City of Northport v. Johnny Sledge

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REL: 06/28/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2111171 C i t y o f Northport v. Johnny Sledge Appeal from Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t Court (CV-11-900474) MOORE, J u d g e . The City of Northport ("the C i t y " ) appeals from t h e judgment o f t h e T u s c a l o o s a C i r c u i t C o u r t , w h i c h r e v e r s e d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e N o r t h p o r t C i v i l S e r v i c e B o a r d ("the B o a r d " ) t o 2111171 uphold the C i t y ' s d e c i s i o n to terminate Johnny S l e d g e . We r e v e r s e a n d remand. Procedural Background S l e d g e was e m p l o y e d b y t h e C i t y . 2011, Sledge t h e employment o f was working at a On o r b e f o r e job site with June 1, three other e m p l o y e e s o f t h e C i t y , G a r y W i l d e r , t h e b a c k h o e o p e r a t o r ; Doug Jones, t h e crew chief at the job s i t e ; and C a r l Kenny B u r n s , t h e s u p e r v i s o r i n c h a r g e o f t h e o t h e r was n o t a t t h e j o b s i t e . Burns are sometimes employees." The City Sledge, referred Wilder, to terminated Jones, 1 employees, Eatmon, a n d collectively a l l of Eatmon. as the "the employees' employment b a s e d on an i n c i d e n t t h a t i n v o l v e d t h e e m p l o y e e s t a k i n g s c r a p m e t a l from a j o b s i t e and s e l l i n g i t f o r p e r s o n a l profit; i n order t o s e l l the scrap metal, Sledge l e f t thejob s i t e d u r i n g w o r k i n g h o u r s on a t l e a s t two d i f f e r e n t The employees d i v i d e d among themselves r e c e i v e d from t h e s a l e o f t h e scrap The and, employees appealed occasions. t h e money that was metal. the C i t y ' s d e c i s i o n t o the Board, on June 2 1 , 2 0 1 1 , a h e a r i n g was h e l d b e f o r e the Board. The r e c o r d does n o t i n d i c a t e t h e s p e c i f i c d a t e on w h i c h t h e c o n d u c t made t h e b a s i s o f t h i s a p p e a l o c c u r r e d . 1 2 2111171 N e i t h e r W i l d e r nor Sledge nor t h e i r a t t o r n e y s appeared at the June 21, 2011, h e a r i n g . The Board overturned the City's d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e t h e employment o f Eatmon and J o n e s , b u t i t a f f i r m e d t h e C i t y ' s d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e t h e employment o f S l e d g e , W i l d e r , and Burns. On June 3 0 , 2011, S l e d g e a p p e a l e d t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n t o the Tuscaloosa notice Circuit Court of appeal, Sledge ("the t r i a l court"). a s s e r t e d t h a t the Board's In his 2 decision was i m p r o p e r l y b a s e d on h i s r a c e and a r e a d i n g d i s a b i l i t y and was i n r e t a l i a t i o n f o r c o m p l a i n t s p r e v i o u s l y f i l e d by against with the City the Equal Employment Sledge Opportunity Commission; Sledge a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t h i s s u p e r v i s o r had g i v e n the employees the s c r a p m e t a l from the job s i t e . The City moved t o s t r i k e S l e d g e ' s a l l e g a t i o n s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and h i s allegation matters pursuant of retaliatory discharge, asserting had n o t been r a i s e d b e f o r e t h e Board t o A c t No. 1225, § 19, A l a . A c t s properly presented to the t r i a l court. 3 that those and, t h e r e f o r e , 1969, were n o t The C i t y a l s o moved W i l d e r a l s o appealed to the c i r c u i t court, but h i s appeal was a s s i g n e d t o a d i f f e r e n t j u d g e . 2 The C i t y a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t S l e d g e ' s a l l e g a t i o n s o f r a c e d i s a b i l i t y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as w e l l as r e t a l i a t i o n b y t h e 3 and 3 2111171 to dismiss Sledge's appear appeal, a s s e r t i n g at the h e a r i n g before the On August 15, 2011, the t h a t he h a d failed to Board. trial c o u r t denied the City's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s and remanded S l e d g e ' s c a s e t o t h e B o a r d w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s to conduct another h e a r i n g . after another h e a r i n g b e f o r e the Board, his a t t o r n e y appeared, the City's decision B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n was 2011. On O c t o b e r 4, 2011, at which Sledge the Board voted unanimously to terminate Sledge's f i l e d w i t h the t r i a l to uphold employment. The c o u r t on O c t o b e r 5, A t r a n s c r i p t of the h e a r i n g b e f o r e the Board a l s o submitted to the t r i a l and was court. On November 30, 2011, t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on S l e d g e ' s a p p e a l . trial At the c o n c l u s i o n of t h a t h e a r i n g , the c o u r t q u e s t i o n e d whether decision to terminate Sledge's i t was to review the employment or the City's Board's C i t y were t h e s u b j e c t o f l i t i g a t i o n p e n d i n g i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court f o r the N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t of Alabama. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r e c o r d a l s o r e f l e c t s t h a t , on J u l y 25, 2011, S l e d g e was a w a r d e d u n e m p l o y m e n t - c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s b a s e d on the C i t y ' s t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s employment. The h e a r i n g o f f i c e r f o r t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t o f I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s (now known as t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r ) d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , b e c a u s e S l e d g e had t a k e n t h e s c r a p m e t a l w i t h t h e p e r m i s s i o n o f h i s s u p e r v i s o r , he h a d n o t a c t e d d i s h o n e s t l y o r e n g a g e d i n c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t and, t h u s , was n o t p r e c l u d e d f r o m r e c e i v i n g unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s . 4 2111171 d e c i s i o n to uphold the C i t y ' s d e c i s i o n to terminate Sledge's employment. decision was Sledge contended t h a t the t r i a l g o v e r n e d by A l a . Code 1975, contended t h a t the t r i a l Northport No. Civil 1225. on t h a t On The trial § 11-44B-48, w h i l e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was Service Act court's ("the g o v e r n e d by A c t " ) , A l a . Acts court requested the 1969, City the Act b r i e f s from the p a r t i e s issue. May reversing 3, the 2012, the court decision to t e r m i n a t i o n o f S l e d g e ' s employment. The t h a t i t was 44B-48 and Board's trial reviewing entered uphold a the judgment City's t r i a l court i n d i c a t e d the Board's d e c i s i o n pursuant to § stated: "2. I n r e v i e w i n g the d e c i s i o n o f the Board to u p h o l d the t e r m i n a t i o n o f Johnny S l e d g e [ , ] the Court took i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n Mr. Sledge's major r o l e i n the e v e n t s l e a d i n g to h i s termination, h i s p r i o r d i s c i p l i n a r y record, h i s a l l e g a t i o n s of retaliation a g a i n s t the C i t y of N o r t h p o r t f o r f i l i n g p r i o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n complaints, h i s having received permission to r e c e i v e the pipe f r o m h i s o v e r a l l s u p e r v i s o r , Kenny B u r n s , and h i s i m m e d i a t e s u p e r v i s o r , Doug J o n e s , who a c t u a l l y contacted Kenny B u r n s to o b t a i n t h e p e r m i s s i o n and s h a r e d i n t h e p r o c e e d s g e n e r a t e d by the sale of the p i p e s , and t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n t o r e d u c e t h e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s u s p e n s i o n f o r Doug Jones. 5 11- 2111171 "3. I n l i g h t o f the evidence, i n c l u d i n g the Board's d e c i s i o n to reduce the t e r m i n a t i o n o f Mr. J o n e s t o a s u s p e n s i o n , t h e C o u r t i s of the o p i n i o n t h a t the d e c i s i o n to uphold t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f Mr. S l e d g e i s a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s and i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. I n the Court's view, b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e and t h e r e c o r d , t h e c u l p a b i l i t y o f Mr. J o n e s i s e q u a l t o i f n o t g r e a t e r t h a n t h e c u l p a b i l i t y o f Mr. S l e d g e . T h i s i s so p a r t i c u l a r l y g i v e n t h e t e s t i m o n y by t h e C i t y A d m i n i s t r a t o r t h a t he h e l d t h e s u p e r v i s o r to a h i g h e r standard than the person being supervised. " A c c o r d i n g l y , the D e c i s i o n to Uphold the t e r m i n a t i o n o f J o h n n y S l e d g e i s h e r e b y r e v e r s e d and t h i s c a s e i s remanded t o t h e ... B o a r d f o r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Judgment o f t h i s C o u r t . " The court's City moved to judgment; the alter, court or that the trial The C i t y f i r s t contends t h a t Sledge's a p p e a l to the trial i t s notice of denied vacate motion. City timely f i l e d trial amend, appeal. Analysis The c o u r t was g o v e r n e d by t h e A c t and n o t by A l a . Code 1975, 44B-48, and, thus, t h a t the t r i a l u n d e r t h e wrong s t a n d a r d Alabama personnel Code 1975, system that municipalities organized c o u r t reviewed the of review. § 11-44B-40 is agree w i t h the et seq., under Chapter 6 44B, City. establishes "only and to 11- evidence We applicable § a Class 4 electing by 2111171 o r d i n a n c e w i t h i n 30 d a y s o f M a r c h 15, 2006, t o be s u b j e c t t o this article [i.e., Title 11, C h a p t e r participate i n the personnel article." § 11-44B-40. system The 44B, A r t i c l e provided record 2 ] and for i n this contains nothing to e s t a b l i s h t h a t § 11-44B-40 e t s e q . i s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e C i t y . The C i t y a s s e r t s a Class i ti s a Class 4 municipality. (establishing population "[a]ll that See A l a . Code 8 classifications with 1975, § 11-40-12 of m u n i c i p a l i t i e s based and s p e c i f y i n g t h a t C l a s s cities 7 m u n i c i p a l i t y , not a population 4 municipalities on include o f n o t l e s s t h a n 50,000 a n d n o t more t h a n 99,999 i n h a b i t a n t s " ) . Although the C i t y d i d not make t h a t i t s postjudgment the assertion City's failure proceedings below application until i tfiled t o make did that not assertion justify o f § 11-44B-48 w i t h o u t t h a t t h e C i t y met t h e e l i g i b i l i t y the motion, earlier i n the trial court's some e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s o f § 11-44B-40 et seq. Even assuming t h a t the record contains t o be s u b j e c t the C i t y i s a Class nothing to indicate that 4 municipality, i t ever elected t o § 11-44B-40 e t s e q . a n d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p e r s o n n e l system e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h o s e Code p r o v i s i o n s . 7 Such 2111171 an e l e c t i o n i s an e x p r e s s r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e § 11-44B-40 e t s e q . the record before We, the § 11-44B-40 e t s e q . Conversely, trial was the therefore, court Northport." agree w i t h the City that f a i l e d to demonstrate that a p p l i c a b l e to Sledge's preamble to purpose i s to " e s t a b l i s h a C i v i l of a p p l i c a t i o n of Among o t h e r the Act Service things, that appeal. indicates that i t s System f o r the Act City establishes a p e r s o n n e l board, i . e . , the B o a r d ; d i v i d e s the C i t y ' s employees i n t o "exempt" and " c l a s s i f i e d " s t a t u s ; s p e c i f i e s the d u t i e s t h e B o a r d ; s p e c i f i e s a method f o r f i l l i n g v a c a n t j o b s w i t h C i t y ; a d d r e s s e s d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n s t o be t a k e n a g a i n s t e m p l o y e e s , i n c l u d i n g s u s p e n s i o n s , d e m o t i o n s , and and authorizes regarding Board to review employee d i s c i p l i n e . t h a t the A c t to the the a p p l i e s t o and termination decisions court the City dismissals; of the City T h u s , i t c a n n o t be disputed governs Sledge's appeal relating o f h i s employment w i t h the City. I n h i s b r i e f to t h i s c o u r t , Sledge acknowledges t h a t trial of erred i n applying § 11-44B-48 t o h i s a p p e a l . a s s e r t s , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h a t e r r o r was 8 harmless. We the He disagree. 2111171 Section which the 19 of the Act, City or which employees of establishes the City may a method appeal adverse d e c i s i o n s of the Board, p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t by from part: "The e m p l o y e e , t h e a p p o i n t i n g a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e c i t y may, w i t h i n t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e board i s rendered, appeal to the [ T u s c a l o o s a C i r c u i t C o u r t ] f r o m any d e c i s i o n o f t h e b o a r d by f i l i n g n o t i c e o f s u c h a p p e a l w i t h t h e c o u r t and c a u s i n g a c o p y o f s u c h n o t i c e t o be s e r v e d on t h e a p p o i n t i n g a u t h o r i t y and any member o f t h e b o a r d . Upon t h e f i l i n g of such n o t i c e , the board s h a l l f i l e w i t h the c o u r t a c e r t i f i e d t r a n s c r i p t o f the p r o c e e d i n g had b e f o r e i t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a p p e a l , and i t s d e c i s i o n i n the matter. The a p p e a l s h a l l be h e a r d a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e by t h e c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y on t h e i s s u e s made b e f o r e t h e b o a r d and t h e t r i a l i n t h e c o u r t s h a l l be de n o v o . " (Emphasis added.) Thus, t h e A c t p r o v i d e s f o r a de novo r e v i e w on a p p e a l . Alternatively, § 11-44B-48(f), Ala. s p e c i f i e s t h e means by w h i c h a p a r t y may Code 1975, appeal to the which circuit c o u r t from d e c i s i o n s of a p e r s o n n e l board c r e a t e d p u r s u a n t t o § 11-44B-40 e t s e q . , p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t part: " R e v i e w by t h e c o u r t s h a l l be w i t h o u t a j u r y and c o n f i n e d to the r e c o r d , i n c l u d i n g a t r a n s c r i p t of the evidence. The court, upon the terms and c o n d i t i o n s i t deems p r o p e r , a t any t i m e b e f o r e t h e h e a r i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n , may p e r m i t t h e t a k i n g o f a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e b o a r d and a l l o w m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e f i n d i n g s and f i n a l d e c i s i o n o f t h e b o a r d . The c o u r t upon a h e a r i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n , s h a l l have power t o a f f i r m o r r e v e r s e and r e n d e r t h e 9 2111171 d e c i s i o n o f t h e b o a r d o r r e v e r s e and remand t h e matter to the board for further proceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e judgment o f t h e c o u r t . The court s h a l l a f f i r m the d e c i s i o n of the board unless it finds that the s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the p e t i t i o n e r have b e e n p r e j u d i c e d b e c a u s e t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n o f t h e b o a r d was any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : "(1) Unsupported by substantial evidence i n the record submitted. "(2) I n excess of the a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d by t h i s a r t i c l e on t h e b o a r d . "(3) Violative provisions. "(4) of constitutional A r b i t r a r y or c a p r i c i o u s . " (Emphasis added.) Thus, i n an a p p e a l 44B-48, court's that the t r i a l applicable standard to a p e t i t i o n f i l e d pursuant t o § 11of review i s similar f o r t h e common-law writ to of certiorari. In Civ. H a l l m a n v. C i t y App. specified review 1976), court addressed u n d e r § 11-44B-48. whether a Northport the ordinance court So. the 2d 152 ( A l a . de novo In Hallman, c i t y ordinance a t t e m p t e d t o m o d i f y t h e de novo t r i a l the 333 trial i n t h e A c t and d i s t i n g u i s h e d i t f r o m t h e t y p e allowed considered this of Northport, this had specified of court improperly i n the A c t ; a t i s s u e i n Hallman p r o v i d e d t h a t " ' [ r ] e v i e w by shall be without a 10 jury a n d be confined t o the 2111171 record, and t o a presented; determination t h e Board's conclusive.'" of the questions findings of fact s h a l l of law be f i n a l a n d H a l l m a n , 333 So. 2d a t 154. T h i s c o u r t stated: " S e c t i o n 19 [ o f t h e A c t ] d i r e c t e d a de novo t r i a l upon a p p e a l t o t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t . In the absence o f terms o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n , t h e meaning o f t r i a l de novo i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d b y d e c i s i o n s o f t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s o f t h i s s t a t e . S m i t h v. C i v i l S e r v i c e B o a r d o f C i t y o f F l o r e n c e , 52 A l a . App. 44, [48,] 289 So. 2d 6 1 4 [ , 616 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ] . I n t h a t c a s e we said: "'A t r u e de novo h e a r i n g o f a m a t t e r decided by an inferior court or administrative agency is tried and d e t e r m i n e d as i f no o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s h a d ever taken place. I t i s a t r i a l anew; a b r a n d new p r o c e e d i n g , as i f s u c h p r o c e e d i n g had been commenced i n t h e r e v i e w i n g c o u r t from t h e s t a r t . B a l l v. J o n e s , 272 A l a . 305, 132 So. 2d 120 [ ( 1 9 6 1 ) ] . ' " T h e r e a r e no q u a l i f y i n g t e r m s l i m i t i n g t h e d e f i n e d m e a n i n g o f 'de n o v o ' i n S e c t i o n 19. I t i s n o t i c e d that i ti s provided that the Board s h a l l f i l e w i t h the c o u r t a c e r t i f i e d t r a n s c r i p t o f t h e proceeding had b e f o r e i t a n d i t s d e c i s i o n . I t i s also noticed t h a t t h e c o u r t i s d i r e c t e d t o h e a r t h e a p p e a l on t h e i s s u e s made b e f o r e the Board. However, these p r o v i s i o n s a r e f o l l o w e d w i t h t h e command t h a t ' t h e trial i n the court shall be de n o v o . ' The d i r e c t i o n s o f t h e r u l e e f f e c t i v e l y remove t h e r i g h t t o a t r i a l de novo. "The adopted rule clearly eliminates the a c c e p t e d m e a n i n g o f de novo. The r u l e t u r n s 'trial de n o v o ' i n t o a r e v i e w b y common l a w c e r t i o r a r i . T a r v e r v. H o u s e h o l d F i n a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n , 45 A l a . 11 2111171 App. 344, [346,] 230 So. 2d 5 3 4 [ , 535 i s t h e r e f o r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Act (1970)]. It and i s v o i d . "The r u l e b e i n g w i t h o u t e f f e c t , i t f o l l o w s t h a t the acceptance, over o b j e c t i o n s , of the p r o c e e d i n g s before the Board, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n was e r r o r . Such t r a n s c r i p t c o u l d not supply e v i d e n c e of a prima f a c i e case i n a t r i a l de novo when o b j e c t e d t o by H a l l m a n . Being i l l e g a l l y b e f o r e the c o u r t , the t r a n s c r i p t c o u l d not s u p p o r t a judgment. "We a r e u n a b l e t o d i s c e r n t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e A c t directing the filing of the t r a n s c r i p t of the p r o c e e d i n g s b e f o r e t h e B o a r d and i t s d e c i s i o n i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t on a p p e a l , u n l e s s i t was i n t e n d e d t o be u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i s s u e s t o be t r i e d . The A c t does n o t contain d i r e c t i o n s as t o how the t r a n s c r i p t may be u s e d The u n c e r t a i n t y o f t h e Act i n respect to the purpose of filing the t r a n s c r i p t on a p p e a l does n o t a f f e c t t h e clearly s t a t e d r i g h t t o a t r i a l de n o v o . " H a l l m a n , 333 So. Typically application reversible (Ala. of this the court See 2004) Rehfeld So. McLendon s t a n d a r d v. 2d 863 p e t i t i o n was court's determination had met finds that Roth, ( s t a t i n g t h a t any McLendon, 455 custody-modification trial 154. the a more s t r i n g e n t s t a n d a r d error. C i v . App. Ex p a r t e 2d a t trial does n o t 885 So.2d amount ( A l a . 1984), standard harmless e r r o r because n e c e s s a r i l y meant t h a t to 791, error i n applying t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r had 795 the to a the satisfied the p e t i t i o n e r the l e s s s t r i n g e n t b e s t - i n t e r e s t s s t a n d a r d ) ; 12 court's and I.M. 2111171 v. J . P . F . , 668 So. 2d 843, 845 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1995) ( n o t i n g t h a t " t h e t r i a l c o u r t a p p l i e d t h e McLendon s t a n d a r d ... r a t h e r than t h e 'best standard interest' standard, i s more s t r i n g e n t , regard i s harmless"). indicated the t r i a l court's error i n that I n t h i s case, however, t h e t r i a l on t h e r e c o r d t h a t i f i t c o n s i d e r e d under t h e A c t i t would reach considered cannot b u t b e c a u s e t h e McLendon the evidence agree with a different under Sledge § that the t r i a l the evidence result 11-44B-48. court than i f i t Therefore, court's r e l y i n g on § 11-44B-48 was n e c e s s a r i l y h a r m l e s s . we error i n Accordingly, we r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t a n d remand t h e c a u s e f o r it to reconsider the evidence i n light of the standards e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e A c t . Because pretermit of it resolution consideration remand, t h e t r i a l standards our t h e above of the City's other issue, issues. Hallman, presented On a t t h e de novo h e a r i n g supra. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Pittman, we c o u r t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r under t h e a p p r o p r i a t e only the evidence conducted. of J . , concurs. Thompson, J . , c o n c u r s Thomas, J . , c o n c u r s i n the r e s u l t , without i n the result, Donaldson, J . , recuses himself. 13 with writing. writing. 2111171 THOMAS, J u d g e , c o n c u r r i n g i n the result. I agree t h a t the judgment of the T u s c a l o o s a s h o u l d be reversed agree w i t h Northport The ("the main o p i n i o n . The Civil decision. Service Board The trial court ("the Board") upheld concluded g o v e r n e d by § 11-44B-48, A l a . Code 1975; t h a t the of the N o r t h p o r t the appeal thus, i t reviewed Board. As e x p l a i n e d i n t h e m a i n o p i n i o n , t h e a p p e a l 1225 City not C i t y " ) t e r m i n a t e d J o h n n y S l e d g e ' s employment. the d e c i s i o n of the by Court t h e c a u s e remanded; h o w e v e r , I do r a t i o n a l e i n the Northport City's was the and Circuit Civil Act No. ("the A c t " ) , w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o r e v i e w the decision of the reviewed the City's decision. instruct the City Service Act, A l a . Acts i s governed trial pursuant to the de court novo. to Act. 14 The trial 1969, court I w o u l d remand t h e review the City's has not cause and decision

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