman was i n j u r e d i n submitted f o r a decision, The t r i a l Coleman's m o t h e r a p p e a l e d , a n d t h i s judge g r a n t e d the motion. court held: "The r o a d was n a r r o w , w i t h no d e l i n e a t e d c e n t e r line, and c o n s i s t e d o f t a r and l o o s e gravel. 9 based 2111217 A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r o a d h a d what was d e s c r i b e d as a ' b l i n d h i l l ' t h a t p r e v e n t e d oncoming t r a f f i c from s e e i n g each o t h e r u n t i l they c r e s t e d t h e h i l l . A f t e r r e v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e of S m i t h ' s r a t e o f s p e e d , when c o u p l e d w i t h e v i d e n c e of t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e r o a d i n q u e s t i o n , r a i s e d a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t t o be r e s o l v e d b y t h e j u r y as t o whether Smith's actions rose t o the l e v e l of w a n t o n n e s s as d e f i n e d b y o u r supreme c o u r t . " Coleman, 901 So. 2d a t 732-33. In this case, Schubert argues that e v i d e n c e as t o t h e s p e e d a t w h i c h S m i t h was t r a v e l i n g , when c o u p l e d w i t h e v i d e n c e of the approaching h i l l , with the road t r a v e l e d , the sharp curve, Smith's familiarity and Smith's mental s t a t e , amounts t o s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o f wanton m i s c o n d u c t . In support of h i s contention that e s t a b l i s h e d the elements o f wantonness, Tolbert, So. 988 has n o t Smith c i t e s T o l b e r t v. 903 So. 2d 103 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , Ex p a r t e A n d e r s o n , 2d 467 (Ala. Schubert ( A l a . 1996), 682 Dorman v. J a c k s o n , 623 So. 2d 1056 1 9 9 3 ) , a n d P h i l l i p s v. U n i t e d S e r v i c e s A u t o m o b i l e A s s ' n , So. 2d 464 while riding grandmother ( A l a . 2008). as a g u e s t In Tolbert, a m i n o r was i n h i s grandmother's l o s t c o n t r o l o f h e r v e h i c l e because a p p r e c i a t e t h e dangerous vehicle. killed The she f a i l e d t o c o n d i t i o n s of the road, i n c l u d i n g the f a c t s t h a t t h e roadway was s l i c k due t o a l i g h t r a i n a n d t h a t 10 2111217 the roadway p r o c e e d e d d o w n h i l l a l o n g trial court entered grandmother. a summary double judgment Our supreme c o u r t c o n c l u d e d "S" c u r v e . i n favor The of the that, although the evidence demonstrated t h a t the grandmother had l o s t c o n t r o l of h e r v e h i c l e due t o " d r i v e r e r r o r " r e l a t e d to her f a i l u r e to appreciate the hazard the c r e a t e d on t h e c u r v i n g d o w n h i l l r o a d b y s l i c k n e s s of the road surface resulting l i g h t r a i n , i t c o u l d n o t be c o n c l u d e d been s p e e d i n g , from t h e r e c e n t t h a t the grandmother had e x c e p t "as a m a t t e r o f s p e c u l a t i o n . " Tolbert, 903 So. 2d a t 118. Although t h e supreme c o u r t c o n c l u d e d the grandmother's actions likely negligence, rose to the that level of i t h e l d t h a t summary j u d g m e n t f o r t h e g r a n d m o t h e r was p r o p e r on t h e i s s u e o f w a n t o n n e s s . In Anderson, Anderson, t h e d r i v e r , p u l l e d i n t o a lane of traffic while attempting to make a left turn at an i n t e r s e c t i o n . Her v i e w o f t h e o n c o m i n g v e h i c l e s was o b s t r u c t e d by o t h e r v e h i c l e s i n t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e r o a d s were slick vision due t o a l i g h t Despite the obstruction to her a n d t h e wet roadway, A n d e r s o n a t t e m p t e d t o c r o s s t h e intersection guest rain. a n d was i n Anderson's struck by c a r , was 11 another injured. v e h i c l e . Hughes, a In a f f i r m i n g the 2111217 summary judgment in favor of Anderson, our supreme court stated: "A r e v i e w o f t h e f a c t s c o n v i n c e s us t h a t Hughes d i d not p r e s e n t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e from which a f a c t f i n d e r c o u l d i n f e r t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y of 'wanton c o n d u c t , ' as d e f i n e d i n A l a b a m a c a s e l a w . In r e a c h i n g t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , we have v i e w e d t h e e v i d e n c e i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , as we a r e r e q u i r e d by l a w t o do; we can f i n d no e v i d e n c e t h a t A n d e r s o n a c t e d i n a w a n t o n manner. I n h e r a f f i d a v i t , A n d e r s o n s t a t e s t h a t she w a i t e d a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n u n t i l she b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was s a f e t o t u r n . A l t h o u g h A n d e r s o n may have b e e n n e g l i g e n t i n t u r n i n g l e f t w h i l e her view of the oncoming t r a f f i c was b l o c k e d , we do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e t h a t she was g u i l t y of 'wanton c o n d u c t , ' as t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n o u r c a s e s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e most f a v o r a b l y t o Hughes, we f i n d no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t the defendant Anderson a c t e d ' w i t h knowledge of danger, or w i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h a t the d o i n g [of the a c t would] l i k e l y result in injury.' Lynn Strickland [Sales & Service, I n c . v. A e r o - L a n e F a b r i c a t o r s , I n c . ] , 510 So. 2d [142,] 145 [(Ala. 1 9 8 7 ) ] . I n a d d i t i o n , t h i s C o u r t has h e l d on a t l e a s t two p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s t h a t e v i d e n c e o f conduct s i m i l a r to Anderson's d i d not c o n s t i t u t e s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o f w a n t o n c o n d u c t . See, Dorman v. J a c k s o n , 623 So. 2d 1056 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; G e o r g e v. Champion I n s u r a n c e Co., 591 So. 2d 852 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . " Ex p a r t e A n d e r s o n , In Dorman, 682 So. Jackson, 2d a t the 470. driver, turned i n t e r s e c t i o n i n f r o n t o f an o n c o m i n g v e h i c l e , collision vehicle. and injuries Jackson had to Dorman, slowed 12 down a guest upon left at an resulting in a in Jackson's approaching the 2111217 intersection, car. Our supreme c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d d i d n o t rise to the level but he failed of wantonness summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f In P h i l l i p s , she Catlin, to and see the oncoming a f f i r m e d the trial court's Jackson. the d r i v e r , became d i s t r a c t e d when t o o k h e r e y e s o f f t h e roadway t o wave a t f r i e n d s . result, she the road. vehicle a l l o w e d her v e h i c l e As t o c r o s s the c e n t e r l i n e She u l t i m a t e l y l o s t c o n t r o l o f h e r v e h i c l e , and flipped vehicle. over, Phillips injuring argued that Phillips, Catlin a had guest a of the in the knowledge or c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the danger p r e s e n t e d i n the s i t u a t i o n because Catlin had taken a driver's education course i n which she l e a r n e d the r u l e s of conduct f o r d r i v i n g . P h i l l i p s argued t h a t C a t l i n ' s d e c i s i o n t o t a k e h e r e y e s o f f t h e r o a d t o wave a t t h e friends amounted t o a c o n s c i o u s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e rules she had l e a r n e d i n h e r d r i v e r ' s e d u c a t i o n c o u r s e and t h a t C a t l i n ' s d e c i s i o n t o t a k e h e r e y e s o f f t h e r o a d was w i t h made k n o w l e d g e of the potential consequences. Our supreme court held follows: "In the present case, even reviewing the e v i d e n c e , as we must, i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o [ P h i l l i p s ] , t h e nonmovant f o r summary j u d g m e n t , we agree with USAA [, Catlin's insurer,] that 13 as 2111217 [ P h i l l i p s ] has n o t p r e s e n t e d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g that [Catlin] acted wantonly. [ P h i l l i p s ] has n o t p u t f o r w a r d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o show t h a t [ C a t l i n ] h a d 'knowledge and c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' t h a t a l i k e l y r e s u l t of momentarily waving to her friends was an automobile accident in which [ P h i l l i p s ] w o u l d be i n j u r e d . What [ P h i l l i p s ] has shown i s t h a t [ C a t l i n ] had k n o w l e d g e as t o how t o properly and safely operate an automobile. P r e s u m a b l y , anyone who o b t a i n s a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e i n t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a has such knowledge. See, g e n e r a l l y , A l a . Code 1975, § 32-6-3(a) ('Every p e r s o n who a p p l i e s f o r an i n i t i a l A l a b a m a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e i s s u e d by t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f P u b l i c S a f e t y u n d e r t h i s a r t i c l e s h a l l be g i v e n and s u c c e s s f u l l y pass an examination b e f o r e the issuance of a driver's license.'). [ P h i l l i p s ' s ] r e a s o n i n g would convert every f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y or s a f e l y operate an automobile resulting from 'inattention, t h o u g h t l e s s n e s s , ... h e e d l e s s n e s s , [ o r ] a l a c k o f due c a r e ' i n t o an a c t o f w a n t o n n e s s on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e d r i v e r knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t s u c h i n a t t e n t i o n , t h o u g h t l e s s n e s s , or heedlessness i s improper." Phillips, 988 So. 2d a t 470-71. I n t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s , we are not persuaded that a c t i o n s amount t o a n y t h i n g more t h a n i n a d v e r t e n c e . Smith's Nor can we c o n c l u d e t h a t Smith p o s s e s s e d knowledge o f the danger c r e a t e d by h i s a c t i o n s o r a d e g r e e would result operating his in of consciousness that h i s d r i v i n g Schubert's injuries. Although Smith was v e h i c l e a t a h i g h r a t e o f s p e e d and l i k e l y i n a n e g l i g e n t manner, t h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t he b e g a n t o s l o w t h e v e h i c l e upon a p p r o a c h i n g t h e t u r n and a f t e r a w a r n i n g 14 from 2111217 Schubert. Additionally, Smith might still a p p r o a c h i n g the other although testimony have b e e n e x c e e d i n g the t u r n , even a f t e r s l o w i n g e v i d e n c e , when c o u p l e d w i t h the to substantial evidence speed limit down, t h e r e t r a v e l i n g , that demonstrating that to wantonness. v. Dunn, 819 Unlike i n Coleman, where t h e center l a n e was 2d 22, 24 g r a v e l , the an to the l e v e l of wanton In Tolbert a letter w r i t t e n by months a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . S c h u b e r t and not cared experiencing at Smith to the day of the d i e d , because of p e r s o n a l the time. not consciousness Schubert Schubert several In t h a t l e t t e r , Smith a p o l o g i z e d s t a t e d t h a t , on i f he did behavior. t h a t an i n j u r y w o u l d l i k e l y r e s u l t f r o m h i s a c t i o n s , provided of knowledge of the s l i c k roadways, I n an e f f o r t t o show t h a t S m i t h a c t e d w i t h has amount unmarked yet the c o u r t s t i l l determined t h a t t h e i r inadvertence rise would conditions t h e roadway i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e were c l e a r and d r y . and A n d e r s o n , t h e d r i v e r s had the ( A l a . 2001). n a r r o w roadway w i t h c o v e r e d i n t a r and no Smith's E v i d e n c e o f s p e e d a l o n e does n o t So. upon was a c t i o n s were w a n t o n . Hicks that evidence regarding r a t e o f s p e e d a t w h i c h t h e v e h i c l e was amount indicates Although 15 that accident, he to had i s s u e s he had been letter serves as 2111217 e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t S m i t h was p o s s i b l y depressed at the t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , i t does n o t s e r v e as e v i d e n c e t h a t S m i t h t o o k any a c t i o n i n h i s d r i v i n g b a s e d depressed. The does Smith had knowledge or c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t the v e h i c l e would leave the of speed h i g h e r than the to t r a v e l i n g p o s t e d speed not demonstrate on h i s b e i n g that roadway due letter indicating at a rate limit. B e c a u s e t h e r e were no g e n u i n e to whether Smith acted issues of m a t e r i a l f a c t wantonly, summary a p p r o p r i a t e l y e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f S m i t h . We the judgment therefore as was affirm judgment. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P.J., and Pittman, concur. 16 Thomas, and Moore, J J . ,

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