2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 5 - Libel and Slander
§ 51-5-7. Privileged Communications

The following communications are deemed privileged:

1. Statements made in good faith in the performance of a public duty;
2. Statements made in good faith in the performance of a legal or moral private duty;
3. Statements made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his or her interest in a matter in which it is concerned;
4. Statements made in good faith as part of an act in furtherance of the person's or entity's right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Georgia in connection with an issue of public interest or concern, as defined in subsection (c) of Code Section 9-11-11.1;
5. Fair and honest reports of the proceedings of legislative or judicial bodies;
6. Fair and honest reports of court proceedings;
7. Comments of counsel, fairly made, on the circumstances of a case in which he or she is involved and on the conduct of the parties in connection therewith;
8. Truthful reports of information received from any arresting officer or police authorities; and
9. Comments upon the acts of public men or public women in their public capacity and with reference thereto.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2922; Code 1868, § 2929; Code 1873, § 2980; Code 1882, § 2980; Ga. L. 1893, p. 131, § 2; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3836, 3840; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4432, 4436; Code 1933, §§ 105-704, 105-709; Ga. L. 1996, p. 260, § 2; Ga. L. 2016, p. 341, § 3/HB 513.)

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted "the person's or entity's right of petition or free speech under the Constitution" for "the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the Constitution" in paragraph (4).

- Privileged communications, § 24-5-501, et seq.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, a semicolon was substituted for a period at the end of paragraph (4).

- For article, "Defamation in Georgia Local Government Law: A Brief History," see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 627 (1982). For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982). For annual survey on law of torts, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 431 (1990). For article, "Defamation and Invasion of Privacy," see 27 Ga. St. B. J. 18 (1990). For annual survey article discussing developments in the law of evidence, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 279 (1999). For survey article on zoning and land use law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (2008). For annual survey of law on torts, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 317 (2010). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 109 (2016). For note criticizing qualified privilege enjoyed by mercantile agencies and advocating absolute denial of such privilege, see 11 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (1959). For comment on Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 68 Ga. App. 233, 22 S.E.2d 657 (1942), see 5 Ga. B. J. 45 (1943). For comment regarding privileged communication by employer, in light of Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. App. 458, 34 S.E.2d 296 (1945), see 8 Ga. B. J. 225 (1945). For comment on Barwick v. Wind, 203 Ga. 827, 48 S.E.2d 523 (1948), see 11 Ga. B. J. 230 (1948). For comment regarding privilege of counsel's publications during a trial when such statements are material and relevant, in light of Wall v. Blalock, 245 N.C. 219, 95 S.E.2d 450 (1956), see 8 Mercer L. Rev. 372 (1957). For comment on Walter v. Davidson, 214 Ga. 187, 104 S.E.2d 113 (1958), holding that defamatory statements made by a member of faculty before a chaplain, another member of faculty, are privileged as a result of their relationship as colleagues, see 21 Ga. B. J. 239 (1958). For comment on Savannah News Press, Inc. v. Grayson, 102 Ga. App. 59, 115 S.E.2d 762 (1960), see 23 Ga. B. J. 421 (1961). For comment, "Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo: Use of Official Report Privilege to Protect Defamatory Statements in Press Account Based on Foreign Government Report," see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 275 (1988).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Statements Relating to Public Duty
• Statements Relating to Private Duty
• Statements Relating to Speaker's Interests
• Reports of Legislative and Judicial Bodies and Court Proceedings
• Comments of Counsel
• Reports Based on Police Authorities
• Acts of Public Officials
• Applicability to Specific Cases

Former Code 1933, §§ 105-704 and 105-709 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7) was construed in light of former Code 1933, § 105-711 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8), which provided that all charges, allegations, and averments contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether legally sufficient to obtain it or not, are privileged, and that however false and malicious, they are not libelous. Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406, 61 S.E.2d 221 (1950).

- A letter sent by the defendant bank to the bank's shareholders, which letter quoted from the bank's verified answer to the plaintiff's original complaint, was not absolutely privileged since the letter itself was not a pleading; the publishing of quotations from pleadings in such a letter is protected only by a conditional privilege. O'Neal v. Home Town Bank, 237 Ga. App. 325, 514 S.E.2d 669 (1999).

Former Code 1933, §§ 105-704, 105-709, and 105-710 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-5-7 and51-5-9) should be construed together. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944).

If petition alleging libel states truth, the defendants are liable, unless the alleged publication was absolutely privileged. In an action for libel, that a writing constituted a conditional privilege is generally a matter for plea. But if it appears upon the face of the petition that the communication was really privileged, this may be taken advantage of by demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E.2d 414 (1943).

- O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 creates a defense to an action for libel or slander but does not create evidentiary privileges. Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 270 Ga. 38, 504 S.E.2d 683 (1998), reversing Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 227 Ga. App. 760, 490 S.E.2d 448 (1997).

Privileged communications bar recovery in actions for slander or libel. Zakas v. Mills, 148 Ga. App. 220, 251 S.E.2d 135 (1978).

Privilege is a defense to printed or spoken defamation, and lack of malice in cases of privileged communications will bar recovery. Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga. App. 104, 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981).

- The existence of a conditional privilege for fair and honest reporting is a defense which precludes a claim for invasion of privacy. Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 512 S.E.2d 347 (1999).

- To make the defense of privilege complete good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons must all appear. Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 278 S.E.2d 124 (1981).

Defense of privilege in libel action is one of confession and avoidance, that is, admission of publication but on privileged occasion and bona fide in promotion of object for which privilege was granted. Auer v. Black, 163 Ga. App. 787, 294 S.E.2d 616 (1982).

Privileged communications enumerated in this section are conditional privileges. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 68 Ga. App. 233, 22 S.E.2d 657 (1942), aff'd, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E.2d 414 (1943); Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).

Characteristic feature of absolute, as distinguished from conditional privilege, is that in the former the question of malice is not open. Wilson v. Sullivan, 81 Ga. 238, 7 S.E. 274 (1888); Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E.2d 414 (1943).

Duty and interest which are sought to be protected with conditional privilege must spring from something other than a mere undertaking to speak of others. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975).

Great underlying principle upon which doctrine of privileged communications rests is public policy. This is more especially the case with absolute privilege, when the interests and the necessities of society require that the time and occasion of the publication or utterance, even though it be both false and malicious, shall protect the defamer from all liability to prosecution, for the sake of the public good. It rests upon the same necessity that requires the individual to surrender the individual's personal rights, and to suffer loss for the benefit of the common welfare. Happily for the citizen, this class of privilege is restricted to narrow and well-defined limits. Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E.2d 414 (1943).

Good faith and good intention are necessary and essential ingredients of privileged communications. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944), later appeal, 72 Ga. App. 406, 33 S.E.2d 839 (1945); Elder v. Cardoso, 205 Ga. App. 144, 421 S.E.2d 753 (1992).

Statements to a television station were privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(4) and the Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, as the statements were related to the policies and procedures of the humane society and involved issues of public concern; the activist made the statements in good faith, believing that efforts could influence or persuade government officials and the public at large to help change the problems at the humane society. Harkins v. Atlanta Humane Soc'y, 273 Ga. App. 489, 618 S.E.2d 16 (2005).

An individual does not exercise good faith for a conditional privilege when the individual republishes unreasonable statements or statements obtained under circumstances that would put a reasonable person on inquiry as to the truth and accuracy of the statement. Smith v. Vencare, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 621, 519 S.E.2d 735 (1999).

- Willful falsehood cannot be uttered in good faith, and therefore can never be the subject of a privileged communication. This rule also applies when negligence in failing to ascertain the meaning of the words was proved. Holmes v. Clisby, 121 Ga. 241, 48 S.E. 934 (1904); Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 105 S. Ct. 185, 83 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1984).

- The truth of the words used is not material if privileged by the provisions of this section. Gillis v. Powell, 129 Ga. 403, 58 S.E. 1051 (1907).

Effect of privilege is to require plaintiff to prove actual malice. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).

When language used is actionable per se, malice is implied unless the utterance is privileged, in which case the plaintiff must establish malice. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

When a reporter's news story is shown by the plaintiff's own evidence to have been privileged, malice will not be implied in its utterance although it charges the commission of a crime. In such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show actual or express malice. Edmonds v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 15, 87 S.E.2d 415 (1955).

- In order to prove malice sufficient to forfeit the statutory privilege, it must be shown that the defendant acted willfully, corruptly, or maliciously. A showing of mere negligence is insufficient to create an issue as to the defendant's malice. Heard v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 756, 380 S.E.2d 279, rev'd on other grounds, 289 Ga. 458, 383 S.E.2d 553 (1989).

To make defense of privilege complete in action for libel, good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in the statement's scope to this scope to this purpose, a proper occasion and publication in a proper manner and to proper persons only, must appear; the absence of any one or more of these constituent elements will, as a general rule, prevent the party from relying upon the privilege. All of these questions are, however, questions of fact for the jury to determine according to the circumstances of each case under appropriate instructions from the court. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Vickers, 71 Ga. App. 204, 30 S.E.2d 440 (1944); Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. App. 458, 34 S.E.2d 296 (1945); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951); Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952); Land v. Delta Airlines, 147 Ga. App. 738, 250 S.E.2d 188 (1978).

In order to make the defense of privilege complete the defendant must show, among other things, a proper occasion for the utterance, and that the publication was limited to proper persons. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

Privileged statement must be no broader than interest to be subserved demands. The persons to whom the statement is published must be limited to those to whom the interest to be promoted requires that the information should be given. Layson v. Odom, 55 Ga. App. 868, 192 S.E. 75 (1937).

In a privileged communication the statements must be no broader than the interest to be subserved demands, and if statements wholly unnecessary for the protection of the interest intended to be subserved should be included, this would be a circumstance to be considered by the jury in determining whether the communication was really made in good faith, or was made maliciously. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944).

In order to claim limited privilege under this section, communications must be made only to proper person, and the privilege may not be used as a cloak for venting private malice. Melton v. Bow, 241 Ga. 629, 247 S.E.2d 100, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S. Ct. 576, 58 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1978).

Mere publication to stranger will not always destroy privilege, if it appears that the communication, prima facie privileged, was made in the hearing of third persons not legally interested, when the presence of such persons was merely casual, and not sought by the defendant. Layson v. Odom, 55 Ga. App. 868, 192 S.E. 75 (1937).

An attorney can claim privilege to which the client is entitled. Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 278 S.E.2d 124 (1981).

- Statements in narrative report of doctor who had also been an employer of the workers' compensation claimant were made by the doctor in the performance of the doctor's duties, public and private, and were made to protect the doctor's own interest in the matter; moreover, the report was pertinent and material to the claim for workers' compensation, a legal matter, already filed by the claimant. Thus, however false and malicious such statements would be, the statements would not be libelous. Auer v. Black, 163 Ga. App. 787, 294 S.E.2d 616 (1982).

- A radio broadcast on a matter of public interest is not granted a statutory privilege since a report on matters of public concern is not one of those categories covered by statute, but that does not mean there exists no constitutional privilege for publishing or broadcasting matters of public concern. Those statements are privileged to the extent that the states may not impose strict liability for such statements, for to require absolute accuracy of all published statements would stifle the freedom of the press. Diamond v. American Family Corp., 186 Ga. App. 681, 368 S.E.2d 350, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 368 S.E.2d 350 (1988).

Question of privilege is one which must be raised by plea and submitted to jury as issue of fact. McRae v. Boykin, 50 Ga. App. 866, 179 S.E. 535 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 252, 185 S.E. 246 (1936).

Generally, the question of whether a communication was privileged is a jury question. Southern Bus. Machs. of Savannah, Inc. v. Norwest Fin. Leasing, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 253, 390 S.E.2d 402, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 912, 390 S.E.2d 402 (1990); Kennedy v. Johnson, 205 Ga. App. 220, 421 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 421 S.E.2d 746 (1992).

- In order to avail oneself of the defense that the statement made by the defendant was a privileged communication under this section, the defendant should have filed a plea setting out the defense or alleged facts in the defendant's answer, showing that the communication was privileged. Ingram v. Kendrick, 48 Ga. App. 278, 172 S.E. 815 (1934).

Statement is pleaded as privileged, all facts calculated to throw light upon true character of the occasion are admissible. McRae v. Boykin, 50 Ga. App. 866, 179 S.E. 535 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 252, 185 S.E. 246 (1936).

Defense of privilege is established, jury must then determine whether privilege was used merely as cloak for venting private malice and not bona fide in promotion of the object for which the privilege is granted, i.e., the dissemination of news in which the general public has an interest. If no malice is found to have been involved in the publication of the article, the defense of privilege having been established, a verdict for the defendant should be returned. But, if the jury finds the presence of malice and lack of bona fides in the publication of the article as news in which the general public has an interest, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 138 S.E.2d 173 (1964).

- When it appears without dispute from the evidence that the alleged libelous article was not privileged as being a fair and honest report of court proceedings, or as being a truthful report of information received from any arresting officer of police authority, the court errs in giving in charge to the jury the law with reference to what constitutes a privileged publication. Wood v. Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), aff'd, 187 Ga. 377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

- The question whether a newspaper acted in good faith in publishing a criticism must be determined by the jury. Augusta Evening News v. Radford, 91 Ga. 494, 17 S.E. 612, 44 Am. St. R. 53, 20 L.R.A. 533 (1893).

The question of privilege and good faith is inherently one for the jury. Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989); WMH, Inc. v. Thomas, 195 Ga. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 539, aff'd in part, 260 Ga. 654, 398 S.E.2d 196 (1990).

Trial court erred in finding that the defendant's statement, which constituted defamation per se to the plaintiff's reputation in the plaintiff's profession, was privileged as a matter of law because the record did not conclusively show that the defendant acted in good faith as it was undisputed that the plaintiff was at all times licensed to practice medicine and the defendant had no basis to believe otherwise; and there was a factual question as to whether the statement was properly limited in scope or audience as the documents in the record did not conclusively establish who received the letter from the defendant or that the publication was properly limited to only the defendant's patients who received communication from the plaintiff. Smith v. DiFrancesco, 341 Ga. App. 786, 802 S.E.2d 69 (2017).

- Good faith and malice are both matters that are questions of fact to be submitted to and determined by a jury. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944).

- In connection with the defense of privilege the generally accepted customs and usages of the newspaper business in the community, including all publications having a general circulation there, as to the treatment of news items of this type may be shown, and the jury may consider whether the treatment given this particular story was or was not in keeping with the customs and usages as a circumstance in determining the presence or absence of malice on the part of the publisher against the plaintiff in the publication of the story. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 138 S.E.2d 173 (1964).

- Whether a communication which is conditionally privileged is used with a bona fide intent to protect the speaker's or writer's own interests when it is concerned, or whether such communication is uttered maliciously is a question of fact for the jury to determine. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 72 Ga. App. 406, 33 S.E.2d 839 (1945).

Privileged communications do not extend to reports which are not fair and honest, but which include additional matter in the way of statements or inferences of the publisher. Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261, 165 S.E. 443 (1932).

Cited in Swafford v. Keaton, 23 Ga. App. 238, 98 S.E. 122 (1919); Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 559, 147 S.E. 714 (1929); Abernathy v. News Publishing Co., 45 Ga. App. 693, 165 S.E. 924 (1932); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Coker, 77 Ga. App. 227, 48 S.E.2d 150 (1948); Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v. Rivers, 209 Ga. 98, 70 S.E.2d 734 (1952); Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 104 Ga. App. 22, 120 S.E.2d 918 (1961); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965); Holder Constr. Co. v. Ed Smith & Sons, 124 Ga. App. 89, 182 S.E.2d 919 (1971); Angles v. Wyatt, 124 Ga. App. 393, 184 S.E.2d 43 (1971); Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 365, 236 S.E.2d 23 (1977); Christner v. Eason, 146 Ga. App. 139, 245 S.E.2d 489 (1978); Sparks v. City of Atlanta, 496 F. Supp. 770 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Dixie Beer Co. v. Boyett, 158 Ga. App. 622, 281 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Citizens & S. Bank v. McDowell, 160 Ga. App. 69, 286 S.E.2d 58 (1981); Mewbourn v. Harris, 162 Ga. App. 102, 290 S.E.2d 315 (1982); Cleveland v. Greengard, 162 Ga. App. 201, 290 S.E.2d 545 (1982); Todd v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., 165 Ga. App. 656, 302 S.E.2d 378 (1983); Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 652, 305 S.E.2d 183 (1983); Wright v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 Ga. App. 454, 313 S.E.2d 150 (1984); Fiske v. Stockton, 171 Ga. App. 601, 320 S.E.2d 590 (1984); Henson v. American Family Corp., 171 Ga. App. 724, 321 S.E.2d 205 (1984); Anderson v. Housing Auth., 171 Ga. App. 841, 321 S.E.2d 378 (1984); Sparks v. Parks, 172 Ga. App. 823, 324 S.E.2d 784 (1984); Clayton v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 173 Ga. App. 466, 326 S.E.2d 789 (1985); Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Sumner, 174 Ga. App. 229, 329 S.E.2d 910 (1985); Arrowsmith v. Williams, 174 Ga. App. 690, 331 S.E.2d 30 (1985); Tetrault v. Shelton, 179 Ga. App. 746, 347 S.E.2d 636 (1986); Cohen v. Hartlage, 179 Ga. App. 847, 348 S.E.2d 331 (1986); Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356 (11th Cir. 1987); F.S. Assocs. v. McMichael's Constr. Co., 197 Ga. App. 705, 399 S.E.2d 479 (1990); Green v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 804, 399 S.E.2d 712 (1990); Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94, 421 S.E.2d 550 (1992); Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 1994); Ellenberg v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's (In re Prime Com. Corp.), 187 Bankr. 785 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); NationsBank v. SouthTrust Bank, 226 Ga. App. 888, 487 S.E.2d 701 (1997); Blomberg v. Cox Enters., Inc., 228 Ga. App. 179, 491 S.E.2d 430 (1997); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728 (1997); Fleming v. U-Haul Co., 246 Ga. App. 681, 541 S.E.2d 75 (2000); No Witness, LLC v. Cumulus Media Partners, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2007); Shiva Mgmt., LLC v. Walker, 308 Ga. App. 878, 708 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Statements made bona fide in performance of public duty are privileged; communications made by a public official with respect to one's official duties are privileged. However, this privilege may be lost when the official acts willfully, corruptly, or maliciously. McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga. App. 59, 220 S.E.2d 63 (1975); Goolsby v. Wilson, 146 Ga. App. 288, 246 S.E.2d 371 (1978).

Privileged communication status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty may be lost when the official acts willfully, corruptly, or maliciously. King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 251 S.E.2d 107 (1978); Van Geter v. Housing Auth., 167 Ga. App. 432, 306 S.E.2d 707 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 196, 312 S.E.2d 309 (1984).

Statements made in good faith pursuant to investigation by police of crime are made in performance of public duty and are privileged. Hardaway v. Sherman Enters., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 181, 210 S.E.2d 363 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 2405, 44 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1975); Zakas v. Mills, 148 Ga. App. 220, 251 S.E.2d 135 (1978); Brown v. Scott, 151 Ga. App. 366, 259 S.E.2d 642 (1979).

- Bona fide communications in the prosecution of an inquiry for the purpose of detecting a criminal are privileged. Ventress v. Rosser, 73 Ga. 534 (1884).

Statements made in an effort to recover stolen property are privileged. Chapman v. Battle, 124 Ga. 574, 52 S.E. 812 (1905); Taylor v. Chambers, 2 Ga. App. 178, 58 S.E. 369 (1907).

- Statement which a sheriff provided to the Georgia Department of Labor (DOL), after the sheriff decided not to rehire an employee and the employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits was privileged, and the trial court ruled correctly that the sheriff was entitled to summary judgment on the employee's claim alleging slander, even though the sheriff's statement was published by a newspaper one week later and the newspaper published a follow-on article which stated that the sheriff stood by the statement the sheriff made to the DOL. Cooper-Bridges v. Ingle, 268 Ga. App. 73, 601 S.E.2d 445 (2004).

- When a statement was given at the request of a superior officer in the course of an official investigation concerning improper conduct by a fire department official, it was privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. Meyer v. Ledford, 170 Ga. App. 245, 316 S.E.2d 804 (1984).

- Trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for summary judgment on the appellee's claim for defamation (slander and slander per se) as the 911 call by the appellant's employee to report that the employee had seen the appellee, a convicted felon, standing on the porch of the appellee's apartment, cocking a sawed-off shotgun was privileged because the transcript of the employee's 911 call showed that the employee called the police because the employee believed the employee had a civic duty to report witnessing what the employee thought was criminal conduct; and the appellee did not present any evidence, either direct or circumstantial, of actual malice. Examination Mgmt. Servs. v. Steed, 340 Ga. App. 51, 794 S.E.2d 687 (2016).

Privilege accorded by paragraph (1) of this section is upon grounds of public policy. Hardaway v. Sherman Enters., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 181, 210 S.E.2d 363 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 2405, 44 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1975).

It is jury question whether privileged communication status of bona fide statements in performance of a public duty was used merely as a cloak for venting private malice, and not bona fide in promotion of the object for which the privilege is granted. King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 251 S.E.2d 107 (1978).

Statements in response to inquiries as to another person, when inquirer is one naturally interested in the other's welfare, are privileged. They are statements made in the performance of a private moral duty. Whitley v. Newman, 9 Ga. App. 89, 70 S.E. 686 (1911); Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. App. 458, 34 S.E.2d 296 (1945).

Communication is qualifiedly privileged when made in good faith in answer to one having an interest in information sought, or if volunteered, when the person to whom the communication is made has an interest in it, and the person by whom it is made stands in such a relation to one as to make it a proper or responsible duty to give the information. Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. App. 458, 34 S.E.2d 296 (1945); Thomas v. Hillson, 184 Ga. App. 302, 361 S.E.2d 278 (1987).

- Reports furnished by a commercial agency to subscribers are not privileged. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172, 4 Am. St. R. 77 (1886).

- A contract to pry into and give information concerning the business of another will make a false communication injurious to another privileged under this section. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411, 34 S.E. 216 (1899).

Telegram to police charging criminal disposition of mortgaged property is not privileged. Williams v. Equitable Credit Co., 33 Ga. App. 441, 126 S.E. 855 (1925).

- This clause operates as a protection of testimony of a member before a church tribunal, even though the conduct of a nonmember is involved. Etchison v. Pergerson, 88 Ga. 620, 15 S.E. 680 (1892).

- O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 did not apply to preclude the introduction of statements made by a plant supervisor to management and corporate counsel at a meeting regarding the investigation of an embezzlement scheme at the plant. Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 270 Ga. 38, 504 S.E.2d 683 (1998), reversing Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 227 Ga. App. 760, 490 S.E.2d 448 (1997).

- Statements made in a letter written in the normal course of business in an effort to resolve a bona fide dispute between two parties concerning their respective rights clearly fall within the purview of subdivision (3) of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. Layfield v. Turner Adv. Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 354 S.E.2d 14 (1987).

- In a former employer's suit to enforce noncompetition and nonsolicitation clauses, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the employer on a former employee's defamation counterclaim because alleged slander by a coworker was not authorized by the employer and alleged libel was only published intracompany; moreover, statements made about an employee in good faith in the performance of a duty were privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. H&R Block Eastern Enters. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2010).

- A company's announcement to its customers that plaintiff had retired, when in fact the plaintiff had been terminated by the company, did not constitute defamation or libel; moreover, the statements were privileged, made in the best interests of the company, and were not shown to have been made with malice or in bad faith. Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 498 S.E.2d 537 (1998).

- Letters sent by an insurance company to life insurance policy holders containing information which might, if not revealed, cause their coverage to lapse or be cancelled, were privileged. Willis v. United Family Life Ins., 226 Ga. App. 661, 487 S.E.2d 376 (1997).

- Asphalt testing company was not entitled to summary judgment regarding a defamation claim as to its test reports because the company failed to assert an affirmative defense of private duty privilege under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 in order to avail the company of avoidance of a defamation claim made against the testing company. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2009).

- Expelled respiratory therapy student failed to prove malice as required under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-9 after the student's mentor in an externship program denied signing a letter the student presented as evidence at the student's expulsion hearing that the student had permission to leave the student's shift for a job interview; a showing of malice was required because the mentor's statements in the expulsion hearing were conditionally privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. Wertz v. Allen, 313 Ga. App. 202, 721 S.E.2d 122 (2011).

Paragraph (3) states a conditional privilege and burden rests upon the defendants to prove elements thereof including bona fide intent. Hardboard Mach. Co. v. Coastal Prods. Corp., 289 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1968).

- To make the defense of privilege complete, under this paragraph, good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons must all appear. Sheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry., 123 Ga. 589, 51 S.E. 646 (1905).

If a communication is properly to be classed as one made in the interest of the defendant, the question whether it is or is not privileged would be dependent upon the intention with which it was published. If bona fide, with the sole purpose of protecting oneself, it would be; if otherwise, it would not. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944).

- Statements made in good faith, to effect the collection of an indebtedness justly due, are privileged. Whitley v. Newman, 9 Ga. App. 89, 70 S.E. 686 (1911).

Blacklisting of person as delinquent debtor, who owes writer nothing, is not privileged. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411, 34 S.E. 216 (1899).

- This section will protect an employer who charged a clerk with theft of a pair of shoes, in the presence of other clerks, for the purpose of effecting a return of those shoes. Shehan v. Keen, 26 Ga. App. 339, 106 S.E. 190 (1921).

- Communication by the officials of a railroad to the conductors and superintendent of division that one of the employees had stolen tickets is privileged. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Sheftall, 118 Ga. 865, 45 S.E. 687 (1903).

- Defendant, a resident near the landfill which the defendant suspected of contaminating public waterways, was materially affected by its operations, and the defendant's good faith statements made in furtherance of the defendant's interest against extending the landfill's permit were privileged. Speedway Grading Corp. v. Gardner, 206 Ga. App. 439, 425 S.E.2d 676 (1992).

- Publications of foreclosure ads were privileged as a matter of law and as such privileged as a matter of summary judgment against claims of slander, libel, and defamation. Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga. App. 552, 449 S.E.2d 120 (1994).

- Statements by a landlord to an arbitrator concerning the tenant are not privileged unless the statements are relevant to the business in hand. Jones v. Forehand, 89 Ga. 520, 16 S.E. 262, 32 Am. St. R. 81 (1892).

- The question of intention under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 is a question of fact, to be submitted to and determined by a jury. Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820, 45 S.E. 684 (1903); Watkins v. Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 172, 358 S.E.2d 477 (1987).

As to whether a communication which is qualifiedly privileged is used with a bona fide intent to protect the speaker or writer's own interest when it is concerned, or whether such communication is uttered maliciously, is a question of fact for the jury trying the case to determine. Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 30 S.E.2d 436 (1944).

- The trial court did not err in charging the jury that to find libel in an employee's letter to the company, the jury must find that the employee acted with actual malice as the conditional privilege in O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 concerns itself with whether the accused acted with "a good faith intention" to protect a viable interest. Peeples v. Citizens S. Com. Corp., 209 Ga. App. 157, 433 S.E.2d 319 (1993).

- Trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on privileged communications under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(3) when the materialman's lien claimant's claim of lien was not properly limited in scope; the lien claimant's lien was almost eight times the amount the claimant supplied in labor and materials for improvement of the property. Amador v. Thomas, 259 Ga. App. 835, 578 S.E.2d 537 (2003).

- Because a property owner made statements concerning valuation by a county appraiser in good faith which were limited in scope and made during a proper meeting, and such statements were based on the owner's interest in a property, the owner was entitled to a conditional privilege under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1 and51-5-7(4) from the appraiser's defamation claims; as the appraiser failed in the burden of showing malice by the owner, the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the owner on defamation claims as well as all tort claims based on communications, including invasion of privacy, negligence, and emotional distress. Smith v. Henry, 276 Ga. App. 831, 625 S.E.2d 93 (2005).

It is essential to privileged character of newspaper publication that it be fair and honest report of proceedings of legislative or judicial body or of court proceedings, or that it be truthful report of information received from any arresting officer or police authority. A newspaper article which purports to be a report of a court proceeding is manifestly not a fair and honest report, when it falsely and untruly states that a person has been proceeded against when in fact it clearly and unequivocally appears from the proceedings that the person proceeded against was another and different person from the one referred to in the newspaper article. Wood v. Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), aff'd, 187 Ga. 377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

Fair and honest report of judicial proceeding is conditionally privileged. Cook v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 98 Ga. App. 818, 107 S.E.2d 260 (1959).

If a jury finds that the report of a matter was fair and honest, even though in some material particular the facts developed in the recorder's court and reported may have been false, the defense of privilege is established. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 138 S.E.2d 173 (1964).

Qualified privilege is not right to publish, but rather it it is right to be free from legal liability for libel when and if fair, accurate and nonmalicious reports of judicial, legislative and other proceedings are published. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950); Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Burruss, 131 Ga. App. 572, 206 S.E.2d 679 (1974).

To qualify for privilege as to judicial proceedings, newspaper report of such proceeding must present fully, fairly and accurately impartial account of proceedings. Although it must be accurate, at least with regard to all material matters, a substantially accurate report may be privileged, as mere inaccuracies not affecting materially the purport of the article are immaterial. It is not necessary that the report be verbatim, and it may consist of an abridged or condensed statement, provided such statement is a fair one. Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406, 61 S.E.2d 221 (1950).

- It is generally held that in the exercise of public functions subordinate boards or tribunals, though not created as courts, may at times exercise powers which are judicial, but it is clear that it is the nature of the act to be performed rather than the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or a quasi-judicial function. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Real test as to legislative or judicial character of proceeding depends upon subject of inquiry; it is judicial to punish for infraction of, or to enforce, an existing rule. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Newspaper report of quasi-judicial proceeding of public body need only be fair and accurate to qualify for the conditional privilege of this section. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

What is usually required is that the publication shall be substantially accurate; and if the article is published by the newspaper in good faith and the article is substantially accurate, the newspaper has a complete defense. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

As long as the facts are not misstated, distorted or arranged so as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

When newspaper article is not fair and honest report of court proceedings purported to be reported in article, its publication is not privileged. Wood v. Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), aff'd, 187 Ga. 377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

The publication of any statement by a newspaper made upon its own authority and not purporting to be a report of a judicial proceeding or information received from an arresting officer or a police authority, is not privileged under the law which renders privileged a fair and honest report of court proceedings or a truthful report of information received from any arresting officer or police authority. The publication constitutes a charge by the person uttering it, and the person is responsible therefor. Wood v. Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), aff'd, 187 Ga. 377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

When in a report of a court proceeding, the newspaper article goes further and adds additional defamatory matter, such additions, if false, render the whole publication unprotected by the privilege. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).

There is no privilege as to judicial proceedings when the newspaper report of such proceedings is not accurate and correct, or when the article is not done in good faith but with an express desire to vent "private malice" on another, even though, on its face, the article shows that the reporter was either merely quoting from the court petition verbatim or was repeating the substance of the allegations thereof. Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406, 61 S.E.2d 221 (1950).

- Newspaper reports privileged under this section are conditional, and if the privilege is used merely as a cloak for venting private malice, and not bona fide in promotion of the object for which the privilege is granted, the party defamed shall have a right of action. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 138 S.E.2d 173 (1964).

- If a court or jury finds that the article complained of was privileged, this privilege would be denied to the defendant upon further proof by the petitioner of express malice. Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 93 Ga. App. 633, 92 S.E.2d 619 (1956).

Publisher must not declare on the publisher's own authority existence of facts which are only asserted in proceedings; the publisher is limited to reporting the fact of the assertion. Wood v. Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), aff'd, 187 Ga. 377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

- The publisher must add nothing of the publisher's own. The publisher must not state the publisher's opinion of the conduct of the parties, or impute motives therefor; the publisher must not insinuate that a particular witness committed perjury. That is not a report of what occurred, and to this no privilege attaches. Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Arrington, 42 Ga. App. 746, 157 S.E. 394 (1931).

Privilege as to statements made in judicial proceeding exists although publication is with reference to mere stranger not party to suit, provided the publication was relevant or material to the proceeding. Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952).

- No actionable liability attaches to a witness for any statement in the witness's testimony (no matter how false or malicious it may be), unless the witness, without being asked, volunteers a false and malicious defamatory statement which is not pertinent, and which the witness neither believes to be true nor has any sufficient reason to believe to be material. Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952).

The testimony of a witness is absolutely privileged if it has some relation to the judicial proceeding in which the witness is testifying. Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952).

The answers of a witness in direct response to questions by counsel (which have not been forbidden by the court) are absolutely privileged; and though the statements of the witness in testimony thus adduced be not only defamatory and malicious, but knowingly false, a prosecution for perjury is the only redress provided by law. Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952).

Testimony is absolutely privileged, conditioned on the fact that it is responsive to questions asked by counsel and not disallowed by the court. Horton v. Tingle, 113 Ga. App. 512, 149 S.E.2d 185 (1966).

Strict legal materiality or relevancy is not required to confer privilege as to statements made in judicial proceeding; and in determining what is relevant or pertinent the courts are liberal, resolving all doubt in favor of relevancy or pertinency. Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952); Horton v. Tingle, 113 Ga. App. 512, 149 S.E.2d 185 (1966).

- Whether alleged slanderous statement given as evidence in open court is matter of absolute or merely conditional privilege determines whether or not it can be actionable as slander. Horton v. Tingle, 113 Ga. App. 512, 149 S.E.2d 185 (1966).

- A defendant cannot be held liable for any language used by the defendant in the course of the defendant's statement to the jury as it is privileged. Nelson v. Davis, 9 Ga. App. 131, 70 S.E. 599 (1911).

Qualified privilege attaches to proceedings of, and accurate news accounts of, administrative agencies of government. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Administrative proceedings by governmental agencies to discipline, remove from office, or revoke a license are quasi-judicial in nature and are entitled, as a minimum, to a qualified privilege. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

- A newspaper item copied from a decision of the Supreme Court in a divorce case is privileged communication. Conklin v. Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co., 276 F. 288 (5th Cir. 1921).

Broadcaster's report that an attorney had been found guilty of conspiring to aid a client in evading payment of federal income tax, when in fact the attorney was acquitted of the charges against the attorney, could not be considered to be accurate or even "substantially accurate" so as to bring it within the protection of the privilege of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. Western Broadcasting of Augusta, Inc. v. Wright, 182 Ga. App. 359, 356 S.E.2d 53 (1987).

- Summary judgment was not appropriate since material issues of fact existed as to whether the defendant exercised reasonable care in publishing an article about the plaintiff attorney and made a fair and honest report of court proceedings. Nix v. Cox Enters., Inc., 247 Ga. App. 689, 545 S.E.2d 319 (2001).

- In a libel action arising from a newspaper article based on reports of a Federal Aviation Administration inspection of plaintiff airlines, the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of privilege because it failed to present evidence identifying portions of the record that demonstrated an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and by failing to submit the documents or reports to which the article allegedly referred. AirTran Airlines v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

Comments of Counsel

Address to jury.

- This section is a privilege as to bona fide remarks by counsel addressing the jury. Lester v. Thrumond, 51 Ga. 118 (1874); Atlanta News Publishing Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714, 51 S.E. 756, 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1139 (1905).

False publication of remarks of counsel are not protected. Atlanta News Publishing Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714, 51 S.E. 756, 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1139 (1905).

- When the defendant failed to come forward with evidence that a defamatory remark by an attorney was made to, or heard by, anyone other than the defendant, the attorney was entitled to summary judgment. JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 531 S.E.2d 778 (2000).

In a driver's defamation case against an attorney for parties injured in a collision with the driver, the trial court erred in denying the attorney's motion to dismiss the case under the anti-SLAPP statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, because the attorney's statements regarding the driver's excessive speed and use of Snapchat's Speed Filter on the defendant's phone at the time of the collision were conditionally privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. Neff v. McGee, 346 Ga. App. 522, 816 S.E.2d 486 (2018).

- Because the comments-of-counsel privilege is conditional, the question of malice is open and because good faith, among other factors, must be shown, the court will deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to a solicitor's liability for defamation. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. Cobb County, 665 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1989).

- Alleged libelous statements contained in a letter from the defendant's attorney to the appraisers who were valuing the shareholder's stock upon resignation were not protected by the comments-of-counsel privilege. Sparks v. Ellis, 205 Ga. App. 263, 421 S.E.2d 758, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 421 S.E.2d 758 (1992).

Reports Based on Police Authorities

Phrase "any arresting officer or police authorities."

- The connecting thread of the constituent terms of the phrase "any arresting officer or police authorities" is the police power, as exercised by public agencies in the interest of the public safety. These terms are to apply only to those persons who are authorized by lawful authority to arrest other persons, and to persons and agencies that are authorized by lawful authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions. Heard v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 289 Ga. 458, 383 S.E.2d 553 (1989).

"A truthful report" is a fair and honest report of information obtained from police records and police authorities. But when the petition denies that the police officer ever gave the information attributed to the officer in the article complained of, and that the listings and reports referred to did not exist, there is no privilege as a matter of law, because it affirmatively appears that the article complained of was not based upon information furnished by an arresting officer or police authority. Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 93 Ga. App. 633, 92 S.E.2d 619 (1956).

Summary judgment was properly granted for the newspaper defendants on a teenager's libel claim as the statement that the teenager's window had to be nailed shut to prevent the teenager from letting boys in the teenager's room was privileged as the statement was based on information received from police authorities; the teenager did not come forward with evidence of malice. Torrance v. Morris Publ'g Group, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 563, 636 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 160 (Ga. 2007).

- While a newspaper is privileged to publish a fair and honest report of information received from an arresting officer or police authorities, the publication is not privileged when the newspaper, in undertaking to publish only an account of a court proceeding, or the report of information given by an arresting officer or the police authorities, amounting only to a mere charge by the arresting officers or the police authorities of the commission of a crime, goes further and publishes a statement that the person charged with the commission of the crime is in fact guilty of the crime. Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Arrington, 42 Ga. App. 746, 157 S.E. 394 (1931).

- Newspaper's "truthful report" was beyond the scope of the immunity provision of paragraph (7) of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 since the welfare fraud investigator from whom the newspaper received the published information had power only to conduct inquiries into possible fraud and abuse, and had no power to arrest, nor did the office by which the investigator was employed have the power to initiate or conduct criminal prosecution. Heard v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 289 Ga. 458, 383 S.E.2d 553 (1989).

- Two of the four statements made by a newspaper which a father claimed were false, that the father created a fake lab report which showed that the daughter had a blood alcohol content of 0.0 on the night she was cited for underage drinking, and that the actual lab report showed a blood alcohol content of 0.17, accurately reflected an incident report prepared by officers and the father's arrest warrant, and thus were privileged. Austin v. PMG Acquisition, LLC, 278 Ga. App. 539, 629 S.E.2d 417 (2006).

- Trial court's denial of summary judgment motions filed by a newspaper and a reporter in a libel action brought by a healthcare worker was error because truthful reports of information received from any arresting officer or police authorities were conditionally privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(8), and the articles at issue accurately reflected statements in a police investigative report and made by a sheriff; the reporter's affidavit reflected that the reporter accurately reported statements made by the sheriff, and the healthcare worker did not come forward with any evidence to rebut the reporter's affidavit. Additionally, reading a headline in conjunction with one of the articles, the average reader would have believed that the healthcare worker had been arrested and charged with aiding another to escape from custody, which was true at the time. Cmty. Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King, 299 Ga. App. 267, 682 S.E.2d 346 (2009).

Acts and conduct of public officials are subject to just criticism and comment by the press. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Broadcast based on a National Guard report on the investigation of allegations of sexual harassment by an individual officer was within the conditional privileges of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7. Lawton v. Georgia Television Co., 216 Ga. App. 768, 456 S.E.2d 274 (1995).

Editors have right to express in editorial columns their opinions as to matters of public interest. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Privilege set out under paragraph (8) of this section is not absolute. It is conditional. If used as a cloak for venting private malice, and not bona fide in promotion of the object for which the privilege is granted, the party defamed has a cause of action. DeLoach v. Maurer, 130 Ga. App. 824, 204 S.E.2d 776 (1974).

Newspaper is not privileged to publish libelous charge about public official as respects the conduct of the official's office. Kirkland v. Constitution Publishing Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S.E. 821 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 264, 149 S.E. 869 (1929).

A publication of and concerning the acts of public officials, if untrue and libelous, is not afforded immunity. While the acts and conduct of public officials are subject to just criticism and comment by the press, the exercise of such right should be unrestricted only when the statements made in the publication are supported by the facts. A public officer has the same right to protection against newspaper libel as a private citizen. Freedom and "liberty of the press" do not give a publisher the right to publish libelous statements. Barwick v. Wind, 203 Ga. 827, 48 S.E.2d 523 (1948).

- Former police officer sued a newspaper for libel based on a letter to the editor the newspaper printed. As a public figure, the officer had to establish actual malice on the part of the newspaper under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(9) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), but failed to do so because the statements at issue were opinions that were not susceptible of being proved true or false. Evans v. Sandersville Georgian, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 666, 675 S.E.2d 574 (2009).

Privilege in paragraph (8) of this section will not be sustained if actual malice is shown and thus whether the comments were privileged is for the jury. DeLoach v. Maurer, 130 Ga. App. 824, 204 S.E.2d 776 (1974).

- Constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless the official proves that the statement was made with actual malice. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

A public official might be allowed the civil remedy of recovery of damages for slander or libel only if the official establishes that the utterance was false and made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge of the statement's falsity or in reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or true. Williams v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 26, 279 S.E.2d 465 (1981).

- Statements made by the defendant in the defendant's capacity as a county commissioner to other members of the county commission, state officials and county officials who were officially interested in the matter, were privileged, and deputy warden about whom statements had been made could not prove actual malice by the defendant since the defendant was acting on the fact that the defendant had received numerous complaints about the warden, and the defendant had no reason to dispute or doubt such reports. DeBerry v. Knowles, 172 Ga. App. 101, 321 S.E.2d 824 (1984).

Position of teacher or instructor in state or public educational institution is not that of public officer or official, but the teacher is merely an employee thereof. Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967).

Personal report of committee, appointed by court to investigate attorney is as privileged as the formal charges filed by the court or other person authorized to do so, and as other judicial proceedings, so far as libel is concerned. James v. Brandon, 61 Ga. App. 719, 7 S.E.2d 305 (1940).

Broadcasting or publishing of news stories of what happens in community in which public has legitimate interest is qualified privileged communication, unless relating to matters as to which the law confers an absolute privilege. WSAV-TV, Inc. v. Baxter, 119 Ga. App. 185, 166 S.E.2d 416 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Diamond v. American Family Corp., 186 Ga. App. 681, 368 S.E.2d 350 (1988); Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co., 131 Ga. App. 712, 206 S.E.2d 631, aff'd, 233 Ga. 175, 210 S.E.2d 714 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Diamond v. American Family Corp., 186 Ga. App. 681, 368 S.E.2d 350 (1988).

Report on the quality of a painting job containing the writer's expression of opinions about deficiencies in the work was privileged and did not provide a basis for the plaintiff's claim of libel. Davis v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 242 Ga. App. 907, 531 S.E.2d 764 (2000).

- Summary judgment was properly granted to the CEO of a physicians services group and a hospital on the plaintiff's defamation claim arising from the statements to the doctor, who was the chair of the department that the plaintiff had worked in, as the statements to the doctor were privileged because the doctor had reason to know about the termination of another doctor in the doctor's specialty, and the plaintiff's termination would have impacted the doctor's work; the CEO proffered evidence to show that the CEO did not act with reckless disregard of the truth of the statements; and the plaintiff did not raise an issue of fact on malice; thus, the CEO made the defamatory statements in the CEO's performance of a private moral duty. Murray v. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof'l Corp., 345 Ga. App. 279, 811 S.E.2d 531 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1066, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 697 (Ga. 2018).

- Summary judgment was improperly granted to the CEO of a physicians services group and a hospital on the plaintiff's defamation claim arising from the statements to a doctor that occasionally referred patients to the plaintiff and was friendly with the plaintiff socially because the CEO did not show that the statements were privileged as the appellate court could not conclude that the plaintiff and the doctor retained the type of relationship that permitted disclosure of the information about the plaintiff's alleged disparate treatment of Medicaid patients as nothing in the doctor's job responsibilities would have been directly affected by the plaintiff's termination, and there was no evidence that they shared a close personal friendship. Murray v. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof'l Corp., 345 Ga. App. 279, 811 S.E.2d 531 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1066, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 697 (Ga. 2018).

- When occurring in the context of the obstetrician-patient relationship, communications concerning referrals to pediatricians may be conditionally privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7; however, the existence of a conditional privilege is not the legal equivalent of the nonexistence of an actionable publication. Elder v. Cardoso, 205 Ga. App. 144, 421 S.E.2d 753 (1992).

- When the defendant doctor expressed the doctor's concerns about the proper level of emergency room care to the proper hospital officials, the doctor's statements provided a proper case for disclosure of patient information and were conditionally privileged. Dominy v. Shumpert, 235 Ga. App. 500, 510 S.E.2d 81 (1998).

- Hospital administrator and contract employer had an interest in protecting the safety of their patients and their own corporate interests and, thus, communications made by or between them that the medical director had tested positive for an infectious disease were privileged because the evidence only showed that they were pursuing those interests; the evidence did not show that their privilege to make such communications was waived as the evidence did not show the communications were made with actual malice, that is, with an intent to harm the medical director. Nelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Auth., 257 Ga. App. 571, 571 S.E.2d 557 (2002).

- Trial court erred in dismissing an employee's claim that a union business agent slandered the employee because no interpretation of collective bargaining agreements was required, and the employee could proceed on the claim since the claim was not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185; to the extent the employee contended that the agent made statements in the agent's individual capacity to individuals outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreements, then those statements would have been made outside the scope of the agent's employment, and the statements would not be privileged as the good faith performance of a legal duty. Eason v. Marine Terminals Corp., 309 Ga. App. 669, 710 S.E.2d 867 (2011).

- Trial court did not err in dismissing the employees' defamation claims against the employers because the claims required the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185; determining whether the employees were defamed by the employers' actions of posting false positive drug test results required the examination of the employers' rights and obligations under the collective bargaining agreements to decide whether their actions were privileged or authorized. Eason v. Marine Terminals Corp., 309 Ga. App. 669, 710 S.E.2d 867 (2011).

A report by a medical consultant to an insurance company was privileged since the report was made in the performance of the consultant's private duty to the company. Even assuming the report contained libelous matter, such disclosure was not the "publication of libelous matter." Haezebrouck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 809, 455 S.E.2d 842 (1995).

Mere fact that child was detained at juvenile home at time child made certain statements would not render statements privileged. Crowe v. Constitution Publishing Co., 63 Ga. App. 497, 11 S.E.2d 513 (1940).

There is no conditional privilege in regard to credit reporting. Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985, 94 S. Ct. 1580, 39 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1974).

- Allegations made in recall petitions are not absolutely privileged, but are only conditionally privileged as "comments upon the acts of public men in their public capacity and with reference thereto." Davis v. Shavers, 225 Ga. App. 497, 484 S.E.2d 243 (1997), aff'd, 269 Ga. 75, 495 S.E.2d 23 (1998), aff'd, Davis v. Shavers, 269 Ga. 75, 495 S.E.2d 23 (1998).

- Non-profit organization's statements accusing an attorney of extorting the attorney's clients were not privileged because the statements appeared on the organization's blog post and social media advertisement and the attorney made a prima facie case that the statements were not made in good faith. ACLU v. Zeh, 355 Ga. App. 731, 845 S.E.2d 698 (2020).

- In an action by a former employee against an employer for defamation and invasion of privacy, statements made by the defendant to the district attorney's office were privileged if made in good faith. Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 215 Ga. App. 97, 450 S.E.2d 222 (1994).

Statements made in good faith pursuant to investigation by police of crime are made in performance of public duty and are privileged. Corbin v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Ga. App. 33, 258 S.E.2d 697 (1979).

- Employer was protected against a former employee's defamation claims by the privilege outlined in O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(3) because the employer acted in good faith in filing a loss report with the police when the employee, a pharmacist, was seen on a hidden camera taking hydrocodone pills from the employer's pharmacy and admitted to doing so, and 92% of the employer's medication losses occurred when the employee was working. McIntyre v. Eckerd Corp., 251 Fed. Appx. 621 (11th Cir. 2007)(Unpublished).

Communications which would otherwise be slanderous are protected as privileged, if made in good faith by injured person in prosecution of inquiry regarding crime which one believes to have been committed upon one's property, and for the purpose of detecting the criminal or bringing one to punishment. Hardaway v. Sherman Enters., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 181, 210 S.E.2d 363 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 2405, 44 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1975).

The law does not put roadblocks before those who may have information and prevent the communication of information to police officers. Indeed, it is made the duty of one having such information to report it to those in authority. Hardaway v. Sherman Enters., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 181, 210 S.E.2d 363 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 2405, 44 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1975).

Statements which were made in good faith, and in compliance with a criminal investigation, were not slanderous, and were privileged; therefore, the claim was properly dismissed on a summary judgment motion. Adams v. Carlisle, 278 Ga. App. 777, 630 S.E.2d 529 (2006).

- Hospital superintendent's disclosure of an anonymous letter regarding the conduct of an employee was privileged since the letter was privately communicated only to persons who, by reason of their job functions, needed to be informed of all the factors involved in the deliberations concerning the employee's possible transfer. Williams v. Cook, 192 Ga. App. 811, 386 S.E.2d 665, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 903, 386 S.E.2d 665 (1989).

- With regard to a controller's claims for defamation and tortious interference against an accounting/auditing firm that wrote a letter to the controller's employer that resulted in the controller's termination from employment, the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint after concluding that the alleged defamatory statements were inactionable privileged communications that had not been published since the controller sufficiently alleged malice, the communications between the accounting/auditing firm and the employer were conditionally privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7, and the controller sufficiently alleged publication of the statements. Saye v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 295 Ga. App. 128, 670 S.E.2d 818 (2008).

- According to the express terms of the alleged libelous circular, the defendant company wanted information leading to the arrest of the plaintiff, the jury could consider the plaintiff's act in offering to surrender to the officers and to the defendant company and the steps thereafter taken by the defendant company with respect to the alleged libelous circular on the question of the good faith of the defendant company in issuing and publishing the circular. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Vickers, 71 Ga. App. 204, 30 S.E.2d 440 (1944).

- It is true that, if an article tends in any way, by any reasonable construction, to be a malicious defamation of the plaintiff, tending to injure the plaintiff's reputation and expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, such as suggesting that the plaintiff was indicted for a crime involving moral turpitude when, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff was not, the article should be considered as libelous yet, if the article be only a fair report of the action of the grand jury, the article cannot be considered as such. Constitution Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ga. App. 116, 177 S.E. 258 (1934).

Reports prepared by immediate supervisor of employee evaluating her performance and intended for use within corporation are conditionally privileged. There is no publication when the report is circulated only to those whose responsibility it would be to be cognizant of such facts. Land v. Delta Airlines, 147 Ga. App. 738, 250 S.E.2d 188 (1978).

- If reports of merchants made in good faith to each other in reference to the character and conduct of prospective employees are to be regarded as privileged communications, limitations of the rule under which such communications are privileged must be definitely defined; for the right to publish defamatory matters should, in the interest of society, be closely guarded, and the rule under which one claims the privilege to do so strictly construed. Jordan v. Hancock, 91 Ga. App. 467, 86 S.E.2d 11 (1955).

- As a general rule, a communication in respect of the character or qualifications of an employee or former employee may be made to any person who has a legitimate interest in the subject matter thereof, such as a prospective employer. Land v. Delta Airlines, 147 Ga. App. 738, 250 S.E.2d 188 (1978).

Employee is duty bound to report that fellow employee had been arrested for shoplifting in one of employer's stores, and report is therefore privileged. Fisher v. J.C. Penney Co., 135 Ga. App. 913, 219 S.E.2d 626 (1975).

- In defamation cases involving an employer's disclosure to other employees of the reasons for a plaintiff's discharge, the general rule is that a qualified privilege exists when the disclosure is limited to those employees who have a need to know by virtue of the nature of their duties and other employees who are otherwise directly affected either by the discharged employee's termination or the investigation of the offense leading to termination. Jones v. J.C. Penney Co., 164 Ga. App. 432, 297 S.E.2d 339 (1982).

Unidentified loss prevention supervisor who escorted a terminated employee off the employer's premises and was present during the meeting in which the employee was terminated for failing to disclose a crime on an application had authority to know why the employee was terminated; publication to the unidentified supervisor did not preclude summary judgment for the defendants in the employee's slander suit, even though the employee and the unidentified supervisor did not work in the same location. McClesky v. Home Depot, Inc., 272 Ga. App. 469, 612 S.E.2d 617 (2005).

Employee who was back-up supervisor had a qualified privilege to receive information that an employee was terminated for failure to disclose a crime on an application because the back-up supervisor was a friend to the terminated employee and initiated the request for information and persisted in questioning the reason for the termination, the back-up supervisor's ability to complete work was directly impacted by the termination, and the back up supervisor was provided the information in confidence and privacy. McClesky v. Home Depot, Inc., 272 Ga. App. 469, 612 S.E.2d 617 (2005).

- An employee sued the employer for defamation based on a confidential investigation of charges of the employee's alleged misconduct. The claim failed as: (1) the employee produced no evidence of any defamatory statement; and (2) statements made during intra-corporate investigations conducted in good faith performance of a private duty were privileged and were not "published" for purposes of a defamation claim. Lewis v. Meredith Corp., 293 Ga. App. 747, 667 S.E.2d 716 (2008).

- When the defendant president, in the good faith exercise of the president's duty to the president's non-profit farm bureau, made a communication to the plaintiff employee's employer to have the employee transferred, the president came within the privilege of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 and the privilege was not overcome by a showing of actual malice. Culpepper v. Thompson, 254 Ga. App. 569, 562 S.E.2d 837 (2002).

A statement made by an employee to an immediate supervisor in the course of the employee's employment and concerning a matter directly related to the performance of the employee's job does not constitute a publication sufficient to support an action for slander. Griggs v. K-Mart Corp., 175 Ga. App. 726, 334 S.E.2d 341 (1985).

When the defendant was duty bound to report theft, charge against the plaintiff thereafter became matter of public investigation and the statements made in connection therewith are not an invasion of privacy. Zakas v. Mills, 148 Ga. App. 220, 251 S.E.2d 135 (1978).

- Since the actions of the employers of a state-certified teacher in investigating and reporting alleged violations of rules and standards were privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7, the plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with employment failed. Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 509 S.E.2d 378 (1998).

- Trial court erred in granting a limited liability company (LLC) and the company's members summary judgment in an owner's action for slander of title, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with economic opportunities because the LLC and member did not show that they had an interest to uphold in a commission such that they were entitled as a matter of law to the privilege set forth in O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(3); a letter accompanying the transmission of a complaint against the owner and a notice of lis pendens on the owner's real property to a bank did not refer to a commission owed to either the LLC or member but rather to one owed to another entity. Meadow Springs, LLC v. IH Riverdale, LLC, 307 Ga. App. 72, 704 S.E.2d 239 (2010).

Except as provided by statute, newspaper is not privileged in publications made therein, but is liable on account thereof in the same manner as other persons, and defamatory matter does not become privileged simply for the reason it is published as news. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

When the defendant cross-claimed that opposing candidate had published defamatory statements about the defendant, it was a question for the jury to determine whether such statements were privileged and evidence as to the plaintiff's alleged sources of information was relevant and admissible. McRae v. Boykin, 50 Ga. App. 866, 179 S.E. 535 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 252, 185 S.E. 246 (1936).

State Board of Medical Examiners' jurisdiction and functions meet necessary criteria for it to be "quasi-judicial" body and news reports of proceedings of the Board, if otherwise fair and honest are entitled to the conditional privilege accorded by this section. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

- It cannot be said as a matter of law that the alleged statement by the defendants, that the plaintiff had stolen goods of defendant corporation worth $1,000.00 or more, was made only to proper persons on a proper occasion and was properly limited in its scope so as to be a privileged communication, when it appears from the allegations of the petition that the alleged charge was made not only in the presence of certain police officers but also in the presence of three neighbors of the plaintiff, only one of whom was alleged to be an employee of the defendant. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

Newspaper articles on board member of metropolitan transit authority found to be privileged communications. See Murray v. Williams, 166 Ga. App. 865, 305 S.E.2d 502 (1983).

- In an action against a company for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, when the company's employee misidentified a person as the driver of an automobile which caused an accident and, as a result, that person was charged with a traffic violation, the furnishing of the person's name was privileged since the witness' identification was not made in bad faith or with malice, and neither the witness nor the employer commanded the officer to arrest or prosecute. Arnold v. Premium Distrib. Co., 166 Ga. App. 862, 305 S.E.2d 454 (1983).

- Statements made by the plaintiff were privileged communications so the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment against the defendants' counterclaims for libel. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

- Because a report and videotape prepared by an investigator in connection with the plaintiff's workers compensation claim were privileged communications, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff on the plaintiff's defamation claim arising from production of the report and videotape. Ass'n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 249 Ga. App. 629, 549 S.E.2d 454 (2001).

- Because an attorney's statements regarding a doctor, made in the form of two phone messages to the doctor's patients, were privileged, as they were made in anticipation of a lawsuit the attorney was preparing to file, were not slanderous, and did not interfere with the doctor's business relations, the attorney was entitled to summary judgment on the doctor's claims of slander and tortious interference with business relations. Vito v. Inman, 286 Ga. App. 646, 649 S.E.2d 753 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 770 (Ga. 2007).

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to an estate executor in a suit asserting fraud and other claims brought by two siblings as the trial court incorrectly determined that the privileges set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 51-5-7(2) and51-5-8 applied to the fraud claims and neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata barred the action since a prior probate court proceeding did not involve the same issues. Further, the probate court would have had no jurisdiction over the fraud and intentional interference with a gift claims. Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 663 S.E.2d 714 (2008).

- Although nearly all of an ex-spouse's allegations against an attorney involved the attorney's conduct in a custody dispute, as the complaint alleged the attorney lied about the ex-spouse's mental health and spread negative information about the ex-spouse, it was conceivable that the ex-spouse could establish that some of these acts were not privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(7) and were tortious. Thus, those claims should not have been dismissed. Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008).

- Real estate developer did not show defamation on the part of home buyers because the buyers in the buyers' communications with others concerning drainage problems on the buyers' property which the buyers purchased from the developer addressed factually true information, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6, and the buyers' communications were privileged, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7, as there was no showing of malice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-9. Chaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 308 Ga. App. 808, 708 S.E.2d 672 (2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 257 et seq.

- 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, §§ 104 et seq., 150 et seq.

- Statement or testimony in lunacy proceeding as privileged within law of libel and slander, 2 A.L.R. 1582.

Libel and slander: privilege of communication in relation to member, or prospective member, of society, other than church, 3 A.L.R. 1654; 15 A.L.R. 453.

Libel and slander: privilege in reports or statements about school pupils, 12 A.L.R. 147.

Testimony of witness as basis of civil action for damages, 12 A.L.R. 1247; 54 A.L.R.2d 1298.

Libel and slander: privilege of statement or communication by official charged with prosecution or detection of crime, 15 A.L.R. 249.

Relative provinces of court and jury as to privileged occasion and privileged communication in law of libel and slander, 26 A.L.R. 830.

Libel and slander: privilege of statements made during trial by one not on the witness stand or acting as attorney for another, 44 A.L.R. 389.

Libel and slander: privilege as to reports of judicial proceedings as attaching to publication of pleadings before hearing, 52 A.L.R. 1438; 104 A.L.R. 1124.

Libel and slander: privilege of communications between government officials as affected by their general publication, 53 A.L.R. 1526.

Presumption and burden of proof as to malice when defamatory statement or writing is made on an occasion of qualified privilege, 54 A.L.R. 1143.

Proceeding to obtain search warrant as judicial proceeding within rule of privilege in libel and slander, 58 A.L.R. 723.

Libel and slander: privilege as to communications respecting church matters, 63 A.L.R. 649.

Libel and slander: privilege as to communications to one spouse reflecting on other spouse, 69 A.L.R. 1023.

Communication between relatives or members of a family as publication or subject of privilege within law of libel and slander, 78 A.L.R. 1182.

Libelous or privileged character of publication by newspaper based on matter received from news agency or regular correspondent, 86 A.L.R. 475.

Taking deposition as judicial proceeding as regards law of privilege in libel and slander, 90 A.L.R. 66.

Libel and slander: qualified privilege as regards publication of matters in relation to members of private or quasi public bodies in newspapers or journals of general circulation or in those intended primarily for circulation among their members, 92 A.L.R. 1029.

Libel and slander: privilege of communications made to employee regarding conduct of another employee or former employee, 98 A.L.R. 1301.

Doctrine of privilege or fair comment as applicable to misstatements of fact in publication (or oral communication) relating to public officer or candidate for office, 110 A.L.R. 413; 150 A.L.R. 358.

Libel and slander: garbled, inaccurate, or mistaken report of judicial proceedings as within privilege, 120 A.L.R. 1236.

Police investigation as within rule of privilege relative to report of judicial proceedings, 132 A.L.R. 495.

Libel and slander: scope of absolute privilege of executive officer, 132 A.L.R. 1340.

Libel and slander: privilege of communications made by private person or concern to public authorities regarding one not in public employment, 136 A.L.R. 543.

Libel and slander: privilege regarding communications to police or other officer respecting commission of crime, 140 A.L.R. 1466.

Libel and slander: privilege as regards publication of judicial opinion, 146 A.L.R. 913.

Libel and slander: doctrine of privilege or of fair comment and criticism as applicable to statement or publication imputing impropriety or dishonesty in bringing or defending civil action or proceeding, 148 A.L.R. 1173.

Doctrine of privilege or fair comment as applicable to misstatements of fact in publication (or oral communication) relating to public officer or candidate for office, 150 A.L.R. 358.

Libel and slander: privilege in respect of communication to employer regarding indebtedness of employee, 151 A.L.R. 1104.

Libel and slander: statements in the nature of comment upon judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding, or the decision therein, as within privilege accorded to proceeding or report thereof, 155 A.L.R. 1346.

Libel and slander: lack of jurisdiction as destroying privilege of defamatory allegations or statements in judicial proceedings, 158 A.L.R. 592.

Libel and slander: communication to defendant's employee or business associate as publication or as privileged, 166 A.L.R. 114.

Libel and slander: defamation of one relative to another by person not related to either, as subject of qualified privilege, 25 A.L.R.2d 1388.

Libel and slander: report of mercantile agency as privileged, 30 A.L.R.2d 776.

Libel and slander: statements in briefs as privileged, 32 A.L.R.2d 423.

Libel and slander: statements or utterances by member of municipal council, or of governing body of other political subdivision, in course of official proceedings, as privileged, 40 A.L.R.2d 941.

Libel and slander: findings, report, or the like of judge or person aiding in judicial capacity as privilege, 42 A.L.R.2d 825.

Libel and slander: privilege applicable to judicial proceedings as extending to administrative proceedings, 45 A.L.R.2d 1296.

Libel and slander: proceedings, presentments, investigations, and reports of grand jury as privileged, 48 A.L.R.2d 716.

Pleading or raising defense of privilege in defamation action, 51 A.L.R.2d 552.

Testimony of witness as basis of civil action for damages, 54 A.L.R.2d 1298.

Libel and slander: statements in counsel's argument to jury as privileged, 61 A.L.R.2d 1300.

Libel and slander: privilege of statements by physician, surgeon, or nurse concerning patient, 73 A.L.R.2d 325.

Libel and slander: privilege in connection with proceedings to disbar or discipline attorney, 77 A.L.R.2d 493.

Reliance on facts not stated or referred to in publication, as support for defense of fair comment in defamation case, 90 A.L.R.2d 1279.

Libel and slander: application of privilege attending statements made in course of judicial proceedings to pretrial deposition and discovery procedures, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172.

Libel and slander: public officer's privilege as to statements made in connection with hiring and discharge, 26 A.L.R.3d 492.

Libel and slander: public officer's privilege in connection with accusations that another has been guilty of sedition, subversion, espionage, or similar behavior, 33 A.L.R.3d 1330.

Libel and slander: out-of-court communications between attorneys made preparatory to, or in the course or aftermath of, civil judicial proceedings as privileged, 36 A.L.R.3d 1328.

Libel and slander: qualified privilege of reply to defamatory publication, 41 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Libel and slander: privilege of reporting judicial proceedings as extending to proceeding held in secret or as to which record is sealed by court, 43 A.L.R.3d 634.

Libel and slander: employer's privilege as to communications to news media concerning employees, 52 A.L.R.3d 739.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of communications made in course of grievance or arbitration procedure provided for by collective bargaining agreement, 60 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of communication to other employers or employees' union of reasons for plaintiff's discharge, 60 A.L.R.3d 1080.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of statements or utterances by member of school board in course of official proceedings, 85 A.L.R.3d 1137.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of communications between insurer and insured, 85 A.L.R.3d 1161.

Privilege of newsgatherer against disclosure of confidential sources or information, 99 A.L.R.3d 37.

Libel and slander: reports of pleadings as within privilege for reports of judicial proceedings, 20 A.L.R.4th 576.

Libel and slander: attorneys' statements to parties other than alleged defamed party or its agents, in course of extrajudicial investigation or preparation relating to pending or anticipated civil litigation as privileged, 23 A.L.R.4th 932.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of statements or utterances by members of governing body of public institution of higher learning in course of official proceedings, 33 A.L.R.4th 632.

Defamation: publication by intracorporate communication of employee's evaluation, 47 A.L.R.4th 674.

Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers - modern status, 47 A.L.R.4th 718.

Immunity of police or other law enforcement officer from liability in defamation action, 100 A.L.R.5th 341.

Defamation of church member by church or church official, 109 A.L.R.5th 541.

Individual and corporate liability for libel and slander in electronic communications, including e-mail, internet and websites, 3 A.L.R.6th 153.

Libel and slander: construction and application of the neutral reportage privilege, 13 A.L.R.6th 111.

Liability of newspaper for libel and slander - 21st century cases, 22 A.L.R.6th 553.