Joseph Grace v. Standard Furniture Manufacturing Company, Inc.
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REL: 8/28/09 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF C I V I L APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2009 2080201 Joseph Grace V. Standard Furniture Manufacturing Company, Inc Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (CV-06-07) THOMAS, Judge. Joseph Grace was employed as a forklift operator by Standard Furniture Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("Standard"), on November 8, 2005, when Grace was injured in an accident involving a forklift. Grace had surgery as a result of his 2080201 injuries, and he was given permanent restrictions by his physician that prevented him from continuing his employment as a forklift operator. in the Standard reassigned Grace to a position furniture-assembly line. Grace sued Standard January 2005, seeking workers' compensation benefits. in After a trial on September 29, 2008, the trial court entered the following judgment: "This matter having come before this Court for trial on September 29, 2008 [ ] and the Court having heard , the testimony finds, based on the evidence presented, in favor of [Standard]." Grace appeals. He first argues that the trial court's judgment fails to comply with Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-88, which requires a conclusions trial of court law in to make workers' findings of compensation fact and judgments. Standard argues that, based on a stipulation of the parties, the trial court was concerned with only one issue -- whether Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-57(a) (3)1., applied to Grace's claim -and that, because it had only that one issue before it, we should consider the judgment to be "merely meager or emissive" and review it by considering whether it could be supported by the evidence at trial. See, e.g., Werner Co. v. Williams, 871 So. 2d 845, 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) ("To the extent some of 2 2080201 the findings of the trial court may be meager or emissive, we note that a reversal is not required. Instead, we merely conduct the same review as we would of more specific factual findings to determine whether the ultimate finding made by the trial court is supported by substantial evidence."); and McCutcheon v. Champion Int'l Corp., 623 So. 2d 742, 743 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) ("If the trial court's findings are meager or emissive, this court may look to the record to determine if the trial court's judgment should be upheld."). Our review of the record does not reveal that the parties stipulated that the trial court was limited to determining only whether § 25-5-57 (a) (3)1. applied to Grace's claim. parties stipulated that the accident occurred The in Baldwin County, that the accident arose out of Grace's employment with Standard, and that the accident occurred during the course and scope of the employment. 57(a) (3)1. that The "stipulation" regarding § 25-5- Standard relies upon is the following statement by Standard's counsel at trial: "I don't know why we would need to get into that unless -- in a sense, [Grace's counsel] has already stipulated it' s a real job by stipulating the statute controls, but we 3 also can show that through 2080201 [Grace's] testimony." We cannot agree that that statement is a stipulation of the parties that the only issue to be decided by the trial court was whether § 25-5-57 (a) (3)1. applied to Grace's claim. "A stipulation between opposing is defined counsel as a 'voluntary concerning agreement disposition of some relevant point so as to obviate need for proof or to narrow range of litigable issues.'" Evans v. Alabama Prof'l Health Consultants, Inc., 474 So. 2d 86, 88 (Ala. 1985) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1269 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), quoting in turn Arrington v. State, 233 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1970))(emphasis added in Evans). Our supreme court has also "explained that a stipulation] 'distinct, formal admission made one [making solemn for must the make a express purpose of relieving [the opposing party] from establishing' an element of his claim or defense." George H. Lanier Mem'l Hosp. V. Andrews, 901 So. 2d 714, 725 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Cook V. Morton, 254 Ala. 112, 116, 47 So. 2d 471, 475 (1950)) . A remark by one counsel that another has "in a sense" stipulated to a certain fact or regarding a certain issue is not proof of a voluntary agreement between the two counsel. 2080201 and it is not a "distinct, formal solemn admission." record reflects that Standard's stipulations on the record. counsel had entered The into The record is devoid of any stipulations by Grace's counsel. Alabama law has long required only substantial compliance with § 25-5-88 and has long held that meager and omissive findings of facts or conclusions of law do not necessarily require a reversal of a workers' compensation judgment. See Ex parte Curry, 607 So. 2d 230, 232 (Ala. 1992); Calvert v. Funderburg, 284 Ala. 311, 224 So. 2d 664 (1969) (construing the predecessor statute to § 25-5-88). However, Alabama courts have also held that a judgment devoid of any findings of facts or conclusions of law as to a particular issue is wholly insufficient under § 25-5-88. "'The purpose of Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-88, is to "ensure sufficiently detailed findings so that the appellate court can determine whether the judgment is supported by the facts."' Farris v. St. Vincent's Hosp. , 624 So. 2d 183, 185 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (quoting Elbert Greeson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Ivey, 472 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). '[T]he trial court has a duty to make a finding on each issue presented and litigated before it. In instances where the trial court fails to make a finding responsive to the issue presented, the case must be reversed. ' Thomas v. Gold Kist, Inc., 628 So. 2d 864, 867 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); see also Harbin v. United States Steel Corp., 356 So. 2d 179 2080201 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978); and Dun & Bradstreet Corp. v. Jones, 678 So. 2d 181 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) . In Harbin v. United States Steel Corp., this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case because the trial court had failed to address or to make findings regarding the issue of notice of injury to the employer, despite the issue being presented and litigated. In Harbin, this court stated: "'In the present case the question of whether Harbin notified his employer of his injury was pleaded, contested and submitted to the trial court for its determination. Despite this fact there was no finding made on this issue in the court's original judgment. Nonetheless, Harbin maintains that the absence of a finding of notice of injury does not require reversal since a number of Alabama cases have held that when a finding of the trial court is merely meager or emissive, the reviewing court may examine the evidence in order to decide if the trial court's judgment can be sustained. E.g., West Point Mfg. Co. v. Bennett, 263 Ala. 571, 83 So. 2d 303 (1955) ; Alabama Textile Products Corp. v. Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 82 So. 2d 204 (1955) . However, such is not the rule when, as here, there was no finding made on the issue in question.' "356 So. 2d at 181-82." Equipment Sales Corp. v. Gwin, 4 So. 3d 1125, 1129-30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2 008) . As our supreme court explained precursor statute to § 25-5-88: in discussing the 2080201 "In Ex parte Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. (Greek's Case), 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458, 459 [(1922)], we said of the provisions of law just quoted, § 28, Act 1919, pp. 206-239, as follows: 'The required statement of law, facts, and conclusions is necessary to make serviceable the review by certiorari which the statute provides ....' And in Bryant v. Central Foundry Co., 217 Ala. 332, 116 So. 345 [(1928)], it was said of § 7578, Code 1923, a progenitor of § 304, Title 26: " ' . . . The statute contemplates, not a recital of the evidence, with its conflicting lights and tendencies, but a . determination by the trial judge of the facts established by the evidence, responsive to the issues presented, with the conclusion as to whether the facts found establish or fail to establish the liability asserted; and there should be a finding of every fact necessary to sustain the judgment of the court. ...'" Calvert, 284 Ala. at 314, 224 So. 2d at 666 (some emphasis added; some emphasis in Calvert). The trial court's judgment in the present case is not merely meager or emissive. The judgment makes not one finding of fact or conclusion of law relating to Grace's workers' compensation claim. Even were we to agree that the only issue presented to the trial court for its determination was whether § 25-5-57 (a) (3)1. applied to Grace's claim, the judgment does not mention one fact relevant to the decision as to whether that statute applies. The "meager or emissive" doctrine was 2080201 not intended to apply to a judgment that contains no findings of facts or conclusions of law. Such a judgment is not merely meager or omissive, and it cannot be said to be in substantial compliance with § 25-5-88. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for the trial court to enter a judgment in compliance with § 25-5-88. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, concur. P.J., and Pittman, Bryan, and Moore, JJ. ,
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