2020 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 7 - Pretrial Proceedings
Article 7 - Demand for Trial; Announcement of Readiness for Trial
§ 17-7-171. Time for Demand for Speedy Trial in Capital Cases; Discharge and Acquittal When No Trial Held Before End of Two Court Terms of Demand; Counting of Terms in Cases in Which Death Penalty Is Sought; Special Pleas of Incompetency

1. Any person accused of a capital offense may enter a demand for speedy trial at the term of court at which the indictment is found or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter; or, by special permission of the court, the defendant may at any subsequent term thereafter demand a speedy trial. The demand for speedy trial shall be filed with the clerk of court and served upon the prosecutor and upon the judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the case is not assigned, upon the chief judge of the court in which the case is pending. A demand for trial filed pursuant to this Code section shall be filed as a separate, distinct, and individual document and shall not be a part of any other pleading or document. Such demand shall clearly be titled "Demand for Speedy Trial"; reference this Code section within the pleading; and identify the indictment number or accusation number for which such demand is being made. The demand for speedy trial shall be binding only in the court in which such demand is filed, except where the case is transferred from one court to another without a request from the defendant.
2. If more than two regular terms of court are convened and adjourned after the term at which the demand for speedy trial is filed and the defendant is not given a trial, then the defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment, provided that at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant and provided, further, that the defendant was present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment.
3. In cases involving a capital offense for which the death penalty is sought, if a demand for speedy trial is entered, the counting of terms under subsection (b) of this Code section shall not begin until the convening of the first term following the completion of pretrial review proceedings in the Supreme Court under Code Section 17-10-35.1.
4. If a defendant files a special plea of incompetency to stand trial pursuant to Code Section 17-7-130 or if the court, pursuant to Code Section 17-7-129, conducts a trial on the competency of the defendant, the period of time during which such matter is pending shall not be included in the computation of determining whether a demand for speedy trial has been satisfied.

(Ga. L. 1952, p. 299, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1983, p. 452, § 3; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1437, § 3; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 17; Ga. L. 2006, p. 893, § 2/HB 1421; Ga. L. 2011, p. 372, § 4/HB 421.)

- Requests by inmates for final disposition of indictments or accusations pending against the inmates, § 42-6-3.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2006). For annual survey on the death penalty, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (2012).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Application
• Appeals

General Consideration

Rights attach upon indictment but constitutional right to speedy trial attaches upon arrest.

- Although Ga. L. 1952, p. 299, §§ 1 and 2 and former Code 1933, § 27-1901 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-170 and17-7-171) prescribe a means of asserting one's right to a speedy trial after indictment, there was a right under U.S. Const., amend. 6 to a speedy trial which attaches at arrest and can be asserted thereafter. Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 252 S.E.2d 397 (1979).

Unlike the statutory protections conferred by O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-170 and17-7-171 that attach with formal indictment or accusation, the Sixth Amendment provides constitutional protection over and above the statutory provisions and under that amendment, the right to a speedy trial attaches upon arrest and can be asserted thereafter; a trial court properly denied the defendant's statutory speedy trial demand when no indictment was filed, but improperly overlooked or failed to consider the defendant's constitutional speedy trial demand, and thus, the trial court's judgment was vacated and the case was remanded with direction to the trial court to address the defendant's constitutional claims. Smith v. State, 266 Ga. App. 529, 597 S.E.2d 414 (2004).

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171 does not deprive defendants of equal protection of the law, despite the possibility of relatively longer trial waitings than in those circuits with more terms of court per year. Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 434 S.E.2d 469 (1993).

- Furman v. Georgia, 508 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), which struck down punishment by death of persons convicted of certain capital offenses did not have the effect of abolishing the category of "capital offense" for purposes of determining the term of court by which a defendant must be given a trial, after having made the demand, before the defendant must be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment. Letbedder v. State, 129 Ga. App. 196, 199 S.E.2d 270 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1134, 94 S. Ct. 877, 38 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1974).

While the death penalty could not be constitutionally imposed for a rape conviction when the victim did not die, rape was still a capital offense for purposes of the speedy trial statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 17- 7-170 and17-7-171, because a determination that the death penalty could not be imposed did not affect the legislature's decision that rape was a crime for which the state should be allowed additional time to prepare the state's case, so, under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b), the state had until the end of the third term of court following the term in which a speedy trial demand was made to try such a case. Merrow v. State, 268 Ga. App. 47, 601 S.E.2d 428 (2004).

Armed robbery is a capital offense within the purview of Ga. L. 1952, p. 299, §§ 1 and 2 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171). Simmons v. State, 149 Ga. App. 830, 256 S.E.2d 79 (1979).

- Armed robbery is a capital offense even if the state does not seek the death penalty, and therefore falls under the three-term speedy trial requirements of Ga. L. 1952, p. 299, §§ 1 and 2 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171) rather than the two-term requirement for noncapital offenses under former Code 1933, § 27-1901 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170). Orvis v. State, 237 Ga. 6, 226 S.E.2d 570 (1976).

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(a) does not require that jurors be impaneled at the time the demand is entered in order for the demand to be timely; it simply requires that the demand be entered either at the term of court at which the indictment was found or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. 489, 422 S.E.2d 180 (1992).

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b) provides a three-prong procedure which must be complied with in order for a demand for speedy trial to be effective. First, the demand must actually be filed with the court. Second, there must be juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant at both of the first two regular terms of court following the term at which the demand is filed. Third, at some time during both of the first two regular terms of court following the term at which the demand is filed, the defendant must be present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. 298, 404 S.E.2d 115 (1991).

Because pretrial review proceedings were not yet complete in the Supreme Court, the counting of terms under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b) had not begun, and the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal was proper. Franks v. State, 266 Ga. 707, 469 S.E.2d 651 (1996).

- Defendant failed to file a new demand for trial following dismissal of the defendant's first demand and did not file a motion for dismissal of the indictment before proceeding to trial after five terms of court passed caused a waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy trial by the defendant's own acts or failure to act. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. 489, 422 S.E.2d 180 (1992).

On defendant's interlocutory appeal, after filing of the remittitur in the lower court, the state has the remainder of that term and one additional regular term of court in which to try the defendant pursuant to the defendant's demand for trial, provided there are juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant. Henry v. State, 214 Ga. 527, 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

Defendant was indicted for felony murder and other charges during the June 2014 term of the trial court; the defendant did not file a valid demand in that term or the subsequent September 2014 term; and the December 2014 term began on December 1, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3(20), making the defendant's December 5 speedy trial demand untimely under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(a). Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 794 S.E.2d 60 (2016).

- Speedy trial demand in a non-capital case did not impose a requirement to announce a readiness for trial; rather, a request for a continuance outside the term of the demand waived the speedy trial demand. Dingler v. State, 281 Ga. App. 721, 637 S.E.2d 120 (2006).

- Trial court properly denied a felony murder defendant's motion as to the defendant's statutory speedy trial right as untimely under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(a); however, the trial court failed to make the required findings and conclusions to enable review of the defendant's motion with respect to the defendant's constitutional speedy trial right under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI, requiring remand. Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 794 S.E.2d 60 (2016).

Mere silence or inaction does not satisfy O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171. Crawford v. State, 252 Ga. App. 722, 556 S.E.2d 888 (2001).

- Defendant whose conviction was set aside, but who was not reindicted needed special permission of the court to file a motion for speedy trial in order to invoke the benefits of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for acquittal. Abiff v. State, 260 Ga. 434, 396 S.E.2d 483 (1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1072, 111 S. Ct. 797, 112 L. Ed. 2d 858 (1991).

- While a trial court can grant a defendant special permission to file an out-of-time demand for speedy trial, a trial court cannot actually make that demand for defendants. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. 298, 404 S.E.2d 115 (1991).

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171 must be complied with in order to be discharged and acquitted thereunder. Dennis v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 671, 118 S.E.2d 923 (1961); Burns v. State, 265 Ga. 763, 462 S.E.2d 622 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012).

Conditions that the defendant be present in court at each term, announcing ready, and that the defendant request a trial at that term must be complied with for the defendant to be discharged and acquitted. Hakala v. State, 225 Ga. 629, 170 S.E.2d 406 (1969).

- Because the filing of a statutory speedy trial demand was not a prerequisite to seeking discharge and acquittal based on a denial of the defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial, such could not serve as a valid argument to overturn the trial court's order in granting the defendant a discharge and acquittal on speedy trial grounds. State v. Moore, 289 Ga. App. 99, 656 S.E.2d 156 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0808, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 483 (Ga. 2008).

- If the defendant is not denied a speedy trial, an appellate court is not authorized to order the defendant's release under this section. Butler v. State, 126 Ga. App. 22, 189 S.E.2d 870 (1972).

- Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, which establishes two terms of court for the City Court of Atlanta, is not unconstitutional because it violates equal protection. Cross v. State, 272 Ga. 282, 528 S.E.2d 241 (2000).

Cited in Horne v. State, 212 Ga. 421, 93 S.E.2d 356 (1956); Horne v. State, 94 Ga. App. 522, 95 S.E.2d 288 (1956); Hakala v. State, 225 Ga. 629, 170 S.E.2d 406 (1969); Mays v. State, 229 Ga. 609, 193 S.E.2d 825 (1972); Letbedder v. State, 129 Ga. App. 196, 199 S.E.2d 270 (1973); Treadwell v. State, 233 Ga. 468, 211 S.E.2d 760 (1975); Turner v. State, 136 Ga. App. 42, 220 S.E.2d 57 (1975); Holmes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 572, 222 S.E.2d 121 (1975); Sheats v. State, 237 Ga. 757, 229 S.E.2d 600 (1976); Arnold v. State, 239 Ga. 752, 238 S.E.2d 876 (1977); Gibson v. Giles, 242 Ga. 720, 251 S.E.2d 231 (1978); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693, 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Buxton v. State, 253 Ga. 137, 317 S.E.2d 538 (1984); Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593, 351 S.E.2d 625 (1987); Matthews v. State, 181 Ga. App. 819, 354 S.E.2d 175 (1987); Brown v. State, 261 Ga. 66, 401 S.E.2d 492 (1991); Redd v. State, 261 Ga. 300, 404 S.E.2d 264 (1991); Walker v. State, 216 Ga. App. 236, 454 S.E.2d 156 (1995); State v. McKnight, 265 Ga. 701, 462 S.E.2d 142 (1995); Freeman v. State, 232 Ga. App. 715, 503 S.E.2d 601 (1998); Azizi v. State, 274 Ga. 207, 274 A. 207, 553 S.E.2d 273 (2001); Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006); In the Interest of M.D.H., 300 Ga. 46, 793 S.E.2d 49 (2016).

Application

Motion should have been denied when prejudice from delay not shown.

- Because the defendant failed to show evidence that any prejudice resulted by a 15-month delay in the filing of formal charges, specifically, evidence of either actual anxiety or concern or any specific evidence as to how the delay impaired the ability to present a defense, the trial court abused the court's discretion in finding otherwise. State v. Moore, 289 Ga. App. 99, 656 S.E.2d 156 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0808, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 483 (Ga. 2008).

Applying four-part Barker speedy trial test: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant, the appeals court decided that the defendant's U.S. Const. amend. 6, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI(a), and O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171, speedy trial rights were not violated - inter alia deciding that the three-year delay from arrest to trial was presumptively prejudicial, that the loss of DUI blood test result evidence was an equal loss to the defendant and the state, and that the defendant's delay in asserting the right was an indication that the defendant was not anxious or stressed. Allen v. State, 268 Ga. App. 161, 601 S.E.2d 485 (2004).

Under the Barker test, passage of 26 to 27 months between the defendant's arrest and the trial, even though the defendant was in state custody on another sentence, did not violate speedy trial rights as there was no showing that the state dragged the state's feet in any effort to impede the defendant's defense. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. App. 169, 626 S.E.2d 128 (2006).

- Nine-month delay between a defendant's indictment for murder and the defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds was not a speedy trial violation under the Sixth Amendment as the defendant filed no demand for a speedy trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171; did not raise the speedy trial issue for nine months; was imprisoned on other charges during those nine months; and showed no prejudice from the delay. Jones v. State, 284 Ga. 320, 667 S.E.2d 49 (2008).

- Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on a purported violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial because the circumstances of the case warranted a finding that the twelve-month, ten-day delay between the defendant's indictment and the filing of the defendant's motion to dismiss was not presumptively prejudicial. The defendant was serving a sentence on an unrelated charge in Mississippi when the indictment was returned, a requisition warrant had to be obtained from the Mississippi Governor, which process was initiated within a month of the defendant's indictment and took three months before the warrant was issued, and the defendant was brought to Georgia two months after the warrant issued and was arraigned approximately two months later. Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 387, 688 S.E.2d 344 (2010).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the state violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI(a) because although the 54-month delay between the defendant's arrest and the filing of the defendant's motion was presumptively prejudicial, and the state offered no explanation for the delay, the defendant did not file a request for speedy trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171, the defendant did not assert the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial for the 54 months between the defendant's arrest and the filing of the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the trial court specifically found that the defendant failed to establish prejudice; the defendant's late assertion of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial weighed heavily against the defendant as did the defendant's failure to show prejudice in light of such delay. Falagian v. State, 300 Ga. App. 187, 684 S.E.2d 340 (2009), overruled on other grounds, McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282 (2013).

- Superior court abused the court's discretion in dismissing an indictment on speedy trial grounds, despite a five-year delay in bringing the defendant to trial, which was held to be excessively long and not to be excused; however, because the delay was caused by the state's negligence or other court-related circumstances which were not to be weighed heavily against the state and because the defendant failed to assert a speedy trial violation or show prejudice from the delay, dismissal of the indictment was reversed. State v. Giddens, 280 Ga. App. 586, 634 S.E.2d 526 (2006).

Despite the state's five-year delay in bringing the defendant's child molestation case to trial, the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the defendant's speedy trial right was denied because the defendant waited more than five years to assert the defendant's statutory right under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171, and the defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting from the delay. Arbegast v. State, 301 Ga. App. 462, 688 S.E.2d 1 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0630, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 348 (Ga. 2010).

- Although the state was negligent in failing to bring the defendant to trial in a timely fashion, that consideration was outweighed by the facts that the defendant suffered little actual prejudice from the delay and no unduly oppressive pretrial incarceration, and waited a significant amount of time before asserting a speedy trial right; hence, the defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated. Christian v. State, 281 Ga. 474, 640 S.E.2d 21 (2007).

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss which alleged a speedy trial violation as the delay in bringing the defendant to trial was prejudicial, especially when, after an assertion of the right, an additional seven months passed before the court ruled on the claim, and, in the interim, an alleged material defense witness died. Hardeman v. State, 280 Ga. App. 168, 633 S.E.2d 595 (2006).

- Although the delay of eight years and two months between the defendant's arrest and the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was uncommonly long and presumptively prejudicial, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because: (1) the case was dead-docketed for five years when the state could not locate the victim; (2) nothing in the record showed that the state deliberately attempted to delay the trial to hamper the defense; and (3) fourteen months of the delay could be attributed to the defendant's failure to appear for several court dates; the defendant did not show actual prejudice to the defendant's defense because the police officers who arrested the defendant were available, and every person who was an eyewitness to or participant in the incident for which the defendant was arrested was available to testify. Gray v. State, 303 Ga. App. 97, 692 S.E.2d 716 (2010).

Defendant was not entitled to be discharged and acquitted until the close of the third term of court after the term in which the defendant filed the defendant's demand for a speedy trial because that was when more than two regular terms of court would have convened and adjourned after the term at which the demand for speedy trial was filed. Because the State of Georgia filed the state's notice of intent to seek the death penalty during the third term, which was before the defendant was entitled to be discharged and acquitted, that notice reset the statutory speedy trial clock, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(c), and the defendant's motion was premature. Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012).

Defendant was not deprived of the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial because the defendant was indicted during the March 2010 term of court and was tried within two terms, during the March 2011 term of court. Morrison v. State, 303 Ga. 120, 810 S.E.2d 508 (2018).

- Statutory right to a speedy trial is not jurisdictional in nature and may be waived by an accused's affirmative acts and/or failures to act; conduct of an accused, both before and after the filing of the speedy trial demand, may result in an accused waiving the accused's right to a speedy trial. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. 489, 422 S.E.2d 180 (1992).

It was not error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal based on the defendant's demand for a speedy trial since the defendant waived the right to a speedy trial by not: (1) serving the demand on the county district attorney; and (2) letting the court know that the defendant was ready for trial. Williams v. State, 258 Ga. App. 367, 574 S.E.2d 416 (2002).

By acquiescing in the trial court's action of striking the defendant's first speedy-trial demand under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171, in response to the defendant's counsel's illness at the time set for trial, the defendant abandoned any arguments with regard to the speedy trial, and the defendant's later failure to file an out-of-time demand after gaining permission to do so constituted a waiver. Tolbert v. State, 313 Ga. App. 46, 720 S.E.2d 244 (2011).

- Consent order was properly interpreted to allow the state two terms beyond the term in which the order was entered to comply with the defendant's speedy trial demand. Turner v. State, 269 Ga. 392, 497 S.E.2d 560 (1998).

- Failure to comply with the express language of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171 requiring that the defendant be in court announcing that the defendant is ready for trial following the filing of a speedy trial demand operated as a waiver of that demand; the statutory requirements were mandatory and required strict adherence, and a defendant could waive the right to a speedy trial by the defendant's own actions or inaction. Crawford v. State, 252 Ga. App. 722, 556 S.E.2d 888 (2001).

- Defendant's failure to serve the trial judge with the defendant's demand for a speedy trial, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171, rendered the demand invalid; therefore, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal by concluding that the defendant either withdrew or waived the speedy trial demand. Burdett v. State, 285 Ga. App. 571, 646 S.E.2d 748 (2007).

Continuance granted at defendant's request operated as waiver of speedy trial demand, even though the continuance expired while time remained in that term. Rice v. State, 264 Ga. 846, 452 S.E.2d 492 (1995).

- If the defendant is not tried within two successive terms of court following the term in which the defendant filed a demand for trial, the defendant's escape and voluntary absence from the court amounts to a waiver of the demand for trial and does not entitle the defendant to discharge and acquittal under Ga. L. 1952, p. 299, §§ 1, 2. Holmes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 572, 222 S.E.2d 121 (1975).

- Defendant was not entitled to discharge and acquittal as to an indictment since the record did not show that the defendant was present in court, announcing ready and requesting a trial thereon, for two terms after the term at which the demand was filed, as required by this section, despite an argument that since defendant was in custody during the period, defendant could not be present in court and announce ready, as defendant was represented by counsel who could have done this for the defendant. Dennis v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 671, 118 S.E.2d 923 (1961).

Weighing the state's negligent delay of trial against the defendants' failure to demonstrate that the defendants' defenses would be impaired by the delay as well as the defendants' failure to timely assert the defendants' Sixth Amendment right, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motions to dismiss indictments. Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 534 S.E.2d 796 (2000).

- When the state was ready to proceed with defendant's trial within four months of the offense, but the defendant requested a continuance to prepare the defendant's case, any delay in trial was caused by the defendant's own actions, and the defendant was not denied a speedy trial. Myron v. State, 248 Ga. 120, 281 S.E.2d 600 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1154, 102 S. Ct. 1025, 71 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1982).

- Two-year delay between commission of the crime and the beginning of the trial is not unconstitutional when some of the delay was due to separate trials of codefendants, the defendant did not assert the defendant's speedy-trial right until just before trial, and the only prejudice due to the delay was to the state. Harrison v. State, 257 Ga. 528, 361 S.E.2d 149 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982, 108 S. Ct. 1281, 99 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1988).

- Defendant's correspondences to the trial judge and assistant district attorney did not satisfy the third prong of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b) since the statute does not provide for constructive compliance and since the correspondence fell far short of demonstrating a readiness for trial during the court terms at issue. Levester v. State, 270 Ga. 485, 512 S.E.2d 258 (1999).

In a multi-count indictment which includes both capital and noncapital offenses, the time for trial upon a proper demand by a defendant is the time allowed under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171 for the more serious offenses. Cleary v. State, 258 Ga. 203, 366 S.E.2d 677 (1988), overruled on other grounds, Mize v. State, 262 Ga. 489, 422 S.E.2d 180 (1992).

- Defendant was entitled to a hearing, based on the defendant's written demand for a speedy trial, to determine whether or not the defendant was entitled to discharge and acquittal on 13 counts on which an order of nolle prosequi was entered to the extent the statute of limitations had not run on any of the offenses. Day v. State, 216 Ga. App. 29, 453 S.E.2d 73 (1994).

- Because the record did not support the defendant's contention that the state reindicted the defendant in an attempt to extend the time in which the state could bring the defendant to trial, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Dalton v. State, 263 Ga. 138, 429 S.E.2d 89 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Rice v. State, 264 Ga. 846, 452 S.E.2d 492 (1995).

- When the defendant filed a demand for trial during the July 1986 term of the superior court and the defendant was tried during the January 1987 term of court - i.e., during the second regular term of court following the term in which the defendant's demand was filed, notwithstanding that special juries had been empanelled in the interim, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-20, the defendant was given a trial before more than two regular terms of court were convened and adjourned after the term at which the demand was filed. Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060, 112 S. Ct. 941, 117 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1992).

- Defense counsel's mere explanation that "the district attorney chose not to call the case because they had not procured defendant's presence for trial" provided no basis for excusing strict compliance with the mandatory three-prong requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b). State v. Moore, 207 Ga. App. 677, 428 S.E.2d 815 (1993).

Trial of defendant in fourth term after indictment not a denial of speedy trial rights when the trial in the first term resulted in a hung jury, the defendant was granted a continuance in second term but agreed to an additional term of court, and the defendant failed to announce readiness for trial in the third term. Davis v. State, 221 Ga. App. 168, 471 S.E.2d 14 (1996).

- Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal in a case when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and the trial court was thus forced to declare a mistrial on the last business day of the term of court as the trial itself was commenced within the statutory two-term limit and the state immediately announced the state was ready to try the defendant on the unresolved charges; accordingly, the state had the right to try the defendant in that term if jurors were available, and, if not, the next succeeding regular term of court, again providing there were juries impaneled and qualified to hear the case. State v. Varner, 277 Ga. 433, 589 S.E.2d 111 (2003).

Appeals

Time for trial after interlocutory appeal.

- There is no authority holding that the time for exercising the right to make a demand for trial on one indictment is extended while the trial of another indictment against the same defendant is pending. Blevins v. State, 113 Ga. App. 413, 148 S.E.2d 192 (1966).

- On the defendant's interlocutory appeal, filing of the remittitur in the lower court is the point in time at which the demand clock resumes ticking on a pre-appeal demand for trial, not when the trial court makes the appellate court judgment the judgment of the lower court, overruling Ramirez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 356, 439 S.E.2d 4 (1993). Henry v. State, 214 Ga. 527, 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

- Defendant may directly appeal from the pre-trial denial of either a constitutional or statutory speedy trial claim. Mayfield v. State, 264 Ga. App. 551, 593 S.E.2d 851 (2003).

Although the trial court orally indicated that the court was signing an order allowing the defendant's counsel to withdraw, no such order was in the record, and counsel's withdrawal notice had no effect on the defendant's representation; therefore, a pro se notice of appeal filed by the defendant following the denial of the defendant's speedy trial motion was ineffective because the defendant was represented at the time of the notice. Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 767 S.E.2d 24 (2014).

Although denial of the defendant's constitutional speedy trial demand was not immediately appealable, the denial of the defendant's statutory speedy trial right was immediately appealable, and the constitutional speedy trial ruling was appealable along with it under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(d). Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 794 S.E.2d 60 (2016).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Bail and Recognizance, § 1 et seq. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 265 et seq., 275 et seq.

- 8 C.J.S., Bail; Release and Detention Pending Proceedings, §§ 25 et seq., 41 et seq. 16B C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 1328 et seq. 23 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 793 et seq.

- Waiver or loss of accused's right to speedy trial, 129 A.L.R. 572; 57 A.L.R.2d 302.

Discharge of accused for holding him excessive time without trial as bar to subsequent prosecution for same offense, 50 A.L.R.2d 943.

Effect of abolition of capital punishment on procedural rules governing crimes punishable by death - post-Furman decisions, 71 A.L.R.3d 453.