2020 Georgia Code
Title 24 - Evidence
Chapter 9 - Authentication and Identification
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 24-9-902. Self-Authentication

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility shall not be required with respect to the following:

1. A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States or of any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof or the Panama Canal Zone or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof or of a municipal corporation of this state and bearing a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution;
2. A document purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in paragraph (1) of this Code section having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine;
3. A document purporting to be executed or attested in an official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make such execution or attestation and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature, official position of the executing or attesting person, or of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to such execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to such execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that such documents be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit such documents to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification;
4. A duplicate of an official record or report or entry therein or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this Code section or complying with any law of the United States or of this state, including Code Section 24-9-920;
5. Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by a public office;
6. Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals;
7. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin;
8. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments;
9. Commercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law;
10. Any signature, document, or other matter declared by any law of the United States or of this state to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic;
11. The original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under paragraph (6) of Code Section 24-8-803 if accompanied by a written declaration of its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record:
    1. Was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of such matters;
    2. Was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and
    3. Was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.

       A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph shall provide written notice of such intention to all adverse parties and shall make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge such record and declaration; or

12. In a civil proceeding, the original or a duplicate of a foreign record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under paragraph (6) of Code Section 24-8-803 if accompanied by a written declaration by its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record:
    1. Was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters;
    2. Was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and
    3. Was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.

       The declaration shall be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of the country where the declaration is signed. A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph shall provide written notice of such intention to all adverse parties and shall make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge such record and declaration.

(Code 1981, §24-9-902, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

- Proof of lack of public record by evidence showing that record cannot be found, § 9-11-44.

Records, documents, and papers of public officers generally, T. 50, C. 18.

Evidence that is self authenticating, Fed. R. Evid. 902.

- For article, "An Analysis of Georgia's Proposed Rules of Evidence," see 26 Ga. St. B.J. 173 (1990). For article, "Dancing with the Big Boys: Georgia Adopts (most of) the Federal Rules of Evidence," see 63 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2011).

ANALYSIS

• Certificate and Seal
• Attestation
• Treatment of Specific Records
• a. In General
• b. Exemplification of City Ordinance
• c. Production of Original

Certificate and Seal

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Laws 1830, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273, former Laws 1836, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273, former Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 143, § 1, former Code 1863, §§ 3739, 3753, former Code 1868, §§ 3763, 3777, former Code 1873, §§ 3816, 3829, former Code 1882, § 3816, former Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 109, § 1, former Civil Code 1895, §§ 5211, 5216, 5235, former Penal Code 1895, § 1015, former Civil Code 1910, §§ 5798, 5803, 5822, former Penal Code 1910, § 1041, former Code 1933, §§ 38-601, 38-606, 38-625, 38-627, former Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 20, former Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2, and former O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-44,24-7-8,24-7-20,24-7-21,24-7-23,24-7-24,24-7-25,24-7-26, and24-7-27 are included in the annotations for this Code section. The reader is also advised to consult the annotations under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803, for annotations regarding when deeds serve as evidence, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-920 for annotations regarding the authentication of Georgia state and county records, and O.C.G.A. § 24-9-922, for annotations regarding foreign state laws and records.

- Certificate in the following form: "The above and foregoing is a true copy," etc., was a sufficient authentication of a record. Harden v. Webster, Parmelee & Co., 29 Ga. 427 (1859) (decided under Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 143, § 1).

- To make a certificate from the Executive Department admissible in evidence, it was not necessary that the certificate give a copy of that to which it relates. It was sufficient that it gave, substantially, the contents, or a part of the contents, of the thing to which it related. Henderson v. Hackney, 16 Ga. 521 (1854) (decided under Laws 1830, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273).

- In action for alimony when plaintiff introduced a certified copy of marriage certificate, no issue as to validity of marriage was made in the absence of a direct attack on the record by the defendant. Guess v. Guess, 202 Ga. 364, 43 S.E.2d 326 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- When two sets of notarial protests upon the same bill were filed, both were entitled to be read without further proof by the notary. Southern Bank v. Mechanics Sav. Bank, 27 Ga. 252 (1859) (decided under Laws 1836, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273).

- That a certificate may not have been filed in court and there permitted to remain, agreeably to the provisions of the former statute, simply furnished grounds for objecting to the certificate's reception in evidence. Having been regularly admitted in evidence, it was proper for the court to tell the jury what effect the law attached to a notarial certificate of protest. Patton v. Bank of La Fayette, 124 Ga. 965, 53 S.E. 664, 5 L.R.A. (n.s.) 592, 4 Ann. Cas. 639 (1906), overruled on other grounds, Sharpe v. Department of Transp., 267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5243).

- When considered in connection with the evidence of the notary public who issued a certificate of protest on the paper sued on, the certificate not having been filed in court and permitted to remain there as provided by the former statute, it was not error to reject the certificate from evidence when offered by the plaintiff. Woods v. Mays, 143 Ga. 209, 84 S.E. 450 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5822).

- Notarial certificate, which stated that a draft was presented at maturity, and payment demanded and refused for want of funds, and that due notice of the nonpayment was given on the same day to all the parties concerned, was sufficient notice of the dishonor thereof. Fields v. Thornton, 1 Ga. 306 (1846) (decided under Laws 1836, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273).

Law not only made certificates prima facie evidence of the nonpayment of a note, but evidence of notice also, when so stated in the certificate under the hand and seal of the notary. Walker v. Bank of Augusta, 3 Ga. 486 (1847) (decided under Laws 1836, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273).

- But a notarial certificate reciting the fact of protest for nonpayment, but silent as to whether or not notice of protest was given to the endorser, was no evidence that such notice was in fact given. Hobbs & Tucker v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 97 Ga. 524, 25 S.E. 348 (1895) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5235).

Nothing in former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20 required that certified copies be photostatic copies of original documents. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 241, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Establishment of three elements was commonly spoken of as authentication: the authority of the officer issuing the document, the incumbency of the officer, and the genuineness of the officer's signature or seal. Edmonds v. State, 201 Ga. 108, 39 S.E.2d 24 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-627).

- The Eleventh Circuit held that, once an ancient document has been authenticated under Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(8), the admission of the document under the hearsay exception in Fed. R. Evid. 902 is automatic. United States v. Koizy, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1984).

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24, the signature of the clerk need not be handwritten, nor is there a requirement that the foreign judgment itself be explicitly mentioned in the clerk's certificate. Foy v. Lewis, 248 Ga. 234, 282 S.E.2d 295 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24).

There was no requirement that the signature of the clerk be handwritten rather than stamped. Sandifer v. Lynch, 244 Ga. 369, 260 S.E.2d 78 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-627).

Cited in Roberts v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 331 Ga. App. 364, 771 S.E.2d 68 (2015); Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 783 S.E.2d 344 (2016); DirecTV, LLC v. White, 355 Ga. App. 404, 844 S.E.2d 289 (2020).

Attestation

Contents of record.

- Former statute merely required a certificate or attestation, without specifying any detail as to the location and length of the record, by reference to the number of pages, minute book, case number, and similar details. McIntyre v. Balkcom, 229 Ga. 81, 189 S.E.2d 445 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

Defendant's conviction for impersonating a law enforcement officer was affirmed and the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence a computer-generated record of the defendant's application to LeadsOnline because the trial court properly found that the application fell within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and had been properly authenticated as the defendant had actual notice before trial that the state intended to authenticate via a self-authentication declaration. Chase v. State, 337 Ga. App. 449, 787 S.E.2d 802 (2016).

- Former statute required a certificate or attestation without specifying the necessity for the seal by a court reporter. Kinney v. Avery & Co., 14 Ga. App. 180, 80 S.E. 663 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798); Canal Ins. Co. v. Tate, 111 Ga. App. 377, 141 S.E.2d 851 (1965); McIntyre v. Balkcom, 229 Ga. 81, 189 S.E.2d 445 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

Treatment of Specific Records

1. In General

- There was no error in admitting in evidence the certified copy of an acknowledgment of service. James v. Edward Thompson Co., 17 Ga. App. 578, 87 S.E. 842 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798).

- Properly authenticated administrative records are admissible. Niehaus v. State, 149 Ga. App. 575, 254 S.E.2d 895 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- Conditional sales contract duly recorded and on its face properly executed and attested was admissible in evidence. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Creede, 103 Ga. App. 203, 118 S.E.2d 844 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- It was the duty of the clerk of the superior court to sign a validation certificate and attach the seal of the clerk's office to all county bonds regularly validated. Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85, 84 S.E.2d 81 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- When a division in kind was made between heirs and distributees of a decedent, a certified copy of the return of the commissioners, and of the order of the court approving the return, were admissible in evidence in an action involving title to the land covered by the award. Bell v. Cone, 208 Ga. 467, 67 S.E.2d 558 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- Because a defendant's driver's license was a properly certified public record, the trial court was permitted to infer the reliability of any hearsay contained therein and to conclude that no confrontation clause violation had been shown pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-17 and24-7-20 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-803 and24-9-924). Douglas v. State, 312 Ga. App. 585, 718 S.E.2d 908 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0470, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 606 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-17 and24-7-20).

- A certified copy of an analysis of fertilizers to be used in an action for false or incorrect branding should not contain a statement as to the penalty or damage for which the manufacturer or dealer might be deemed to be liable; only the mathematical result of the chemical analysis should be stated. Georgia Fertilizer Co. v. Walker, 45 Ga. App. 68, 163 S.E. 277 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798).

- Limited liability company and its individual members were properly held liable to a bank following their failure because there was ample undisputed evidence that the bank was the company's successor-in-interest under the credit line agreements as various documents allowed judicial notice that the bank had acquired the company's assets and the loan documents were properly authenticated. Jaycee Atlanta Dev., LLC v. Providence Bank, 330 Ga. App. 322, 765 S.E.2d 536 (2014).

In a wrongful foreclosure action, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of an affidavit from a bank official because the plaintiffs were clearly on notice that the bank sought to introduce the bank records as business records and the official had sufficiently authenticated the bank records relied upon and attached to the affidavit. Salas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 334 Ga. App. 274, 779 S.E.2d 48 (2015).

- Properly certified copy of a map of a county, in the office of the Secretary of State, was admissible in evidence without proof of the correctness or existence of the original. Berry v. Clark, 117 Ga. 964, 44 S.E. 824 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5211).

- Public record of a ceremonial marriage was conclusive evidence of such marriage, in the absence of a timely direct attack on such record, which attack must be supported by proper proof. Guess v. Guess, 202 Ga. 364, 43 S.E.2d 326 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence to the extent that defendant's blood-alcohol content exceeded the legal limit was reversed as the trial court erroneously admitted a copy of the Intoxilyzer report over a best evidence objection; the state was unable to explain the absence of the original, the state presented no evidence that the state made any effort to locate the original, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20 did not apply. Lumley v. State, 280 Ga. App. 82, 633 S.E.2d 413 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- In a case in which the original intoxilyzer printouts could not be located, because the investigator was a former deputy who averred that the investigator was familiar with the procedures of the sheriff's office regarding the handling of the intoxilyzer printout cards, and that the investigator asked for the intoxilyzer log sheet with handwritten intoxilyzer results, after the investigator was unsuccessful in locating the intoxilyzer printout cards, and explained the procedure for completing and maintaining the log book at the jail facility in detail, the trial court did not err in determining that the investigator was a qualified person under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-902 to properly authenticate the log book entry. Jones v. State, 345 Ga. App. 14, 812 S.E.2d 337 (2018).

- Although the appellate court found that book-in photographs which the state offered to prove that defendant was the same person who was convicted of a prior felony, albeit under a different name, could have been admitted under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20, and the appellate court recommended that practice, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion during the sentencing phase of defendant's trial when the court admitted the photographs and used them to determine that defendant was subject to a sentence of life in prison without parole, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), because defendant had prior felony convictions. Farmer v. State, 268 Ga. App. 831, 603 S.E.2d 16 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Rule that a public record could be proved only by a duly certified copy thereof, in the absence of admission in open court that the document was an original public record, did not apply to search warrants. DePalma v. State, 228 Ga. 272, 185 S.E.2d 53 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- A certified copy of a record in the office of the Secretary of State was held admissible on the question as to who was the grantee of land from the state. Ferrell v. Hurst, 68 Ga. 132 (1881) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3816).

- Former homeowner was required to give notice to a defendant under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399 even though the defendant was incorporated and had its principal place of business in a different state. There was no evidence that the defendant did not maintain a place of business in Georgia or keep some assets in Georgia, and the homeowner's contention was predicated on uncertified computer printouts from the Secretary of State's website, which were inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-9-907). Steed v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Corp., 301 Ga. App. 801, 689 S.E.2d 843 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Upon the trial of a tax collector for embezzlement, transcripts from the books of the Comptroller General and former Treasurer of the State, certified under the former statute, were admissible in evidence to show a failure on the part of such defendant to pay over the taxes collected by the defendant tax collector. Shivers v. State, 53 Ga. 149 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3816).

- It was not error to allow material portions of certified copies of tax returns of the defendant in ejectment, as to the number of acres of land given in by the defendant and the value thereof for certain years, to be received in evidence over the objection that the copies were certified to by the tax receiver, and not by the tax collector; that the original returns themselves, and not certified copies of the returns, should be produced in evidence. Jett v. Hart, 152 Ga. 266, 109 S.E. 654 (1921) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798).

- Books of tax returns in the office of the Comptroller General were of equal rank as evidence with those in the proper offices of the respective counties, and the certificate of the Comptroller General touching the contents of such books was no less admissible than the certificates of the proper county officer were. Clark v. Empire Lumber Co., 87 Ga. 742, 13 S.E. 826 (1891) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3816).

- After an execution for unpaid taxes was issued by the Comptroller General against a certain tract of unreturned wild land, and a sale of the land was made thereunder, and the execution was returned to the Comptroller's office with the official entries thereon, it became an office paper, and a certified copy of such execution and entries was admissible in evidence in lieu of the original. Cannon v. Gorham, 136 Ga. 167, 71 S.E. 142, 1912C Ann. Cas. 39 (1911) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798).

- Uncertified copies of computer printouts apparently obtained from the Secretary of State's website could not be used as evidence to show a relationship between corporations because the printouts did not contain a certificate or attestation of a public officer and thus were not properly authenticated. Matson v. Noble Inv. Group, LLC, 288 Ga. App. 650, 655 S.E.2d 275 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Trial court erred in considering name search documents from the Ohio Secretary of State's office because the documents were not properly authenticated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20. Uncertified copies of computer printouts from a Secretary of State's website were not admissible as evidence unless authenticated. Std. Bldg. Co. v. Wallen Concept Glazing, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 443, 680 S.E.2d 527 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Exemplifications of "records and minutes" of municipal corporations did not include talley sheets of former municipal elections. Sewell v. City of Tallapoosa, 145 Ga. 19, 88 S.E. 577 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803).

Owner of a lost negotiable promissory note no longer has the option of "establishing" the note pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-902 and24-9-927). The owner must now bring suit directly on the lost note itself pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 11-3-804. Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 346 S.E.2d 893 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24).

- Uniform Traffic Citations that came before the court within the court clerk's file were "certified under seal" as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-21. Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-21).

- See Elliott v. State, 253 Ga. 417, 320 S.E.2d 361 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-21).

- Vacancy exclusion did not bar coverage for the vandalism loss to an insured as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the insured on that issue because the senior field adjuster's affidavit did not include any admissible evidence regarding the status of the renovation work as the affidavit relied on hearsay and unauthenticated documents. R&G Invs. & Holdings, LLC v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 337 Ga. App. 588, 787 S.E.2d 765 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1830, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 144 (Ga. 2017).

Recording of9-1-1 call was properly admitted as a self-authenticating business record. Gregory v. State, 342 Ga. App. 411, 803 S.E.2d 367 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 186 (Ga. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 180, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 5563, 202 L. Ed. 2d 110 (U.S. 2018).

Elements of authentication, the authority, the incumbency, and the genuineness of the signature of the certifying custodian, were applicable to records of the federal, not the state, government. O'Connor v. United States, 11 Ga. App. 246, 75 S.E. 110 (1912) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798); Edmonds v. State, 201 Ga. 108, 39 S.E.2d 24 (1946); Pressley v. State, 207 Ga. 274, 61 S.E.2d 113 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601); Mach v. State, 109 Ga. App. 154, 135 S.E.2d 467 (1964); Cowan v. State, 130 Ga. App. 320, 203 S.E.2d 311 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-902 and24-9-922) applied only to acts, records, and judicial proceedings of states, territories, and possessions of the United States. There was no Georgia statute expressly governing the authentication of copies of federal records. Rice v. State, 178 Ga. App. 748, 344 S.E.2d 720 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24).

3. Court Records

In general.

- Clerk of court may certify a copy or transcript of the court record, but the clerk's certificate of the nonexistence on the records of certain facts was not admissible. Miller v. Reinhart, 18 Ga. 239 (1855) (decided under Laws 1830, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273); Dillon v. Mattox, 21 Ga. 113 (1857); Martin v. Anderson, 21 Ga. 301 (1857) (decided under Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 143, § 1); Walker v. Logan, 75 Ga. 759 (1885); Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 377, 17 S.E. 92 (1892) (decided under Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 143, § 1); Hines v. Johnston, 95 Ga. 644, 23 S.E. 470 (1895); Greer v. Fergerson, 104 Ga. 552, 30 S.E. 943 (1898) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3816); Thompson v. Cheatham, 244 Ga. 120, 259 S.E.2d 62 (1979);(decided under former Code 1882, § 3816);(decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5211);(decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5211);but see for contra implication,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- The only legal way to prove proceedings of the superior court was by an extract from the minutes of that court duly certified by the court's clerk. Bowden v. Taylor, 81 Ga. 199, 6 S.E. 277 (1888) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3816); Weaver v. Tuten, 138 Ga. 101, 74 S.E. 835 (1912);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5798).

- Exemplification of the record of an illegality case, under the hand and seal of the clerk, exhibiting among other things, the assignment by the plaintiff of the writ of fi. fa., was admissible in evidence to prove the transfer. Napier v. Neal, 3 Ga. 298 (1847) (decided under Laws 1830, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 273).

- Trial court properly used a prior guilty plea to sentence the defendant as a recidivist when the state had presented a certified copy of the plea that was signed and initialed by defense counsel along with a plea hearing transcript; even if the plea hearing transcript was uncertified and unauthenticated, the certified copy of the plea was admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20, and the defendant did not produce evidence of invalidity once the fact of conviction was proved and the state showed that the defendant was represented by counsel. Moorer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 395, 649 S.E.2d 537 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1910, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 806 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Original papers of proceedings in the court were admissible in another case in the same court where otherwise relevant. Sellers v. Page, 127 Ga. 633, 56 S.E. 1011 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5211); Woods v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 429, 186 S.E. 467 (1936); Clarkum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601); Williford v. State, 55 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937); Brantley v. State, 121 Ga. App. 79, 172 S.E.2d 852 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601); Thompson v. Cheatham, 244 Ga. 120, 259 S.E.2d 62 (1979);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- Former statute made provision for exemplification by certificate of any public officer of authenticity of any copy or transcript of any record, but had no relation to the court record in another case or cases pending in the same court in which the records were offered in evidence. Brantley v. State, 121 Ga. App. 79, 172 S.E.2d 852 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- It was entirely proper for the clerk of the superior court, as custodian of the court's records, to certify what appears or does not appear upon the minutes of the court. Thompson v. Cheatham, 244 Ga. 116, 259 S.E.2d 62 (1979) (decided under former Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 20).

- Certification by the clerk of court must speak the truth, and the clerk must not be required by a mandamus, or otherwise, to certify an instrument that did not conform to the records in the clerk's office. Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85, 84 S.E.2d 81 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

- Introduction of a certified copy of a judgment against a party was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of that judgment. Gowdey v. Rem Assocs., 176 Ga. App. 83, 335 S.E.2d 309 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court excluded a document purported to be the codefendant's felony conviction, as the document was not a properly certified copy and was unauthenticated. McClendon v. State, 276 Ga. App. 543, 623 S.E.2d 738 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Certification and seal on record of conviction furnished by an officer of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Corrections) who was required by law to keep the records on file was sufficient to qualify the record for admission into evidence to establish the fact of lawfulness of incarceration even though the certification was not by the Superior Court of Whitfield County, the source of the original document. Ward v. State, 165 Ga. App. 163, 300 S.E.2d 528 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20 did not address hearsay concerns; the former statute did not require the admission of hearsay merely because the hearsay had been recorded in a court of record. McGaha v. State, 221 Ga. App. 440, 471 S.E.2d 533 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

Clerical error in a certified copy of the sentence of one convicted of crime did not render the paper inadmissible in evidence if it clearly appeared from the context what the true purport of the document was. Daniel v. State, 114 Ga. 533, 40 S.E. 805 (1902) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1015).

- It was too late to object to a record for want of proper authentication after the record had been admitted and read to the jury without objection. Williams v. Rawlins, 33 Ga. 117 (1861) (decided under Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 143, § 1).

Uniform Traffic Citations were not evidence, and thus could not provide the factual basis necessary to establish venue. Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-21).

- Georgia resident's argument that the supplemental affidavit attached to the motion under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State was inadmissible because it did not comply with former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-27 failed because former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-27 provided the method for authenticating out-of-state court records and the affidavit was not a court record. Wollesen v. State, 242 Ga. App. 317, 529 S.E.2d 630 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24).

- In a suit for damages sustained in an automobile collision, alleging that the defendant negligently failed to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of a traffic citation issued against the defendant in conjunction with the accident. The citation noted entry of a guilty plea, but also indicated the defendant was found guilty by the municipal court. Though ambiguous and subject to conflicting interpretations, the citation was relevant if interpreted by the jury as a plea of guilty. Hunter v. Hardnett, 199 Ga. App. 443, 405 S.E.2d 286, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 286 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20).

- When a plea of guilty, in a prior criminal proceeding arising from the same occurrence, was admitted in evidence in the subsequent civil case for its impeaching value, the plea was not admitted as a court paper, and the former statute did not apply. Webb v. May, 91 Ga. App. 437, 85 S.E.2d 641 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

4. Medical Records

Purpose.

- Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1 and 2 (see former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8) and Ga. L. 1970, p. 225, § 1 (see former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9) deal with the method of authenticating records which are otherwise admissible and are not new rules of admissibility eliminating the hearsay rule. Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 260 S.E.2d 11 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2).

- Admissibility of the contents of hospital records was governed by the rules of admissibility and not by the manner in which the records were obtained, whether the records were obtained through certification, or through subpoena, or notice to produce. Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 226 S.E.2d 292 (1976) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2).

In a premises liability suit, the trial court properly excluded certified copies of some of an invitee's medical records under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8 because the invitee had not provided the requisite 60-day notice under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-18 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-826). Former § 24-7-8 concerned only the authentication of medical records and did not allow the invitee to circumvent other evidentiary rules; furthermore, the invitee failed to provide a record citation for the specific medical records that the invitee claimed should have been admitted and thus it was unclear whether those records were narratives, to which former § 24-3-18(a) applied, or other types of records. Fuller v. Flash Foods, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 217, 679 S.E.2d 775 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8).

- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8 dealt with the authentication of medical records which were otherwise admissible, and did not eliminate the rule against hearsay or create a new one. Giles v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 563, 305 S.E.2d 154 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8).

Former statutes which pertained to the authentication of documents did not remove hearsay considerations. Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 499 S.E.2d 650 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8).

Effect of certification is to dispense with preliminary proof of authenticity on the part of the custodian of the records, but not to make admissible any matter contained in the reports which is otherwise subject to objection. Smith v. State, 141 Ga. App. 720, 234 S.E.2d 385 (1977) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2); Adams v. MARTA, 246 Ga. App. 698, 542 S.E.2d 130 (2000);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8).

- If a hospital record contained diagnostic opinions and conclusions, the record could not, upon proper objection, be admitted into evidence unless and until the person who entered such diagnostic opinions and conclusions upon the record qualified as an expert and related the facts upon which the entry was based. Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 226 S.E.2d 292 (1976) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2).

- Records which contain diagnostic opinions, conclusions, and other statements of third parties not before the court are still not admissible if tendered in toto, though relevant portions of such records not subject to such defects may be. Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 226 S.E.2d 292 (1976) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2); Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 260 S.E.2d 11 (1979);(decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2).

Photographs are admissible to show the condition of the body of the deceased and the nature and extent of the deceased's wounds, and when used to illustrate medical testimony as to the cause of death of the deceased, photographs are not inadmissible because the photographs might inflame the jury, but are relevant and material to the issue. Sirmans v. State, 229 Ga. 743, 194 S.E.2d 476 (1972) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1, 2).

- When the records in question were certified as accurate by the custodian of the treating hospital and contained no inadmissible hearsay evidence, it was not necessary for foundation to be laid for admitting records in evidence by offering testimony of examining doctor or medical personnel who prepared the records. Venenga v. State, 163 Ga. App. 161, 293 S.E.2d 553 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8); Wilson v. Childers, 174 Ga. App. 179, 329 S.E.2d 503 (1985);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8).

5. Council Records

Action of city council.

- Until the contrary appeared, the action of a city council was supposed to be in writing; and its book of minutes, properly proved as such, or an exemplification of the record, certified by the clerk or keeper of such records, under seal, was the proper mode of placing the evidence before the court. Farrar Lumber Co. v. City of Dalton, 20 Ga. App. 138, 92 S.E. 946 (1917) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803); Mullis v. State, 197 Ga. 550, 30 S.E.2d 99 (1944);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

- Official minutes of the city council may be proved by the production of the original book of minutes identified as such by the clerk of the corporation, and shown to have come from the clerk's custody. Mullis v. State, 197 Ga. 550, 30 S.E.2d 99 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

Certified copy was not the exclusive evidence of the minutes and records of a municipal corporation. Mullis v. State, 197 Ga. 550, 30 S.E.2d 99 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

6. Proving Ordinances

a. In General

Two methods of proof of city ordinances were: (1) by an official certified copy thereof under seal as provided by statute; or, (2) by the production of the original book of ordinances, identified as such by the clerk of the corporation and shown to have come from the clerk's custody. Metropolitan St. R.R. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500, 16 S.E. 49 (1892) (decided under Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 109, § 1); Western & Atl. R.R. v. Hix, 104 Ga. 11, 30 S.E. 424 (1898); Southern Ry. v. Thompson, 96 Ga. App. 305, 99 S.E.2d 845 (1957) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5216); R.O.H. Properties, Inc. v. Westside Elec. Co., 151 Ga. App. 857, 261 S.E.2d 767 (1979);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

- That a municipal ordinance could not be judicially noticed by state courts was a well settled rule since the ordinances were treated as private statutes, and must be alleged and proved as matters of fact. Greenberg v. Rothberg, 72 Ga. App. 882, 35 S.E.2d 485 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

If a local ordinance was relied on, the ordinance must be pled and proved in the trial court and, absent a properly admitted copy of the ordinance, neither the trial court nor the court of appeals may take judicial notice of the ordinance's existence. In re J.T., 239 Ga. App. 756, 521 S.E.2d 862 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-21).

- An ordinance of a municipality cannot be established by parol evidence. Western & A.R.R. v. Peterson, 168 Ga. 259, 147 S.E. 513 (1929) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803); Harrison v. Central of Ga. Ry., 44 Ga. App. 167, 160 S.E. 694 (1931); Greenberg v. Rothberg, 72 Ga. App. 882, 35 S.E.2d 485 (1945) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803); Southern Ry. v. Thompson, 96 Ga. App. 305, 99 S.E.2d 845 (1957);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

b. Exemplification of City Ordinance

Certification of whole ordinance.

- Where it was sought to have the clerk of a municipal corporation certify to a transcript of an ordinance, generally the entire ordinance on the subject in hand should be copied, but the admission of the certified transcript of one section would not always furnish ground for a reversal. Cason v. State, 134 Ga. 786, 68 S.E. 554 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803).

- When city ordinances were codified, and such codification was adopted by an ordinance, and the clerk copied and certified a section of such codification, and also prepared and certified from the record a copy of the adopting ordinance, this was sufficient to authorize the admission in evidence of the copy of the section of the city code. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Peavler, 134 Ga. 618, 68 S.E. 432 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803); Harrison v. Central of Ga. Ry., 44 Ga. App. 167, 160 S.E. 694 (1931);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803).

- City court did not err in refusing to admit in evidence a copy of an ordinance which copy was not properly exemplified. Carroll v. Yearty, 102 Ga. App. 677, 117 S.E.2d 248 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

- Certification that the alleged ordinance was an exemplification from a book gave it no greater dignity than the book itself, as the former statute referred to records and minutes, and the ordinance without proof of the ordinance's validity in the form of proper records or minutes was inadmissible. Western & A.R.R. v. Peterson, 168 Ga. 259, 147 S.E. 513 (1929) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803); Harrison v. Central of Ga. Ry., 44 Ga. App. 167, 160 S.E. 694 (1931); City of Dalton v. Cochran, 80 Ga. App. 252, 55 S.E.2d 907 (1949) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803); Southern Ry. v. Thompson, 96 Ga. App. 305, 99 S.E.2d 845 (1957);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

- When there was no constitutional attack on the former statute permitting a local ordinance, the appeals court was required to hold that a properly certified copy of such ordinance was admissible in evidence on the trial of an automobile negligence case in which it was alleged, and proof was tendered, that the defendants violated such an ordinance. Cambron v. Cogburn, 118 Ga. App. 454, 164 S.E.2d 350 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

- City ordinance certified by the clerk and keeper of the records of the municipality was not subject to the objection that it must be shown that the ordinance was duly and properly adopted. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606); Cambron v. Cogburn, 118 Ga. App. 454, 164 S.E.2d 350 (1968);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

Municipal ordinance may be proved by the production of the original book of ordinances, identified as such by the clerk of the corporation, and shown to have come from the clerk's custody. Harrison v. Central of Ga. Ry., 44 Ga. App. 167, 160 S.E. 694 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803).

- It was not error for the court to permit the introduction, under proper proof, of the original minutes showing the adoption of the ordinance in question, rather than to require a certified copy thereof; this was competent evidence of an expression of formal corporate action. Mullis v. State, 197 Ga. 550, 30 S.E.2d 99 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-606).

City clerk was the proper person to certify to the ordinance. Cason v. State, 134 Ga. 786, 68 S.E. 554 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5803).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 38-601 have been included in the opinions for this Code section.

Former statute related only to the certification of state and county records, and did not embrace federal records. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-176 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-601).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 974 et seq., 1192, 1193, 1272, 1323, 1333 et seq., 1339 et seq. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Inspection Laws, § 11.

21A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Records and Recording Laws, § 3.

- 32 C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 841 et seq., 886, 896, 897, 900 et seq., 909. 32A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 1037, 1106.

- Pendency of appeal from judgment as affecting right to enforce it in another state, 5 A.L.R. 1269.

Weight of oral testimony as to law of another state or country, 6 A.L.R. 1344.

Refusal to entertain an action upon a judgment rendered in another state upon a cause of action which it would have been contrary to statute or public policy of the forum to have entertained, 10 A.L.R. 719; 24 A.L.R. 1437.

Full-faith and credit provision as applying to decree of another state admitting a will to probate, 13 A.L.R. 498.

Right of notary who protests paper to change or contradict his certificate, 28 A.L.R. 543.

Determination of question relating to foreign law as one of law or of fact, 34 A.L.R. 1447.

Conclusiveness of decision of sister state on a contested hearing as to its own jurisdiction, 52 A.L.R. 740.

Foreign judgment based upon, or which fails to give effect to, a judgment previously rendered at the forum, or in a third jurisdiction, 53 A.L.R. 1146.

Construction and effect of foreign statutes or judicial decisions as question for court or for jury, 68 A.L.R. 809.

Conclusiveness as against insured or beneficiary or physician's report made as, or in connection with, proofs of loss or death, 93 A.L.R. 1342.

Judgment or order upholding prior judgment in the same state against direct attack upon ground of lack of jurisdiction, as conclusive in another state under the full faith and credit provision or doctrine of res judicata, 104 A.L.R. 1187.

Full faith and credit provision as affecting insurance contracts, 119 A.L.R. 483; 173 A.L.R. 1138.

Admissibility of hospital chart or other hospital record, 120 A.L.R. 1124.

Admissibility of records of a practicing physician or surgeon as evidence of physical or mental condition of person examined, 135 A.L.R. 1258.

Conflict of laws as to trusts inter vivos, 139 A.L.R. 1129.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to plead or prove foreign law (apart from judicial notice), 149 A.L.R. 759.

Decree for alimony in instalments as within full faith and credit provision, 157 A.L.R. 170.

Necessity that the transcript of a judgment of another state upon a cognovit under warrant of attorney shall include the cognovit and the note containing the alleged warrant of attorney, 162 A.L.R. 685.

Right to maintain action or proceeding in one state or country to collect or enforce tax due to another state or country or political subdivision thereof, 165 A.L.R. 796.

Conclusiveness of decree assessing stockholders or policyholders of insolvent corporations or mutual insurance companies, as against nonresidents, not personally served within state in which decree was rendered, 175 A.L.R. 1419.

Recognition as to marital status of foreign divorce decree attached on ground of lack of domicile, since Williams decision, 1 A.L.R.2d 1358; 28 A.L.R.2d 1303.

Admissibility of X-ray report made by physician taking or interpreting X-ray pictures, 6 A.L.R.2d 406.

Foreign divorce decree as subject to attack by spouse in state of which neither spouse is resident, 12 A.L.R.2d 382.

Foreign filiation or support order in bastardy proceedings, requiring periodic payments, as extraterritorially enforceable, 16 A.L.R.2d 1098.

Admissibility, in personal injury or death action arising out of airplane accident, of documents and reports pertaining to investigations, 23 A.L.R.2d 1360.

Presumption and prima facie case as to ownership of vehicle causing highway accident, 27 A.L.R.2d 167.

Admissibility of records or report of welfare department or agency relating to payment to or financial condition of particular person, 42 A.L.R.2d 752.

Injunction against suit in another state or country for divorce or separation, 54 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Identification of parties in action on foreign judgment, 60 A.L.R.2d 1024.

Admissibility in civil action of electroencephalogram, electrocardiogram, or other record made by instrument used in medical test, or of report based upon such test, 66 A.L.R.2d 536.

Admissibility of report of police or other public officer or employee, or portions of reports, as to cause of or responsibility for accident, injury to person, or damage to property, 69 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 44 and Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 27, relating to proof of official records, 70 A.L.R.2d 1227; 41 A.L.R. Fed. 784.

Admissibility in evidence of enlarged photographs or photostatic copies, 72 A.L.R.2d 308.

Choice of law in application of automobile guest statutes, 95 A.L.R.2d 12.

Preliminary proof, verification, or authentication of X-rays requisite to their introduction in evidence in civil cases, 5 A.L.R.3d 303.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances, 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

Necessity of expert evidence to support action against hospital for injury to or death of patient, 40 A.L.R.3d 515.

Weather reports and records as evidence, 57 A.L.R.3d 713.

Admissibility under business entry statutes of hospital records in criminal case, 69 A.L.R.3d 22.

Admissibility under Uniform Business Records and Evidence Act or similar statute of medical report made by consulting physician to treating physician, 69 A.L.R.3d 104.

Admissibility, under public records exception to hearsay rule, of record kept by public official without express statutory direction or authorization, 80 A.L.R.3d 414.

Admissibility under state law of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient, 80 A.L.R.3d 456.

Disbarment or suspension of attorney in one state as affecting right to continue practice in another state, 81 A.L.R.3d 1281.

Choice of law as to application of comparative negligence doctrine, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206.

Admissibility in personal injury action of hospital or other medical bill which includes expenses for treatment of condition unrelated to injury, 89 A.L.R.3d 1012.

Admissibility in evidence of professional directories, 7 A.L.R.4th 638.

Authentication of electronically stored evidence, including text messages and e-mail, 45 A.L.R.4th 602.

Medical malpractice: presumption or inference from failure of hospital or doctor to produce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th 906.

Proof of foreign official record under Rule 44(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 784.