Jean Clemons v. Justine Howard

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REL: 04/12/2013 Notice: This o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2110744 Jean Clemons v. J u s t i n e Howard Appeal from Choctaw C i r c u i t (CV-10-6) Court PITTMAN, J u d g e . Jean Clemons division action Raymond Mitchell appeals insofar from a judgment as t h e j u d g m e n t ("Raymond"), deceased, i n a sale-fordetermined that was t h e f a t h e r o f J u s t i n e Howard ( " J u s t i n e " ) a n d t h a t J u s t i n e i s t h e owner o f an 2110744 undivided one-half Choctaw County i n t e r e s t i n 102 acres o f r e a l p r o p e r t y i n ("the p r o p e r t y " ) . We reverse a n d remand w i t h instructions. Raymond deceased, property and each h i s brother, owned Jessie an u n d i v i d e d when Raymond died Mitchell one-half intestate ("Jessie"), interest i n 1975. t e s t a t e i n 1989, a n d h i s w i l l was p r o b a t e d . i n the Jessie died I n 2010, J u s t i n e s u e d Clemons and o t h e r p e r s o n s who were p o t e n t i a l d e v i s e e s o f Jessie's undivided one-half alleged property that Raymond's i n t e r e s t i n the property. J u s t i n e undivided one-half h a d p a s s e d t o h e r by i n t e s t a t e interest succession i n the upon h i s d e a t h i n 1975 b e c a u s e , J u s t i n e a l l e g e d , she was Raymond's child. 1 J u s t i n e also a l l e g e d that the property only c o u l d n o t be e q u i t a b l y p a r t i t i o n e d and sought a judgment o r d e r i n g a s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y and a d i v i s i o n o f t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e among t h e owners o f t h e p r o p e r t y . Clemons a n d t h e o t h e r defendants When Raymond d i e d i n 1975, T i t l e 16, § 1, A l a . Code 1940 (Recomp. 1 9 5 8 ) , p r o v i d e d , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : 1 "The r e a l e s t a t e o f p e r s o n s d y i n g i n t e s t a t e , as t o s u c h e s t a t e d e s c e n d s , s u b j e c t t o t h e payment o f d e b t s , c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e , a n d t h e widow's dower, as f o l l o w s : "(1) To t h e c h i l d r e n o f t h e i n t e s t a t e , o r t h e i r descendants, i n equal p a r t s . " 2 2110744 answered J u s t i n e ' s c o m p l a i n t w i t h a g e n e r a l d e n i a l b u t d i d not plead any a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s . The that trial began court received evidence ore tenus a t a i n M a r c h 2011 b u t was r e c e s s e d trial a f t e r one d a y o f t e s t i m o n y a n d c o n c l u d e d i n O c t o b e r 2 0 1 1 . The i s s u e s t r i e d were (1) w h e t h e r Raymond was owner o f the undivided Justine's one-half Raymond h a d owned when he d i e d , undivided one-half father, (2) who was t h e interest i n the property (3) who were t h e owners o f t h e i n t e r e s t i n the property when he d i e d , a n d (4) w h e t h e r t h e p r o p e r t y partitioned. 2 In January 2012, t h e t r i a l J e s s i e h a d owned c o u l d be e q u i t a b l y court entered a I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , § 35-6-20, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t ] h e c i r c u i t c o u r t s h a l l have o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d i v i d e o r p a r t i t i o n , o r s e l l f o r p a r t i t i o n , any p r o p e r t y , r e a l o r p e r s o n a l , h e l d b y j o i n t owners o r t e n a n t s i n common " S e c t i o n 35-6-22, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t ] h e c o u r t s h a l l a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e t h e r i g h t s , t i t l e s and i n t e r e s t o f a l l t h e p a r t i e s t o s u c h a c t i o n , t h e p l a i n t i f f s as w e l l as t h e d e f e n d a n t s , and s h a l l g i v e j u d g m e n t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s . " I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , § 3 5 - 6 - 2 3 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, provides: 2 " I f the t i t l e of the p l a i n t i f f s seeking p a r t i t i o n or s a l e o f l a n d s f o r a d i v i s i o n s h a l l be c o n t r o v e r t e d , o r s h o u l d t h e t i t l e o r c l a i m o f any o f t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e a c t i o n be a d v e r s e t o t h a t o f one o r more o f t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s , t h e q u e s t i o n o f t i t l e s h a l l be t r i e d and d e t e r m i n e d i n t h e a c t i o n by t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t , w h i c h s h a l l have power t o d e t e r m i n e a l l questions of t i t l e " 3 2110744 j u d g m e n t f i n d i n g t h a t Raymond was J u s t i n e ' s t h a t Raymond's u n d i v i d e d one-half i n t e r e s t i n the p r o p e r t y had p a s s e d t o J u s t i n e by i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n 1975 i n t e r e s t i n the property; f i n d i n g that undivided Clemons a n d o f t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s owned t h e o t h e r u n d i v i d e d i n t e r e s t i n the property; be when Raymond d i e d i n a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t she was t h e owner o f t h a t one-half one father; finding equitably f i n d i n g that the property p a r t i t i o n e d ; and o r d e r i n g that one-half could not the property be s o l d a n d t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e d i v i d e d among t h e o w n e r s . The p o r t i o n of the judgment p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s appeal stated: " 1 . P l a i n t i f f J u s t i n e Howard i s t h e owner o f an u n d i v i d e d o n e - h a l f (1/2) i n t e r e s t i n t h e [ p r o p e r t y ] , h a v i n g i n h e r i t e d t h i s i n t e r e s t from her f a t h e r , Raymond M i t c h e l l . A l t h o u g h [ J u s t i n e ' s ] m o t h e r was n e v e r m a r r i e d t o Raymond M i t c h e l l , t h e C o u r t f i n d s that, pursuant to Code of A l a . 1975, § 26-l7-204(a)(5), Raymond M i t c h e l l , o p e n l y h e l d o u t J u s t i n e Howard as h i s n a t u r a l c h i l d and e s t a b l i s h e d a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r e n t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h e r by p r o v i d i n g e m o t i o n a l and f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t f o r h e r , t h u s c r e a t i n g a p r e s u m p t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y , w h i c h was n o t r e b u t t e d b y any c o m p e t e n t , a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d by t h e D e f e n d a n t s . " (Emphasis added.) Clemons t i m e l y to alter, alternative, amend, to filed or grant a R u l e 59, A l a . R. C i v . P., vacate a new 4 the judgment trial ("the or, motion in the postjudgment 2110744 motion"). Among 3 a s s e r t e d t h a t the the other trial judgment because, Code 1 9 7 5 , Act 4 (2008), things, court should Clemons s a i d , which i s a part § the postjudgment alter, amend, o r motion vacate § 26-l7-204(a)(5), Ala. of the Alabama U n i f o r m P a r e n t a g e 26-17-101 e t seq., Ala. Code 1975 AUPA"), d i d n o t a p p l y t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n ("the 2008 w h e t h e r Raymond was J u s t i n e ' s f a t h e r b e c a u s e , Clemons s a i d , § 26-17-603, A l a . Code 1975, man w h i c h i s a l s o a p a r t o f t h e 2008 AUPA, r e q u i r e s t h a t whose p a t e r n i t y i s t o be adjudicated under the must be j o i n e d as a p a r t y t o t h e p r o c e e d i n g not be joined as a party because he had the 2008 AUPA and Raymond c o u l d died i n 1975. postjudgment motion a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t the judgment s h o u l d The be A l t h o u g h a R u l e 59, A l a . R. C i v . P., m o t i o n may be made only i n reference to a f i n a l , appealable j u d g m e n t , see Ex p a r t e T r o u t m a n S a n d e r s , LLP, 866 So. 2d 547, 549-50 ( A l a . 2003), i n a s a l e - f o r - d i v i s i o n a c t i o n b o t h the judgment o r d e r i n g t h e s a l e and t h e judgment c o n f i r m i n g t h e s a l e a r e f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t s , see J e t t o n v. J e t t o n , 502 So. 2d 756, 759 ( A l a . 1987) . 3 I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , § 26-17-204(a)(5) provides i s p r e s u m e d t o be t h e f a t h e r o f a c h i l d i f , 4 that a " w h i l e t h e c h i l d i s u n d e r t h e age o f m a j o r i t y , he r e c e i v e s t h e c h i l d i n t o h i s home and o p e n l y h o l d s o u t t h e c h i l d as h i s n a t u r a l c h i l d o r otherwise o p e n l y h o l d s o u t t h e c h i l d as h i s n a t u r a l c h i l d and establishes a significant parental relationship with the c h i l d by p r o v i d i n g e m o t i o n a l and financial support f o r the c h i l d . " 5 man 2110744 a l t e r e d , amended, o r v a c a t e d b e c a u s e , Clemons s a i d , J u s t i n e ' s claim seeking a determination barred by the statute 1975. In the a l t e r n a t i v e , the 5 t h a t a new had trial census i n the records 1938 school order denying that order, apply to the the father l i m i t a t i o n s i n § 6-2-33, A l a . postjudgment motion evidence i n the form of a Code asserted 1938 trial she school c e n s u s " ) i n d i c a t i n g t h a t S a n d e r s Howard the was of the Choctaw County B o a r d of E d u c a t i o n Justine's father. Following a hearing, an her s h o u l d be g r a n t e d b e c a u s e , Clemons s a i d , newly d i s c o v e r e d ("the of t h a t Raymond was the t r i a l c o u r t postjudgment motion court determination ruled that whether in April was entered 2012. In § 26-17-603 d i d not Raymond was Justine's f a t h e r ; t h a t the defense of the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , which had b e e n r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h e p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , was an affirmative defense defendants' f a i l u r e to plead 1938 that had been waived i t i n t h e i r a n s w e r ; and by the that the s c h o o l c e n s u s d i d n o t w a r r a n t t h e g r a n t i n g o f a new trial I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , § 6-2-33(2) p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ a ] c t i o n s for the recovery o f ... h e r e d i t a m e n t s , o r t h e possession t h e r e o f , " must be commenced w i t h i n 10 y e a r s . I n B l a c k m o n v. B r a z i l , 895 So. 2d 900, 909 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , t h e supreme c o u r t h e l d t h a t § 6-2-33(2) a p p l i e s t o a c l a i m b r o u g h t by a c h i l d b o r n o u t o f w e d l o c k who s e e k s an a d j u d i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y f o r p u r p o s e s o f i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n p u r s u a n t t o § 43-8-48, A l a . Code 1975. 5 6 2110744 because trial i t had and been because, a v a i l a b l e and i f presented discoverable at t r i a l , before i t would not o u t w e i g h e d t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t Raymond was father. Thereafter, Clemons t i m e l y a p p e a l e d , and A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . Because the t r i a l review i s g o v e r n e d by have Justine's the supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal to t h i s c o u r t pursuant to § 7(6), the 12-2- 6 c o u r t r e c e i v e d evidence ore tenus, the our following principles: "'"'[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, i t s f i n d i n g s on disputed facts are p r e s u m e d c o r r e c t and i t s j u d g m e n t b a s e d on those f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d u n l e s s t h e j u d g m e n t i s p a l p a b l y e r r o n e o u s or m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t . ' " ' Water Works & S a n i t a r y Sewer Bd. v. P a r k s , 977 So. 2d 440, 443 ( A l a . 2007) ( q u o t i n g F a d a l l a v. F a d a l l a , 929 So. 2d 429, 433 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n P h i l p o t v. S t a t e , 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002)). '"The p r e s u m p t i o n of c o r r e c t n e s s , however, i s r e b u t t a b l e and may be overcome where t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence presented to the t r i a l c o u r t to s u s t a i n i t s j u d g m e n t . " ' Waltman v. R o w e l l , 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086 ( A l a . 2005) ( q u o t i n g D e n n i s v. Dobbs, 474 So. 2d 77, 79 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ) . ' A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e o r e t e n u s r u l e does n o t e x t e n d t o c l o a k w i t h a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s a t r i a l judge's c o n c l u s i o n s of law or t h e i n c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f law t o t h e facts.' Waltman v. R o w e l l , 913 So. 2d a t 1086." R e t a i l D e v e l o p e r s o f A l a b a m a , LLC Inc., 985 6 So. 2d 924, 929 v. E a s t Gadsden G o l f Club, ( A l a . 2007). None o f t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d 7 a n o t i c e of appeal. 2110744 Initially, we note argument t o t h i s c o u r t that Clemons regarding has by waived that (Ala. the 1982) brief, statute issue. See of limitations. Boshell presented the i s s u e whether c l a i m s e e k i n g an a d j u d i c a t i o n t h a t Raymond was barred not Justine's her f a t h e r i s Therefore, v. K e i t h , 418 So. she 2d 89, 92 ("When an a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o a r g u e an i s s u e i n i t s that issue i s waived."). Clemons a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l postjudgment court e r r e d i n denying her m o t i o n i n s o f a r as i t s o u g h t a new trial. " I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r a new trial r e s t s w i t h i n the sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e . The e x e r c i s e o f t h a t discretion carries with i t a presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s , w h i c h w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d by t h i s C o u r t u n l e s s some l e g a l r i g h t i s a b u s e d and t h e r e c o r d p l a i n l y and p a l p a b l y shows t h e t r i a l j u d g e t o be i n e r r o r . " Hill has v. Sherwood, 488 So. 2d 1357, 1359 ( A l a . 1986). "The c r i t e r i a f o r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l b a s e d on newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e are s e t out i n F o r e s t I n v e s t m e n t C o r p . v. C o m m e r c i a l C r e d i t C o r p . , 271 Ala. 8 [ , 1 2 ] , 122 So. 2d 1 3 1 [ , 135] ( 1 9 6 0 ) . The c r i t e r i a are: "(1) t h e trial; evidence will change the "(2) t h e e v i d e n c e has b e e n d i s c o v e r e d result since of trial; "(3) t h e e v i d e n c e c o u l d n o t have b e e n d i s c o v e r e d due d i l i g e n c e ; 8 the by 2110744 "(4) t h e e v i d e n c e i s m a t e r i a l ; "(5) t h e e v i d e n c e impeaching." Eastwood Lands, 2d 247, In 249 not merely cumulative or I n c . v. W a l t e r C a r l o s A n d e r t o n , I n c . , 412 So. ( A l a . 1982). pertinent part, postjudgment is motion the t r i a l court's order denying the stated: "The [1938 s c h o o l c e n s u s ] was a v a i l a b l e and d i s c o v e r a b l e and c o u l d have b e e n p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l h e l d i n t h i s c a s e on M a r c h 30, 2 0 1 l and on O c t o b e r 5, 2011, a t w h i c h t i m e i t c o u l d have b e e n p r o p e r l y o f f e r e d as e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e , w i t h [ J u s t i n e ' s ] h a v i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b j e c t t o i t s admission, cross-examine the custodian of the r e c o r d s b e i n g o f f e r e d and q u e s t i o n t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f t h e r e c o r d s r e l i e d on. The C o u r t f u r t h e r n o t e s t h a t t h i s r e c o r d o n l y r e f l e c t s t h a t J u s t i n e Howard's m o t h e r was l i v i n g w i t h , and p o s s i b l y , m a r r i e d t o , S a n d e r s Howard a t t h e t i m e , when [ J u s t i n e ] was 11 y e a r s o l d , and t h i s e v i d e n c e , o f i t s e l f , w o u l d n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y o f Raymond M i t c h e l l r a i s e d by t h e t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e r e c e i v e d and a d m i t t e d a t t h e t r i a l o f t h i s case." W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r t h e 1938 was available and discoverable before the school trial, census Clemons argues: "[I]t was not u n t i l t r i a l when t h e defendants learned that [Justine] d i d not have a birth c e r t i f i c a t e . O b v i o u s l y , a b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e would e s t a b l i s h a presumption of p a t e r n i t y . Furthermore, [ J u s t i n e ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t she b e l i e v e d t h e s c h o o l she 9 2110744 attended was 'Mary Rose.' Despite [Justine's] recollection of the i n c o r r e c t school name, t h e d e f e n d a n t s were a b l e t o o b t a i n t h e c e r t i f i e d r e c o r d [of t h e 1938 school census] post trial and subsequently provided [ i t ] t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t as p a r t of the [postjudgment] motion." First, we n o t e t h a t Clemons does n o t e x p l a i n why she d i d n o t attempt t o l e a r n through p r e t r i a l discovery had she h a d a t t e n d e d a birth certificate o r where whether J u s t i n e school. S e c o n d , t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l i n d i c a t e s t h a t J u s t i n e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she d i d n o t have a b i r t h she attended March certificate and t h a t t h e s c h o o l was named Mary Rose on t h e f i r s t d a y o f t r i a l i n 2 0 1 1 , y e t Clemons does not e x p l a i n why she d i d n o t d i s c o v e r t h e 1938 s c h o o l c e n s u s d u r i n g t h e more t h a n s i x - m o n t h recess between t h e f i r s t second day o f t r i a l the record, could census through p r e t r i a l 2011 o r d u r i n g trial after i n M a r c h 2011 a n d t h e i n October 2011. F o r a l l t h a t appears i n Clemons March day o f t r i a l have discovered discovery before t h e more t h a n l e a r n i n g on t h e f i r s t t h e 1938 the t r i a l school began i n six-month recess i n the day o f t r i a l that Justine d i d n o t h a v e a b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e . A c c o r d i n g l y , Clemons h a s n o t shown t h a t school she e x e r c i s e d census and t h a t , diligence, she c o u l d due d i l i g e n c e i n s e e k i n g t h e 1938 despite such n o t have 10 having exercised discovered t h e 1938 due school 2110744 census u n t i l a f t e r t h e t r i a l had been c o n c l u d e d . we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l Consequently, court's d e n i a l of the postjudgment m o t i o n i n s o f a r a s i t s o u g h t a new t r i a l was a p r o p e r e x e r c i s e of t h e t r i a l Finally, applying § court's Clemons discretion. argues 26-l7-204(a)(5) that to the t r i a l court erred i n the determination whether Raymond was J u s t i n e ' s f a t h e r . "The l a w c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i g h t o f an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d t o i n h e r i t through i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n has s e e n many c h a n g e s o v e r t h e y e a r s . A t common l a w , an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d , who h a d n o t b e e n l e g i t i m a t e d , was c o n s i d e r e d t h e c h i l d o f no one a n d c o u l d i n h e r i t f r o m no one. See W i l l i a m s v . W i t h e r s p o o n , 171 A l a . 559, 55 So. 132 ( 1 9 1 1 ) . The c o u r t s c o n s i d e r e d an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d 'nullius f i l i u s , ' the 'heir to nobody,' a n d t h u s , t h e c h i l d 'ha[d] no a n c e s t o r f r o m whom a n y i n h e r i t a b l e b l o o d [ c o u l d ] be d e r i v e d . ' L i n g e n v. L i n g e n , 45 A l a . 410, 413 (1871) ( q u o t i n g 1 Wendell's Blackstone, 459). "By 1929, i n t h e c a s e o f Moore v. T e r r y , 220 Ala. 47, 124 So. 80 ( 1 9 2 9 ) , o v e r r u l e d i n p a r t b y E v e r a g e v. G i b s o n , [372 So. 2d 829 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) ] , t h i s Court had recognized t h a t an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d , who h a d n o t b e e n l e g i t i m a t e d , c o u l d i n h e r i t from h i s mother, b u t n o t from h i s f a t h e r , even i f p a t e r n i t y was shown. T h i s change was a l s o r e f l e c t e d i n Code 1940, T i t . 16, § 6, w h i c h p r o v i d e d t h a t ' [ e ] v e r y i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d i s c o n s i d e r e d as t h e h e i r o f h i s mother, and i n h e r i t s h e r e s t a t e i n whole o r i n p a r t , a s t h e c a s e may b e , i n l i k e manner as i f b o r n i n l a w f u l w e d l o c k . ' L a t e r , i n Hudson v. Reed, 259 A l a . 340, 66 So. 2d 909 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , t h i s C o u r t d e s c r i b e d t h e common l a w r u l e as a ' h a r s h r u l e , ' a n d h e l d t h a t an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d , b e c a u s e o f t h i s 11 2110744 s t a t u t e , c o u l d i n h e r i t not o n l y from h i s mother b u t a l s o through h i s mother. "Between 1929 and 1979, h o w e v e r , t h e l a w i n A l a b a m a r e c o g n i z e d o n l y t h e f o l l o w i n g two methods by w h i c h an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d c o u l d be l e g i t i m a t e d i n o r d e r t o i n h e r i t from i t s f a t h e r through i n t e s t a t e succession: 1) by marriage of the parents, a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e f a t h e r ' s r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e c h i l d ; o r 2) by a w r i t t e n d e c l a r a t i o n , a t t e s t e d b y two w i t n e s s e s , and f i l e d w i t h t h e j u d g e o f p r o b a t e . See Moore, 220 A l a . 47, 124 So. 80 ( 1 9 2 9 ) ; see a l s o Code 1923, §§ 9299, 9300, l a t e r c o d i f i e d a t Code 1940, T i t . 27, §§ 10, 11, and Code 1975, §§ 2 6 - 1 1 - 1 , 26-11-2. " " A f t e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e c i d e d t h e c a s e s o f T r i m b l e v. G o r d o n , 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. C t . 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , and L a l l i v. T-,11-; / l o T o ocn c-ro C O n o L a l l i , 439 n tU.S. 259, n n n S. 0 4t . 518, 58 T L. T P ^ 2d^ c503 99 CEd. o ( 1 9 7 8 ) , A l a b a m a ' s l a w c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i g h t --^ an of illegitimate child to i n h e r i t from i t s f a t h e r c h a n g e d d r a m a t i c a l l y . I n T r i m b l e , 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. C t . 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , t h e C o u r t f o u n d an I l l i n o i s s t a t u t e , much l i k e A l a b a m a ' s Code 1975, §§ 26-11-1 and 26-11-2, w h i c h s e t f o r t h t h e two methods o f l e g i t i m a t i o n d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , t o be unconstitutional under an equal protection challenge. " ' ' "... I n L a l l i , 439 U.S. 259, 99 S. C t . 518, 58 L. Ed. 2d 503 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t upheld, as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , a similar New York s t a t u t e b e c a u s e i t p r o v i d e d t h a t an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d c o u l d i n h e r i t from i t s f a t h e r i f t h e r e had been a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y b e f o r e the f a t h e r ' s death. 12 2110744 " " C o n s e q u e n t l y , i n 1979, t h i s C o u r t , i n t h e c a s e o f E v e r a g e v. G i b s o n , 372 So. 2d 829 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 445 U.S. 931, 100 S. C t . 1322, 63 L. Ed. 2d 765 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , i n order to avoid finding A l a b a m a ' s s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , construed i t t o include a t h i r d method of legitimation, i.e., a judicial d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y made w i t h i n two y e a r s o f b i r t h a n d d u r i n g t h e f a t h e r ' s l i f e t i m e . The E v e r a g e Court gleaned t h i s t h i r d method f r o m t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t s t a t u t e s f o u n d a t Code 1975, § 26-12-1 e t s e q . I n 1982, t h e A l a b a m a l e g i s l a t u r e s u p e r s e d e d Everage and wrote t h i s p r o c e d u r e i n t o t h e Probate Code i t s e l f , i n § 43-8-48, w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h e c h i l d o f the f a t h e r i f t h e parents marry or i f p a t e r n i t y i s e s t a b l i s h e d b y an a d j u d i c a t i o n b e f o r e t h e d e a t h o f the f a t h e r o r t h e r e a f t e r by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f . Then, i n a d d i t i o n , i n 1984, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e r e p e a l e d Code 1975, § 26-12-1 e t s e q . , a n d r e p l a c e d those s e c t i o n s w i t h t h e Alabama U n i f o r m Parentage A c t , f o u n d a t Code 1975, § 26-17-1 e t s e q . L i k e t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t s t a t u t e s i t r e p l a c e d , t h e AUPA s e t s f o r t h a mechanism whereby a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y c a n be made. T h e r e f o r e , there are presently two statutory schemes for judicial d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y , one i n t h e P r o b a t e Code and one i n t h e AUPA." S t o n e v. G u l f A m e r i c a n F i r e & C a s . Co., 554 So. 2d 346, 363-67 (Ala. 1989) ( f o o t n o t e s court's omitted). d e c i s i o n i n S t o n e v. G u l f A m e r i c a n Co., A c t No. 2008-376, A l a . A c t s Alabama U n i f o r m 1975, S u b s e q u e n t t o t h e supreme Fire & Casualty 2008, r e p e a l e d t h e o r i g i n a l P a r e n t a g e A c t , § 26-17-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code e f f e c t i v e January 1, 2009, a n d r e p l a c e d i t w i t h t h e 2008 13 2110744 AUPA, w h i c h became e f f e c t i v e t h e same d a y . Thus, there p r e s e n t l y two s t a t u t o r y schemes f o r j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n paternity, one i n t h e P r o b a t e Code, § 43-8-1 e t s e q . , are of Ala. Code 1975, a n d one i n t h e 2008 AUPA. When Raymond d i e d allow a child succession born i n 1975, h o w e v e r , A l a b a m a l a w d i d n o t out of wedlock to inherit from h i s o r h e r f a t h e r u n l e s s by intestate t h e c h i l d had been l e g i t i m a t e d "1) b y m a r r i a g e o f t h e p a r e n t s , accompanied by t h e father's 2) recognition declaration, of attested the child; or b y two w i t n e s s e s , by a and f i l e d written with the j u d g e o f p r o b a t e . " S t o n e v. G u l f A m e r i c a n F i r e & C a s . Co., 554 So. 2d a t 364 (footnote omitted). not i n d i c a t e that In the present record does either o f t h o s e m e t h o d s . However, t h e A l a b a m a l a w g o v e r n i n g the right of a child born Justine was case, the out of wedlock legitimated to inherit by by intestate succession f r o m h i s o r h e r f a t h e r t h a t was i n e f f e c t when in Raymond died 1975 has subsequently been held u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . See S t o n e v. G u l f A m e r i c a n F i r e & C a s . Co., 554 So. 2d a t 368. I n S t o n e v. G u l f A m e r i c a n F i r e & C a s . Co., the supreme c o u r t stated: "We r e c o g n i z e that the law a t the time of [the] f a t h e r ' s death had not y e t r e c o g n i z e d the t h i r d 14 2110744 method o f l e g i t i m a t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f i n t e s t a t e succession, i.e., a judicial determination of p a t e r n i t y ; h o w e v e r , we a l s o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e l a w as i t e x i s t e d a t t h a t t i m e has s i n c e b e e n f o u n d t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n T r i m b l e v. G o r d o n , 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. C t . 1459, 52 L. E d . 2d 31 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , a n d b y t h i s C o u r t i n E v e r a g e v. G i b s o n , 372 So. 2d 829 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) . " I n an a c t i o n , s u c h as t h e p r e s e n t one, t h a t i s n o t t i m e - b a r r e d and i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , we a r e b o u n d t o a p p l y a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w as i t exists a t the time the appeal i s heard. This s i t u a t i o n has been a d d r e s s e d by t h i s C o u r t and t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s i n t h e c a s e s o f C o t t o n v. T e r r y , 495 So. 2d 1077 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) ; Abrams v. W h e e l e r , 468 So. 2d 126 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; and F r e e v. v F r e e , 507 So. 2d 930 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 6 ) . " I n C o t t o n , 495 So. 2d 1077 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) , an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d b r o u g h t an a c t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y u n d e r Code 1975, § 4 3 - 8 - 4 8 ( 2 ) ( b ) , 11 y e a r s a f t e r the death of the a l l e g e d f a t h e r . In c o n s t r u i n g § 43-8-48(2)(b), t h i s Court held: " ' [ I ] t may be s e e n f r o m t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e of the s t a t u t e that paternity o f an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d may be e s t a b l i s h e d a f t e r the death of the father through an adjudication supported by clear and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . When so e s t a b l i s h e d , s u c h a c h i l d may i n h e r i t f r o m t h e f a t h e r - I - ^-^ . 1 t h r o u g h i-!n tA-e^ s^ tA a t -e- ^ s u c c e s s i o n . ' ^n-, " C o t t o n , 495 So. 2d a t 1079. I n C o t t o n , as i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e r e was c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r r e c o g n i z e d t h e c h i l d as h i s a n d h e l d h i m s e l f o u t as t h e c h i l d ' s f a t h e r . Y e t , i n C o t t o n , as i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e l a w a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r ' s d e a t h w o u l d n o t have r e c o g n i z e d t h e c h i l d as an h e i r . Even s o , t h i s C o u r t d i d n o t a p p l y an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w t o t h e p a r t i e s , b u t , r a t h e r , 15 2110744 a p p l i e d t h e l a w as i t e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a p p e a l . A l s o , i n Abrams v . W h e e l e r , 468 So. 2d 126 (Ala. 1985), an i l l e g i t i m a t e child brought a p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n before the death of the f a t h e r , but a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of the two-year limitations p e r i o d t h a t h a d b e e n a d o p t e d i n E v e r a g e , 372 So. 2d 829 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) . However, t h i s C o u r t r e f u s e d t o a p p l y t h e two-year l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d because i t had s i n c e b e e n f o u n d t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I n s t e a d , i t a p p l i e d t h e l a w as i t e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a p p e a l , and found t h e a c t i o n n o t t i m e - b a r r e d . A g a i n , i n F r e e v. F r e e , 507 So. 2d 930 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 6 ) , an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d b r o u g h t an a c t i o n u n d e r § 43-8-48(2)(b), not only a f t e r the death of the f a t h e r , b u t a l s o 20 y e a r s a f t e r t h e c h i l d h a d r e a c h e d t h e age o f m a j o r i t y . D e s p i t e t h e a r g u m e n t s by t h e l e g i t i m a t e h e i r s , t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s r e f u s e d t o apply the law i n e f f e c t a t the time of the death of the f a t h e r or a t the time of the b i r t h of t h e c h i l d because t h a t l a w had s i n c e been f o u n d unconstitutional." 554 So. 2d a t 368 (emphasis added; original emphasis f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) . Thus, i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , b e c a u s e that governed whether a child born and the law out of wedlock could i n h e r i t by i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n from h i s o r h e r f a t h e r when Raymond 1975 held died in unconstitutional, governing that we issue S t o n e v. G u l f A m e r i c a n Section must that Fire has apply exists subsequently the been constitutional at the present time. law See & C a s . Co., s u p r a . 26-17-103, A l a . Code 1975, t h e Code s e c t i o n o f t h e 2008 AUPA s t a t i n g t h e s c o p e o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e 2008 16 2110744 AUPA, p r o v i d e s parentage t h a t t h e 2008 AUPA " a p p l i e s t o d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n this state except l e g i t i m a t i o n and a d o p t i o n . " and f o r matters relating § 26-17-103(a). Sections 26-11-2, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e of to 26-11-1 f o r the l e g i t i m a t i o n of a c h i l d b o r n o u t o f w e d l o c k and, t h e r e f o r e , c o n s t i t u t e e x p r e s s exceptions Adoption t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e 2008 AUPA. Code, § 26-10A-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 7 The A l a b a m a 1975, g o v e r n s adoptions i n Alabama and, t h e r e f o r e , c o n s t i t u t e s an e x p r e s s exception t o t h e 2008 AUPA. S e c t i o n 4 3 - 8 - 4 8 ( 2 ) b . , A l a . Code 1975, a p a r t o f t h e P r o b a t e Code, p r o v i d e s , that, "[i]f, relationship f o r purposes of parent determine succession born child intestate must be succession, a established to by, t h r o u g h , o r from a p e r s o n [ , ] " i f "[t]he p a t e r n i t y i s e s t a b l i s h e d b y an a d j u d i c a t i o n b e f o r e the death the father convincing i s the c h i l d a child of the father of out of wedlock and of i npertinent part, or i s e s t a b l i s h e d proof (Emphasis thereafter by added.) A l t h o u g h clear and t h e 2008 S e c t i o n 26-11-1 p r o v i d e s t h a t a c h i l d b o r n o u t o f w e d l o c k may be l e g i t i m a t e d b y t h e m a r r i a g e o f t h e p a r e n t s a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e f a t h e r ' s r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e c h i l d as h i s . S e c t i o n 26¬ 11-2 p r o v i d e s f o r l e g i t i m a t i o n o f a c h i l d b o r n o u t o f w e d l o c k by t h e f a t h e r ' s f i l i n g w i t h t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t o f t h e f a t h e r ' s or t h e c h i l d ' s r e s i d e n c e a w r i t t e n d e c l a r a t i o n o f l e g i t i m a t i o n a t t e s t e d b y two w i t n e s s e s . 7 17 2110744 AUPA does not determinations expressly of except paternity from i t s application f o r purposes of intestate s u c c e s s i o n pursuant t o § 43-8-48(2)b., " [ t ] h e r e i s a r u l e of statutory specific construction that subjects provisions specific are understood relating to general provisions relating to as e x c e p t i o n s to general s u b j e c t s . " Murphy v. C i t y o f M o b i l e , 504 So. 2d 243, 244 ( A l a . 1987) . S e c t i o n 4 3 - 8 - 4 8 ( 2 ) (b) is a specific p r o v i s i o n addressing j u d i c i a l determinations succession, whereas determinations of the s p e c i f i c subject of of p a t e r n i t y f o r purposes of i n t e s t a t e the 2008 paternity AUPA addresses i n general. judicial Accordingly, c o n c l u d e t h a t § 4 3 - 8 - 4 8 ( 2 ) b . c o n s t i t u t e s an e x c e p t i o n 2008 AUPA, therefore, s e e Murphy v. C i t y of Mobile, supra, we to the and t h a t , § 4 3 - 8 - 4 8 ( 2 ) b . , r a t h e r t h a n t h e 2008 AUPA g o v e r n s j u d i c i a l determinations of p a t e r n i t y f o r purposes of i n t e s t a t e succession. Thus, Justine i n the present case, we conclude that, because s o u g h t an a d j u d i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y f o r p u r p o s e s o f determining i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n , § 43-8-48(2)b., r a t h e r than t h e 2008 AUPA, g o v e r n e d t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r Raymond was J u s t i n e ' s f a t h e r . C o n s e q u e n t l y , 18 the t r i a l court 2110744 e r r e d i n a p p l y i n g § 2 6 - l 7 - 2 0 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) , a p a r t o f t h e 2008 AUPA, to the that determination. trial Justine's court Therefore, we r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f i n s o f a r as i t d e t e r m i n e d f a t h e r . Moreover, because J u s t i n e owned an u n d i v i d e d o n e - h a l f that Raymond the determination was that i n t e r e s t i n the property was d e p e n d e n t on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t Raymond was J u s t i n e ' s f a t h e r , we r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l it determined interest that Justine i n the property. owned an Furthermore, with i n s t r u c t i o n s f o rthe t r i a l court c o u r t i n s o f a r as undivided we one-half remand t h e c a u s e (1) t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r Raymond was J u s t i n e ' s f a t h e r b y a p p l y i n g § 4 3 - 8 - 4 8 ( 2 ) b . t o t h e evidence already presented evidence already presented, and (2) t o d e t e r m i n e , who b a s e d on t h e owns t h e u n d i v i d e d one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y Raymond owned when he d i e d . REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , a n d Thomas a n d D o n a l d s o n , J J . , c o n c u r . Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n the r e s u l t , without 19 writing.

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