2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 3 - Limitations of Actions
Article 2 - Specific Periods of Limitation
§ 9-3-25. Open Accounts; Breach of Certain Contracts; Implied Promise; Exception

All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11.

(Laws 1809, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 566; Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 10; Code 1863, § 2859; Code 1868, § 2867; Code 1873, § 2918; Code 1882, § 2918; Civil Code 1895, § 3768; Civil Code 1910, § 4362; Code 1933, § 3-706; Ga. L. 1962, p. 156, § 1.)

- For survey article on construction law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 59 (2008). For annual survey of law on construction law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 71 (2010). For annual survey on real property law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (2018). For note, "Forty-Eight States are Probably Not Wrong: An Argument for Modernizing Georgia's Legal Malpractice Statute of Limitations," see 33 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 805 (2017).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Actions, Generally
• Running of Limitation

This section applies to counties. MacNeill v. McElroy, 193 Ga. 55, 17 S.E.2d 169 (1941).

- "Hand" is used in legal parlance to denote either handwriting or a written signature. Scarboro v. Ralston Purina Co., 160 Ga. App. 576, 287 S.E.2d 623 (1981).

Cited in Hunt v. Burk, 22 Ga. 129 (1857); Bigelow v. Young, 30 Ga. 121 (1860); Crane v. Barry, 60 Ga. 362 (1878); Smith v. Hudspeth, 63 Ga. 212 (1879); Lilly v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 83 (1883); Hill v. Hackett, 80 Ga. 53, 4 S.E. 856 (1887); Schofield v. Woolley, 98 Ga. 548, 25 S.E. 769, 58 Am. St. R. 315 (1896); Cooper v. Claxton, 122 Ga. 596, 50 S.E. 399 (1905); Sherling v. Long, 122 Ga. 797, 50 S.E. 935 (1905); Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S.E. 251 (1906); Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S.E. 701, 110 Am. St. R. 215, 6 L.R.A. (n.s.) 436 (1906); Waters v. Hurst, 12 Ga. App. 248, 77 S.E. 102 (1913); Arnold Grocery Co. v. Shackelford, 140 Ga. 585, 79 S.E. 470 (1913); Swords v. Walker, 141 Ga. 450, 81 S.E. 235 (1914); Harris v. Black, 143 Ga. 497, 85 S.E. 742 (1915); South Ga. Ry. v. South Ga. Grocery Co., 17 Ga. App. 349, 86 S.E. 939 (1915); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601, 89 S.E. 680 (1916); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Southern Power Co., 145 Ga. 761, 89 S.E. 1975 (1916); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Luke, 19 Ga. App. 100, 90 S.E. 1041 (1916); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Malsby Co., 22 Ga. App. 595, 96 S.E. 710 (1918); Denny v. Gardner, 152 Ga. 602, 110 S.E. 891 (1922); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Averett, 159 Ga. 876, 127 S.E. 217, 39 A.L.R. 1400 (1925); Brazell v. Hearn, 33 Ga. App. 490, 127 S.E. 479 (1925); Sammons v. Glascock County, 161 Ga. 893, 131 S.E. 881 (1926); Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S.E. 826 (1927); Smith v. Dalton Ice Co., 45 Ga. App. 447, 165 S.E. 144 (1932); Richardson v. Empire Talc & Lumber Co., 47 Ga. App. 434, 170 S.E. 559 (1933); Adams v. Lee County Bank & Trust Co., 178 Ga. 154, 172 S.E. 224 (1934); Chatham Motor Co. v. De Sosa, 48 Ga. App. 257, 172 S.E. 604 (1934); Marks v. Maxwell Bros. Furn. Co., 50 Ga. App. 325, 177 S.E. 920 (1935); Brooks v. Sims, 54 Ga. App. 71, 187 S.E. 254 (1936); Harris v. Neuman, 183 Ga. 398, 188 S.E. 689 (1936); Harrison v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 185 Ga. 556, 195 S.E. 750 (1937); In re Sanders, 20 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ga. 1937); Lamis v. Callianos, 57 Ga. App. 238, 194 S.E. 923 (1938); Frank G. Wright Co. v. Board of Educ., 187 Ga. 438, 200 S.E. 790 (1939); Brice v. National Bondholders Corp., 187 Ga. 511, 1 S.E.2d 426 (1939); Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S.E.2d 814 (1939); McIntire v. McQuade, 63 Ga. App. 116, 10 S.E.2d 233 (1940); Underwood v. American Book Co., 64 Ga. App. 184, 12 S.E.2d 467 (1940); White v. Homecraft Spread Co., 64 Ga. App. 715, 13 S.E.2d 912 (1941); Higginbotham v. Adams, 192 Ga. 203, 14 S.E.2d 856 (1941); Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 14 S.E.2d 874 (1941); Stillwell v. McIntire, 67 Ga. App. 81, 19 S.E.2d 334 (1942); Dukes v. Rogers, 67 Ga. App. 661, 21 S.E.2d 295 (1942); Adams v. Higginbotham, 194 Ga. 292, 21 S.E.2d 616 (1942); City of Eastman v. Georgia Power Co., 69 Ga. App. 182, 25 S.E.2d 47 (1943); Neal v. Stapleton, 203 Ga. 236, 46 S.E.2d 130 (1948); Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 58 S.E.2d 834 (1950); Stelling v. Richmond County, 81 Ga. App. 571, 59 S.E.2d 414 (1950); Vinson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 208 Ga. 813, 69 S.E.2d 866 (1952); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 86 Ga. App. 319, 71 S.E.2d 558 (1952); Service Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 170 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1959); Spratler v. Georgia Art Supply Co., 295 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1961); Blackstock v. Murphy, 220 Ga. 661, 140 S.E.2d 902 (1965); Church of God of Union Ass'y, Inc. v. Isaacs, 222 Ga. 243, 149 S.E.2d 466 (1966); Kirkland v. Bailey, 115 Ga. App. 726, 155 S.E.2d 701 (1967); Smallwood v. Conner, 118 Ga. App. 59, 162 S.E.2d 747 (1968); Rosenstock v. Congregation Agudath Achim, 118 Ga. App. 443, 164 S.E.2d 283 (1968); Baldwin v. Happy Herman's, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 520, 177 S.E.2d 814 (1970); Cheek v. J. Allen Couch & Son Funeral Home, 125 Ga. App. 438, 187 S.E.2d 907 (1972); Willis v. Kemp, 130 Ga. App. 758, 204 S.E.2d 486 (1974); Gearhart v. Etheridge, 131 Ga. App. 285, 205 S.E.2d 456 (1974); Spengler v. Employers Com. Union Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 443, 206 S.E.2d 693 (1974); Jackson v. Citizens Trust Bank, 133 Ga. App. 371, 211 S.E.2d 17 (1974); Williams v. Leide Assocs., 133 Ga. App. 454, 211 S.E.2d 407 (1974); Jackson v. Jordan, 139 Ga. App. 469, 228 S.E.2d 606 (1976); Garrett v. Lincoln Cem., 148 Ga. App. 744, 252 S.E.2d 650 (1979); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979); Jankowski v. Taylor, 154 Ga. App. 752, 269 S.E.2d 871 (1980); Spalding Ins. & Realty Co. v. Morris, 154 Ga. App. 869, 270 S.E.2d 78 (1980); Keheley v. Benham, 155 Ga. App. 59, 270 S.E.2d 285 (1980); Vanguard Ins. Agency & Real Estate Co. v. Walker, 157 Ga. App. 838, 278 S.E.2d 723 (1981); Gator Express Serv. Inc. v. Funding Sys. Leasing Corp., 158 Ga. App. 92, 279 S.E.2d 332 (1981); Maelstrom Properties, Inc. v. Holden, 158 Ga. App. 345, 280 S.E.2d 383 (1981); Black v. Lowry, 159 Ga. App. 57, 282 S.E.2d 700 (1981); Atlanta Professional Ass'n for Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgery v. Allen, 163 Ga. App. 400, 294 S.E.2d 647 (1982); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Martin, 164 Ga. App. 364, 297 S.E.2d 313 (1982); Akins v. Jones, 164 Ga. App. 705, 297 S.E.2d 341 (1982); Jones v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 730, 318 S.E.2d 152 (1984); McDonald v. Patton, 172 Ga. App. 491, 323 S.E.2d 690 (1984); Long v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 172 Ga. App. 564, 323 S.E.2d 868 (1984); Golden v. Hussey, 179 Ga. App. 797, 348 S.E.2d 123 (1986); Bowen & Bowen, Inc. v. McCoy-Gibbons, Inc., 185 Ga. App. 298, 363 S.E.2d 827 (1987); Dronzek v. Vaughn, 191 Ga. App. 468, 382 S.E.2d 188 (1989); Piedmont Eng'g & Constr. Corp. v. Balcor Partners-84 II, Inc., 196 Ga. App. 486, 396 S.E.2d 279 (1990); Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 303, 404 S.E.2d 607 (1991); Hyman v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 852, 412 S.E.2d 615 (1991); Farmers State Bank v. Huguenin, 220 Ga. App. 657, 469 S.E.2d 34 (1996); Wright v. Swint, 224 Ga. App. 417, 480 S.E.2d 878 (1997); League v. United States Postamatic, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 171, 508 S.E.2d 210 (1998); Herndon v. Heard, 262 Ga. App. 334, 585 S.E.2d 637 (2003); Hornsby v. Hunter, 262 Ga. App. 598, 585 S.E.2d 900 (2003); Batesville Casket Co. v. Watkins Mortuary, Inc., 293 Ga. App. 854, 668 S.E.2d 476 (2008); Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 786 S.E.2d 903 (2016).

Actions, Generally

Preemption by statute of limitations contained in federal Interstate Commerce Act.

- While the federal Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., did not preempt a motor carrier's state law actions against a shipping broker for breach of contract and recovery on an open account, the state law statute of limitations for those actions found in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-25 and46-9-5 were preempted by the 18-month statute of limitations in 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a); therefore, the carrier's action, filed five days after the 18-month time limit had expired, was untimely. Exel Transp. Servs. v. Sigma Vita, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 527, 654 S.E.2d 665 (2007).

- Trial court erred in granting a creditor summary judgment in its action against a guarantor to collect on a past due commercial account because the guarantor was served several years beyond either the two-year statute of limitation period, O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725, or the four-year limitation period, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25; the creditor had notice of a service of process issue at least as early as March 2007 and knew of the service problem in January 2008, but it did not serve the guarantor with process until September 2008, and the creditor failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in attempting to effect service. Scanlan v. Tate Supply Co., 303 Ga. App. 9, 692 S.E.2d 684 (2010).

Limitation for action based on written acknowledgment of open account is four years, not six, as nature of original obligation rather than new promise determines limitation. Jackson v. Brown, 118 Ga. App. 558, 164 S.E.2d 450 (1968).

Open account for continuous service of attorney, for which the attorney is entitled to be paid only after particular result is procured and accepted by employer, is not barred until four years after such result is accepted. City of Summerville v. Sellers, 94 Ga. App. 152, 94 S.E.2d 69 (1956).

This section applies when contract is admittedly oral. Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 103 Ga. App. 225, 119 S.E.2d 63 (1961).

When contract is partly in writing and partly in parol, entire contract is considered one in parol. G.M. Shutt & Co. v. Andrews, 47 Ga. App. 530, 171 S.E. 219 (1933).

Period of limitation applicable to action for contribution based upon implied contract is four years from time right of action accrues. Powell v. Powell, 171 Ga. 840, 156 S.E. 677 (1931), later appeal, 179 Ga. 817, 177 S.E. 566 (1934).

Right of one who paid promissory note signed by that person personally and another as coprincipal to call on the latter for contribution under an implied contract for money paid is limited to a period of four years. Porter v. Ingram, 47 Ga. App. 266, 170 S.E. 299 (1933).

Statute of limitation as to action by comaker of promissory note for contribution from another comaker is four years. Bell v. Kleinberg, 102 Ga. App. 623, 117 S.E.2d 262 (1960).

Action for money had and received must under this section be brought within four years from time right of action accrues. Norris v. Nixon, 78 Ga. App. 769, 52 S.E.2d 529 (1949).

- When assistant county probation officer was paid salary under statute subsequently held invalid, such salary being more than the salary which had been properly fixed, right of county to recover excess of salary paid would be subject to four-year period of limitation stated in this section, computed from time when each payment was made, regardless of continuance in office of probation officer. MacNeill v. McElroy, 193 Ga. 55, 17 S.E.2d 169 (1941).

- When foundation of action is promise to account or contract to account, not under seal, made subsequent to dissolution of partnership, action was one on assumpsit, and four-year statute of limitations applied. Dukes v. Rogers, 67 Ga. App. 661, 21 S.E.2d 295 (1942).

Action for accounting based on parol contract of partnership, filed more than four years after termination of partnership, was barred by the statute of limitations. Baker v. Schneider, 210 Ga. 493, 80 S.E.2d 783 (1954).

- Since the firm was composed of two partners, both of whom died before the dissolution agreement had been made or the partnership affairs settled, an action upon demand or claim by a representative of one partner against a representative of the other was timely, if brought within four years of the death of the partner who died first. Powell v. Powell, 171 Ga. 840, 156 S.E. 677 (1931), later appeal, 179 Ga. 817, 177 S.E. 566 (1934).

- Action seeking to recover reasonable value of services, less credit for partial payment in form of reduced rentals, clearly came under the four-year limitation of former Code 1933, § 3-706 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25), and was not an action "for recovery of wages," as that term was used in former Code 1933, § 3-704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22). Parks v. Brissey, 114 Ga. App. 563, 151 S.E.2d 896 (1966).

- Suit in equity to enjoin enforcement of a judgment which allegedly has been satisfied by settlement after institution of the litigation and payment of the agreed amount is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(f), nor is it barred by the four-year statutes applicable to breach of contract. Wells v. Mullis, 255 Ga. 426, 339 S.E.2d 574 (1986).

- When an individual assumes relation of confidence to another, such as relationship of attorney and client, without disclosing lack of qualification and authorization to perform legal services contracted for, the client's cause of action for rescission of the contract and recovery of fees paid to the attorney, when no benefits were received by the client from such services as may have been performed, arises when the client discovers the attorney's lack of qualification and authorization to act as attorney-at-law. Lowe v. Presley, 86 Ga. App. 328, 71 S.E.2d 730 (1952).

In this state legal malpractice is based upon breach of duty imposed by attorney-client contract of employment, and as such, the applicable statute of limitations is four years. Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 265 S.E.2d 92 (1980).

Action for attorney malpractice accrues and period of limitations begins to run from date of attorney's breach of duty, that is, from date of alleged negligent or unskillful act. Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 265 S.E.2d 92 (1980).

When plaintiffs sued defendant attorney and defendant's former law partner and partnership for malpractice, this four-year statute of limitation, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, applied. Peppers v. Siefferman, 166 Ga. App. 389, 304 S.E.2d 511 (1983).

Since the only underlying contractual relationship that could be established based on the pleadings would be a contract of employment to perform the legal services and such was not a written contract at all but rather an oral one, and the instruments alleged to be defective were not in part or in whole the contract but were merely the work product or the objective of the contract for services, the defendant's claim was subject to a four-year statute of limitations either because the defendant's action was based on malpractice or an oral contract, both of which are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Loftin v. Brown, 179 Ga. App. 337, 346 S.E.2d 114 (1986).

A cause of action for legal malpractice, alleging negligence or unskillfulness, sounds in contract (agency) and, in the case of an oral agreement, is subject to the four-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, but such a cause of action can also sound in tort and, thus, be subject to the one-year and/or two-year limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 346 S.E.2d 893 (1986); Coleman v. Hicks, 209 Ga. App. 467, 433 S.E.2d 621 (1993).

When defendant's counterclaim did not seek tort damages for any "injuries to the person" within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, but sought only those damages alleged to be the result of plaintiff-attorney's negligent breach of the plaintiff's contract of employment, the trial court erred in striking the counterclaim based upon the two-year statute of limitation defense. Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 346 S.E.2d 893 (1986).

Cause of action for legal malpractice, alleging attorney's negligent breach of the attorney's contract of employment, was subject to the four-year limitation provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25. Royal v. Harrington, 194 Ga. App. 457, 390 S.E.2d 668 (1990).

Plaintiff's cause of action accrued and the period of limitation began to run when defendant attorney committed unskillful acts during the plaintiff's criminal trial, and the failure of the defendant to argue on plaintiff's appeal from conviction the defendant's own possible ineffective assistance rendered during trial was not a separate act of malpractice for purposes of the statute of limitations. Long v. Wallace, 214 Ga. App. 466, 448 S.E.2d 229 (1994).

Cause of action based on attorney's allegedly negligent preparation of a promissory note was subject to limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, and the limitation period was not tolled when there was no allegation or evidence of concealment or misrepresentation of any negligence in the preparation of the note. Jaraysi v. Soloway, 215 Ga. App. 531, 451 S.E.2d 521 (1994).

Because a breach of contract would occur upon the commission of the wrongful act violating the contractual duty, a cause of action ex contractu, like a cause of action ex delicto, arises and the statute of limitations for legal malpractice is triggered immediately upon the commission of the wrongful act. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. American Envirecycle, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 80, 456 S.E.2d 264 (1995).

When legal malpractice is alleged to arise from negligent preparation of a contractual document, the date of contract execution is the controlling date giving rise to a cause of action for malpractice and in commencing the running of the statute of limitations. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. American Envirecycle, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 80, 456 S.E.2d 264 (1995).

Actions for legal malpractice averring negligence or unskillfulness are subject to the four-year statute of limitation, which commences to run from the date of the attorney's alleged wrongful act of negligence or unskillfulness. Brown v. Kinser, 218 Ga. App. 385, 461 S.E.2d 564 (1995).

Legal malpractice claim may sound either in tort or contract, depending on the circumstances. The circumstances on which it depends, however, are those involving the attorney-client relationship, the duty involved, and the breach thereof, not those involving the nature of the underlying action for which the attorney was consulted or retained. Plumlee v. Davis, 221 Ga. App. 848, 473 S.E.2d 510 (1996).

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (simple contracts in writing) was not applicable to a legal malpractice claim, since the contract creating the attorney-client relationship covered certain issues such as fees, expenses, etc., but did not constitute the entire agreement between the parties, not specifying, for example, the manner in which the attorney was to carry out the attorney's duties, when suit was to be filed, etc. As such, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, applicable to oral contracts, had to be applied. Plumlee v. Davis, 221 Ga. App. 848, 473 S.E.2d 510 (1996).

In a legal malpractice action based on the defendant's failure to advise the plaintiff regarding the applicable statute of limitation in a prior action, the statute of limitation began to run when the statute of limitation on the plaintiff's original personal injury claim expired without suit being filed. Harrison v. Beckham, 238 Ga. App. 199, 518 S.E.2d 435 (1999).

Legal malpractice statute of limitation was four years and was triggered upon the commission of the alleged wrongful act; a malpractice action, asserting a lawyer's negligence in the representation during a medical malpractice trial, was time-barred since the complaint was filed more than five years after the trial. Villani v. Hughes, 279 Ga. App. 618, 631 S.E.2d 709 (2006).

- Trial court did not err in granting an attorney's motion to vacate the dismissal of a client's medical malpractice suit and to foreclose the attorney's lien for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) because the attorney's motion to enforce the lien was timely under the four-year statute of limitations applicable to open accounts, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, since the motion was filed within the same year the attorney's right of action accrued; the statute of limitation did not begin to run until the client settled the client's lawsuit on February 6, 2008, the attorney filed the attorney's notice of attorney's lien the day after the client executed the settlement release, and when the client filed a dismissal of the lawsuit without satisfying the lien the attorney filed the attorney's motion to vacate the dismissal and to enforce the attorney's lien on September 10, 2008. Woods v. Jones, 305 Ga. App. 349, 699 S.E.2d 567 (2010).

- See Morris v. Atlanta Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 222 Ga. App. 62, 473 S.E.2d 501 (1996).

- When attorneys' letter to the client merely confirmed representation in broad terms and outlined in detail only the fee arrangement between the parties and thus clearly did not constitute the entire agreement for legal services between the parties, an action based on malpractice by attorneys fell within the four-year limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 and not the six-year limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Frates v. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 164 Ga. App. 243, 296 S.E.2d 788 (1982).

Allegations of accountant malpractice are clearly analogous to charges of attorney malpractice when issues of negligence or unskillfulness are raised. A breach of duty of an accountant's professional competence falls within the four-year statute of limitation as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25. Consolidated Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Halligan, 186 Ga. App. 621, 368 S.E.2d 148, aff'd, 258 Ga. 471, 369 S.E.2d 745 (1988).

- Because a recycler's breach of contract claim was premised on a written contract for professional services and called into question the conduct of an engineering firm in the firm's area of expertise, it was a claim for professional malpractice that was subject to the four-year statute of limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, rather than the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on written contracts in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc. v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 294, 682 S.E.2d 666 (2009).

Engineering firm was properly granted summary judgment in a breach of contract suit because the three documents the customer claimed to form the written contract did not contain the essential element of consideration; thus, the parties' agreement was not a contract in writing and the four-year limitation period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 applied and the suit was time barred. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc., 317 Ga. App. 464, 731 S.E.2d 361 (2012).

This section is applicable to claims against estate by executor for enhancing value of the estate. Evans v. Evans, 237 Ga. 549, 228 S.E.2d 857 (1976).

Payments made by executor for care of life tenant, when not made from portions of remainder of estate as provided by will, are treated as loans from individual, and recovery of them is governed by this section. Evans v. Evans, 237 Ga. 549, 228 S.E.2d 857 (1976).

- Claim of decedent's widow for reimbursement of money she expended personally to satisfy obligations of her husband's estate were barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 because she failed to file the claim within four years from the date the money was advanced. Kicklighter v. Woodward, 267 Ga. 157, 476 S.E.2d 248 (1996).

- Because an action filed by a creditor to collect unpaid credit card charges was based on a written contract, and not an open account, the trial court properly held that the six-year limitations period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applied (and not that under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25), supporting summary judgment in the creditor's favor; moreover, because the transaction at issue was a written contract, the form of the debtor's acceptance was immaterial. Hill v. Am. Express, 289 Ga. App. 576, 657 S.E.2d 547 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1008, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 490 (Ga. 2008).

Claim to be subrogated to rights of former holders of county warrants paid with money of claimant is one arising upon an implied undertaking within this section. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilcox County, 298 F. 772 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 2 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1924).

- Two-year limitation period for modification of a prior award based on a change of condition, which is contained in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b), does not apply to overpayment cases; instead, the four-year limitation period contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 applies. Bahadori v. Sizzler, 230 Ga. App. 52, 505 S.E.2d 23 (1998).

This section does not apply to widow's application for a year's support, as right to year's support is not an open account, nor is it based upon a contract or an implied assumpsit or undertaking. Bacon v. Bacon, 37 Ga. App. 171, 139 S.E. 111 (1927).

Specific performance of oral contract to convey land is not governed by this section. Jones v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 231 Ga. 765, 204 S.E.2d 116 (1974).

In action for recovery of land by equitable owners, by statute, clearly no four-year statute of limitation is applicable. Smith v. Aldridge, 192 Ga. 376, 15 S.E.2d 430 (1941).

- Right to be free from discriminatory practices in employment is not analogous to right of action on implied or unwritten contracts which are governed by four-year limitation period of this section; rather, it is failure to contract for employment or promotion on an equal basis which gives rise to an action. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).

Claim for failure to employ cannot be characterized as contractual in nature because refusal or failure to employ implicitly excludes existence of mutual assent which is necessary for any contract. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974).

Section inapplicable to action brought under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. - When action was brought on independent statutory remedy afforded by Ga. L. 1976, p. 1564, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-22-14), relating to disposition of unearned insurance premiums, and claim for relief was predicated on statutory obligation contained therein, former Code 1933, § 3-704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22), rather than former Code 1933, § 3-706 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25), applied. Perry & Co. v. Knight Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 128, 253 S.E.2d 808 (1979).

- Document and blueprints did not create a written contract under O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1 and thus the parties' construction agreement was an oral/parol one and the limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 applied; the documents could not be read together as the documents did not reference each other and were not contemporaneous, and moreover even if the documents could be read together, the documents did not identify the subject matter of the contract or the specific parties to the contract, and neither was signed, thus failing to reflect the parties' assent. Harris v. Baker, 287 Ga. App. 814, 652 S.E.2d 867 (2007).

Action by broker against executrix of deceased speculator to recover for advancements made and for commissions on transactions in buying and selling stocks for speculator, when only evidence of written contract consisted in telegraphic communications and letters exchanged between broker and speculator, was not upon a written contract, but was upon a contract "not under the hand of the party sought to be charged" and upon an "implied assumpsit or undertaking." G.M. Shutt & Co. v. Andrews, 47 Ga. App. 530, 171 S.E. 219 (1933).

- While as general rule right to claim benefit of statute of limitations is personal to debtor, it may also be claimed by debtor's transferee when it is sought to subject property transferred to the debtor to payment of debt; hence, in action against alleged fraudulent grantee, seeking to set aside alleged fraudulent transfer and to subject property to payments of debts, to which suit debtor has not been made a party, alleged fraudulent grantee, being a privy in estate to debtor grantor, may claim benefit of statute of limitations against debts represented by open accounts. Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Emory Univ., 185 Ga. 571, 196 S.E. 58 (1938).

- Georgia's four-year statute of limitations governed the Resolution Trust Corporation's actions as receiver; the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (12 U.S.C. § 1821) does not operate to revive stale state actions. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 1994).

- Italian companies that sold goods to a Georgia corporation were not required to obtain a certificate of authority from the State of Georgia prior to doing business in Georgia, and Georgia courts had jurisdiction over actions which the Italian companies filed against the Georgia corporation after they delivered goods, submitted invoices for payment, but were not fully paid. Imex Int'l v. Wires Eng'g, 261 Ga. App. 329, 583 S.E.2d 117 (2003).

Monthly wire transfer payments from a debtor to a creditor containing notations regarding the debtor's account constituted new promises by the debtor to pay under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-110 and9-3-112 and sufficed to renew the running of the four-year statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25. Because the last payment was made in July 2008, the creditor's suit in March 2012 was not time-barred. SKC, Inc. v. eMag Solutions, LLC, 326 Ga. App. 798, 755 S.E.2d 298 (2014).

Running of Limitation

Controlling effect of time of breach.

- When action is based on breach of written contract and implied warranty, time of breach, not time of discovery of breach, starts the statute of limitations. National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 320 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D. Ga. 1970).

Breach of duty, not time special damage results, is beginning period for right of action. Waddey v. Davis, 149 Ga. App. 308, 254 S.E.2d 465 (1979).

Statute of limitation on the breach of the duty imposed by the contract of employment runs from the date of the breach of duty, and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is ascertained. McClain v. Johnson, 160 Ga. App. 548, 288 S.E.2d 9 (1981), cert. denied, 248 Ga. 877, 289 S.E.2d 247 (1982).

Former employer was entitled to summary judgment as to a former employee's breach of contract claim because the four-year statute of limitations barred the claim since the employee's right of action accrued either when the former employer's owner first agreed to give the employee 10% of the company or when the employee's compensation changed to only a base salary and the owner refused to give the employee a written document of any kind. Contract Furniture Refinishing & Maint. Corp. v. Remanufacturing & Design Group, LLC, 317 Ga. App. 47, 730 S.E.2d 708 (2012).

Creditor's nondischargeability complaint against the debtor failed as a matter of law because there was no enforceable debt to except from the debtor's bankruptcy discharge after the creditor failed to file a suit against the debtor within four years after the debtor missed the date agreed upon for repayment in the oral contract between the parties. Even if the contract was entered into fraudulently, the same limitations period applied, and the statute began to run from the date the fraud was discovered, which was also the date of initial default on repayment of the loan. Stinson v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 525 Bankr. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).

Statute of limitations on open account runs from date it is due. Murray v. Lightsey, 58 Ga. App. 100, 197 S.E. 870 (1938); Leonard v. Cesaroni, 98 Ga. App. 715, 106 S.E.2d 362 (1958).

- When an account grew out of implied undertakings that amounted to a severable contract as defined by law, rights of action accrued and statute of limitation began to run as services were rendered and charges were made from time to time on the account. Yeargin v. Bramblett, 115 Ga. App. 862, 156 S.E.2d 97 (1967).

- When one merchant sells goods to another on open account, and due date of account is expressly and definitely fixed in contract of sale, seller's cause of action thereon is barred after expiration of four years from such date. Robinson v. Jackson, 57 Ga. App. 431, 195 S.E. 877 (1938).

In action of claim for money received, statute does not begin to run until demand is made. Goodwyn v. Roop, 53 Ga. App. 847, 187 S.E. 127 (1936).

- When a loan is made on the basis of an oral promise to pay, it will be assumed the parties intended either expressly or impliedly that demand for repayment would not be made until some future time; the statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 will not commence before the date of demand. McRae v. Smith, 159 Ga. App. 19, 282 S.E.2d 676 (1981); Mills v. Barton, 205 Ga. App. 413, 422 S.E.2d 269 (1992).

- When money is loaned, payable on demand, an express or implied agreement between the parties that the parties' arrangement should continue into the future for a considerable length of time before the plaintiff would be expected to demand the plaintiff's money delays the running of the statute of limitations. Scarboro v. Ralston Purina Co., 160 Ga. App. 576, 287 S.E.2d 623 (1981).

In action based on breach of oral agreement to provide plaintiff with 10% of the stock of a certain corporation, as no time was set for performance, the cause of action accrued at the date of the oral agreement. Palmer v. Neal, 602 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

In action based on breach of an oral agreement which provided that the plaintiff and defendant would be joint owners of any patent issued for the apparatus in question, the breach occurred when the defendant executed the patent application naming the defendant as the sole inventor, but the statute of limitations was not tolled by fraud since the defendant had no duty to disclose the defendant's actions to the plaintiff, the plaintiff having previously terminated the association with the defendant. Palmer v. Neal, 602 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Under Georgia law, contracts that are partly written and partly in parol must be considered as in parol and are governed by the four-year statute of limitation applicable to oral contracts under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25. Bridge Capital Investors II v. Small, 144 Fed. Appx. 762 (11th Cir. 2005)(Unpublished).

- When principal obligor, with own funds, pays joint debt due by the obligor and the coprincipal, the right upon implied contract of coprincipal to bear share of common burden arises when payment extinguishes debt of common debtor. Powell v. Powell, 171 Ga. 840, 156 S.E. 677 (1931), later appeal, 179 Ga. 817, 177 S.E. 566 (1934).

Mere ignorance of facts constituting cause of action does not prevent running of statute of limitations. Ponder v. Barrett, 46 Ga. App. 757, 169 S.E. 257 (1933).

- Because the defendant was not properly served by the plaintiff, the statute of limitation continued to run even after the action was filed, and the statute of limitation expired without the defendant being properly served. Gamlins, Solicitors & Notaries v. A.E. Roberts & Assocs., Inc., 254 Ga. App. 763, 564 S.E.2d 29 (2002).

- Fraud which will relieve the bar of the statute of limitation must be of that character which involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect of debarring or deterring the plaintiff from the plaintiff's action. Findley v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 332, 414 S.E.2d 317 (1991).

In a legal malpractice action filed subsequent to the running of the four-year statute of limitations, when there was no evidence giving rise to factual merit in the plaintiff's claim that the limitations statute was tolled due to fraud, and since there existed no justiciable issue of law as to such claim, the trial court erred in denying the defendant attorneys' motion for attorney fees. Brown v. Kinser, 218 Ga. App. 385, 461 S.E.2d 564 (1995).

Employee's claims for unjust enrichment and unpaid compensation were partially barred by the statutes of limitations as the statutes of limitations were not tolled since the employee failed to show fraud by claiming that the employee justifiably relied on the corporation's representations that the employee would be paid all the monies owed. Heretyk v. P.M.A. Cemeteries, Inc., 272 Ga. App. 79, 611 S.E.2d 744 (2005).

Four-year statute of limitations applicable to accountant malpractice actions, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, was not tolled by fraud because there was no evidence that the accountant concealed or failed to disclose information that deterred the client from filing suit within the limitation period; the accountant consistently informed the client that the tax return was not complete. Bryant v. Golden, 302 Ga. App. 760, 691 S.E.2d 672 (2010).

Certain of plaintiff's claims for fraud, conversion, and breach of oral contract arose outside of the four-year statutes of limitation, and the undisputed facts showed that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the defendant's alleged fraud as to a certain account as the defendant was put on notice of the account when the defendant received two personal checks issued from that account, endorsed and cashed the checks, but never inquired as to the checks' source. Hot Shot Kids Inc. v. Pervis (In re Pervis), 497 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).

- When fraudulent concealment of cause of action is in breach of confidential relation involving duty to make full disclosure, statute does not begin to run until discovery of fraud. Lowe v. Presley, 86 Ga. App. 328, 71 S.E.2d 730 (1952).

Party's action was barred since the party failed to bring an action against an employer until more than four years after discovering that the party's pension payments were lower than what the party believed the employer had orally agreed to since the party would have become aware of any alleged fraud by the employer when the party discovered the true amount of payments. Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 330 S.E.2d 102 (1985).

- Employee was properly granted summary judgment for breach of an oral employment agreement for commission payments; claims for commissions for jobs done before November 1999 were not time-barred because the commissions were not payable until the employee submitted a worksheet calculating them, and no worksheet had been submitted before that time. CPD Plastering, Inc. v. Miller, 284 Ga. App. 172, 643 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

- In an estate's claim for partition of property, a co-tenant's counterclaim for contribution and set-off for sums the co-tenant paid in loan and tax payments was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, because under O.C.G.A. § 44-6-122, the statute did not begin to run until the estate filed its complaint. Khimani v. Ruppenthal, 344 Ga. App. 658, 811 S.E.2d 448 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0916, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 571 (Ga. 2018).

- Limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 applicable to an action by a client based on an oral contract with the client's attorney was tolled during the pendency of proceedings on the client's petition under the Arbitration of Fees Disputes program of the State Bar. Antinoro v. Browner, 223 Ga. App. 664, 478 S.E.2d 392 (1996).

- Debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 did not toll the running of the statute of limitation during the pendency of the bankruptcy; if the limitation period has expired during a bankruptcy, suit against the debtor must be commenced within 30 days of the automatic stay. J.T. Indus. Contractors v. Hargis Railcar, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 679, 458 S.E.2d 702 (1995).

- After the plaintiff discovered in 1926 that proceeds from the sale of bonds which the plaintiff had intended to be applied to payment of the promissory note had never been accounted for by the bank, but did not bring an action until 1931, such action was barred by the statute of limitations, which ran against the plaintiff from date of discovery of the wrong, whether the action was brought in tort or in contract. Wall v. Middle Ga. Bank, 180 Ga. 431, 179 S.E. 363 (1935).

- Federal common law doctrine of "adverse domination" did not toll the state statute of limitations governing Resolution Trust Corporation's claims in a case when subject loans were made between 1982 and 1985, more than four years prior to the defendant bank's placement into receivership with the RTC's predecessor agency. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 1994).

- With respect to allegedly defective title examinations and opinions rendered by ab attorney to a client, this section, relating to an oral contract of employment, applies and begins to run from the date of the attorney's alleged negligent or unskillful act, not from the date of the client's discovery. Master Mtg. Corp. v. Byers, 130 Ga. App. 97, 202 S.E.2d 566 (1973).

- In a legal malpractice action, despite the fact that the trial court held that the client's failure to prove proximate causation supported an order granting summary judgment to the attorney and the attorney's law firm, the appeals court nevertheless held that summary judgment was properly granted to the attorney, under the "right for any reason" rule, as the suit was untimely filed. Moreover, the client's argument that the attorney could have amended the suit to add a damages claim up until the time of a pre-trial order, and that this later failure to act should be considered the triggering date for the malpractice action, was unavailing, as the attorney's failure to amend constituted a failure to avoid the effect of the earlier breach and a failure to mitigate damages, but was not a failure inflicting a new harm, thus triggering a new limitations period. Duke Galish, LLC v. Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP, 288 Ga. App. 75, 653 S.E.2d 791 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0416, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. 2008).

In an action for damages against an attorney at law for unskillfulness or negligence, the statute of limitation runs from the date of the breach of the duty and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is ascertained nor from the date of the client's discovery of the error. Peppers v. Siefferman, 166 Ga. App. 389, 304 S.E.2d 511 (1983).

Actions of a law firm in assuring its client that an enforceable option existed, and continuing to represent the client in a breach of contract action, when the law firm had failed to include a negotiated option to purchase in the final contract, constituted such concealment as would toll the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action. Arnall, Golden & Gregory v. Health Serv. Ctrs., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 791, 399 S.E.2d 565 (1990).

In accountant malpractice cases, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the breach of the duty and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is ascertained, not from the date of the client's discovery of the error. Consolidated Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Halligan, 186 Ga. App. 621, 368 S.E.2d 148, aff'd, 258 Ga. 471, 369 S.E.2d 745 (1988).

- In action against local school district for money had and received, when there is no condition precedent to bringing such action that demand for payment be made, statute of limitation begins to run from time funds were on hand to discharge obligations. Jasper Sch. Dist. v. Gormley, 57 Ga. App. 537, 196 S.E. 232 (1938).

- Court of Appeals erred in holding that a professional malpractice claim premised on a written contract between an engineering firm and the firm's client was governed by the four-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, rather than the six-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc., 288 Ga. 236, 703 S.E.2d 323 (2010).

- After dissolution of partnership, statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of one partner against another until partnership affairs relating to debtors and creditors have been wound up and settled, or at least until sufficient time has elapsed since dissolution to raise presumption that such was the fact. Dukes v. Rogers, 67 Ga. App. 661, 21 S.E.2d 295 (1942).

When running of limitation period commenced prior to beginning of alleged fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitation does not cease to run. Peppers v. Siefferman, 166 Ga. App. 389, 304 S.E.2d 511 (1983); Kilby v. Shepherd, 177 Ga. App. 462, 339 S.E.2d 742 (1986).

- Trial court properly dismissed a firefighter's action against a city, as an employer, and a firefighters pension fund for rescission of an alleged contract and for fraud, as the claims were barred by the four-year limitations period for actions based on mutual mistake or fraud, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-25,9-3-26, and9-3-31, and the firefighter did not show that the firefighter was prevented from bringing the action in a timely manner, rather than nine years after the firefighter's termination. Bradshaw v. City of Atlanta, 275 Ga. App. 609, 621 S.E.2d 563 (2005).

- Because an implied promise to perform professionally pursuant to a written agreement for professional services is written into a contract for professional services by the law, an alleged breach of this implied obligation is necessarily governed by the six-year contract statute of limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, not the four-year statute applicable to professional malpractice actions under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25. Saiia Constr., LLC v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., 310 Ga. App. 713, 714 S.E.2d 3 (2011).

- In a suit for repayment of a personal loan, the trial court did not err by denying the debtor's motion for a directed verdict based on the debtor's assertion that the statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 had expired as the facts showed that the parties intended, either expressly or impliedly, that demand for repayment would not be made until some future time. Therefore, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until the date of demand for repayment. Murphy v. Varner, 292 Ga. App. 747, 666 S.E.2d 53 (2008).

- In response to certified questions from a federal action which arose with respect to a mortgagee's charges that included substantial notary fees from a refinancing transaction, it was determined that even if there was actual fraud by the mortgagee, there was no tolling of limitations periods for claims of fraud and money had and received pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-25 and9-3-31, as the mortgagors could have discovered the impropriety of the notary fees by simple reference to O.C.G.A. § 45-17-11. Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 287 Ga. 448, 697 S.E.2d 166 (2010).

In an action by borrowers claiming that the lender's charging of an illegal notary fee gave rise to a "money had and received" claim, the district court did not err in dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds, the claim, which was brought more than five years after the borrowers signed the loan agreement because, even assuming the lender's conduct constituted actual fraud, Georgia's Supreme Court, in response to a certified question, declined to allow equitable tolling because the borrowers could have discovered the discrepancy between the notary fee statute and the actual fee charged at any time by simple reference to the notary fee statute. Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 626 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2010).

- Trial court properly dismissed a real estate firm's counterclaims against a title insurance company as time barred because the firm did not bring the firm's counterclaims for complaint on account and money had and received until February 8, 2010, more than four years after the claims accrued; thus, those claims were brought outside the statute of limitation and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the title insurance company on those claims. Dewrell Sacks, LLP v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 324 Ga. App. 219, 749 S.E.2d 802 (2013).

Partial payments made on open account do not renew account and suspend statute of limitations; on all open accounts, statute of limitations commences to run from date of purchase of last item on that account. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 18.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accounts and Accounting, § 4 et seq. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 118, 119.

Proving Fraudulent Concealment to Toll Statutory Limitations Periods, 32 POF3d 129.

21B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Restitution and Implied Contracts, § 2.

- 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §§ 95, 179.

- What constitutes an open, current account within the statutes of limitations, 1 A.L.R. 1060; 39 A.L.R. 369; 57 A.L.R. 201.

Implied contract to reimburse one for expense of trip taken at request of relative, 24 A.L.R. 973; 68 A.L.R. 200.

Payment on account as removing or tolling statute of limitation, 36 A.L.R. 346; 156 A.L.R. 1082.

Right of one who by mistake pays taxes to recover against person benefited by payment, 91 A.L.R. 389.

Bar of statute of limitations against action to recover principal of obligation as affecting right to recover interest, 115 A.L.R. 728.

Liability of surety as affected by running of limitation in favor of principal or cosurety, 122 A.L.R. 204.

Vendee's right to recover back amount paid under executory contract for sale of land, 134 A.L.R. 1064.

Running of statute of limitations against claim for services rendered over extended period under indefinite employment not fixing time of payment, 7 A.L.R.2d 198.

Right of creditor to set aside transfer of property as fraudulent as affected by the fact that his claim is barred by statute of limitation, 14 A.L.R.2d 598.

Limitation of actions as applied to account stated, 51 A.L.R.2d 331.

Limitation of actions: physician's claim for compensation for medical services or treatment, 99 A.L.R.2d 251.

Judgment in action on express contract for labor or services as precluding, as a matter of res judicata, subsequent action on implied contract (quantum meruit) or vice versa, 35 A.L.R.3d 874.

What statute of limitations applies to action for contribution against joint tort-feasor, 57 A.L.R.3d 927.

What statute of limitations governs action arising out of transaction consummated by use of credit card, 2 A.L.R.4th 677.

Computer sales and leases: time when cause of action for failure of performance accrues, 90 A.L.R.4th 298.

Application of statute of limitations to actions for breach of duty in performing services of public accountant, 7 A.L.R.5th 852.

Modern status of the application of "discovery rule" to postpone running of limitations against actions relating to breach of building and construction contracts, 33 A.L.R.5th 1.

Attorney malpractice - tolling or other exceptions to running of statute of limitations, 87 A.L.R.5th 473.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence - View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of negligent act or omission, 11 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of sustaining damage or injury and other theories, 12 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence - View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission - Statement of rule and application of rule to providing client with allegedly negligent advice or failing to advise, 13 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence - View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission - Application of rule to conduct of litigation and delay or inaction in conducting client's affairs, 14 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence - View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission - Application of rule to property, estate, corporate, and document cases, 15 A.L.R.6th 427.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence - View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission - Application of rule to negligent misrepresentation, failure to supervise junior counsel, conflict of interest, billing disputes, and unspecified acts of negligence, 16 A.L.R.6th 653.

Application of relation-back doctrine permitting change in party after statute of limitations has run in state court action - construction cases, 104 A.L.R.6th 1.

Application of doctrine of adverse domination, 13 A.L.R.7th 3.

Preemptive effect of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 75 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 257.