2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 13 - Controlled Substances
Article 2 - Regulation of Controlled Substances
Part 1 - Schedules, Offenses, and Penalties
§ 16-13-31. Trafficking in Cocaine, Illegal Drugs, Marijuana, or Methamphetamine; Penalties

1. 1. Except as authorized by this article, any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state or who is in possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine, as described in Schedule II, in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
      1. If the quantity of the cocaine or the mixture involved is 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years and shall pay a fine of $200,000.00;
      2. If the quantity of the cocaine or the mixture involved is 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years and shall pay a fine of $300,000.00; and
      3. If the quantity of the cocaine or the mixture involved is 400 grams or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years and shall pay a fine of $1 million.
   2. Except as authorized by this article, any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state or who is in possession of any mixture with a purity of less than 10 percent of cocaine, as described in Schedule II, in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine if the total weight of the mixture multiplied by the percentage of cocaine contained in the mixture exceeds any of the quantities of cocaine specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection. Upon conviction thereof, such person shall be punished as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, depending upon the quantity of cocaine such person is charged with selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into this state or possessing.
2. Except as authorized by this article, any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, brings into this state, or has possession of four grams or more of any morphine, opium, or substance identified in subparagraph (RR) or (SS) of paragraph (1) or paragraph (13), (14), or (15) of Code Section 16-13-25, or subparagraph (A), (C.5), (F), (U.1), (V), or (V.2) of paragraph (2) of Code Section 16-13-26 or any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in Schedules I and II, or four grams or more of any mixture containing any such substance in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking in illegal drugs and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
   1. If the quantity of such substances involved is four grams or more, but less than 14 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years and shall pay a fine of $50,000.00;
   2. If the quantity of such substances involved is 14 grams or more, but less than 28 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years and shall pay a fine of $100,000.00; and
   3. If the quantity of such substances involved is 28 grams or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years and shall pay a fine of $500,000.00.
3. Except as authorized by this article, any person who sells, manufactures, grows, delivers, brings into this state, or has possession of a quantity of marijuana exceeding ten pounds commits the offense of trafficking in marijuana and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
   1. If the quantity of marijuana involved is in excess of ten pounds, but less than 2,000 pounds, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years and shall pay a fine of $100,000.00;
   2. If the quantity of marijuana involved is 2,000 pounds or more, but less than 10,000 pounds, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of seven years and shall pay a fine of $250,000.00; and
   3. If the quantity of marijuana involved is 10,000 pounds or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years and shall pay a fine of $1 million.
4. Except as authorized by this article, any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state 200 grams or more of methaqualone or of any mixture containing methaqualone, as described in paragraph (6) of Code Section 16-13-25, in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking in methaqualone and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
   1. If the quantity of the methaqualone or the mixture involved is 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years and shall pay a fine of $50,000.00; and
   2. If the quantity of the methaqualone or the mixture involved is 400 grams or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years and shall pay a fine of $250,000.00.
5. Except as authorized by this article, any person who sells, delivers, or brings into this state or has possession of 28 grams or more of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or any mixture containing either methamphetamine or amphetamine, as described in Schedule II, in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
   1. If the quantity of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or a mixture containing either substance involved is 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years and shall pay a fine of $200,000.00;
   2. If the quantity of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or a mixture containing either substance involved is 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years and shall pay a fine of $300,000.00; and
   3. If the quantity of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or a mixture containing either substance involved is 400 grams or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years and shall pay a fine of $1 million.
6. Except as authorized by this article, any person who manufactures methamphetamine, amphetamine, or any mixture containing either methamphetamine or amphetamine, as described in Schedule II, in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking methamphetamine or amphetamine and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
   1. If the quantity of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or a mixture containing either substance involved is less than 200 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years and shall pay a fine of $200,000.00;
   2. If the quantity of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or a mixture containing either substance involved is 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years and shall pay a fine of $300,000.00; and
   3. If the quantity of methamphetamine, amphetamine, or a mixture containing either substance involved is 400 grams or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years and shall pay a fine of $1 million.
7. 1. The district attorney may move the sentencing court to impose a reduced or suspended sentence upon any person who is convicted of a violation of this Code section who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his or her accomplices, accessories, coconspirators, or principals. Upon good cause shown, the motion may be filed and heard in camera. The judge hearing the motion may impose a reduced or suspended sentence if he or she finds that the defendant has rendered such substantial assistance.
   2. 1. In the court's discretion, the judge may depart from the mandatory minimum sentence specified for a person who is convicted of a violation of this Code section as set forth in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph if the judge concludes that:
         1. The defendant was not a leader of the criminal conduct;
         2. The defendant did not possess or use a firearm, dangerous weapon, or hazardous object during the crime;
         3. The criminal conduct did not result in a death or serious bodily injury to a person other than to a person who is a party to the crime;
         4. The defendant has no prior felony conviction; and
         5. The interests of justice will not be served by the imposition of the prescribed mandatory minimum sentence.
      2. The sentencing departure ranges pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall be as follows:
         1. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or (d) of this Code section, two years and six months to five years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $25,000.00 nor more than $50,000.00;
         2. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of this Code section, two years and six months to five years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $50,000.00 nor more than $100,000.00;
         3. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (2) of subsection (c) of this Code section, three years and six months to seven years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $125,000.00 nor more than $250,000.00;
         4. Any person convicted of violating subparagraph (a)(1)(A), paragraph (2) of subsection (a), relating to the quantity of drugs specified in subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of this Code section, or paragraph (1) of subsection (e) or (f) of this Code section, five to ten years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $100,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00;
         5. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section, five to ten years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $50,000.00 nor more than $100,000.00;
         6. Any person convicted of violating subparagraph (a)(1)(B), paragraph (2) of subsection (a), relating to the quantity of drugs specified in subparagraph (a)(1)(B) of this Code section, or paragraph (2) of subsection (e) or (f) of this Code section, seven years and six months to 15 years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $150,000.00 nor more than $300,000.00;
         7. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of this Code section, seven years and six months to 15 years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $500,000.00 nor more than $1 million;
         8. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of this Code section, seven years and six months to 15 years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $125,000.00 nor more than $250,000.00;
         9. Any person convicted of violating paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this Code section, 12 years and six months to 25 years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $250,000.00 nor more than $500,000.00; and
         10. Any person convicted of violating subparagraph (a)(1)(C), paragraph (2) of subsection (a), relating to the quantity of drugs specified in subparagraph (a)(1)(C) of this Code section, or paragraph (3) of subsection (e) or (f) of this Code section, 12 years and six months to 25 years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $500,000.00 nor more than $1 million.
      3. If a judge reduces the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to this paragraph, the judge shall specify on the record the circumstances for the reduction and the interests served by such departure. Any such order shall be appealable by the State of Georgia pursuant to Code Section 5-7-1.
      4. As used in this paragraph, the term:
         1. "Dangerous weapon" shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 16-11-121.
         2. "Firearm" shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 16-11-127.1.
         3. "Hazardous object" shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 20-2-751.
         4. "Leader" means a person who planned and organized others and acted as a guiding force in order to achieve a common goal.
   3. In the court's discretion, the judge may depart from the mandatory minimum sentence specified in this Code section for a person who is convicted of a violation of this Code section when the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have agreed to a sentence that is below such mandatory minimum.
8. Any person who violates any provision of this Code section shall be punished as provided for in the applicable mandatory minimum punishment and for not more than 30 years of imprisonment and by a fine not to exceed $1 million.
9. Notwithstanding Code Section 16-13-2, any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of this Code section shall not be reduced by any earned time, early release, work release, leave, or other sentence-reducing measures under programs administered by the Department of Corrections, the effect of which would be to reduce the period of incarceration ordered by the sentencing court or any form of pardon, parole, or commutation of sentence by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles; provided, however, that during the final year of incarceration, a defendant so sentenced shall be eligible to be considered for participation in a Department of Corrections administered transitional center or work release program.

(Ga. L. 1980, p. 432, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 16; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2215, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 620, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 16; Ga. L. 1985, p. 552, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 10, § 16; Ga. L. 1986, p. 397, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 420, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1594, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2106, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 169, § 5.1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1311, § 5; Ga. L. 2003, p. 177, § 4; Ga. L. 2003, p. 257, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 3-8/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 4/HB 349; Ga. L. 2014, p. 432, § 2-8/HB 826; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 2-2/SB 364; Ga. L. 2015, p. 5, § 16/HB 90; Ga. L. 2017, p. 417, § 6-2/SB 104.)

The 2017 amendment, effective May 8, 2017, substituted "Except as authorized by this article, any" for "Any" throughout subsections (a) through (f); and, in subsection (b), in the middle, substituted "morphine, opium" for "morphine or opium" and inserted ", or substance identified in subparagraph (RR) or (SS) of paragraph (1) or paragraph (13), (14), or (15) of Code Section 16-13-25, or subparagraph (A), (C.5), (F), (U.1), (V), or (V.2) of paragraph (2) of Code Section 16-13-26".

- Reward for furnishing information leading to arrest and conviction of person charged with selling controlled substance in violation of section, § 45-12-37.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1987, a comma was deleted following "Code section" in subsection (f) (now (h)).

- Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act."

Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 21/HB 349, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2013, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense."

Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 5-1/SB 364, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to any sentence imposed on or after July 1, 2013.

- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For annual survey of criminal law and procedure, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 115 (1989). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For article, "Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate," see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 241 (1994). For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005). For survey article on criminal law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (2007). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012). For article, "Appeal and Error: Appeal or Certiorari by State in Criminal Cases," see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 17 (2013). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 61 (2017). For annual survey on criminal law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 37 (2014). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 212 (1992). For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 76 (2003).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Possession
• Quantity of Contraband
• Sufficiency of Evidence
• Sentencing
• Cocaine
• In General
• Procedure
• Evidence
• Jury Instruction
• Sentencing
• Marijuana
• In General
• Procedure
• Evidence
• Jury Instruction
• Sentencing
• Methamphetamine or Amphetamine
• In General
• Procedure
• Evidence
• Jury Instruction
• Sentencing
• Multiple Drugs
• In General
• Procedure
• Evidence
• Jury Instruction
• Sentencing

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- See Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981).

Imposing greater punishment based on the total amount of mixture possessed, and not on the total amount of cocaine, is not an unconstitutional classification scheme. Lavelle v. State, 250 Ga. 224, 297 S.E.2d 234 (1982).

Setting a maximum sentence does not conflict with the preamble of the act which enacted this section, which refers to minimum sentences; O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f) is logically related to the purposes of the act and is therefore constitutional. Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 353 S.E.2d 19 (1987).

Mandatory fines imposed under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 do not violate constitutional standards. Green v. State, 239 Ga. App. 617, 521 S.E.2d 441 (1999).

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) did not violate equal protection of the laws because the statute contained no purity requirement, as was required for cocaine, because the legislature was under no duty to treat all drugs and drug offenders the same, the mere fact that cocaine and methamphetamine were both listed as Schedule II controlled substances did not mean that the legislature had to enact identical statutes pertaining to those substances, and the statute treated all those charged with methamphetamine trafficking equally. Hardin v. State, 277 Ga. 242, 587 S.E.2d 634 (2003).

- Manufacturing methamphetamine charge in the complaint did not violate ex post facto protections under U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. X and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X since the defendant was not charged under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1), which was not effective at the time of the defendant's conduct; at the time of the offense, the defendant's alleged conduct was prohibited by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e). Gentry v. State, 281 Ga. App. 315, 635 S.E.2d 782 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0117, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 78 (Ga. 2007).

- Prosecutions for trafficking in cocaine by possessing more than 28 grams of a mixture containing cocaine were abated by the lack of a savings clause in the 1985 repeal and reenactment of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. Blount v. State, 181 Ga. App. 330, 352 S.E.2d 220 (1986).

While clearly after July 1, 1985, the date this section was repealed and reenacted, the legislature no longer regarded as trafficking in cocaine the possession of an undetermined and perhaps infinitesimal amount of cocaine in a mixture, it is clear the legislature continued to regard selling, manufacturing, delivering or bringing into this state and possessing 342.4 grams of pure cocaine to be trafficking and, moreover, increased the penalty. Therefore, the prosecution of such conduct under the former law did not abate with re-defining the crime and the reenactment of harsher criminal sanctions. Thus, the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to 25 years, 15 years in confinement and ten years on probation, with a $250,000 fine, which was the penalty that attached to defendant's conduct under the law by which the defendant was prosecuted. Barrett v. State, 183 Ga. App. 729, 360 S.E.2d 400 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Gonzalez v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993); Mataluni v. State, 185 Ga. App. 551, 364 S.E.2d 911 (1988).

When at the time of the indictment and trial O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) provided that any person who was knowingly in actual possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine committed the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine, but effective July 1, 1985, the new statute deleted the mixture language and trafficking in cocaine was no longer defined as being in possession of "any mixture containing cocaine," and the July 1, 1985, effective date occurred prior to the time that the defendant's appeal had reached final disposition in the Court of Appeals, the repeal of the statute abated the prosecution, as the prosecution had not reached final disposition in the highest court. Blackshear v. Wharton, 258 Ga. 427, 370 S.E.2d 152 (1988).

- Repeal date of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) occurred on July 1, 1986, the effective date of a 1986 amendment to that subsection (a), and not the date of the amendment's enactment on March 28, 1986, so that there was no gap between March 28 and July 1 in which cocaine trafficking was legal. Rodriguez v. State, 184 Ga. App. 819, 363 S.E.2d 23 (1987).

- Redefinition of the crime of trafficking in cocaine prior to the defendant's conviction did not void the conviction when the conviction was authorized under the redefinition of the crime of trafficking in cocaine as well as under the former version of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. Nichols v. State, 186 Ga. App. 314, 367 S.E.2d 266 (1988).

- When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the state failed to show that the defendant was in "actual possession" of cocaine as was then required by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a), and the appellate courts of this state have held that a charge such as the one given in the defendant's case constitutes reversible error because there is a substantial likelihood that the instruction could have been interpreted by the jury as authorizing a conviction for trafficking in cocaine on a finding of mere constructive possession, the instruction was substantially in error and harmful as a matter of law, and the court reversed the defendant's conviction for the offense of trafficking in cocaine. Riley v. State, 191 Ga. App. 781, 383 S.E.2d 172 (1989).

- Conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was void when the indictment alleged a conspiracy to commit the crime of possessing a sufficient amount of substance containing cocaine and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review by certiorari after July 1, 1985, the date of repeal of the former trafficking in cocaine statute; use of the word "substance" in the indictment was a synonym for "mixture" as used in the statute. Gonzalez v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993).

Conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was void where the indictment alleged a conspiracy to commit the crime of possessing a sufficient amount of a substance containing cocaine and alleged that the defendant committed the overt act of possessing 945 grams of cocaine at a certain time, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review by certiorari after July 1, 1985, the date of repeal of the former trafficking in cocaine statute. Gonzalez v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993).

- Inclusion of language of the applicable Code section which was not pertinent to the indictment was not reversible error because illegal possession is included in the crime illegal sale. Sullivan v. State, 204 Ga. App. 274, 418 S.E.2d 807 (1992).

- When a defendant acts as a procuring agent in this state in arranging the sale of controlled substances in another state, the defendant thereby commits an offense defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, and this state has jurisdiction to impose punishment. Raftis v. State, 175 Ga. App. 893, 334 S.E.2d 857 (1985).

- Amount of controlled substance was chosen as the basis for distinguishing the crime of trafficking from the somewhat less serious crimes described in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30. Twenty-eight grams was chosen as the dividing line. Bassett v. Lemacks, 258 Ga. 367, 370 S.E.2d 146 (1988).

- District court's sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) to alien's illegal re-entry conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) and (b)(2) was proper because Georgia's three-tiered drug scheme recognized that someone in possession of 87 grams of methamphetamine planned on distributing and thereby "trafficking" those drugs; therefore, the alien's previous conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) constituted drug trafficking for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) of the manual. United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1026, 124 S. Ct. 589, 157 L. Ed. 2d 447 (2003).

- There is no requirement that the proof of actual possession be by direct and not circumstantial evidence. Heath v. State, 186 Ga. App. 655, 368 S.E.2d 346 (1988).

§§ 16-13-20 and16-13-26(1)(D). - When the total weight of the substances seized from the defendant was only 24.4 grams of cocaine, the defendant argued that the only Georgia statute that proscribes possession of cocaine is O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, which prohibits the possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine. However, although that section deals with knowing, actual possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine or any mixture containing cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-26(1)(D) (prior to 1988 amendment inserting "Cocaine," at the beginning of the paragraph) lists "Coca leaves, any salt, compound, derivative, stereoisomers of cocaine, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, stereoisomers of cocaine, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances . . . ," which includes cocaine. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, the unlawful possession of any controlled substance, regardless of amount, constitutes an offense. Dixon v. State, 180 Ga. App. 222, 348 S.E.2d 742 (1986) (decided prior to 1988 amendment of § 16-13-26).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion in autrefois convict/plea in bar because the federal and state prosecutions required proof of a fact that the other did not as the defendant's federal conviction for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance required the agreement of two or more persons to commit a criminal act, and the state trafficking charge did not require proof of an agreement between two or more people to commit a criminal act, and required proof of the possession of the cocaine. Stembridge v. State, 331 Ga. App. 199, 770 S.E.2d 285 (2015).

- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a general demurrer to an indictment; even if a general demurrer had been filed, there would have been no error in denying it as the defendant could not have admitted all the facts and still have been innocent. Harris v. State, 258 Ga. App. 669, 574 S.E.2d 871 (2002).

- Totality of the circumstances supported the finding that the defendants not only had knowledge of the drug transport but directly and actively participated in the transport, since the defendants were nervous at the initial traffic stop, and had vague accounts of visiting a sick relative. Eliopulos v. State, 203 Ga. App. 262, 416 S.E.2d 745, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 745 (1992).

- Because defendant delivered a package containing drugs to an informant's girlfriend who was working with police, and there was no evidence that the defendant asked the girlfriend to engage in anything or that the defendant used language indicating a clear and present danger that a felony would be committed, the defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on criminal solicitation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-4-7(a). Dimas v. State, 276 Ga. App. 245, 622 S.E.2d 914 (2005).

Court did not err in jury charge by quoting statute in the statute's entirety, and the fact that the trafficking charge also stated that possession was required did not by itself result in charging an offense with which the defendant was not charged since the jury was informed there were two separate counts and the indictment gave the defendant notice that the defendant would have to defend against both counts. Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 340 S.E.2d 199 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990).

- Failure of the defendant to raise the defendant's constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 in the trial court, either before the jury rendered the jury's verdict or in an amended motion for a new trial, caused such a challenge to be unpreserved for review on appeal. Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 523, 615 S.E.2d 592 (2005).

- Because the defendant's consent to search was not obtained by deceit, the defendant voluntarily accompanied officers to the motel room searched, and the consent was not the product of an illegal detention, suppression of the contraband seized was unwarranted. Miller v. State, 287 Ga. App. 179, 651 S.E.2d 103 (2007).

- Because the defendant did not grant consent to an officer to search the defendant's purse, and no other exception to the warrant requirement allowing a search of the purse applied, the trial court properly granted suppression of the drugs seized from within the purse. State v. Fulghum, 288 Ga. App. 746, 655 S.E.2d 321 (2007).

Cited in Speight v. Whiddon, 516 F. Supp. 905 (M.D. Ga. 1980); Little v. State, 157 Ga. App. 462, 278 S.E.2d 17 (1981); Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738 (1981); Hartley v. State, 159 Ga. App. 157, 282 S.E.2d 684 (1981); Printup v. State, 159 Ga. App. 574, 284 S.E.2d 82 (1981); State v. Shuman, 161 Ga. App. 304, 287 S.E.2d 757 (1982); Dalton v. State, 162 Ga. App. 7, 289 S.E.2d 801 (1982); Arp v. State, 249 Ga. 403, 291 S.E.2d 495 (1982); Connell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 53, 293 S.E.2d 367 (1982); McAdoo v. State, 164 Ga. App. 23, 295 S.E.2d 114 (1982); McDaniel v. State, 172 Ga. App. 562, 323 S.E.2d 866 (1984); Jones v. State, 174 Ga. App. 783, 331 S.E.2d 633 (1985); Brunetti v. State, 176 Ga. App. 184, 335 S.E.2d 414 (1985); Hall v. State, 176 Ga. App. 498, 336 S.E.2d 604 (1985); Dunn v. State, 178 Ga. App. 6, 341 S.E.2d 877 (1986); Luke v. State, 178 Ga. App. 614, 344 S.E.2d 452 (1986); Robinson v. State, 256 Ga. 564, 350 S.E.2d 464 (1986); Hamilton v. State, 181 Ga. App. 279, 351 S.E.2d 705 (1986); Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 353 S.E.2d 572 (1987); Sablon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 128, 355 S.E.2d 88 (1987); Lockwood v. State, 184 Ga. App. 262, 361 S.E.2d 195 (1987); State v. Benzaquen, 184 Ga. App. 392, 361 S.E.2d 503 (1987); McIntosh v. State, 185 Ga. App. 612, 365 S.E.2d 454 (1988); Borda v. State, 187 Ga. App. 49, 369 S.E.2d 327 (1988); Beguiristain v. State, 187 Ga. App. 164, 369 S.E.2d 774 (1988); Garcia v. State, 187 Ga. App. 166, 369 S.E.2d 776 (1988); Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 371 S.E.2d 428 (1988); Deych v. State, 188 Ga. App. 901, 374 S.E.2d 753 (1988); Coleman v. State, 189 Ga. App. 366, 375 S.E.2d 663 (1988); Christopher v. State, 190 Ga. App. 393, 379 S.E.2d 205 (1989); Villa v. State, 190 Ga. App. 530, 379 S.E.2d 417 (1989); Samuel v. State, 190 Ga. App. 539, 379 S.E.2d 571 (1989); Ramirez v. State, 190 Ga. App. 889, 380 S.E.2d 323 (1989); Brown v. State, 190 Ga. App. 818, 380 S.E.2d 349 (1989); Wiltshire v. State, 191 Ga. App. 426, 382 S.E.2d 166 (1989); State v. Freeman, 191 Ga. App. 541, 382 S.E.2d 664 (1989); Allen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 623, 382 S.E.2d 690 (1989); Oglesby v. State, 192 Ga. App. 165, 384 S.E.2d 192 (1989); Bassett v. State, 192 Ga. App. 293, 384 S.E.2d 402 (1989); Causey v. State, 192 Ga. App. 294, 384 S.E.2d 674 (1989); Ragin v. State, 192 Ga. App. 686, 385 S.E.2d 770 (1989); Betha v. State, 192 Ga. App. 789, 386 S.E.2d 515 (1989); Allen v. State, 193 Ga. App. 16, 387 S.E.2d 11 (1989); Boatwright v. State, 193 Ga. App. 141, 387 S.E.2d 386 (1989); Hamlin v. State, 193 Ga. App. 453, 388 S.E.2d 48 (1989); Romano v. State, 193 Ga. App. 682, 388 S.E.2d 757 (1989); McCrief v. State, 193 Ga. App. 667, 388 S.E.2d 859 (1989); Jackson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 636, 388 S.E.2d 881 (1989); McCrief v. State, 260 Ga. 87, 390 S.E.2d 32 (1990); Randall v. State, 194 Ga. App. 153, 390 S.E.2d 74 (1990); Mallarino v. State, 194 Ga. App. 212, 390 S.E.2d 114 (1990); Garmon v. State, 194 Ga. App. 401, 390 S.E.2d 882 (1990); Rose v. State, 195 Ga. App. 399, 393 S.E.2d 459 (1990); Boatwright v. State, 195 Ga. App. 440, 393 S.E.2d 707 (1990); Hollingsworth v. State, 195 Ga. App. 502, 394 S.E.2d 131 (1990); Jones v. State, 195 Ga. App. 868, 395 S.E.2d 69 (1990); Langham v. State, 196 Ga. App. 71, 395 S.E.2d 345 (1990); White v. State, 196 Ga. App. 813, 397 S.E.2d 299 (1990); Santana v. State, 197 Ga. App. 204, 397 S.E.2d 629 (1990); Knight v. State, 197 Ga. App. 250, 398 S.E.2d 202 (1990); Sanchez v. State, 197 Ga. App. 470, 398 S.E.2d 740 (1990); Guerrero v. State, 198 Ga. App. 397, 401 S.E.2d 749 (1991); Jones v. State, 198 Ga. App. 881, 403 S.E.2d 867 (1991); Dumas v. State, 199 Ga. App. 582, 405 S.E.2d 571 (1991); Murrell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 231, 407 S.E.2d 460 (1991); Oyola v. Bowers, 947 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1991); King v. State, 201 Ga. App. 391, 411 S.E.2d 278 (1991); Merriman v. State, 201 Ga. App. 817, 412 S.E.2d 598 (1991); Kemp v. State, 201 Ga. App. 629, 411 S.E.2d 880 (1991); King v. State, 203 Ga. App. 287, 416 S.E.2d 842 (1992); Orman v. State, 207 Ga. App. 671, 428 S.E.2d 813 (1993); State v. Williams, 212 Ga. App. 164, 441 S.E.2d 501 (1994); Capers v. State, 220 Ga. App. 869, 470 S.E.2d 887 (1996); Lovain v. State, 253 Ga. App. 271, 558 S.E.2d 812 (2002); Palmer v. State, 257 Ga. App. 650, 572 S.E.2d 27 (2002); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. App. 337, 574 S.E.2d 398 (2002); Lawton v. State, 281 Ga. 459, 640 S.E.2d 14 (2007); Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga. App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468 (2008); Locher v. State, 293 Ga. App. 67, 666 S.E.2d 468 (2008); Kim v. State, 298 Ga. App. 402, 680 S.E.2d 469 (2009); Scott v. State, 298 Ga. App. 376, 680 S.E.2d 482 (2009); Proctor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 388, 680 S.E.2d 493 (2009); Thomas v. State, 299 Ga. App. 235, 682 S.E.2d 325 (2009); Perkins v. State, 300 Ga. App. 464, 685 S.E.2d 300 (2009); Cox v. State, 300 Ga. App. 109, 684 S.E.2d 147 (2009); Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 166, 692 S.E.2d 766 (2010); Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012); Smith v. State, 323 Ga. App. 668, 747 S.E.2d 859 (2013); State v. Terrell, 327 Ga. App. 745, 761 S.E.2d 142 (2014); State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (2015); Jenkins v. State, 345 Ga. App. 684, 813 S.E.2d 438 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 807 (Ga. 2018);.

Law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of the thing. A person who, though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing is then in constructive possession. Lockwood v. State, 257 Ga. 796, 364 S.E.2d 574 (1988); Chews v. State, 187 Ga. App. 600, 371 S.E.2d 124 (1988).

- Either actual or constructive possession suffices to establish the element of "possession" necessary to support a conviction of trafficking in controlled substances. Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 405 S.E.2d 716 (1991); Gamble v. State, 223 Ga. App. 653, 478 S.E.2d 455 (1996).

- Person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is in "actual possession" of the thing, as when a person has the keys to a locked airplane or a locked suitcase where marijuana is found. Evans v. State, 167 Ga. App. 396, 306 S.E.2d 691 (1983).

Legislature did not intend the phrase "actual possession" in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) to mean that a person would be holding marijuana in the person's hand or have the marijuana physically on the person because the punishment for trafficking in marijuana is divided into three categories of 100 to less than 2,000 pounds; 2,000 to less than 10,000 pounds; and more than 10,000 pounds. For a person to have such large amounts of marijuana "on his person" in order to constitute actual possession would be a physical impossibility in most instances. Evans v. State, 167 Ga. App. 396, 306 S.E.2d 691 (1983) (decided prior to 1988 amendment which deleted "actual" preceding "possession"), overruled on other grounds, Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910 (1984).

"Actual possession" required by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 to authorize a conviction for trafficking refers not merely to physical custody, but refers to actual active participation in the possession of such substances so as to be a party to the crime of trafficking. Dukes v. State, 186 Ga. App. 815, 369 S.E.2d 259 (1988); Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 370 S.E.2d 348 (1988).

- Although the defendant never had physical possession of cocaine and marijuana in the cab from which the cocaine was delivered, the defendant aided and abetted its actual physical possession and is guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-13-31 as a party to the crime. The "actual possession" required by § 16-13-31 to authorize a conviction for trafficking refers not merely to physical custody but to actual active participation in the possession of such substances so as to be a party to the crime of trafficking. Holder v. State, 194 Ga. App. 790, 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990).

- Despite the defendant's contrary claim, the state presented sufficient evidence that the defendant and the codefendants had joint constructive possession of the contraband seized, and that the jury could reject the defendant's equal access defense, given that: (1) some of that contraband was found in a bedroom in which the defendant slept and underneath the defendant's mattress; and (2) a large amount of cash was found in the defendant's purse. Castillo v. State, 288 Ga. App. 828, 655 S.E.2d 695 (2007).

- When immediate and exclusive possession of an automobile, locker room, or other premises is shown, the inference is authorized that the owner of such property is the owner of what is contained therein, and this inference has been referred to as a rebuttable presumption; however, as to automobiles, the rule does not apply when there is evidence in the case that the defendant has not been in possession of the vehicle for a period of time prior to the discovery of the contraband or that others have had access to the vehicle. Robinson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 769, 334 S.E.2d 358 (1985).

- If a person is driving an automobile or has an automobile in the person's possession, custody, or control, all that is in that automobile is presumed to be the person's and in the person's possession, and whether or not the evidence was sufficient to rebut the inference arising from the finding of the drugs in the automobile is a question for the jury to decide. Reed v. State, 186 Ga. App. 539, 367 S.E.2d 809 (1988).

The "actual possession" that was required for a conviction for trafficking in cocaine did not mean that the person had to be holding the contraband in the person's hand or have the contraband physically on the person. If a person was driving an automobile or had an automobile in the person's possession, custody, or control, all property in that automobile was presumed to be the person's and in the person's possession. Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 577, 394 S.E.2d 359 (1990).

Trial court did not err in denying either a motion for directed verdict or a motion for new trial based on sufficiency grounds because the evidence supported the finding that the defendant was in possession of bags of cocaine and marijuana found in the cargo area of the car when stopped and, although the defendant did not own the car, the fact that the defendant was driving the car gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant possessed the drugs found within the car, which the defendant failed to rebut. Cromartie v. State, 348 Ga. App. 563, 824 S.E.2d 32 (2019).

Head of household presumption of possession of contraband found therein is no longer a viable presumption in Georgia. Ramsay v. State, 175 Ga. App. 97, 332 S.E.2d 390 (1985).

- Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), trafficking in methamphetamine, § 16-13-31(e), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(a)(5), because the state failed to prove any connection between the defendant and the contraband other than spatial proximity; no drugs were found on the defendant's person, and the defendant was not seen in proximity to the well-hidden drugs. Cobarrubias-Garcia v. State, 316 Ga. App. 787, 730 S.E.2d 455 (2012).

- When a customs agent had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant could have been carrying drugs internally, the trial court properly denied the defendant's contention that the defendant signed a consent form out of frustration and due to fatigue. Blackwood v. State, 261 Ga. App. 110, 581 S.E.2d 724 (2003).

Quantity of Contraband

Legislative intent.

- By enacting O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(b), the legislature clearly authorized a trafficking conviction based upon knowing possession of four or more grams of opium; although the defendant disagreed that such possession established "trafficking," the appellate court could not ignore the clear statutory language governing the case. Nahid v. State, 276 Ga. App. 687, 624 S.E.2d 264 (2005).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's post-trial motion to require the state crime lab to test the substance contained in the corner tie that the defendant sold to an undercover officer as heroin to determine the purity of the heroin it contained because the defendant was able to elicit testimony from the expert from the state crime lab that the tests the expert performed did not establish the purity of the substance and that the crime lab did not have the ability to test for the purity of heroin contained in a sample; O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(b) does not require that the substance containing heroin exceed any purity threshold. Thomas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 279, 701 S.E.2d 895 (2010).

- It is that quantity of drugs averred in the indictment of which the offender has been convicted, rather than the amount of drugs which the evidence establishes that the offender possessed in excess of the amount averred in the indictment, that controls in determining which mandatory minimum sentence is operative under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a). Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga. App. 398, 379 S.E.2d 210 (1989), aff'd, 194 Ga. App. 212, 390 S.E.2d 114 (1990).

- Language of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, "28 grams or more," would not allow the prosecutor to divide the amount discovered during a search for the purpose of creating multiple charges. Snoke v. State, 237 Ga. App. 686, 516 S.E.2d 541 (1999).

Sufficiency of Evidence

Evidence sufficient to support conviction for heroin trafficking.

- Jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in heroin was authorized when officers found a plate containing over four grams of a mixture containing heroin, five loaded handguns, drug paraphernalia, items used in the business of trafficking heroin and over $1,000 on the bed in the defendant's apartment. Hutchins v. State, 204 Ga. App. 690, 420 S.E.2d 374 (1992).

Surveillance showing persons entering for approximately a minute prior to leaving, a controlled buy by a confidential and reliable informant, and the fact that the defendant had a set of keys which opened a black nylon bag found on the bed inside the bedroom that contained heroin, all provided sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of trafficking. Ibekilo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 384, 626 S.E.2d 592 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in heroin in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(b)(3) because the expert witness from the state crime lab testified that the witness examined the substance contained in the corner tie that the defendant sold to the undercover officer as heroin, the witness took a representative sampling of different parts of the substance, the witness subjected the samples to three separate tests, and the witness concluded that the substance contained heroin; whether the substance in the corner tie was a mixture containing heroin or merely a "look alike" substance was a question for the jury as was the weight to be given to the testimony of the state's expert from the crime lab. Thomas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 279, 701 S.E.2d 895 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in heroin because the defendant constructively possessed the heroin as the heroin was discovered inside of a tea box in the kitchen of the apartment, but other items throughout the apartment that were related to the distribution of heroin were not hidden; and officers discovered $3,100 in cash on the defendant and a small baggie of heroin hidden in the accomplice's private area; and because the defendant knew that the heroin found in the kitchen weighed 28 grams or more as the heroin weighed 81.68 grams - nearly three times the threshold weight of 28 grams; and a digital scale, a cutting agent, cutting tools, and a tally sheet to record amounts of drugs sold were found in the kitchen. Jones v. State, 339 Ga. App. 95, 791 S.E.2d 625 (2016).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial because even assuming that the defendant established a prima facie case of entrapment, the jury was authorized to find the state's evidence rebutted the defense beyond a reasonable doubt as the jury heard an audio recording of the defendant boasting that the defendant had sold a gram of heroin for $65 and that no one could get clean off of the defendant's product; thus, there was some evidence to disprove entrapment. Johnson v. State, 355 Ga. App. 683, 845 S.E.2d 419 (2020).

- Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine because the evidence showed nothing more than the defendant's mere presence in the owner's house at a time when methamphetamine was not being actively manufactured. Denson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 450, 838 S.E.2d 117 (2020).

- Defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine was supported by sufficient evidence based on the state showing that police found the defendant with over 55 grams of methamphetamine in a box in a car that the defendant admitted belonged to the defendant. Smith v. State, 350 Ga. App. 496, 829 S.E.2d 776 (2019).

- See Clark v. State, 184 Ga. App. 380, 361 S.E.2d 682, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 909, 361 S.E.2d 682 (1987); Rice v. State, 224 Ga. App. 725, 481 S.E.2d 839 (1997).

- Despite the defendant's denial of any knowledge of the existence of drugs and other contraband in a motel room in which the defendant was the sole occupant, evidence of the contraband found in close proximity to other evidence which the defendant admitted owning, when coupled with the fact that only one key to the room existed, which the defendant admitted to having, and that no one had brought anything into the room since the person the defendant alleged was the owner of the evidence had left, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-106,16-13-2,16-13-30, and16-13-31. Hall v. State, 283 Ga. App. 266, 641 S.E.2d 264 (2007).

- Defendant was entitled to reversal of the convictions for possession with intent to distribute and trafficking drugs because the defendant was merely present at a residence, which the defendant did not own or lease, when a search warrant was executed, there was no evidence the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the drugs, and there was no evidence the defendant was a party to these crimes. Scott v. State, 326 Ga. App. 115, 756 S.E.2d 220 (2014).

- Evidence was not sufficient to convict the defendant after the defendant "acted a little nervous" at the scene, scene, a pager was found in the glove compartment, and that in the defendant's wallet was a list "full of different phone numbers" as the state adduced no evidence to connect the pager, the phone numbers, or the digits with dollar signs to telltale signs of criminality. Hughes v. State, 215 Ga. App. 6, 449 S.E.2d 547 (1994).

- Given the substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt, a trial court did not abuse the courts discretion by permitting evidence showing the commission of similar transactions, in the nature of two out-of-state traffic stops which led to searches and discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia on the defendant, because there was no reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different had the evidence been excluded. Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 523, 615 S.E.2d 592 (2005).

- With regard to drug-related convictions, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because the search warrant was supported by probable cause in that the confidential informant took a position against penal interest by reporting to officers that the informant bought drugs from the defendant, the officer stated that the information supplied by the confidential informant was confirmed by conducting three controlled drug purchases from the defendant, and the controlled buys strongly corroborated the reliability of the informant and demonstrated a fair probability that contraband would be found in the defendant's house. Reid v. State, 321 Ga. App. 653, 742 S.E.2d 166 (2013).

Sentencing

Sentence reduction provision not unconstitutionally vague.

- Term "substantial assistance" in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)), regarding reduced sentences for those convicted of drug trafficking, is not too vague for persons of ordinary intelligence to understand. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244 (1986).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)), regarding reduced sentences for those convicted of drug trafficking, does not compel a defendant to exchange the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights for a chance at a reduced sentence as it only requires the defendant to provide information about other persons involved in the same crime for which the defendant has already been convicted. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244 (1986).

- Most reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1) was to supplant the general punishment provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) with a specific and potentially more harsh punishment provision for manufacturing methamphetamine. Richards v. State, 290 Ga. App. 360, 659 S.E.2d 651 (2008).

- If separate offenses charged in one indictment were committed at the same time and place as parts of a continuous criminal act, and inspired by the same criminal intent, they are susceptible of only one punishment. York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000).

§§ 16-13-31 and17-10-2, dealing with presentence hearings. - See Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981).

- It is the conviction of the specific trafficking offense which authorizes a particular sentence and not the language of the indictment. The defendants' sentence was within the maximum sentence for the offense and was therefore not invalid or illegal. Moon v. State, 194 Ga. App. 777, 392 S.E.2d 19 (1990).

- In view of the specific sentences required for a specified offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, subsection (f) (now (g)) is a general provision and in large part a superfluity. Steward v. State, 182 Ga. App. 659, 356 S.E.2d 890 (1987).

- Mandatory sentence provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) (now (f)), by its express terms, is removed from the application of the probated and suspended sentence provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a). Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716 (1984).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(1), the trial court lacked the authority to probate or suspend sentences imposed against two defendants in unrelated criminal actions, and neither the 2004 nor the 2006 amendments to the general sentencing provisions under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(1) were relevant; moreover, because O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-6.1 and17-10-6.2 were statutes that defined certain categories of crimes and provided the sentencing guidelines for those categories, it did not appear that the list of these two exceptions normally would have included § 16-13-31 or any other specific criminal statute, and any omission would be significant only with regard to a statute that defined classes or categories of crimes. Gillen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 616, 649 S.E.2d 832 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1780, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 809 (Ga. 2007).

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) (now (f)) does not conflict with parole authority of State Board of Pardons and Paroles granted under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II). Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981).

- Acts constituting "substantial assistance" as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)) may be brought to the attention of the sentencing court by motion of either the district attorney or the defendant, or the sentencing court may make its own inquiry into the matter. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244 (1986); Swantner v. State, 244 Ga. App. 372, 535 S.E.2d 343 (2000).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)) does not by its terms require the judge to impose a reduced or suspended sentence in the event a defendant has rendered such assistance but instead merely authorizes the judge to do so. Lastohkein v. State, 199 Ga. App. 555, 405 S.E.2d 554 (1991).

- Because the defendant's 25-year sentence for trafficking in cocaine was within the statutory limit, the defendant presented no basis upon which to vacate the sentence of imprisonment. Brown v. State, 353 Ga. App. 559, 839 S.E.2d 21 (2020).

- Defendant failed to prove a Brady violation in the state's failure to reveal a deal the state made with a codefendant in exchange for the codefendant's substantial assistance because the defendant presented no evidence that there was a deal but merely argued that there must have been one because of the codefendant's sentence; all of the evidence showed there was no deal. Pihlman v. State, 292 Ga. App. 612, 664 S.E.2d 904 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1954, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 977 (Ga. 2008).

- Recidivist sentence imposed upon the defendant was upheld on appeal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-7(a) and16-13-31(a)(1)(A) and (h), based on evidence of the defendant's 1993 convictions; hence, the defendant was properly sentenced to the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the offense, and ordered to serve the mandatory minimum of 10 years. Smith v. State, 282 Ga. App. 317, 638 S.E.2d 440 (2006).

- When the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 15 years in prison for three drug offenses, the trial court did not err in failing to sentence the defendant below the mandatory minimum because the trial court's statements during the sentencing hearing clearly indicated an awareness that the court had the discretion to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence; there was nothing in the trial court's statement that indicated the court was applying a mechanical policy or that there was an outright refusal to consider the defendant's request to deviate; and the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in concluding that the interests of justice factor did not weigh in favor of deviating from the mandatory minimum sentence. Reed v. State, 342 Ga. App. 466, 804 S.E.2d 129 (2017).

- Defendant's case was remanded for resentencing after a conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine because the trial court considered an uncertified Arkansas docket sheet in aggravation of sentence and a Tennessee conviction that might not qualify as a prior felony in Georgia under the recidivist statute. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga. App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Cocaine

In General

- Since at the time of the offense, O.C.G.A § 16-13-31(a) defined two methods of committing the crime of trafficking in cocaine, one dealing with pure cocaine and the other with mixtures containing cocaine, by amending the trafficking statute in 1985 to define the crime as "actual possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine," the legislature demonstrated an intent to repeal that portion of the trafficking statute which defined the crime as "actual possession of 28 grams or more . . of any mixture containing cocaine . . . ," and a defendant convicted thereafter of trafficking in a mixture is being held under an illegal sentence and must be discharged in a habeas corpus proceeding. Bassett v. Lemacks, 258 Ga. 367, 370 S.E.2d 146 (1988).

- Offense "trafficking in cocaine" is committed whether cocaine is delivered in a pure form or whether the cocaine is present in a mixture containing other substances, as long as the quantity of the mass containing cocaine is more than 28 grams. Belcher v. State, 161 Ga. App. 442, 288 S.E.2d 299 (1982); Godett v. State, 205 Ga. App. 545, 423 S.E.2d 34 (1992).

- Indictment charging the defendant with trafficking in cocaine is not at fatal variance with proof at trial that a powder found in the defendant's suitcase was cocaine hydrochloride, a salt of cocaine, because under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-26 the definition of cocaine includes any salt of cocaine. Britt v. State, 186 Ga. App. 418, 367 S.E.2d 298 (1988).

Ownership of the contraband is not an element of the offense of trafficking in cocaine. Reeves v. State, 192 Ga. App. 12, 383 S.E.2d 613 (1989).

- There is no requirement in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 that the state either allege or prove that defendant had an intent to distribute cocaine. Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716 (1984).

- Mere fact that a defendant is traveling with someone who is convicted for possessing cocaine does not establish that the defendant is a party to the crime of possession even if the defendant may have known that the defendant's companion is carrying drugs. Haxho v. State, 186 Ga. App. 393, 367 S.E.2d 282 (1988).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 requires as the mens rea that the defendant know that the defendant possesses cocaine but it does not require that the defendant know that the substance possessed weighs at least 28 grams. Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga. App. 661, 463 S.E.2d 36 (1995).

Procedure

Indictment based on actual possession.

- Because the evidence was that the defendant was in actual possession of cocaine buried in the defendant's backyard, the defendant could not claim harmful error arising out of the superior court's charge indicating that the jury could convict upon a finding of actual, joint, or constructive possession thereof notwithstanding the defendant's indictment upon actual possession alone. Williams v. State, 247 Ga. App. 88, 543 S.E.2d 402 (2000).

- When an indictment incorrectly charged the defendant with possession of a substance composed of a purity of one-tenth of a percent of cocaine, and the defendant moved at trial to dismiss the indictment, the trial court properly refused and constructively amended the indictment before the jury to read "ten percent." By waiting until trial to complain of the form of the indictment, the defendant was too late; motions to quash must be entered before trial, or the motions are waived. Arena v. State, 194 Ga. App. 883, 392 S.E.2d 264 (1990).

- Denial of habeas relief was reversed after conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was based on an indictment alleging "a conspiracy to commit the crime of possessing a sufficient amount of a substance containing cocaine": this indictment was invalid as a matter of law. Gonzalez v. Abbott, 986 F.2d 461 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 894, 114 S. Ct. 257, 126 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1993).

Absence of the word "purity" from an indictment charging trafficking in cocaine did not render the indictment void as the Georgia Supreme Court itself has omitted the word when describing the crime prohibited by the statute. Clark v. State, 266 Ga. App. 334, 596 S.E.2d 783 (2004).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment accusing the defendant of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-13-31(a)(1); purity did not have to be alleged in an attempt case, particularly since there was no cocaine involved in the instant case, the indictment satisfied O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) by tracking the applicable statutes in a manner that was easily understood and by apprising the defendant of both the crime and the manner in which it was alleged to have been committed, and if the defendant admitted the allegations precisely as set forth in the indictment, the defendant would have been guilty of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0408, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2007).

- Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). The state was not required to prove an intent to distribute, and the determination of guilt or innocence depended largely on whether the jury believed the defendant, who claimed that some drugs were thrown into the defendant's lap and that the defendant panicked, picked the drugs up, and threw the drugs out of the window. Hancock v. State, 293 Ga. App. 595, 667 S.E.2d 437 (2008).

Evidence

Motel safe with cocaine inside.

- Sufficient evidence supported the conviction of the defendant for trafficking cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1); during a police search of the defendant's motel room, to which the defendant consented, police discovered that a safe key on the defendant's person opened a safe that contained 58.1 grams of cocaine. Nelson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 585, 618 S.E.2d 192 (2005).

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the evidence showing more than mere proximity to the cocaine in that the defendant was alone in the hotel room when the defendant heard the knock on the door; no one entered or exited the room prior to the search; paraphernalia commonly used to prepare crack cocaine was openly displayed on the counter; and the jacket in which the cocaine was found was the same jacket the defendant wore during a prior arrest that had been videotaped at which time the defendant was also found to have possessed cocaine. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. 2009).

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq.; the defendant was found alone in a bathroom in which the toilet contained 90 grams of cocaine and a large amount of cash, and a key to a car, which was later found to contain marijuana, was found in the defendant's pants. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372 (2006).

- Evidence was sufficient to support a drug trafficking charge because, inter alia, an officer observed a steady flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic around two residences, the officer explained that a suspected seller would enter the first home and then return to the second home to complete a sale, and after completing five or six sales, the suspected seller would return to the first home, the officer observed almost 20 of these transactions and, in executing a search warrant, officers saw the defendant and the spouse leave a bathroom in one of the homes, and officers found cocaine in the pipes of the bathroom's toilet. Blue v. State, 275 Ga. App. 671, 621 S.E.2d 616 (2005).

- Defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine was supported by sufficient evidence that officers found more than 43 grams of cocaine under the hood of the vehicle the defendant was driving after a drug dog alerted that contraband was located inside the vehicle and a subsequent search based on the alert. Garvin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 242, 641 S.E.2d 176 (2006).

- Defendant failed to rebut the presumption of possession of bricks of cocaine found in the defendant's pickup truck following a road block stop because the defendant claimed that the truck was the defendant's, the defendant asserted ownership over the contents of the truck, the defendant was the sole occupant of the truck, and there was no showing that others had access to the truck bed. Maldonado v. State, 313 Ga. App. 511, 722 S.E.2d 123 (2012).

- While a defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to exclude the possibility that the cocaine belonged solely to the defendant's passenger, the testimony of the passenger that the passenger dropped the drugs out of the truck after the defendant threw the drugs in the passenger's lap was adequately corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the facts that the defendant had more than $2,000 in the defendant's pocket and that the defendant was the owner and driver of the truck from which the drugs were thrown; the defendant was, thus, properly convicted of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) and possession of cocaine as a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. Wingfield v. State, 297 Ga. App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704 (2009).

- Knowledge of the weight of cocaine in a case of cocaine trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) was shown by evidence that crack cocaine packaged for resale, a 72.65-gram slab of crack cocaine beside a mirror and cutting tools, 37 individual packets of powder cocaine, digital scales, sandwich bags, and loaded handguns, were in a home defendant rented. Scott v. State, 331 Ga. App. 395, 771 S.E.2d 93 (2015).

Circumstances of the possession, including the defendant driving the car from which the cocaine was thrown, the presence of a very large quantity of narcotics in the car, the display of nervousness during the stop, the inconsistent statements made, the scales found on the passenger floorboard, the defendant's spontaneous admissions, and the weight provided sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for trafficking to show knowing possession of more than 200 grams of the drug. Robinson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 872, 772 S.E.2d 223 (2015).

- State proved the conspiracy to traffic cocaine charge by showing that the defendant knowingly possessed 28 grams or more of cocaine and that one of the conspirators took an overt act to possess the cocaine. The conviction was not invalid on the ground that the indictment alleged the defendant possessed pure cocaine, but the evidence showed that the cocaine was a mixture, as the crime could be proved by either showing that a defendant possessed pure cocaine or cocaine mixtures, and the state was not required to prove every substantive element of the offense since the defendant was charged with conspiracy to traffic, not trafficking itself. Allison v. State, 259 Ga. App. 775, 577 S.E.2d 845 (2003).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of a drug related object, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's 2003 drug possession incident because both incidents involved the possession and concealment of cocaine and, during both incidents, the defendant described the process by which the drugs were obtained. Stover v. State, 322 Ga. App. 142, 744 S.E.2d 119 (2013).

- Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized after an automobile search given that law enforcement had reliable information that the defendant was transporting drugs, specifically, cocaine, as: (1) the defendant was on parole, and that as a condition thereof, had specifically consented to a warrantless search; (2) the information received from the informant about the defendant's actions was reliable; and (3) no evidence was presented that the officers acted in bad faith or to harass the defendant. State v. Cauley, 282 Ga. App. 191, 638 S.E.2d 351 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0420, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 148 (Ga. 2007).

- See Dixon v. State, 177 Ga. App. 506, 339 S.E.2d 775 (1986); Hamilton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 284, 349 S.E.2d 230 (1986); Wilson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 183, 387 S.E.2d 413 (1989); Roberson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 379, 393 S.E.2d 516 (1990); Ross v. State, 206 Ga. App. 1, 424 S.E.2d 308 (1992).

Accomplice's testimony combined with a videotape of defendant in the front seat of a car while talking to a confidential police informant during a drug buy was sufficient corroboration to justify defendant's convictions for selling cocaine. Etchison v. State, 266 Ga. App. 528, 597 S.E.2d 583 (2004).

Despite a sufficiency of the evidence challenge based solely on an issue of the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the defendant's conviction for the sale of cocaine was affirmed on appeal because the issue surrounding the credibility of the witness making such identification was for the jury, and not the Court of Appeals of Georgia, to determine, while resolving any inconsistencies in the testimony presented for or against the guilt of the accused. Cosby v. State, 289 Ga. App. 36, 656 S.E.2d 186 (2007).

State's uncontradicted evidence showed that the idea to sell cocaine to an informant originated with the defendant, and the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime without any undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit by the state, and therefore supported the defendant's conviction for the sale of cocaine and the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on the defense of entrapment. Lightsey v. State, 289 Ga. App. 181, 656 S.E.2d 852 (2008).

Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the defendant's conviction for selling cocaine because unrefuted testimony from an undercover agent identifying the defendant as the seller of the cocaine purchased in a controlled buy conducted by the agent was corroborated by an audio tape and the testimony of other officers at the scene. Thompson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 387, 657 S.E.2d 296 (2008).

- Witness's testimony established that the defendant sold cocaine to the victim, later struggled with the victim and the victim was shot, and the defendant threatened the witness not to tell the police; the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., and of concealing a death under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 278, 609 S.E.2d 207 (2005).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing or attempting to elude based on the defendant's involvement in a police chase that included speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a residential area and the defendant's attempt to flee on foot; a backpack that the defendant was carrying while running from the police and which was recovered from the roof of the house around which the defendant had disappeared had drugs and a pistol in the backpack. Hinton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (2009).

- Because a videotape of a cocaine sale provided independent evidence of the defendant's participation in the transaction, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for selling cocaine. McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 859, 619 S.E.2d 367 (2005).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine found by an officer after a precautionary pat-down as the officer's actions in responding to a suspicious-person complaint and immediately encountering the defendant were reasonable and neither arbitrary nor harassing; hence, the seizure was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 654, 637 S.E.2d 70 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0216, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 77 (Ga. 2007).

Police search of a defendant's bag and person which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers' lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. Green v. State, 302 Ga. App. 388, 691 S.E.2d 283 (2010).

- Court properly allowed an agent to testify on direct examination as to the agent's conversations with a coconspirator as part of the res gestae. What the coconspirator said, as related by the agent, did not refer to the defendants or directly implicate the defendants but concerned instead the quantity of cocaine being negotiated for sale. Lawrence v. State, 187 Ga. App. 211, 369 S.E.2d 531 (1988).

- Whether or not the defendant had physical possession of cocaine, the defendant aided and abetted the cocaine's actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-13-31 as a party to the crime. Barrett v. State, 183 Ga. App. 729, 360 S.E.2d 400 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Gonzalez v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993).

- Jury could find the defendant mother and her son guilty of joint actual possession of cocaine either directly or as intentional aiders and abettors or intentional encouragers. As to the indirect roles, there was ample evidence that at the least, the mother was permitting direct committers to use her apartment for trafficking, providing a haven, and her son was intentionally encouraging the trafficking by himself being a direct receiver. Heath v. State, 186 Ga. App. 655, 368 S.E.2d 346 (1988).

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of the defendant's 2004 arrest for trafficking in cocaine as a similar transaction since, despite the defendant's claims, sufficient similarities existed between the prior offense and the crime charged because the prior transaction involved the defendant's possession of a trafficking amount of cocaine and the defendant's intent and bent of mind to traffic in cocaine were at issue in the crime charged. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. 2009).

- Because the defendant's brother was prosecuted in federal court for possession of a cocaine mixture in an apartment, the state was permitted to prove the state's case against the defendant by proof of joint constructive possession; the state did not prosecute the brother for the brother's joint constructive possession of the cocaine mixture in the apartment, but the United States did prosecute the brother in federal court. Holiman v. State, 313 Ga. App. 76, 720 S.E.2d 363 (2011).

Undisputed evidence that the defendant was driving the car in which the cocaine was found gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant had possession and control over the drug and the presumption could not be rebutted by citation to the equal access rule when both the defendant and the passenger were charged with joint constructive possession. Robinson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 872, 772 S.E.2d 223 (2015).

- Defendant may be convicted under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 of trafficking in cocaine based on a finding of either actual or constructive possession. Cheeks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 446, 507 S.E.2d 204 (1998).

- Testimony by two of the defendant's cohorts that the defendant directed one of them to pull the cocaine from under the front seat and hide the cocaine in a cup was sufficient evidence of the defendant's constructive possession of the cocaine to support a trafficking conviction. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. App. 493, 583 S.E.2d 207 (2003).

- Despite sufficient evidence existing to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the conviction was reversed because the trial court violated the defendant's right to confrontation by admitting the out-of-court statements of a confidential informant that the informant purchased crack cocaine from the defendant, which was arguably the only direct or non-circumstantial evidence that the defendant was involved in the illegal drug activity occurring at the residence. Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014).

- Since the circumstantial evidence failed to establish a connection between the defendant and the cocaine other than the fact that the cocaine was found hidden in a package on the floor behind the driver's seat in a car in which the defendant was riding in the front passenger seat, a conviction for knowingly possessing more than 400 grams of a mixture containing at least 10 percent cocaine was reversed. Hodges v. State, 277 Ga. App. 174, 626 S.E.2d 133 (2006).

- Evidence was sufficient to authorize a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) as the evidence showed that, during a traffic stop, a sheriff's deputy found a package containing cocaine in a car owned and driven by the defendant. While the defendant argued that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under the equal access rule because the sole evidence of the defendant's possession of the cocaine was the defendant's ownership and possession of the car and because others had equal access to the part of the car where the cocaine was found, the equal access rule was inapplicable as the state charged all three occupants of the car with possession of cocaine; thus, the state was entitled to rely on the presumption to show that the defendant, as the car's owner and driver, had possession and control over the cocaine. Warren v. State, 314 Ga. App. 477, 724 S.E.2d 404 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1072, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 548 (Ga. 2012).

- Evidence was sufficient when the cocaine was found in plain view of the defendant in the lap of the front-seat passenger of the car the defendant was driving, scales were found in the car, and there was testimony from an accomplice. Knight v. State, 242 Ga. App. 363, 528 S.E.2d 855 (2000).

- Evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine since cocaine was found in a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, the defendant had $1,780 in the defendant's pockets, and the defendant was accompanied by the defendant's brother, who had a history of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. McKenzie v. State, 283 Ga. App. 555, 642 S.E.2d 187 (2007).

- Evidence that the defendant admitted to driving the car where the drugs were found, that the defendant had been paid to drive drugs from one county to another, that the defendant had transported drugs in the past, the defendant had been told the defendant was transporting marijuana, and a passenger told the defendant that the defendant was transporting four kilos of cocaine only as they saw police officers supported the defendant's conviction for trafficking cocaine. Martinez v. State, 315 Ga. App. 727, 728 S.E.2d 255 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew about the cocaine in a car and was acting jointly and in concert with a codefendant in the possession and transportation of the drugs because the fact that other people, including the codefendant, had equal access to the car did not automatically exculpate the defendant; instead, it was for the jury to decide whether evidence that others could have had access to the car was sufficient to overcome evidence that the defendant was in sole or joint, active or constructive possession of the drugs. Smith v. State, 316 Ga. App. 175, 728 S.E.2d 808 (2012).

Defendant's conviction of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was affirmed because the defendant was the driver of the car, and the defendant exercised dominion and control over the car throughout the car's use over the course of several days and the baggy containing the cocaine was in plain view between the defendant's driver's seat and the front passenger seat, which showed the defendant's access to the drugs. Sabb v. State, 317 Ga. App. 537, 731 S.E.2d 399 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant and the codefendant had equal access to the cocaine, the cocaine was in a package that had been open and stored with a gun directly under the defendant's seat, the defendant was carrying a large amount of cash banded into $1,000 increments, and the defendant and the others in the car offered inconsistent explanations about where they had been and who had ridden in the car was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine. McCants v. State, 338 Ga. App. 733, 791 S.E.2d 611 (2016).

- When the defendant was free to go after a valid traffic stop, was not unreasonably detained or asked numerous questions unrelated to the traffic stop, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated when a police officer requested consent to search a car and the defendant was subsequently convicted of trafficking in cocaine; the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. Daniel v. State, 260 Ga. App. 732, 580 S.E.2d 682 (2003), aff'd, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

Record supported the trial court's judgment that a vehicle checkpoint that was established to check drivers' licenses, registrations, and proof of insurance was established for a legitimate purpose, that a police officer did not violate the defendant's rights when the officer walked a drug detection dog around the defendant's car while another officer was checking the validity of the defendant's driver's license, and that police had probable cause to search the defendant's car after the dog alerted on the car; furthermore, the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence which the defendant filed after the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the defendant was properly convicted of both offenses. McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84, 601 S.E.2d 452 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendants knowingly possessed cocaine as was required to support the defendants' convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) for trafficking in cocaine; the defendants' criminal intention was shown by the fact that when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense and a seat belt violation, the defendants' stories contradicted each other, the defendants' car smelled of air freshener, the defendants could not explain who owned the car nor produce a vehicle registration for the vehicle that the defendants were traveling in, and related circumstances from which a jury could infer that the defendants knew about the large quantity of cocaine that was hidden in a secret compartment in the defendants' car, despite the defendants' claims that the defendants did not know about the cocaine. Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 151, 619 S.E.2d 821 (2005).

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine and crack pipes found during an inventory search of a car was properly denied as: (1) the police impound was not unlawful; (2) waiting a reasonable time, usually 20 minutes, prior to having the car towed, was not unreasonable as a matter of law; and (3) the officers were not required to call the defendant's relatives first. Carlisle v. State, 278 Ga. App. 528, 629 S.E.2d 512 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for cocaine trafficking was upheld on appeal as the evidence showed that an excess of twenty-eight grams of cocaine, with a purity of over 10 percent, was found in plain view in a car that the defendant was driving, directly in front of the defendant and the defendant was the only person in the car. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 98, 630 S.E.2d 612 (2006).

Defendant's knowledge that the vehicle in which the defendant was riding had a hidden compartment containing $130,000 in cash and a kilo of cocaine could be inferred from the circumstances including the defendant's claiming ownership of the car and the conflicting stories told by a codefendant and the defendant regarding their destination. Feliciano v. State, 302 Ga. App. 328, 690 S.E.2d 680 (2010).

- Trial court did not err in dismissing as untimely a defendant's motion in limine to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence with regard to the defendant being charged with cocaine trafficking for which the defendant was later convicted because the defendant waived formal arraignment and pleaded not guilty, and more than three months later the defendant filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence, arguing that both the cocaine and any testimony regarding the cocaine should be excluded on the ground that both were products of an unlawful search of the home where the defendant and the cocaine were found; the defendant was unable to circumvent the requirements of Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.1 by couching the defendant's motion to suppress as a motion in limine as the defendant's failure to file a timely motion to suppress the seized evidence waived any right to claim that the search which produced the evidence was unconstitutional. Fraser v. State, 283 Ga. App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129 (2007), overruled in part by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine seized after a valid traffic stop had essentially concluded as a state trooper's objective observations, when combined with the extensive experience the trooper possessed in drug interdiction and knowledge of drug smuggling patterns, supplied sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant might have been engaged in criminal activity. Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 642 S.E.2d 921 (2007).

In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in denying motions to suppress filed by the two defendants because: the officer (1) had a reasonable and sufficient basis for initiating a traffic stop of the car the defendants were traveling in based on a belief that the license plate on the subject vehicle might have belonged on another car, and hence, was illegally transferred; and (2) did not improperly prolong the stop once the defendants told conflicting stories of their travels and one declined to grant the officer consent to search. Andrews v. State, 289 Ga. App. 679, 658 S.E.2d 126 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0963, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 507 (Ga. 2008).

In a cocaine trafficking prosecution, although the defendant testified that an officer kicked in the door to the defendant's residence, the defendant's landlord testified that there was no damage to the front door, and the trial court was entitled to believe the officer's testimony that the door was open, thus, the officer was entitled to seize drugs seen in plain view through the open door and the defendant's motion to suppress the drugs was properly denied. Reid v. State, 298 Ga. App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine that was discovered during a search of the rental vehicle the defendant was driving based on evidence from the officer that the defendant consented to the search, although the defendant testified that the defendant did not consent and that the officer just announced that the officer was going to search. Morgan v. State, 311 Ga. App. 740, 716 S.E.2d 821 (2011).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine found on the bus the defendant was driving because the consent to search was obtained approximately 10 minutes after the stop and a prolonged traffic stop was justified based on the information the deputy learned during the course of the traffic stop, such as the inconsistencies in the defendant's statements and the log book. Rocha v. State, 317 Ga. App. 863, 733 S.E.2d 38 (2012).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine evidence found in the defendant's vehicle after a warrantless search because the fact that the officer detected the odor of marijuana emitting from the defendant's car provided probable cause to believe that the car contained drug contraband, which authorized the search of the car. Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678, 738 S.E.2d 130 (2013).

- Evidence that the 817.7 grams of powdery substance seized contained cocaine, without proof that the actual cocaine in the substance exceeded 400 grams, defeated a motion for acquittal. Quinn v. State, 171 Ga. App. 590, 320 S.E.2d 827 (1984).

Conviction for possessing cocaine was not inconsistent with acquittal of trafficking in cocaine since the cocaine upon which the possession offense was based was seized at a different time and place from the cocaine upon which the trafficking offense was based. Rogers v. State, 182 Ga. App. 599, 356 S.E.2d 546 (1987).

- After the defendant was charged with both trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to distribute, and the instructions given by the court were not separated as to the two counts, the court erred in charging both constructive and actual possession with regard to the trafficking count. While constructive possession will support possession with intent to distribute, it will not support a trafficking conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. Edwards v. State, 194 Ga. App. 571, 391 S.E.2d 137 (1990) (decided under facts existing prior to 1988 amendment which deleted "actual" preceding "possession").

- Offenses of possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute were lesser included offenses, as a matter of fact, of the trafficking offense since proof of the two possession offenses was established by "the same or less than all the facts" required to establish the distribution offense; thus, it was error to convict the defendant of all three offenses. Hancock v. State, 210 Ga. App. 528, 437 S.E.2d 610 (1993).

- Although the lab reports were less than explicit on the element of purity of the cocaine, the reports could have reasonably been interpreted to authorize the trial judge to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substances described therein were of a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine. Stroud v. State, 286 Ga. App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476 (2007).

- While the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that portion of the state's closing argument in which the prosecutor referenced a slain officer's funeral a week prior, as that fact had no relevance to the charges the defendant was facing, based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant's admission, the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute were upheld on appeal; thus, a new trial was properly denied. Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga. App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468 (2008).

- There was sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed a briefcase of cocaine, although other people were present in the house; the briefcase was in the same room where an officer had bought cocaine from the defendant no more than an hour before, the officer had seen other cocaine there at the time, and the defendant had gone to that room before admitting other officers into the house. Daugherty v. State, 283 Ga. App. 664, 642 S.E.2d 345 (2007).

- Evidence, although it was for the most part circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one defendant was knowingly in actual possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine and that one other defendant was a party to the crime. Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 370 S.E.2d 348 (1988).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was in "possession" of cocaine since the defendant was seen by law enforcement officers holding a grocery sack, which was later found to contain over $5,000 in cash, since cocaine with a street value of over $400 was found in the kitchen garbage basket, and since the defendant was the only person in the kitchen at the time the police entered the apartment. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989).

When the defendant was seen sitting on the living room sofa, under which were found the defendant's keys and a large stash of cocaine, $423 in cash was found in the defendant's front pocket, cocaine was found hidden in the defendant's bedroom closet, cocaine was found carefully hidden in the defendant's and the codefendant's bathroom, and a matchbox containing 12 pieces of "crack" or "rock" cocaine was found in the "breast pocket" of the codefendant's jacket and that a plastic bag containing 43 pieces of "rock" or "crack" cocaine was found on the living room sofa next to the codefendant's jacket, this evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reasonably find that the defendants were in "actual possession" of the more than 28 grams of pure cocaine. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989) (decided prior to 1988 amendment).

Defendants were observed purchasing several small objects from a codefendant in what the detectives believed to be a drug transaction and when the defendants were pulled over a short time later, the arresting officer saw a napkin, which contained several pieces of crack cocaine fall out of the car. This evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty of possession of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Byers v. State, 212 Ga. App. 110, 441 S.E.2d 290 (1994).

After the defendant was found seated near a bag containing a large quantity of cocaine, had within reach two loaded guns and access to ammunition, was monitoring police traffic using a scanner, and had more drugs and large amounts of money stashed in various places, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant was in knowing, constructive possession of over 28 grams of cocaine. Cobb v. State, 236 Ga. App. 265, 511 S.E.2d 522 (1999).

As the defendant was seen in actual possession of a shoebox containing 241 grams of cocaine, which the defendant disposed of in a dumpster, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. Hubbard v. State, 274 Ga. App. 184, 617 S.E.2d 167 (2005).

Appellate court upheld the defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on sufficient evidence consisting of testimony from two special agents identifying the defendant, a videotape of a cocaine sale, and positive test results confirming the substance the defendant sold and possessed was cocaine. Henley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 242, 635 S.E.2d 856 (2006).

Based on: (1) the evidence presented to the jury about the condition and location of two bags of cocaine found in the grass near a vehicle after the vehicle rolled over with the defendant inside was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the bags were thrown out of the vehicle along with the other items; (2) items thrown from inside the car were traced back to the defendant and a passenger as the only occupants of the vehicle; and (3) receipts found in the vehicle, the jury could infer that the defendant had been in Maryland on one day, in Texas two days thereafter, and in Georgia on the day after that, and that this pattern indicated that the defendant was knowingly engaged in delivering cocaine, sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to support the defendant's possession and trafficking cocaine convictions. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 315, 645 S.E.2d 753 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant's live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583 (2007).

- Evidence supported a conviction for trafficking in cocaine; even if corroboration of a confidential informant's testimony was necessary, the informant's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of a police officer and an agent with the Drug Enforcement Agency. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 362, 629 S.E.2d 5 (2006).

- State put forth sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine after the state established, through the defendant's confession, that the defendant arranged the purchase of 28 grams or more of cocaine; the state was not required under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) to prove the purity of the cocaine. Gumbs v. State, 258 Ga. App. 230, 573 S.E.2d 485 (2002).

- See Crenshaw v. State, 183 Ga. App. 527, 359 S.E.2d 419 (1987); Cochran v. State, 190 Ga. App. 884, 380 S.E.2d 319 (1989); Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 424, 484 S.E.2d 60 (1997); Stevens v. State, 245 Ga. App. 237, 537 S.E.2d 688 (2000); Baltazar v. State, 254 Ga. App. 773, 564 S.E.2d 202 (2002).

Defendant's trafficking in cocaine conviction was reversed on appeal, as the state failed to present sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the cocaine found in a house, the defendant had no tie to the house as an occupant or resident, and the act of standing in the front of the house when officers approached the defendant amounted to mere spatial proximity, which on its own, was insufficient to link the defendant to the crime; moreover, because the evidence showed that another individual, who was later incarcerated on drug charges, lived at the residence at that time, such gave rise to an unrebutted reasonable hypothesis that this other individual possessed the drugs in question. Brown v. State, 285 Ga. App. 330, 646 S.E.2d 273 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 750 (Ga. 2007).

An officer exceeded the permissible scope of a consent frisk for weapons as nothing indicated that a cigar box that the officer removed from a defendant's pocket felt like a gun or other weapon, and the officer pointed to no particularized facts that reasonably led the officer to believe that the defendant might have a weapon. Thus, crack cocaine found in the box was inadmissible, and in the absence of this evidence, there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine because the defendant did not own or lease the house where the contraband was found; officers found no bills in the defendant's name in the house; the defendant did not possess any marked currency from the controlled buy; and the defendant's possession of $1,332 in unmarked cash when the defendant was arrested did not connect the defendant to the drugs found in the house, in light of the three-day time lapse and evidence that the defendant was employed. Blue v. State, 350 Ga. App. 702, 830 S.E.2d 279 (2019).

- Defendant's probation was improperly revoked based on the defendant's alleged trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), as an informant's hearsay statements were not competent to show the defendant arranged a drug sale, and no evidence connected the defendant with cocaine found in a house where the informant said the sale was to occur. That the defendant was sitting in front of the house and fled from police was insufficient to show the defendant's constructive possession of the cocaine as none of the defendant's belongings were inside the house; the defendant did not live there; and there was no evidence the defendant had ever been inside the house. Brown v. State, 294 Ga. App. 1, 668 S.E.2d 490 (2008).

- Defendant's conviction on one count of trafficking in cocaine was reversed because the trial court abused the court's discretion in admitting the evidence of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigation as intrinsic evidence of the charged trafficking offense since the state failed to sufficiently link the DEA evidence to the events immediately surrounding the defendant's arrest as it was too attenuated in time and space from the events leading up to the charged offense. Sanchez-Villa v. State, 341 Ga. App. 264, 799 S.E.2d 364 (2017).

- Evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to connect the defendant to the house where drugs were found; thus, it was sufficient to support convictions of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Although others might have been present on the property on various unspecified occasions, the defendant was allowed by the owner to use the house, had been seen at the residence by police on previous occasions, had a vehicle on the premises, and hurriedly walked away from officers when the officers arrived; the evidence also showed that no other persons were present when officers executed the search warrant. Clyde v. State, 298 Ga. App. 283, 680 S.E.2d 146 (2009).

Police officer testified about searching a patrol car before transporting the defendant in the car, and about the officer's suspicions that the defendant had stuffed something underneath the backseat because the officer saw debris on the back of the defendant's pants and on the backseat. This circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to convict the defendant of possessing the cocaine found wedged underneath the backseat. Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (2009).

- Circumstantial evidence consisting of the following facts was insufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking: the defendant was a passenger in a car, which was owned by the defendant's brother and driven by a friend; the car's trunk contained two kilos of cocaine; the car led police on a high speed chase across state lines; and the car crashed near the defendant's relatives' home. Foster v. State, 300 Ga. App. 446, 685 S.E.2d 422 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0361, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 164 (Ga. 2010).

In a "reverse sting" case, the authorities conducting the sting arrested the defendants before the defendants acquired possession of the drug and therefore the convictions for trafficking in cocaine are reversed. Epps v. State, 251 Ga. App. 645, 555 S.E.2d 25 (2001).

- State's admission of proof that over 28 grams of cocaine of at least ten percent purity was found in an envelope box on the floor of the car that the defendant was driving was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for cocaine trafficking. Kates v. State, 271 Ga. App. 326, 609 S.E.2d 710 (2005).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine when in addition to the defendant's fingerprint on a laundry detergent box of cocaine, the jury was entitled to infer from tape recorded conversations between a codefendant and an informant that the defendant was the supplier of the cocaine that was to be delivered to the informant; the day after the codefendant notified the informant that the supplier had arrived, the codefendant and the defendant showed up at the informant's house, and the defendant was with the codefendant when the codefendant turned to avoid a roadblock and when the laundry detergent box was left in the woods. Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga. App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316 (2007).

Evidence that the defendant agreed to sell drugs to an informant was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for cocaine trafficking. Carter v. State, 261 Ga. App. 204, 583 S.E.2d 126 (2003).

- Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine was reversed because there was no evidence of any agreement between the defendant and those operating the stash house, beyond a possible buy-sell agreement, and since the felony murder conviction was predicated on the conspiracy offense, that conviction required reversal as well. Griffin v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Nov. 25, 2013).

- Because the state failed to prove the essential element of an agreement between the defendant and the occupants of a stash house in a drug conspiracy trial, since the only evidence was that a purchase of drugs was to take place, the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-31(a)(1) was reversed. Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325, 751 S.E.2d 773 (2013).

- In an attempt to traffic in cocaine case under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-13-31, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because the state did not prove the purity of the cocaine that the defendant intended to purchase; proof of purity was unnecessary given that all that was needed was a substantial step towards the crime of trafficking, not completion of the crime. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0408, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2007).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit trafficking in cocaine based on the trial evidence establishing that the defendant negotiated for and attempted to purchase one kilogram of cocaine from an undercover investigator, that the defendant took substantial steps and actively participated in the attempted drug offense by meeting with the undercover investigator at the designated location and at the arranged time for the purpose of conducting the transaction and by executing the bill of sale for a vehicle in exchange for the drug purchase, and by taking possession of the package of cocaine and cutting the package open to examine the contents. Tehrani v. State, 321 Ga. App. 685, 742 S.E.2d 502 (2013).

- See Wilson v. State, 179 Ga. App. 780, 347 S.E.2d 709 (1986); Rodriquez v. State, 180 Ga. App. 272, 349 S.E.2d 22 (1986); Feblez v. State, 181 Ga. App. 567, 353 S.E.2d 64 (1987); Kelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 605, 353 S.E.2d 92 (1987); Lopez v. State, 184 Ga. App. 31, 360 S.E.2d 722 (1987); Thomas v. State, 184 Ga. App. 318, 361 S.E.2d 280 (1987); Reed v. State, 186 Ga. App. 539, 367 S.E.2d 809 (1988); Means v. State, 188 Ga. App. 210, 372 S.E.2d 484 (1988); Burroughs v. State, 190 Ga. App. 467, 379 S.E.2d 175 (1989); Ward v. State, 193 Ga. App. 137, 387 S.E.2d 150 (1989); Kelly v. State, 193 Ga. App. 549, 388 S.E.2d 377 (1989); Beauchene v. State, 194 Ga. App. 222, 390 S.E.2d 116 (1990); Mitchell v. State, 195 Ga. App. 255, 393 S.E.2d 274 (1990); Tatum v. State, 195 Ga. App. 349, 393 S.E.2d 494 (1990); Ross v. State, 206 Ga. App. 1, 424 S.E.2d 308 (1992); Daniels v. State, 221 Ga. App. 476, 471 S.E.2d 560 (1996); White v. State, 225 Ga. App. 74, 483 S.E.2d 329 (1997); Covington v. State, 226 Ga. App. 484, 486 S.E.2d 706 (1997); Brown v. State, 229 Ga. App. 87, 493 S.E.2d 230 (1997); McCoy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 703, 500 S.E.2d 611 (1998); Milton v. State, 232 Ga. App. 672, 503 S.E.2d 566 (1998); Smith v. State, 237 Ga. App. 616, 516 S.E.2d 319 (1999); Gurr v. State, 238 Ga. App. 1, 516 S.E.2d 553 (1999); Gurr v. State, 238 Ga. App. 1, 516 S.E.2d 553 (1999); Straite v. State, 238 Ga. App. 420, 518 S.E.2d 914 (1999); Small v. State, 243 Ga. App. 678, 534 S.E.2d 139 (2000); Brown v. State, 244 Ga. App. 440, 535 S.E.2d 785 (2000); Montgomery v. State, 249 Ga. App. 777, 549 S.E.2d 463 (2001).

When the defendant was convicted of the offense of trafficking in cocaine, and at trial, the state's expert witness testified that the cocaine seized from the defendant's possession weighed 28.0 grams, and on cross-examination stated that the electronic balance scales on which the cocaine was weighed had a margin of error of less than one percent, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict because even if the jury could reasonably find that the cocaine seized from the defendant was slightly less than the requisite 28 grams, the jury could just as reasonably have found that the weight measurement was accurate or that the amount of cocaine seized slightly exceeded 28 grams. Newton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 664, 382 S.E.2d 432 (1989).

When the defendant was chased by a detective to the vicinity of an abandoned house where the defendant was seen throwing something under the front porch by another police officer and a mailman, and when a bag was immediately retrieved from that location containing marijuana, rolling papers and a bottle of cocaine, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a guilty verdict of trafficking in cocaine. Hall v. State, 192 Ga. App. 151, 384 S.E.2d 428 (1989).

When more than 28 grams of pure cocaine was found in the defendants' apartment, where some of the cocaine was found in plain view, and where some of the illegal drug was found hastily stashed in and under household furnishings and some of the cocaine was found carefully hidden in various spots throughout the apartment, this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that someone was involved in trafficking in cocaine. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine since: (1) a confidential informant made a controlled buy from the defendant; (2) the defendant offered to provide the name of a major drug dealer if the defendant were set free; (3) a person who was with the defendant at the time of the defendant's arrest stated that the defendant had taken the person to the defendant's residence to pick up cocaine; (4) officers executing a search warrant at the defendant's residence found a lockbox filled with scales and cocaine; and (5) the defendant's equal access defense was rejected. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667 (2004).

Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied and the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) as the defendant arranged the drug transaction with an undercover officer, accepted the container in which the officer directed the defendant to place the cocaine, and delivered to the officer 397 grams of cocaine with a purity of 44 percent. Salgado v. State, 268 Ga. App. 18, 601 S.E.2d 417 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because there was more evidence than the defendant's mere presence in the apartment, which was actually rented by the defendant's sister, that linked the defendant to the cocaine: (1) the jury could infer that the defendant actually lived in the apartment because the defendant claimed ownership of a television and a video game in the apartment; (2) it was a one-bedroom apartment to which the defendant had a key; (3) the defendant was sleeping in the bedroom when the police arrived; (4) the defendant's own statements provided additional evidence demonstrating the defendant's possession of the cocaine hidden in the kitchen cabinets; and (5) the defendant had a lot of cash on the defendant's person with large numbers of denominations that was typically used to purchase drugs. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434 (2004).

Evidence that an undercover police officer tried to purchase drugs from a third person, that the third person would have to get the drugs from "his source," and that the officer was present when the defendant gave a package to a third person shortly before the third person delivered cocaine to the officer was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Serrate v. State, 268 Ga. App. 276, 601 S.E.2d 766 (2004).

When, upon executing a search warrant for the defendant's house, four kilograms of cocaine were found in the house and a fifth kilogram was found in the defendant's car parked at the house, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for cocaine trafficking. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166 (2004).

Sufficient evidence existed to support a defendant's conviction for cocaine trafficking and the subsequent denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial since the evidence showed, via testimony from the defendant's wife and the wife's two friends, that once the defendant found the cocaine in the house of a client the defendant was sent to retrieve the drug from, the defendant not only took possession of the cocaine but also used some of the drug as well. Fraser v. State, 283 Ga. App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129 (2007), overruled in part by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

There was sufficient evidence that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a); in addition to evidence that 1,000 grams of cocaine (with a purity of 73 percent) was found in the apartment occupied by the defendant, the state produced evidence connecting the defendant to the cocaine by more than mere spatial proximity. Taylor v. State, 285 Ga. App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1515, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 655 (Ga. 2007).

Given sufficient evidence that: (1) the defendant was arrested after driving a car containing over 900 grams of cocaine, raising a presumption of both possession and control; (2) the link between the defendant and the cocaine was not based solely on the presumption of possession; (3) the defendant admitted to purchasing the shoes originally packaged in the box containing the cocaine, and was wearing those shoes; (4) a search of the defendant's person further revealed a large sum of cash; and (5) the trial court considered the defendant's equal access theory but found that it did not demand a defense verdict, the defendant's cocaine trafficking conviction was upheld on appeal. McGee v. State, 287 Ga. App. 460, 651 S.E.2d 546 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 167 (Ga. 2008).

When testimony from three troopers revealed that one package of contraband was taken from each of three passengers occupying a car, the packages were identified at trial as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and one of the troopers stated unequivocally on direct examination that the package of cocaine identified as Exhibit 2 was the one the trooper took from the defendant, and the state's expert established that each package met the requisite weight and purity under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Volcey v. State, 300 Ga. App. 881, 410 S.E.2d 36 (1991).

When the total weight of the mixture equaled almost three times the amount required for the conviction and the chemist testified that the chemist tested bags containing over half of the mixture there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine. Hancock v. State, 212 Ga. App. 78, 441 S.E.2d 261 (1994).

When the state tendered cocaine evidence in three exhibits, only one of which had been analyzed for purity, proof that one of the packages contained over 400 grams of cocaine, consisting of more than 10 percent purity was sufficient to support a conviction for trafficking. Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 464 S.E.2d 851 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was the person named in the indictment and to establish that defendant was guilty of cocaine trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998).

Defendant's conviction on conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was supported by the evidence as it showed that the defendant conspired with others to knowingly possess 28 grams or more of cocaine and that the defendant took the overt act of possessing the cocaine by picking it up from the defendant's nephew, telling the driver of the vehicle to slow down in order to avoid arrest, and tried to conceal the cocaine under the defendant's seat after being stopped for speeding. Smith v. State, 253 Ga. App. 131, 558 S.E.2d 455 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendants knowingly possessed more than 28 grams of cocaine found in the defendants' car, and were guilty of trafficking in cocaine after, inter alia, officers searched the car and found a package containing 165 grams of crack cocaine under the front passenger seat and another package containing 235 grams of powder cocaine in a bag sitting on the back seat. Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga. App. 703, 574 S.E.2d 896 (2002).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict as the evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine; evidence showed that the one bag that the state tested was positive for cocaine, the state was not required to test the other two bags containing a similar-looking substance, the three bags together contained more than 28 grams of cocaine with a purity of 10 percent, and no evidence indicated the defendant was making personal use of that amount of cocaine. Pitts v. State, 260 Ga. App. 553, 580 S.E.2d 618 (2003).

When the drug expert testified to performing a random analysis on the 200 grams of cocaine, tested approximately 40.8 grams, and found that the sample was 93 percent pure cocaine, the defendant's conviction of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) was affirmed because the expert's opinion was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on the drug trafficking charge. Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 589 S.E.2d 325 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant possessed cocaine when the defendant resided in the bedroom where the cocaine was discovered, a friend testified that the friend heard the defendant admit the cocaine was found in the defendant's room, the defendant's mother pointed out the room as the defendant's, and after the cocaine was discovered, the defendant went into hiding, and the argument of equal access by the defendant's mother and brother to the cocaine was unavailing since other evidence linked the defendant to the cocaine. Truitt v. State, 266 Ga. App. 56, 596 S.E.2d 219 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine because: (1) the defendant rented and furnished an apartment for the codefendant, who defendant described as a casual friend; (2) the defendant paid for a cell phone used by the codefendant; and (3) a kilogram of cocaine and over $98,000.00 was found in the apartment; however, the conviction was reversed on other grounds. Patten v. State, 275 Ga. App. 574, 621 S.E.2d 550 (2005).

Because: (1) the defendant failed to sufficiently prove an entrapment defense and, hence, the need for disclosure of an informant's identity; (2) no error resulted in refusing to strike a juror for cause; and (3) the trial court's entrapment instruction was legally correct and did not mislead the jury, the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and two counts of use of communication facilities in committing a felony drug offense, under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3, were affirmed on appeal. Griffiths v. State, 283 Ga. App. 176, 641 S.E.2d 169 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine since the defendant was the only passenger in a hatchback and chose to sit in the rear of the vehicle with full access to the cargo area and the cocaine. The defendant volunteered in an interview that the defendant "just needed to make some money." Oliveres v. State, 292 Ga. App. 460, 664 S.E.2d 836 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 916 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence which included testimony from a defendant's codefendant that: (1) the defendant came to the codefendant's house; (2) the defendant showed the codefendant drugs; (3) the defendant indicated that the defendant needed help to move the drugs; and (4) the codefendant contacted the defendant and arranged a date and time for a drug transaction after a confidential informant (CI) told the codefendant that CI had an associate in need of one to four kilos of cocaine was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction on a trafficking in cocaine charge. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 670 S.E.2d 506 (2008).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict as there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the observations of the police watching the defendant and codefendants engaging in suspicious behavior in a high-crime area; the contents of the backpack, which contained 377.45 grams of 50.7 percent pure cocaine heavily wrapped in saran wrap, with a street value between $8,000 and $10,000 in powder form or as much as $15,000 if cut with an agent and compressed into rocks of crack cocaine; the drugs found in the trunk of the defendant's rental vehicle; and the rental of a motel room by the defendant. Mosley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 746, 675 S.E.2d 607 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1188, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 322 (Ga. 2009).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of a drug-related object, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-31(a)(1) and16-13-32.2, against the defendant as the defendant's van contained items used as drug pipe filters, the defendant's passenger had dropped crack cocaine on the ground just prior to being apprehended, both individuals had large amounts of cash on them, and the defendant had a criminal history of similar drug-related conduct. Holloway v. State, 297 Ga. App. 81, 676 S.E.2d 445 (2009).

Sufficient evidence existed to convict a defendant of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because a search of the defendant's residence revealed, inter alia, large amounts of cocaine and cash and several persons approached the residence while the officers were there to execute the search warrant and sought to purchase drugs. Weems v. State, 295 Ga. App. 680, 673 S.E.2d 50 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant on a trafficking in cocaine charge as a large amount of cash was found on the defendant's person, the defendant tried to flee once a drug dog alerted to the area of a van in which the defendant was sitting, and a shopping bag containing cocaine was observed by the defendant's foot. Singleton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 452, 677 S.E.2d 348 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant was going in and out of the defendant's home, that an officer saw through the open front door the codefendant sitting near a large slab of cocaine, and that a small amount of cocaine was found on the defendant's person, allowed the jury to find that the defendant had the intent to exercise control over the slab of cocaine seen in plain view. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Reid v. State, 298 Ga. App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Defendant's accomplice's testimony that the defendant was knowingly in possession of cocaine found in their vehicle was corroborated by evidence of 575 grams of cocaine in the vehicle, that the defendant was extremely anxious when stopped by police, and the fact that there were 18 air fresheners hung throughout the vehicle, and was therefore sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), supporting the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Richardson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 850, 700 S.E.2d 738 (2010).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of tools for the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-20 and16-13-31, when narcotics and an electronic scale were found in the defendant's residence, and although the defendant did not own the residence, the defendant resided there for the previous five years and there was a lack of evidence at the home of any other persons residing therein. Further, the items were well hidden within the premises, the defendant used a closed circuit surveillance system to monitor the home, and the defendant possessed a substantial amount of cash at the time of the search. Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 704 S.E.2d 227 (2010).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for trafficking in more than 400 grams of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) because the defendant directed that the cocaine package be cut open and tasted, provided a knife for this purpose, directed another man to get the money, and assisted in counting the money. A jury could conclude that the defendant had the power and intent to control the cocaine. Phillips v. State, 307 Ga. App. 366, 705 S.E.2d 287 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), based on the defendant's participation in a sale of a sufficient amount and purity of cocaine to an undercover agent; although a codefendant conducted the sale directly, the defendant was a party to the sale under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) since the defendant was in a nearby vehicle that the codefendant went to during the transaction. McGee v. State, 316 Ga. App. 661, 730 S.E.2d 131 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking because the defendant arrived at a house under surveillance wearing a light-colored shirt and carrying a package. After police entered the house, an officer saw a man in a light-colored shirt drop a bag of cocaine out the window. No other person present had on a light-colored shirt; therefore, the jury could conclude that the defendant possessed the 490.22 grams of cocaine found in the bag. Kimble v. State, 301 Ga. App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242 (2009).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the evidence showing that the mixture in the defendant's possession weighed 37.79 grams and had a purity of 34.6 percent of cocaine. Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678, 738 S.E.2d 130 (2013).

Regardless of whether the defendant passenger had physical possession of the cocaine, the evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant passenger actively participated in, and was a party to, the trafficking of the three kilos of 70-percent pure cocaine because a sergeant set up an undercover surveillance at an apartment complex; after the defendants exited the building, the defendants were talking back and forth and the defendant driver was carrying a black and grey duffle bag, which the defendant driver did not have upon entering the building; and, during an open-air sniff, a canine alerted to the rear passenger side of the vehicle where the detective saw the black and grey duffle bag that contained the cocaine. Williams v. State, 336 Ga. App. 64, 783 S.E.2d 666 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

Evidence that the defendant made a four-hour round trip drive at night for a brief stop before police found over 200 grams of cocaine and that upon being stopped the defendant expressed to the defendant's girlfriend that the defendant could not go to prison for over 30 years was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Anderson v. State, 338 Ga. App. 171, 789 S.E.2d 363 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of trafficking in cocaine as "party thereto." Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 405 S.E.2d 716 (1991).

- Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction as a party to trafficking in cocaine since the evidence showed that the defendant was aware that an alleged drug dealer kept cocaine in the house where the defendant was arrested, that the dealer doled cocaine out to the defendant and others so that they could sell the cocaine, that the defendant had sold cocaine for the dealer in the past and had stated the intent to do so on the day the defendant was arrested, that cocaine found in the defendant's possession had the same packaging as cocaine found in the basement of the house, and that when the police arrived to execute a search warrant, the defendant attempted to destroy the cocaine the defendant had in the defendant's physical possession. Riley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 202, 663 S.E.2d 835 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because the state presented evidence that even if the defendant did not bring the bag of cocaine to an owner's residence, the defendant possessed the cocaine and was a party to the crime of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Kegler v. State, 317 Ga. App. 427, 731 S.E.2d 111 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant was the driver, approximately 220 grams of narcotics were found in the passenger compartment, the defendant was nervous, and scales were found on the passenger floor board was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Robinson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 872, 772 S.E.2d 223 (2015).

Defendant's trafficking conviction was supported by evidence that the defendant had been staying at the house where the warrant was executed, the defendant was inside the house during an active cook of crack cocaine, the defendant fled with several other people, some of whom were throwing cocaine in the air, police apprehended the defendant immediately after the defendant jumped the back yard fence and found drugs within arm's reach, and the defendant made an inculpatory statement. Johnson v. State, 338 Ga. App. 500, 790 S.E.2d 291 (2016).

- Evidence that the defendant's companion showed a bag of cocaine to an undercover officer while the defendant stood nearby in a manner the officer described as a "show of force," and that the companion's car contained another 16 ounces of cocaine, was sufficient for a jury to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine as either a principal in the transaction or as a party to the crime. Martinez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82 (2003).

- Juvenile's possession of 38.7 grams of cocaine was sufficient to sustain delinquency adjudication for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). In the Interest of R.S., 253 Ga. App. 409, 559 S.E.2d 143 (2002).

- State failed to prove the state's case that the defendant, a minor, was delinquent under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-471) for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, as the state did not prove the necessary connection between the defendant and the drugs, other than spatial proximity, which was insufficient; the fact that the defendant was in a house in the middle of the night with non-family members, that a large amount of cocaine and cash were found in the house, although not visible, and that the defendant was sitting on a couch where a bag containing crack cocaine was found did not establish the necessary connection and did not exclude all other possibilities except the guilt of the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). In re E.A.D., 271 Ga. App. 531, 610 S.E.2d 153 (2005).

- Defendants' convictions for trafficking in cocaine were vacated, and their cases remanded with direction that a conviction and sentence be entered for both defendants for possession of cocaine, since there was not sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants possessed at least 28 grams of pure cocaine, but the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine seized from the adjacent building. Byers v. State, 204 Ga. App. 552, 420 S.E.2d 23 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 928, 113 S. Ct. 1305, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine and was a party to the crime pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) and (b)(3), and the trial evidence authorized the jury to find that the only reasonable hypothesis pointed to the defendant's guilt of the drug offense; the evidence showed that the defendant participated and intentionally aided in the commission of the drug trafficking offense by driving the codefendants and the cocaine to the pre-arranged location for the transaction, warning the codefendants that the principal agent was a police officer and taking possession of the funds used for the transaction. Valdez v. State, 310 Ga. App. 274, 712 S.E.2d 656 (2011).

Because the state introduced sufficient corroborating evidence of an accomplice's testimony that the drugs found in the basement of the house belonged to the defendant because the record showed the presence of all factors required to authorize admission of the similar transaction evidence, and because there was sufficient evidence of probable cause for a search warrant even without the representation that the affiant saw the informant buy drugs from the defendant, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine. Dickerson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 320, 718 S.E.2d 564 (2011).

Defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in 400 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C), because the evidence tended to show a connection between the defendant and the contraband sufficient to prove the defendant knowingly shared with the defendant's brother the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the mixture; there was evidence that the cocaine mixture was in plain view and visible from the common sitting area of the apartment and that the defendant was in the apartment alone for an extended period of time, and there was evidence of two similar transactions, which tended to show a course of conduct and intent to possess and distribute cocaine, possess large amounts of currency, and in one of the similar transactions, use a black bag to transport drug-related items. Holiman v. State, 313 Ga. App. 76, 720 S.E.2d 363 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine because the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant possessed the cocaine the defendant retrieved from the trunk of a car; the defendant retrieved the drugs from the trunk of the car and had the drugs in hand when the police arrested the defendant. Raines v. State, 313 Ga. App. 879, 722 S.E.2d 779 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), was supported by sufficient evidence under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(b)(3) and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) because both the defendant and the codefendant made statements regarding the defendant's involvement in the criminal activity, and the police observed the defendant's actions; there was evidence that the defendant was an active participant and a party to the trafficking offense. Martinez v. State, 314 Ga. App. 551, 724 S.E.2d 851 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of drug trafficking because an intercepted phone call indicated that the second defendant had successfully delivered nine kilograms of cocaine. Estrada-Nava v. State, 332 Ga. App. 133, 771 S.E.2d 28 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the third defendant of drug trafficking because the third defendant arranged a drug sale involving 10 kilograms of cocaine; monitored and directed the transfer of vehicles; and monitored the testing of the cocaine once received. Estrada-Nava v. State, 332 Ga. App. 133, 771 S.E.2d 28 (2015).

- State failed to present sufficient facts from which a jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant knowingly possessed 28 grams or more of cocaine with a purity of 10 percent or more as there was only one bag containing 35 grams of cocaine in evidence, the purity was never tested, and the state could not point to a scale or other evidence that the defendant weighed or measured the cocaine to know that the cocaine was more than 28 grams. Childs v. State, 330 Ga. App. 727, 769 S.E.2d 147 (2015).

- Evidence sustained the finding of guilt on the charge of trafficking in cocaine because knowledge of the weight or precise purity of the cocaine was not necessary for a conviction. Barr v. State, 302 Ga. App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643 (2010).

- When the defendant was indicted for being "knowingly in actual possession of more than 400 grams of cocaine, a schedule two controlled substance, and a mixture with a purity of more than 10 percent of cocaine," but the evidence showed the total mass of the substance to be 450 grams, of which 71 percent or 319 grams was pure cocaine, it was held that since the amount shown would still show a violation of law, even if it did not meet the increment charged, there would not be a material variance between the allegata and probata. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 370 S.E.2d 173 (1988).

Sufficient evidence showed the defendant had knowledge of the weight of the cocaine found in the search as the evidence showed that the crack cocaine which the defendant was convicted of possessing had a purity of 82 percent and weighed 50.62 grams and was packaged in a plastic bag, hidden in a vent in a bedroom that the defendant was occupying, plus, the jury heard of five similar transactions, including the defendant's three convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014).

- Defendant possessed requisite 28 grams of cocaine, even though it was found in two individual lots totaling 47.5 grams in the defendant's house and truck and neither lot amounted to 28 grams. Hite v. State, 206 Ga. App. 245, 424 S.E.2d 885 (1992); Snoke v. State, 237 Ga. App. 686, 516 S.E.2d 541 (1999).

- In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the state established a chain of custody for the drugs with: 1) testimony of the officer who found the drugs; 2) testimony of the officer who placed the drugs in an evidence bag, which the officer then sealed, labeled, and transported to the crime lab; 3) that officer's identification of the state's exhibit as that bag; and 4) testimony of a Georgia Crime Lab chemist, who identified the exhibit as the bag containing the substance the chemist tested. Testimony of another chemist who had inspected the drugs was not required since, absent evidence of tampering, the crime lab could be treated as a single link in the chain of custody for admissibility purposes. Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (2009).

Jury Instruction

Belief by jury of informant over defendant.

- Evidence in cocaine trafficking case did not require a directed verdict on the basis of entrapment; although the defendant claimed a confidential informant repeatedly contacted the defendant about arranging a sale, the informant testified that the defendant contacted the informant and offered to set up the sale, and the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version and accept the informant's version. Mulvey v. State, 250 Ga. App. 345, 551 S.E.2d 412 (2001).

- When under the evidence presented, only two verdicts were possible - guilty of trafficking in cocaine or acquittal, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury concerning possession of cocaine. Hernandez v. State, 182 Ga. App. 797, 357 S.E.2d 131 (1987).

- When the indictment charged defendant with trafficking in cocaine by possessing more than 28 ounces, the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested charge on the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine. Howard v. State, 220 Ga. App. 579, 469 S.E.2d 746 (1996); Lumpkin v. State, 245 Ga. App. 627, 538 S.E.2d 514 (2000).

- When a jury issue exists as to whether the defendant was exercising actual or constructive possession of cocaine, the lesser offense of possession of cocaine was reasonably raised by the evidence, and the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct pursuant to the defendant's written request. Alvarado v. State, 194 Ga. App. 781, 391 S.E.2d 668, aff'd, 260 Ga. 563, 397 S.E.2d 550 (1990).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as there was no dispute that the cocaine exceeded the amount necessary to sustain a trafficking conviction, therefore, there was no evidence of the lesser included offense. However, even if the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was error, it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict in light of the overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed the greater offense. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. 2009).

- Trial court did not commit plain error by charging the jury on the entire definition of trafficking as no evidence was introduced at trial suggesting that the defendant brought the cocaine at issue into the state, sold the cocaine, or that the defendant delivered the cocaine to anyone; rather, the evidence showed only that the defendant was in knowing possession of the cocaine for a brief period of time; thus, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury convicted the defendant of trafficking in a manner not charged in the indictment. Hernandez-Garcia v. State, 322 Ga. App. 455, 745 S.E.2d 706 (2013).

- Trial court's jury charge in the attempted trafficking in cocaine case under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-13-31 was not improper despite the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on purity, as purity was not an essential element of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0408, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2007).

- Although the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), the trial court's erroneous response to a jury question regarding the knowledge requirement may have resulted in an improper verdict; such error might have led the jury to incorrectly substitute criminal negligence for the knowledge requirement when the jury rendered the jury's verdict. McGee v. State, 316 Ga. App. 661, 730 S.E.2d 131 (2012).

- Trial court's instruction requiring the jury to find that a defendant who was charged with trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was required to have knowingly possessed 28 grams of cocaine or more sufficiently charged that the jury had to find that the defendant was aware of the weight of the cocaine the defendant possessed. Further, any error in the charge was harmless because the defendant was shown to have possessed 106 grams of cocaine and to have been familiar with the weight of cocaine from the defendant's past dealings with cocaine. Harrison v. State, 309 Ga. App. 454, 711 S.E.2d 35 (2011).

- Trial court's failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) constituted reversible error even though the defendant failed to request such a charge because the evidence against a defendant in a cocaine trafficking case under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was entirely circumstantial based on the defendant's participation in the crime with defendant's brother and a third party. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 71, 692 S.E.2d 737 (2010).

- When in the court's charge to the jury, the court read the indictment, pointing out that in Count 1 the defendants were charged with trafficking by knowing possession of the cocaine, and further instructed that the jury should reach a decision on the trafficking offense based on the charges as made in Count 1 of the indictment, the instructions were sufficient to prevent any likelihood that the jury would mistakenly convict defendants on evidence supporting a form of trafficking in cocaine not charged in the indictment. Ancrum v. State, 197 Ga. App. 819, 399 S.E.2d 574 (1990).

Despite the defendant's allegation that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant was convicted of committing the offense of trafficking in cocaine in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, when the trial court immediately charged the jury that to establish the defendant's guilt for trafficking, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly had in the defendant's possession more than 28 grams of cocaine on the date alleged, the court properly limited the jury's consideration to the offense as charged; thus, reversal on this ground was unwarranted. Brockington v. State, 265 Ga. App. 13, 592 S.E.2d 858 (2003).

- When the prosecution and defense of a case turned on proof, or the lack of proof, that each of three defendants had actual or constructive possession of the cocaine and other dangerous drugs found under the seat of the rented car in which the defendants were passengers, without any instruction on the law of possession, the jury was left without appropriate guidelines for reaching a verdict. The failure to so charge was substantial error and required reversal of the defendants' convictions. Ancrum v. State, 197 Ga. App. 819, 399 S.E.2d 574 (1990).

- Trial court's jury instruction on constructive possession was not harmful error, even though the indictment charged the defendant only with actual possession, since the evidence indisputably showed that immediately before the defendant's arrest the defendant had actual possession of the crack cocaine at issue. Cheeks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 446, 507 S.E.2d 204 (1998).

- Trial court's error in instructing the jury that the element of intent could be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that the defendant deliberately closed the defendant's eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to the defendant was harmless given the entire jury charge and the record as a whole, including the jury's ability to assess the credibility of the defendant and the arresting officer, both of whom testified at trial. Matos-Bautista v. State, 353 Ga. App. 773, 839 S.E.2d 260 (2020).

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)-(3) establishes the specific mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking in cocaine and subsection (f) (now (g)) provides a general maximum sentence. Recoba v. State, 179 Ga. App. 31, 345 S.E.2d 81 (1986).

- When the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and fined $100,000, the fine was not out of proportion to the severity of the crime and not constitutionally infirm either because of the fine's mandatory nature or the fine's amount. Wyatt v. State, 259 Ga. 208, 378 S.E.2d 690 (1989).

- District court erred by applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b) enhancement because O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), the portion of the Georgia statute under which the defendant was convicted, prohibited the possession of cocaine, not possession with the intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense; because the district court considered the defendant's underlying conduct to arrive at the conclusion the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute the cocaine, the district court erred (correctly applying the modified categorical approach led to the conclusion that the defendant's Georgia conviction was for simple possession and, thus, the conviction was not a drug trafficking offense). United States v. Veleta-Dominguez, F.3d (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013)(Unpublished).

Presentence hearing was not required when the court imposed the statutory minimum sentence for cocaine trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C). Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 464 S.E.2d 851 (1995).

- Since it was not required that the defendant be in possession of a specific amount of methamphetamine, the defendant's sentence was not void because the crime lab report said the sample weight was less than one gram. Oneill v. State, 352 Ga. App. 103, 834 S.E.2d 111 (2019).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(2) did not require the trial court to impose a reduced or suspended sentence if the defendant rendered substantial assistance that led to the arrest or conviction of accomplices, accessories, coconspirators, or principals, but merely authorized the court to do so. Therefore, the defendant was properly given the mandatory minimum sentence for cocaine trafficking as the trial court found that the assistance the defendant rendered was not "substantial" since the assistance did not lead to the arrest of an associate, a codefendant, or a supplier. Eidman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 304, 671 S.E.2d 292 (2008).

- Defendant was properly sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(B) for possession of 200 or more grams of cocaine because although the indictment only charged that the defendant did knowingly possess more than 28 grams, the jury returned a verdict, based on the testimony of a forensic expert, that the cocaine in the defendant's possession weighed 245.64 grams. Singleton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 452, 677 S.E.2d 348 (2009).

- Second remand was required when, upon the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine and after a prior remand, the trial court imposed the entire ten-year mandatory minimum prison sentence but refused to impose the fine of $200,000 as such was mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(A). State v. Andrews, 278 Ga. App. 899, 630 S.E.2d 139 (2006).

Sentence upon conviction of trafficking in cocaine within the limits set by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) and subsection (g) was not so disproportionate as to shock the conscience. Small v. State, 243 Ga. App. 678, 534 S.E.2d 139 (2000).

After the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy of trafficking in cocaine in 2011 and sentenced to two concurrent terms of life in prison, the defendant's life sentence was proper because the defendant's 2010 trafficking conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 qualified as an actual conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) to trigger the recidivist provisions of § 16-13-30(d) and enhance the defendant's sentence for the 2011 trafficking conviction; and the legislature did not intend that violators of the more serious offense of trafficking be exempt from the severe punishment of § 16-13-30(d). Duron v. State, 340 Ga. App. 74, 796 S.E.2d 310 (2017).

Trafficking as a second violation of § 16-13-30. - Conviction for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 constituted a second violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) for purposes of the sentencing provisions of § 16-13-30(d) since the first conviction was for a more serious version of the offenses outlined in § 16-13-30(b). Gilber v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 430 S.E.2d 391 (1993).

- Defendant's conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with prior convictions for sale of cocaine to trigger the mandatory life sentence provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d). Covington v. State, 231 Ga. App. 851, 501 S.E.2d 37 (1998).

Life sentence was properly imposed on the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 after the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine. Howard v. State, 234 Ga. App. 260, 506 S.E.2d 648 (1998).

- Defendant's conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with the defendant's previous conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) to trigger the mandatory life sentence provisions of § 16-13-30(d) and the state gave proper notice that the prior conviction would be used in aggravation at sentencing pursuant to § 16-13-30(d). Brundage v. State, 231 Ga. App. 478, 499 S.E.2d 408 (1998).

- Defendant's offense level was properly enhanced based on a prior conviction for cocaine trafficking in Georgia as: (1) United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003), which held that the Georgia crime of drug trafficking was a qualifying predicate offense for sentence enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2, controlled; (2) Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013), did not abrogate or supplant Madera-Madera because it merely determined that a Georgia possession of marijuana offense could not be an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (3) Madera-Madera properly used a categorical approach by performing an analysis of the elements of the Georgia drug trafficking statute. United States v. Pineda-Goigochea, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2042, 195 L. Ed. 2d 240 (U.S. 2016)(Unpublished).

- Trial court properly denied defendant's "new sentence" motion since it was a rehash of a prior motion to modify the sentence; the defendant's 20-year sentence for cocaine possession was within the statutory range and was, therefore, not void as a matter of law. Baez v. State, 257 Ga. App. 129, 570 S.E.2d 352 (2002).

- Defendant's sentence of 30 years without parole for trafficking in cocaine was a sentence allowed under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) and, hence, not illegal or void. Defendant could not have been sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), or defendant's sentence would have been 40 years. Because the sentence was not void, the sentence was not subject to modification under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(f). State v. Blue, 304 Ga. App. 471, 696 S.E.2d 692 (2010).

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not improperly consider similar transaction evidence of being arrested for trafficking in cocaine in 2004, as well as convictions that were reversed on appeal, in aggravation of the defendant's sentence because, although the state filed a notice of intent to seek recidivist punishment, the state did not offer certified copies of any convictions in evidence at sentencing and the defendant was not sentenced as a recidivist. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. 2009).

Marijuana

In General

- See Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836 (1988).

Procedure

State not required to prove THC content of marijuana.

- Despite the defendant's contrary claim, the state was not required to prove the tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content of the plant material seized in a prosecution for trafficking in marijuana; further, THC was treated separately in the criminal code as a Schedule I drug under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-25(3)(P). Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (2007).

Evidence held sufficient to show defendant possessed marijuana fields from which bulk of marijuana was confiscated. Meeks v. State, 178 Ga. App. 9, 341 S.E.2d 880 (1986).

- When the two defendants were occupants of a car rented by another in Florida which was stopped for speeding, and each admitted driving the vehicle at alternate times, the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that both defendants had possession of the 112 pounds of marijuana found in the car trunk. Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836 (1988).

- Evidence that the defendant took delivery of a large package of marijuana from an investigator dressed as a postal worker, that the defendant said the defendant was expecting the package and signed for the package using a false name and then took possession of the package was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c). Defendant's knowledge of the precise weight of the drugs in the defendant's possession was not required to sustain the defendant's drug trafficking conviction, and the trial court did not err in so instructing the jury. Wilson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 166, 718 S.E.2d 31 (2011), aff'd, 291 Ga. 458, 729 S.E.2d 364 (2012).

- Testimony of expert as to the weight of the marijuana produced by a given quantity of marijuana plants which were seized, together with photographs of the plants, is sufficient to establish the weight of the plants which had been destroyed upon confiscation. Evans v. State, 176 Ga. App. 818, 338 S.E.2d 48 (1985).

Evidence showing that the total weight of confiscated marijuana plants, including stalks, stems, and leaves, was 10,340 pounds was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the marijuana leaves alone weighed more than 100 pounds. Westberry v. State, 178 Ga. App. 243, 342 S.E.2d 737 (1986).

Reasonable doubt existed as to whether more than 100 pounds of marijuana was confiscated. Payton v. State, 177 Ga. App. 104, 338 S.E.2d 462 (1985).

No remotely reasonable doubt that at least 100 pounds of chargeable marijuana was trafficked in. Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576, 302 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1983).

- When the evidence is overwhelming that the defendant possessed more than 100 pounds of marijuana, the destruction of all but 100 grams without notice to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, even if it was erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and if only by accident, did not prevent the state from proving possession of 100 pounds. Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576, 302 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1983).

- Charges of conspiracy to import marijuana and trafficking in marijuana could be joined for trial, over objection, where the charges arose from the same conduct. Bridges v. State, 195 Ga. App. 851, 395 S.E.2d 30 (1990).

Offenses of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana and trafficking itself did not merge when conspirators first possessed the marijuana, since the "trafficking" charge involved sale of the marijuana, an act not yet completed. Meyers v. State, 174 Ga. App. 161, 329 S.E.2d 293 (1985).

- In an action for trafficking in marijuana, the defendant's knowledge of the specific weight of the marijuana was not an essential element and the evidence, including video of the defendant making a delivery of a bag to the defendant's son's house after the son requested that marijuana be retrieved, was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant knowingly possessed the marijuana found at the defendant's residence, which amounted to 12 pounds and sufficed to support a finding of guilt for trafficking. Brown v. State, 355 Ga. App. 308, 844 S.E.2d 182 (2020).

- Offense of selling marijuana was not complete upon defendants' leading undercover agents to the site of the marijuana since an agreed-upon weighing, loading, and delivering had not yet occurred; thus, the substantive trafficking offense did not merge with or extinguish the conspiracy-to-traffic offense. Meyers v. State, 174 Ga. App. 161, 329 S.E.2d 293 (1985).

- In a trial for possession of marijuana, when a codefendant, appearing as a defense witness, claimed ownership of the contraband and testified that the defendant and another had not known of the presence of contraband in the automobile, it was established without dispute that the defendant had neither a possessory nor a proprietary interest in the vehicle but was simply occupying the vehicle as a passenger. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict. Llaguno v. State, 197 Ga. App. 789, 399 S.E.2d 564 (1990).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana seized as the search of the defendant's truck was conducted after a valid traffic stop after the defendant gave the officer consent to conduct the search, and nothing supported the defendant's claim that this consent was coerced because the consent was obtained during a custodial interrogation and without the benefit of Miranda warnings as the officer's questioning did not unduly prolong the traffic stop and did not result in an unauthorized seizure or an equivalent custodial detention for which Miranda warnings were required. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (2007).

- There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking marijuana as the jury was authorized to conclude that it was not reasonable, as the defendant suggested, that someone other than the defendant placed over 21 pounds of marijuana in open view in the back of a trailer of which the defendant had the only key, without the defendant's knowledge. Mora v. State, 292 Ga. App. 860, 666 S.E.2d 412 (2008).

- When the defendant: (1) signed for two boxes containing approximately 82 pounds of marijuana using two different aliases; (2) claimed ignorance as to the contents of the boxes but admitted to police that the plan was to deliver the boxes to another person in a public restroom and then to accept payment of $200 per box at yet another location; and (3) gave conflicting stories before and during trial as to defendant's belief regarding the contents of the boxes, such evidence supported the defendant's conviction of trafficking in more than 50 pounds of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c), especially since the "deliberate ignorance" doctrine applied. Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 572 S.E.2d 657 (2002).

Defendant was properly convicted for trafficking in marijuana as the defendant owned a farm used by the defendant's son to grow marijuana, the defendant helped to construct a building used to grow marijuana, and the defendant helped acquire necessary support devices to put the building into operation; this evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant's son had actual possession of the marijuana and that the defendant had constructive possession by aiding and abetting the son's possession. Lang v. State, 171 Ga. 368, 320 S.E.2d 185 (1984).

Because the state presented sufficient evidence that identified the contraband seized as marijuana, and it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that the two lightweight nylon duffel bags seized, along with some plastic wrap, weighed less than 40 pounds, a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of marijuana seized from the defendant was at least the equivalent of the amount charged in the indictment; thus, the defendant's trafficking conviction was upheld on appeal. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (2007).

Evidence supported conviction of trafficking in marijuana since, when a package that a parcel service and police had found to contain marijuana was delivered to the place where defendant rented a mailbox, the defendant took possession of the package and said that the package contained Christmas presents, then took the package to the defendant's truck and was arrested; it was only just before the package was opened at a police station that the defendant said the package was not the property of the defendant. Hitchcock v. State, 291 Ga. App. 455, 662 S.E.2d 155 (2008).

Evidence that a defendant participated in a plan for the delivery of a package containing 12 pounds of marijuana to a residence, along with digital scales, a marijuana grinder, and plastic baggies at the residence, and the defendant's admission that the marijuana was the defendant's, was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of marijuana, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Salinas v. State, 313 Ga. App. 720, 722 S.E.2d 432 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c)(1) was affirmed because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice's testimony regarding the defendant's involvement. Evidence corroborated the accomplice's testimony that the accomplice and the defendant planned to switch vehicles after taking delivery of the crate. Watt v. State, 317 Ga. App. 551, 732 S.E.2d 96 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana after: (1) an informant testified at trial that the informant purchased marijuana from the defendant, which was corroborated by the recovery of a large quantity of marijuana from the informant's vehicle; (2) an expert confirmed that the substance recovered from the informant's vehicle weighed well in excess of the 50-pound threshold for trafficking established by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c); and (3) in a taped statement, the defendant admitted buying 125 pounds of marijuana and selling 100 pounds. Whitehead v. State, 258 Ga. App. 271, 574 S.E.2d 351 (2002).

- Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant with regard to convicting the defendant of marijuana trafficking because the evidence authorized the jury to find that by entering a vehicle used in a police sting operation, the defendant took a substantial step towards marijuana trafficking in that the defendant made a substantial step towards possessing the marijuana. Drammeh v. State, 285 Ga. App. 545, 646 S.E.2d 742 (2007).

- Defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c), was sufficiently supported by the evidence because, although only one ounce of two plastic bags in the defendant's vehicle was tested, the state's expert testified that the remainder of the bags' contents were similar to the test sample; the opinion of the state's expert that the remainder of the bags contained marijuana was sufficient to uphold the defendant's conviction. Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 236, 656 S.E.2d 574 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant followed a person to a house, retrieved something from the house, placed it in the trunk of a friend's vehicle, and that the marijuana found in the trunk weighed approximately 21 pounds was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for marijuana trafficking. Summerville v. State, 332 Ga. App. 617, 774 S.E.2d 190 (2015).

- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of attempted trafficking in marijuana. A codefendant's testimony at the codefendant's trial and the codefendant's statement to the police were admissible as prior inconsistent statements and constituted substantive evidence of the defendant's participation in the attempted drug trafficking; furthermore, the codefendant's statements were sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the testimony of a case agent that a loaded pistol was found at the defendant's feet and that a bag containing the currency used in the drug transaction was found within arm's reach of the defendant. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (2009).

- Defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana was authorized because the defendant, a roommate, and an accomplice were willing participants in the drug offenses, and the defendant agreed to accept delivery of the package of marijuana at the defendant's residence in exchange for $200 and an ounce of marijuana for the defendant's personal consumption; whether the defendant had physical possession of the drugs, the defendant aided and abetted the marijuana's actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) and under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as a party to the crime because the defendant admitted that the defendant was aiding the accomplice's efforts to commit the trafficking offense by giving the accomplice a safe haven and a means to avoid law enforcement detection. Park v. State, 308 Ga. App. 648, 708 S.E.2d 614 (2011).

Jury Instruction

Jury instruction on knowledge of weight.

- Even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury that knowledge of the weight of the marijuana possessed by the defendant was not required for a conviction of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c), because the issue was subject to reasonable dispute, the instruction did not amount to plain error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b). Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. 458, 729 S.E.2d 364 (2012).

Because the trial court instructed that the trafficking in marijuana count alleged that the defendant did knowingly possess more than 10 pounds of marijuana and because the trial court did not charge the jury that the state was not required to prove knowledge of the weight of the marijuana, the charge accurately and fully apprised the jury of the applicable law, and the failure of the trial court to give the requested instruction that the defendant knew that the weight of the marijuana was greater than 10 pounds was not error. Prado v. State, 327 Ga. App. 402, 759 S.E.2d 287 (2014).

- See Christian v. State, 181 Ga. App. 569, 353 S.E.2d 65 (1987).

- Since the defendant was convicted of trafficking in marijuana, a conviction for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana cannot also stand and the jury should be instructed that a verdict of one or the other is authorized but not both. Hardin v. State, 172 Ga. App. 232, 322 S.E.2d 540 (1984).

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial since no error occurred with the trial court giving the state's requested instruction on deliberate ignorance as the defendant's actions in being paid to pick up a package from a shipping company, the defendant and the codefendant approaching the driver twice, giving a false name, and trying to allude the police, all supported the inference of deliberate ignorance. Aguilera v. State, 293 Ga. App. 523, 667 S.E.2d 378 (2008).

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial since no error occurred by the trial court giving the jury an instruction on conspiracy as evidence that the defendant and the codefendant were paid, jointly picked up a package containing drugs from a shipping company, and both refused to tell who hired the pair was sufficient to support that a conspiracy existed. Aguilera v. State, 293 Ga. App. 523, 667 S.E.2d 378 (2008).

Sentencing

Merger of manufacturing and trafficking marijuana offenses.

- Defendant's conviction for manufacturing marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) should have been merged into the defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) because the same evidence was used to prove both crimes, and the manufacturing count did not require proof of any fact which the trafficking count did not require. Preval v. State, 302 Ga. App. 785, 692 S.E.2d 51 (2010).

Methamphetamine or Amphetamine

In General

- Even assuming that defendants convicted of methamphetamine trafficking who provided substantial assistance were similarly situated and treated differently than those who could not provide assistance, because there was a rational basis for doing so as the legislature intended to reward individuals with a reduced sentence in exchange for information that was useful in assisting law enforcement officials with identifying, arresting, or convicting other individuals involved with illegal drugs and shutting down drug networks, the provisions for sentencing those defendants who provided assistance differently than those like the defendant who could not did not violate the defendant's substantive due process or equal protection rights. State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 761 S.E.2d 1 (2014).

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for new trial because the evidence at trial showed that the defendant was driving the car at the time of the stop and, thus, necessarily was in possession of the vehicle's keys, affording the defendant access to the trunk where the methamphetamine was located. Smith v. State, 350 Ga. App. 496, 829 S.E.2d 776 (2019).

Procedure

No fatal variance between "methamphetamine" and "mixture containing methamphetamine".

- Because "methamphetamine" and a "mixture containing methamphetamine" are synonymous for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), there was no fatal variance between the delinquency petition charging delivery of a certain amount of methamphetamine and the proof at the hearing showing delivery of that amount of a mixture containing methamphetamine. In the Interest of S. C. P., 320 Ga. App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 474 (2013).

- There was no fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial when the defendant was charged with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime by trafficking in methamphetamine, while defendant was charged, in another count, with trafficking in amphetamine rather than methamphetamine; trafficking in either methamphetamine or amphetamine fell within the categories set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. Sims v. State, 258 Ga. App. 536, 574 S.E.2d 622 (2002).

- Trial court erred in allowing the state to nolle prosequi the two methamphetamine possession charges over the defendant's objection and proceed only on a trafficking charge because the case had been submitted to the jury within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-3. Also, this procedure essentially allowed the state to amend the indictment. Truelove v. State, 302 Ga. App. 418, 691 S.E.2d 549 (2010).

- Convictions on counts for selling methamphetamine were lesser included offenses of convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and, therefore, merged into the trafficking convictions. Nunery v. State, 229 Ga. App. 246, 493 S.E.2d 610 (1997).

Evidence

Manufacture of methamphetamine.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. Query v. State, 217 Ga. App. 61, 456 S.E.2d 704 (1995).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in amphetamine after the state's chemist testified that the bag containing the drug weighed 251.1 grams; the only reasonable interpretation of the testimony was that the substance inside the "plastic ziploc type" bag weighed 251.1 grams. Emilio v. State, 257 Ga. App. 49, 570 S.E.2d 372 (2002).

- Subsection (e) treats pure methamphetamine and a mixture containing methamphetamine equally; accordingly, any variance in proof at trial regarding whether the substance was a mixture containing methamphetamine or pure methamphetamine is not fatal. Bellamy v. State, 243 Ga. App. 575, 530 S.E.2d 243 (2000).

Trial court's instruction to the jury that trafficking in amphetamine could be accomplished by possessing "amphetamine or any mixture of amphetamine" did not create the possibility that the defendant was convicted of an offense not charged since O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) did not establish two different methods of trafficking based on the purity of the drug. Emilio v. State, 257 Ga. App. 49, 570 S.E.2d 372 (2002).

- Even if a bag containing methamphetamine was found on the floorboard of the van in which the defendant was riding, as the defendant claimed, instead of on the defendant's person, the evidence sufficed to show constructive possession of the bag; the bag was in plain view at the defendant's feet, and the methamphetamine in the bag was packaged in the same way as the methamphetamine in a container that was found on the defendant's person. Hulsey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 461, 643 S.E.2d 888 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of cocaine were upheld on appeal as the jury was authorized to find that the defendant constructively possessed the contraband since the defendant lived at the apartment searched by consent and despite the fact that others living in the apartment had equal access to the drugs. Additionally, the defendant was found lying on a mattress atop a bag containing more than an ounce of methamphetamine. Maldonado v. State, 293 Ga. App. 356, 667 S.E.2d 156 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the defendant was in joint constructive possession of methamphetamine found under the seat of the vehicle the defendant was driving, and the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's alternative hypothesis that the defendant believed the defendant was simply delivering a vehicle to a motel as the jury could have found that, given the high street value of the methamphetamine, the defendant would not have been permitted to drive the vehicle alone to the motel unless the defendant was a trusted accomplice. Garcia-Maldonado v. State, 324 Ga. App. 518, 751 S.E.2d 149 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the defendant was in joint constructive possession of the contraband as the evidence demonstrated that the defendant lived at the house where the methamphetamine was found, and that methamphetamine residue was found in the kitchen, and methamphetamine oil was found in the garage, both of which were common areas over which a resident might exercise control; and the evidence showed that the defendant was more than merely present at the scene as the defendant knew that large quantities of methamphetamine were present in the house and actively participated in guarding the methamphetamine in exchange for monetary benefit. Lopez-Vasquez v. State, 331 Ga. App. 570, 771 S.E.2d 218 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine based on constructive possession of at least 28 grams of methamphetamine because the defendant made phone calls to one of the sellers to arrange for the informant to buy 28 grams of methamphetamine; both sellers came to the pre-arranged meeting location with more than 28 grams in their possession; and, while the defendant argued that only 26 grams was delivered to support the sale in which the defendant was involved, the evidence did not demand such a finding as the jury could infer that the sellers brought some of the additional methamphetamine in case the informant insisted on delivery of the full weight for which the informant had bargained. Hampton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 864, 792 S.E.2d 124 (2016).

Whether the defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the defendant's bedroom was a question for the jury and the defendant's admission to using drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the room was sufficient to allow the jury to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine. Thomas v. State, 342 Ga. App. 310, 803 S.E.2d 131 (2017).

- Agreement relating to the sale or delivery of amounts of less than 28 grams cannot support a conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, even if the amounts sold over time amount to 28 grams or more, as the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) requires a transaction involving 28 grams or more; additionally, the coconspirators must act "together with" one another to commit the crime of trafficking. Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga. App. 44, 589 S.E.2d 864 (2003).

- Based on the defendant's confession to selling methamphetamine and the other evidence, including a videotape of the transaction, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e). Graves v. State, 274 Ga. App. 855, 619 S.E.2d 356 (2005).

- Because the state did not rely solely on the fact that the drugs were found in the defendant's hotel room, but also presented evidence that a large bag of methamphetamine was found inside a hard drive which the defendant expressly claimed ownership of, this fact constituted additional evidence of possession of the methamphetamine and contraband seized to support a trafficking conviction. Miller v. State, 287 Ga. App. 179, 651 S.E.2d 103 (2007).

- Because the informant's testimony was the only testimony in which the defendant was identified as the person who sold the methamphetamine to the informant in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the testimony of one witness was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity. Vasquez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 548, 621 S.E.2d 764 (2005).

- Trial court did not err in denying either defendant's motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized during the consensual search of the defendant's vehicle or a motion to suppress the defendant's voluntary custodial statement as the testimony of the arresting and investigating officers established that the defendant did not display any problems with the understanding of the English language as did videotapes of the vehicle search and the in custody interview, which likewise showed the defendant having no problems with the English language. Therefore, the defendant's consent to the search of the vehicle nor the defendant's waiver of defendant's Miranda rights were invalidated. Serrano v. State, 291 Ga. App. 500, 662 S.E.2d 280 (2008).

- Manufacturing methamphetamine was lesser-included offense of trafficking methamphetamine as charged. Wesson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 428, 631 S.E.2d 451 (2006).

Crimes set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30.3(b)(2) and16-13-32.2, with regard to possessing objects or materials of any kind for the purpose of manufacturing or preparing a controlled substance, are lesser included offenses of the crime of trafficking by manufacture of methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f). Franks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 758 S.E.2d 604 (2013).

Because the possession of pseudoephedrine and possession of a drug-related object required proof of elements not required for the crime of trafficking, those crimes were not lesser included offenses of the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine as indicted, and the trial court did not err in denying the second defendant's requested charges on lesser included offenses. Long v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 758 S.E.2d 604 (2013).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of a conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine based on the defendant's understanding with the defendant's spouse regarding the spouse's drug sales, and testimony of drug enforcement agents and co-indictees as well as drugs, money, and drug paraphernalia obtained during a search of the residence the defendant shared with the spouse, who had engaged in three sales of this contraband. Williamson v. State, 300 Ga. App. 538, 685 S.E.2d 784 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0387, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 191 (Ga. 2010).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine over 400 grams in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-31(e)(3) because an accomplice testified that the defendant supplied the accomplice with several pounds of methamphetamine, and that testimony was amply corroborated by other evidence in the record; the defendant's translator testified that the translator retrieved $15,000 from the accomplice as payment for fronted methamphetamine, police officers recovered $15,000 in cash from the translator upon leaving the accomplice's residence, and there were recorded conversations between the accomplice, the defendant, and the translator in which they discussed methamphetamine transactions. Melesa v. State, 314 Ga. App. 306, 724 S.E.2d 30 (2012).

- In a prosecution for burglary and trafficking methamphetamine, probable cause supported the defendant's warrantless arrest and supported the admission of the seized evidence because: (1) it was reasonable for the arresting officers to act upon an investigating deputy's observations; (2) law enforcement had reasonably trustworthy information to warrant their belief that the defendant had committed or had participated in committing a burglary; and (3) a determination of probable cause to arrest the defendant could rest on the collective knowledge of the police, given the communication between them. Murphy v. State, 286 Ga. App. 447, 649 S.E.2d 565 (2007).

- Defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine was supported by the evidence because: (1) the defendant's wife informed law enforcement authorities that the defendant was manufacturing methamphetamine; (2) the defendant was discovered at a motel and was arrested; and (3) a forensic chemist testified that the items found in the defendant's motel room were those used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga. App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

- Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for attempted trafficking by manufacturing methamphetamine based on the evidence that the defendant lived at the residence wherein the meth lab was discovered as shown by the owner's testimony and another witness who testified that the defendant slept at the home nightly and material used in the red phosphorous process for manufacturing methamphetamine was seized from the residence. Franks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 758 S.E.2d 604 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support both the defendants' convictions for attempted trafficking by manufacturing methamphetamine because the evidence connected the defendants to the house and the rooms in which the manufacturing components and the items containing methamphetamine residue were found; the police found lantern fuel in the house, which was commonly used as a solvent in methamphetamine labs; the chief of police, who was qualified as an expert witness, testified that the items seized appeared to have been used in the red phosphorous process for manufacturing methamphetamine; and a chemical odor associated with methamphetamine labs lingered around the house. Long v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 758 S.E.2d 604 (2013).

- Because the state's evidence sufficiently showed the first defendant's joint constructive possession of methamphetamine beyond mere spatial proximity, and the first defendant's act of testifying for the state without a promise of leniency or immunity did not unfairly prejudice the second defendant at the expense of that defendant's constitutional right not to testify, the defendants' convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of tools for the commission of a crime were upheld; thus, the trial court did not err in denying both defendants a new trial. Herberman v. State, 287 Ga. App. 635, 653 S.E.2d 74 (2007).

- Denial of the defendant's motion for acquittal was supported by evidence that the defendant stated the defendant had three ounces of methamphetamine about two hours before the drug transaction, that amount was found in the vehicle, and the defendant provided methamphetamine to an individual who sold the methamphetamine to the confidential informant. Osorio v. State, 323 Ga. App. 843, 748 S.E.2d 483 (2013).

- Evidence that the defendant helped direct a witness to a police informant's home in order to buy a pound of methamphetamine, combined with the defendant's previous contact with the informant, showed more than mere presence, and, at a minimum, showed that the defendant was guilty as a party to the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine. Lopez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 623, 636 S.E.2d 770 (2006).

- Trial court properly denied the defendants' motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in the car because the search was conducted pursuant to the valid consent of both defendants and the involvement of the Spanish-speaking officer was needed to fulfill the purpose of the stop to explain the violation. Flores v. State, 347 Ga. App. 174, 818 S.E.2d 90 (2018).

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31; the vehicle in which the methamphetamine was found was the defendant's vehicle and the defendant had been driving the vehicle, the defendant was found with methamphetamine on the defendant's person, and although there had been a passenger, the passenger had not been in the car alone. Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 636 S.E.2d 145 (2006).

Evidence authorized a finding that the defendant was guilty as a party to trafficking methamphetamine and not merely a passenger in the codefendant's truck after the codefendant testified that the defendant obtained methamphetamine from a third party and was the supplier for the deal, the defendant admitted that the defendant had previously purchased methamphetamine from the third party and knew what was going on when the defendant and the codefendant met with the third party, and the defendant remained in the truck when the codefendant took the methamphetamine and got into an agent's vehicle to make the sale. Russell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 789, 658 S.E.2d 400 (2008).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and the defendant's motion for a new trial with regard to the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine as the defendant failed to rebut the presumption that finding the defendant in possession of such a large amount of drugs was sufficient to establish trafficking. The reviewing court noted that it was for the jury to decide if the defendant rebutted the presumption and the fact that a codefendant owned the vehicle in which the drugs were found and had equal access to the drugs was not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Navarro v. State, 293 Ga. App. 329, 667 S.E.2d 125 (2008).

Because a police officer properly stopped the defendant's car for a suspended registration, saw what appeared to be a weapon in the defendant's fanny pack, and the suspected methamphetamine was found in plain view during a limited protective search and while the officer was engaged in a lawful arrest; accordingly, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated, and the defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and16-13-31(e). Eaton v. State, 294 Ga. App. 124, 668 S.E.2d 770 (2008).

Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) beyond a reasonable doubt since the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the drugs, which were stashed inside a green vehicle; the defendant had moments earlier given an accomplice the keys to the vehicle, told the accomplice where to drive and park the vehicle, and led the accomplice to a motel. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).

Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal for the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), because there was no evidence that anyone other than the defendant and the codefendant had recent access to the vehicle in which they were riding when they were stopped for a traffic violation, even though the vehicle belonged to the defendant's grandparent. Moreover, because the defendant and the codefendant were jointly charged with the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine, the State of Georgia was not required to show that the defendant was in sole constructive possession of the brick of methamphetamine which was found in a search of the vehicle. Mercado v. State, 317 Ga. App. 403, 731 S.E.2d 85 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant was the only occupant of the car, drugs were found under a blanket that the defendant held in the defendant's hand, and the defendant had a large sum of cash on the defendant's person, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine and showed more than the defendant's mere presence at the scene. Reyes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 496, 745 S.E.2d 738 (2013).

Evidence that the drugs were found under the passenger seat where the defendant was seated, the driver testified that the driver had not put any methamphetamine under the passenger seat and the defendant had tried to hide drugs in the driver's purse, and the driver's testimony that the defendant had sold the driver drugs from a motel room that had additional drugs in it and also was found to have a scale and multiple cell phones was sufficient to support the defendant's trafficking conviction. Crider v. State, 336 Ga. App. 83, 783 S.E.2d 682 (2016).

- Trial court erred in denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict after the codefendant was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) because the evidence against the codefendant was insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the codefendant was in actual or constructive possession of the drugs found in a vehicle, and there was no presumption of drug possession since there was no evidence that the codefendant owned or controlled the vehicle in which the drugs were found; there was no evidence that the codefendant had even been in or had any connection to that vehicle, no testimony implicated the codefendant in the transaction, and the evidence showed nothing more than the codefendant's presence in the vehicle with the defendant, but there was no evidence that the codefendant had the power and intent to exercise control over the drugs. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).

- Although the defendant argued that the defendant's passenger had equal access to 27.1 grams of methamphetamine that were found taped under the console tray of the defendant's truck, the state sufficiently proved the defendant's possession. Dalton v. State, 261 Ga. App. 72, 581 S.E.2d 700 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was in joint constructive possession of drugs found under the passenger seat of a car the defendant was driving; at a minimum, there was evidence that the defendant was transporting the passenger, a codefendant, in a car knowing that the passenger was in possession of the bag containing methamphetamine. Waters v. State, 280 Ga. App. 566, 634 S.E.2d 508 (2006).

- Because the defendant's possession of the 400 grams of methamphetamine found inside a vehicle was established by other circumstantial evidence besides ownership, use, or possession of the vehicle, the equal access rule did not entitle the defendant to an acquittal of the drug trafficking charge. The issue of whether the drugs belonged to the defendant was for the jury's determination and an appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence and reassess the witnesses' credibility. Evans v. State, 288 Ga. App. 103, 653 S.E.2d 520 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), despite an equal access defense, given the evidence linking the defendant to the methamphetamine found, and the defendant's unusual nervousness following the traffic stop. Arellano v. State, 289 Ga. App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264 (2008).

Because the state was not relying upon the defendant's ownership or control of the residence in order to link the ownership and possession of the methamphetamine found to the defendant, a charge on equal access was not authorized by the evidence. Thrasher v. State, 289 Ga. App. 399, 657 S.E.2d 316 (2008).

Evidence supported a conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine when the defendant was driving a vehicle that contained 441.11 grams of amphetamine, over which the defendant presumptively had possession and control, the drug was on the seat directly behind the defendant, and the vehicle was registered to another person, which an investigator testified was common among drug dealers; the defendant had not presented any evidence to rebut the presumption of possession, and as both the defendant and the defendant's passenger were charged with the crime of possession, the equal access rule did not apply. Ramirez v. State, 290 Ga. App. 3, 658 S.E.2d 790 (2008).

Evidence at trial was sufficient to enable the jury to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine because the codefendant testified that the defendant and the defendant's daughter sold drugs from the defendant's house, and the defendant tested positive for methamphetamine the day of the search; a rebuttable presumption arose that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine because the defendant was the owner of the house in which the methamphetamine was found, and it was found in the defendant's bedroom, and because a codefendant was a member of the defendant's immediate household, evidence of the codefendant's access was not sufficient to rebut the presumption against the defendant and did not demand an acquittal under the equal access rule. Swan v. State, 300 Ga. App. 667, 686 S.E.2d 310 (2009).

- As the defendant was the driver, owner, and sole occupant of a vehicle, and 250 grams of methamphetamine were found hidden beneath the steering column, within arm's reach of the driver, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's "knowing" possession of the drugs as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e). Garcia v. State, 293 Ga. App. 422, 667 S.E.2d 205 (2008).

- Defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-1, because the trial court properly admitted the state's similar transaction evidence when the evidence was introduced for the appropriate purpose of showing the defendant's knowledge and intent regarding the methamphetamine found in the defendant's room, and the trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence for that limited purpose; both incidents occurred on the same street and both involved methamphetamine, and in both incidents police found the drugs in the defendant's bedroom along with scales. Swan v. State, 300 Ga. App. 667, 686 S.E.2d 310 (2009).

- Police officers lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to justify the officers' presence in the back yard of a home where the officers were conducting a first-tier encounter "knock and talk," and the officers' detention of the home's occupants as the occupants fled out the back door was unlawful. Therefore, methamphetamine seen through the back door of the home was not in "plain view" and was required to be suppressed. Galindo-Eriza v. State, 306 Ga. App. 19, 701 S.E.2d 516 (2010).

- Sufficient corroboration existed to support a defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine after a police informant testified that the defendant appeared to be involved in the deal and the state also offered testimony that a person would not simply tag along to a drug transaction involving over 400 grams of methamphetamine. Casanova v. State, 285 Ga. App. 554, 646 S.E.2d 754 (2007).

There was sufficient corroborating evidence to support a defendant's conviction for violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), as the defendant's presence with a codefendant outside the rurally located barn where the methamphetamine was found corroborated the codefendant's testimony that some of the drugs belonged to the defendant. Dingler v. State, 293 Ga. App. 27, 666 S.E.2d 441 (2008).

- Conviction for the sale of methamphetamine was upheld on appeal because the state presented sufficient evidence to support a charge of the sale of methamphetamine before the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, specifically, that the drugs allegedly sold to an informant were packaged in the same type of Ziploc bag as those found on the defendant's person, and the defendant was in possession of a large of amount of cash and paraphernalia. Ramey v. State, 288 Ga. App. 800, 655 S.E.2d 675 (2007).

- See Cook v. State, 226 Ga. App. 113, 485 S.E.2d 595 (1997); Neill v. State, 247 Ga. App. 152, 543 S.E.2d 436 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine since: (1) the defendant was the owner of a vehicle in which drugs were found and was a passenger at the time the drugs were found; (2) the driver stated that the drugs did not belong to the driver; (3) the drugs were in plain view on the passenger side of the vehicle where the defendant was sitting; and (4) the defendant told the driver not to stop and fled the scene when approached by officers. The equal access rule did not apply since the defendant's possession of the vehicle was not the sole evidence of the defendant's guilt. Kantorik v. State, 257 Ga. App. 828, 572 S.E.2d 690 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine when the defendant drove to the meeting place, got out of the defendant's car and got into the passenger seat of the informant's car, and the defendant gave the informant the agreed upon amount of money, $3200, half of the purchase price for the drugs. Harris v. State, 258 Ga. App. 669, 574 S.E.2d 871 (2002).

Evidence that the first defendant actually handled and attempted to sell the nearly 450 grams of methamphetamine to the undercover officer, and the second defendant not only accompanied the first defendant to the scene but also sat in the seat under which the drugs were stored prior to the attempted sale was sufficient to support convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine. Evidence that the third defendant's participation was voluntary and not the product of entrapment was sufficient to sustain that defendant's conviction. Baggs v. State, 265 Ga. App. 282, 593 S.E.2d 734 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in methamphetamine since, among other things, the testimony of the codefendant was corroborated by the fact that, at the time of the defendant's arrest, methamphetamine was found behind the front passenger seat of the car the defendant was driving, and the defendant had items in the defendant's pocket commonly known to be drug paraphernalia. Garmon v. State, 265 Ga. App. 622, 594 S.E.2d 779 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) as: (1) methamphetamine, weighing 59.49 grams, was found in the defendant's truck; (2) the defendant was the sole occupant and admitted owner of the truck; (3) the methamphetamine was found hidden near where the defendant was sitting; (4) the defendant had recently ingested methamphetamine; and (5) the defendant provided no evidence of equal access by others. Craig v. State, 274 Ga. App. 504, 617 S.E.2d 653 (2005).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, because testimony from police agents and task force members who were part of the surveillance or take-down of the defendant established that an informant had arranged a drug deal, the designated vehicle drove up to the specified location, the defendant was identified as the individual who exited the vehicle and was on the phone with the informant at the time that the vehicle arrived at the location, and drugs were found in the vehicle; the testimony of the agents was based on the agents' observations and actions and was not hearsay. Diaz v. State, 275 Ga. App. 557, 621 S.E.2d 543 (2005).

Because the defendant, who was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police, and the vehicle's driver had different responses when the arresting officers asked them where they were going, and a bag containing about three pounds of methamphetamine was found between the passenger's and driver's seats, and the defendant fled the scene, and the packaging of the methamphetamine was very similar to the packaging of the cocaine, marijuana, and cash found at the defendant's residence two months earlier, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in methamphetamine and of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Salinas-Valdez v. State, 276 Ga. App. 732, 624 S.E.2d 278 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine when a confidential informant (CI) arranged to have drugs delivered to a mall, a short time later, the defendant arrived in a taxi and entered the mall, the CI then received a call and told the caller that the CI had moved to a different location, the defendant came out of the mall, and got back into the taxi, and the officers stopped the defendant with the drugs. Flores v. State, 277 Ga. App. 211, 626 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper as the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e); there was clearly evidence that the sale of the drug involved more than 28 grams of methamphetamine, that defendant either possessed or sold the methamphetamine through the defendant's presence when the drug was being cut, weighed, packaged, and sold, and that the defendant was liable as an aider and abettor under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21 even if there was no evidence that the defendant either arranged the sale or received any money in connection therewith. Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga. App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of trafficking methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) based on insufficient evidence, given the various items seized from the defendant's property that were indicative of the manufacture of methamphetamine as well as the samples of substances that tested positive for methamphetamine. Wesson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 428, 631 S.E.2d 451 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for methamphetamine trafficking was supported by sufficient evidence as: (1) on the basis of a tip from a confidential informant, the police made a controlled buy of methamphetamine from a codefendant dropped off from a car driven by the defendant; (2) the codefendant testified that the defendant had arranged to drop the codefendant off in the driveway, circle the neighborhood, and pick the codefendant up; and (3) a second codefendant had also been a passenger in the car and testified that the second codefendant and the defendant ran a methamphetamine business together. Temples v. State, 280 Ga. App. 874, 635 S.E.2d 249 (2006).

Defendant's trafficking in methamphetamine conviction was upheld as the evidence showed that: (1) no compelling reason existed to grant a continuance of the trial; and (2) the defendant failed to show that but for counsel's alleged inactions, the outcome of the trial would have been different or aided in the presentation of a defense. Hartley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 388, 641 S.E.2d 607 (2007).

In a prosecution for trafficking in methamphetamine: (1) no error resulted from the admission of evidence of a 2003 incident in which officers investigated the defendant's involvement in another drug case; (2) admission of evidence regarding the two packs of crystalline substance that were not tested was not erroneous; and (3) the fact that portions of the suspected methamphetamine had not been tested went to the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility of the evidence. Perry v. State, 283 Ga. App. 520, 642 S.E.2d 141 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine; the defendant participated in phone calls in which the defendant's over interest arranged to deliver methamphetamine to an informant and had driven the car used to lead the person making the delivery to the informant's house. Gonzalez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (2007).

Despite the defendant's contrary contentions, evidence seized via the execution of a valid search warrant, specifically a substantial amount of methamphetamine, a set of scales in a case marked "dope kit inside," a .38 revolver, common tools of the drug trade, written instructions for making pure ephedrine, a loose bag of vitamin B-12 commonly used to dilute methamphetamine, over $2,000 in cash, and evidence that the defendant installed a video surveillance system to monitor the front door and driveway, both a trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon conviction were supported by sufficient evidence. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 178, 645 S.E.2d 658 (2007).

Although no evidence was presented as to the ownership of a Nissan Pathfinder parked at the scene of the crime, the defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal as sufficient evidence was presented to not only link the defendant with that vehicle where the trafficking amount of drugs was found, but also to support a finding of guilt as a party to the crime; moreover, the jury could conclude that as a party to the crimes charged, the defendant was actively involved in a criminal enterprise to possess the methamphetamine stashed inside the vehicle. Sherrer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258, cert. denied, No. S08C0875, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 391 (Ga. 2008).

With regard to defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, which was based on the trial court improperly admitting evidence of a witness's statements made during a polygraph examination as the evidence, which indicated that the defendant sold methamphetamine, did not go to proving what the defendant was indicted for, namely trafficking methamphetamine since possessing the drug in a certain amount was also a way of proving the crime. Further, the defendant was able to fully call into issue the witness's motive for testifying. Corn v. State, 290 Ga. App. 792, 660 S.E.2d 782 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for trafficking methamphetamine. Although a person could not be convicted of a felony based solely on an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony, there was no evidence that the friend who testified against the defendant was an accomplice; furthermore, an officer's sighting of the defendant with a dog within walking distance of the residence that the defendant left with a dog, the defendant's appearance at a convenience store that was consistent with the violent argument described by the friend, the defendant's arrest there with the gun the friend said the defendant had left with, and the discovery of the defendant's photographs at the residence would be sufficient corroboration of the friend's testimony. Honeycutt v. State, 293 Ga. App. 614, 668 S.E.2d 19 (2008).

Sufficient evidence existed to convict a defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine (meth) under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) because evidence showed that the defendant had actual possession of the drugs when the defendant arrived at an apartment complex with the meth and showed the meth to the confidential informant; the defendant also admitted possession of the drugs during a cell phone conversation with an undercover detective, and undercover officers observed the transfer of the drugs to the defendant's accomplice in an ice cream van. Escobar v. State, 296 Ga. App. 898, 676 S.E.2d 291 (2009).

Because probation officers were authorized to investigate an allegation that the defendant's son possessed drugs in violation of the son's probation, and because the officers were authorized to seize contraband falling in plain view, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and trafficking in methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and16-13-31(e)(1). Prince v. State, 299 Ga. App. 164, 682 S.E.2d 180 (2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction, and the jury was authorized to conclude that the circumstances excluded the hypothesis that another passenger had placed drugs in the bed of the truck; the passenger testified at trial that the passenger did not place the drugs in the truck bed, and a police officer testified that the passenger, whom the officer had in sight the entire time, never came within five-to-six feet of the truck and that the officer not only saw the defendant place the defendant's arm in the truck bed but heard an accompanying thump. Haggard v. State, 302 Ga. App. 502, 690 S.E.2d 651 (2010).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence was sufficient to show more than the defendant's mere presence and spatial proximity to the methamphetamine drugs when the defendant and the codefendant, who was the defendant's boyfriend, lived at the residence where the drugs were found, and the presumption that the defendants had joint possession of the drugs was not rebutted by the evidence; the defendant had sold methamphetamine to an informant during the controlled buy, the money used to make the drug purchase was located during the subsequent search of the defendant's purse, and two individuals who had been arrested at the residence testified at trial that the defendant had supplied those individuals with methamphetamine. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (2010).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1) because given the evidence, the jury was authorized under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as either the actual perpetrator or as a party to the crime of the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine as charged in the indictment; officers executing a search warrant for a house discovered the defendant on a couch with a codefendant and baggies of methamphetamine. Hughes v. State, 309 Ga. App. 150, 709 S.E.2d 900 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), because the equal access doctrine was not applicable since the evidence of the defendant's possession of the drugs included more than the defendant's mere possession of the car where the drugs were discovered; because the defendant's possession of the methamphetamine found inside the trunk of the car was established by evidence besides the defendant's mere ownership, use, or possession of the car, including the defendant's statement that the defendant was transporting the methamphetamine, the issue of whether the drugs belonged to the defendant or one of the other occupants was for the jury's determination. Arroyo v. State, 309 Ga. App. 494, 711 S.E.2d 60 (2011).

Evidence that a defendant sold an undercover officer methamphetamine on two occasions, with one sale of more than 28 grams, and that the defendant participated in a later, larger drug deal, supported the defendant's convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), and sale of methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-26(3)(B) and16-13-30(b). Culajay v. State, 309 Ga. App. 631, 710 S.E.2d 846 (2011).

Evidence that the defendant resided in the house, refused to show the house to an individual who was in the yard even though the house was for sale, occupied a bedroom in which methamphetamine was found, was present when drugs were brought into the house, and was surrounded with plastic garbage bags full of narcotics packing material when police entered the house was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine. Lopez-Jimenez v. State, 317 Ga. App. 868, 733 S.E.2d 42 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the officers found coffee filters, tubing, a funnel, a bottle with tubing coming out of it, a bottle containing a liquid substance, a can of fuel, drain cleaner, muriatic acid, a cold pack containing ammonium nitrate, a coffee grinder, lithium batteries, and rubber gloves, which were all items that could be used together to produce methamphetamine; and because the investigators found scales, which were consistent with selling drugs, as well as syringes, a spoon, and straws, commonly used for ingesting drugs. State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 761 S.E.2d 1 (2014).

Evidence that the box with the methamphetamine was found in the debris field of the wreck, the defendant was walking around the wrecked car looking for something on the ground, and there was over 15 times the threshold trafficking amount in the box was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant knew the defendant possessed 28 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine as required to convict the defendant of trafficking over 400 grams of a mixture with methamphetamine. Brown v. State, 334 Ga. App. 674, 780 S.E.2d 372 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine and trafficking methamphetamine because, given the large array of products involved in the production of methamphetamine, their proximity to each other in the residence, and the fact that methamphetamine was found throughout the residence, the jury heard sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that it would have been virtually impossible for the defendant to have been unaware that methamphetamine was being produced there; and the state presented evidence that police had observed the defendant sell methamphetamine to a confidential informant from the same residence where the methamphetamine was being produced. Cummings v. State, 345 Ga. App. 702, 814 S.E.2d 806 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1280, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 728 (Ga. 2018).

- Circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the defendant had a key to the house searched, received mail there, and kept clothes there was sufficient to sustain a trafficking in amphetamine conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), and the defendant's equal access defense did not apply. Swanger v. State, 251 Ga. App. 182, 554 S.E.2d 207 (2001).

Evidence supported a conviction for trafficking in amphetamine after a package was dropped from the defendant's truck containing amphetamine, the codefendant testified that the package was obtained from the defendant's aunt in exchange for money, and a police officer testified that an individual user would have had paraphernalia, less amphetamine, and more money than was found with the defendant and the codefendant; the state did not rely solely on the testimony of the codefendant, who was acquitted. Steed v. State, 273 Ga. App. 845, 616 S.E.2d 185 (2005).

- There was an initial one-ounce sale of methamphetamine between the defendant and the supplier, but each week thereafter, for about four months, the defendant called the supplier and requested one-half ounce of methamphetamine or less; thus, there was insufficient evidence of an agreement to act together to sell or deliver 28 grams, and the defendant's trafficking conviction was reversed. Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga. App. 44, 589 S.E.2d 864 (2003).

Evidence was not sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) because a known drug dealer, who was on the defendant's premises at the time police arrived and conducted a search, was the only person possessing sufficient methamphetamine and the evidence did not show that the defendant had control over the drugs on the dealer's person or any basis to attribute these drugs to the defendant, particularly as the dealer had always advanced the defendant much smaller amounts of methamphetamine. Peacock v. State, 301 Ga. App. 873, 689 S.E.2d 853 (2010).

Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(3) because although the evidence raised grave suspicions of the defendant's guilt, the state failed to establish that the defendant had both the power and the intention at the time of the defendant's arrest to exercise dominion or control over the drugs and failed to show that other men did not have equal access to the house and the items within the house; all of the evidence was circumstantial with regard to the defendant's constructive possession of the contraband, there was nothing in the case linking the defendant to the drugs or manufacturing equipment in the house, and several other people with access to the house were unaccounted for and were not charged. Aquino v. State, 308 Ga. App. 163, 706 S.E.2d 746 (2011).

Codefendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) could not be upheld on the ground that the codefendant was a party to the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine because the state failed to adduce evidence that the codefendant intentionally caused another to commit the crime, aided or abetted in the commission of the crime, or advised or encouraged another to commit the crime; thus, the state's evidence did not show essential links between the codefendant's proven behavior and the drug trafficking charge. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).

Defendant's conviction for attempted trafficking by manufacturing methamphetamine was reversed because the evidence was not overwhelming as to the charge of trafficking; thus, it could not be said that it was harmless error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses requested by the defendant. Franks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 758 S.E.2d 604 (2013).

- After an investigating officer took various containers used to cook methamphetamine from the inside and outside of the defendant's trailer home and scraped residue from the inside of the containers into one pile, the evidence only showed that the mixture of materials from all the containers contained some unknown quantity of methamphetamine and weighed 90.5 grams; thus, it was impossible to determine how much of the material was methamphetamine and how much may have been simply ephedrine or something else. Hill v. State, 253 Ga. App. 658, 560 S.E.2d 88 (2002).

- Evidence was insufficient to support conviction of trafficking in amphetamine where the charge was brought under a portion of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 that required proof that the defendant knowingly possessed 28 grams or more of amphetamine and a chemist testified that a substance recovered from the defendant that weighed 28.8 grams contained only 40 to 60 percent pure amphetamine; however, evidence did support conviction for possession of amphetamine. Daniel v. State, 251 Ga. App. 792, 555 S.E.2d 154 (2001).

Jury Instruction

Charge on lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute.

- Because defendant was indicted for possession of more than 28 grams of methamphetamine, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, defendant had sufficient notice that the lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), might be submitted to the jury if the evidence warranted it; consequently, by charging the lesser offense in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6, the trial court did not permit the jury to convict the defendant in a manner not alleged in the indictment in violation of the defendant's due process rights. Rupnik v. State, 273 Ga. App. 34, 614 S.E.2d 153 (2005).

- State did not rely solely on the testimony of the codefendant to convict the defendant of trafficking in amphetamine, so an instruction on accomplice testimony was not required; further, counsel was not ineffective in failing to submit a written request for instructions on accomplice testimony and corroboration. Steed v. State, 273 Ga. App. 845, 616 S.E.2d 185 (2005).

Jury charge failed to properly define the offenses of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute because all the jury was told was that it was a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., to traffic or possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine; the instructions given completely failed to inform the jury about the manner in which the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine or the offense of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute may have been committed. As such, the jury did not receive sufficient instructions to guide the jury in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence on these charges. Torres v. State, 298 Ga. App. 158, 679 S.E.2d 757 (2009).

- Defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) because the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, when there was no written request to give a charge on simple possession; even if the trial court erred in not giving the charge, reversal was not required in light of the overwhelming evidence that the defendant possessed 432.31 grams of methamphetamine, which clearly constituted trafficking, and, therefore, it was highly unlikely that the failure to give an instruction on simple possession contributed to the verdict. Gonzalez v. State, 299 Ga. App. 777, 683 S.E.2d 878 (2009).

- Trial court's failure to charge the jury on manufacturing methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), as a lesser included of offense of trafficking methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f), did not contribute to the verdict and was harmless; although the trial court was required to charge the jury on § 16-13-30(b) as a lesser included offense of § 16-13-31(f) since there was evidence that the defendant manufactured methamphetamine as prohibited by § 16-13-30(b), there was no relevant distinction between the two statutes with regard to methamphetamine as applied to the case. Because the evidence established that the defendant manufactured methamphetamine, and the defendant's admission that the defendant was "cooking" showed that the defendant knowingly manufactured methamphetamine, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of both offenses or not guilty of both. Poole v. State, 302 Ga. App. 464, 691 S.E.2d 317 (2010), overruled on other grounds, 293 Ga. 282 (2013).

- In a criminal trial on a charge of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), the trial court did not err when the court did not sua sponte instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of mistake of fact under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-5 as the defendant's mistaken belief that the bag that the defendant delivered contained marijuana rather than methamphetamine did not justify delivery of the package in any event. Dimas v. State, 276 Ga. App. 245, 622 S.E.2d 914 (2005).

- In an action in which defendant was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), a claim that the defendant thought that the defendant was delivering marijuana to an informant's girlfriend rather than methamphetamine, based on prior marijuana deliveries made by the defendant for a drug dealer did not warrant a jury instruction on accident pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2; that defense was unavailable to the defendant as the defendant thought that the defendant was committing a criminal act. Dimas v. State, 276 Ga. App. 245, 622 S.E.2d 914 (2005).

- Defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine was affirmed because the trial court instructed the jury on sole and joint possession, actual and constructive possession, mere presence at the scene of the commission of a crime and mere association with persons involved in the commission of a crime, thus fairly instructing the jury regarding the defendant's defense. Palencia-Barron v. State, 318 Ga. App. 301, 733 S.E.2d 824 (2012).

Sentencing

Rule of lenity is not implicated in trafficking methamphetamine.

- Because a more specific law applies to trafficking methamphetamine, the general provisions for manufacturing controlled substances do not apply; there being no uncertainty as to which statute applies, the rule of lenity is not implicated. State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 761 S.E.2d 1 (2014).

- Because both the trafficking and manufacturing charges against the defendants arose from methamphetamine found in a cooler, no other quantity of methamphetamine was presented at trial, and there was no separate quantity of methamphetamine used to prove the trafficking charge, defendants were entitled to resentencing because the convictions merged and the trial court erred in sentencing for both offenses. Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 523, 615 S.E.2d 592 (2005).

Trial court's failure to follow the mandatory sentencing requirement for conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine in a quantity of 28 grams or more required that the sentence be vacated and remanded to the trial court with direction that the trial court follow the mandates of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(1). Conrad v. State, 217 Ga. App. 388, 457 S.E.2d 592 (1995).

- When the defendant was in possession of 434.72 grams of methamphetamine, the sentence of 25 years in prison and a one million dollar fine was mandated; given the large quantity and value of the methamphetamine, the sentence required by the legislature was not wholly irrational or grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, and because trafficking in methamphetamine was so lucrative, the mandatory sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Flores v. State, 277 Ga. App. 211, 626 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

- Because O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1) required a mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in methamphetamine of ten years and a $200,000 fine, and the sentence imposed by the trial court failed to include the fine, the trial court's resentencing to add the fine after the defendant began serving the sentence was valid and did not violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights. The suspended sentence provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a) were inapplicable to the mandatory sentence provisions of § 16-13-31, and there was no indication that the trial court intended to suspend the fine portion. Strickland v. State, 301 Ga. App. 272, 687 S.E.2d 221 (2009).

- Assessment of a $300,000 fine for trafficking in 87.5 grams of methamphetamine exceeded the trial court's authority. Davis v. State, 232 Ga. App. 450, 501 S.E.2d 241 (1998).

- Upon a conviction of methamphetamine trafficking, because the sentence imposed by a trial judge against the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(2) was supported by the record evidence that the defendant assisted the police in identifying a methamphetamine supplier, and did not result from an illegal departure from O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(1), the state's appeal from imposition of the sentence on grounds that the sentence was void was dismissed. State v. Carden, 281 Ga. App. 886, 637 S.E.2d 493 (2006).

- Defendant's case was remanded for resentencing after a conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine because the trial court considered an uncertified Arkansas docket sheet in aggravation of sentence and a Tennessee conviction that might not qualify as a prior felony in Georgia under the recidivist statute. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga. App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

- Offense of manufacturing methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) was a lesser included offense of trafficking/manufacturing under O.C.G.A. § 16-31-31(f)(1); thus, the trial court was authorized to sentence a defendant for the greater offense after merging the lesser offense into it. Richards v. State, 290 Ga. App. 360, 659 S.E.2d 651 (2008).

Multiple Drugs

In General

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) based on the statute's allowance of a conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine if a defendant possessed 28 grams or more, regardless of the purity of the methamphetamine mixture, while O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) only allowed a conviction for trafficking in cocaine if the mixture of cocaine had a purity of at least 10 percent; the proposed challenge was not supported by the evidence as the state's expert testified that 56.2 grams of the 79.0 grams of the substance tested was positive for methamphetamine, and there was no proffer or evidence as to the purity of the mixture or any allegation by defendants that the substance was not methamphetamine. Christopher v. State, 262 Ga. App. 257, 585 S.E.2d 107 (2003).

Procedure

Indictment sufficient.

- Trial court's decision overruling the defendant's special demurrer to an indictment charging the defendant with trafficking in methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and16-13-31(e) was authorized because the allegations of the indictment were sufficient to be easily understood by the jury, to allow the defendant to prepare the defendant's defense, and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy; the indictment sufficiently set forth the date of the offenses and tracked the material language of the statutes proscribing the charged offenses, and the language set forth in the counts against the codefendants separately designated the drugs upon which those charges were based and made clear that the defendant's drug charges were not based upon the drugs allegedly possessed by those individual codefendants. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (2010).

Evidence

Intent to distribute drugs.

- Given a police officer's testimony that the drugs found at the scene came from a bag which the defendant removed from a pants pocket, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant trafficked in cocaine, possessed cocaine with intent to distribute, and possessed less than one ounce of marijuana; moreover, the amount of cocaine at issue, as well as the defendant's possession of digital scales typically used to weigh drugs for distribution, permitted the jury to discount the defendant's own testimony and find an intention to distribute the drugs. Lipsey v. State, 287 Ga. App. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870 (2007).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(A), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), because the verdict was not insupportable as a matter of law; in addition to evidence that the defendant rented a hotel room where illegal drugs were found, had a key to the suite, and was going to the suite at a time when a great quantity and variety of drugs were in open view, there was other evidence linking the defendant to the contraband found there, including the defendant's suspicious behavior upon seeing officers near the suite and the presence of the defendant's personal property inside the suite. Glass v. State, 304 Ga. App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140 (2010).

- In the prosecution for the sale of cocaine and methamphetamine, the trial court erred in allowing an officer to identify the defendant in two surveillance photographs based on the officer's familiarity with the defendant's appearance and absent a change in the defendant's appearance because the testimony was offered to establish a fact which the jurors could decide for themselves; hence, the evidence was erroneously admitted as invading the jury's province to decide the issue. Mitchell v. State, 283 Ga. App. 456, 641 S.E.2d 674 (2007).

- Given that two officers testified that the officers saw the defendant, in plain view, packaging 35 grams of cocaine and 94 grams of marijuana into smaller packages, and the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute were upheld on appeal. King v. State, 289 Ga. App. 461, 657 S.E.2d 570 (2008).

- Convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute were supported by sufficient evidence which showed that the defendant was the sole lessee and resident of an apartment where nearly 500 grams of cocaine were found, along with several bags of marijuana packaged for resale, and that the defendant had recently sold cocaine, which came from a blue bag holding 111 grams of cocaine, which was also found in the apartment. Vance v. State, 268 Ga. App. 556, 602 S.E.2d 276 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school, despite an argument on appeal that no evidence of either actual or constructive possession was presented as: (1) sufficient additional evidence, albeit circumstantial, tied the defendant to those crimes and established more than the defendant's mere presence to the drugs seized; and (2) the proved facts excluded any reasonable hypotheses that a crime could have been committed by anyone else. Slaughter v. State, 282 Ga. App. 276, 638 S.E.2d 417 (2006).

Evidence that a defendant showed officers a can in the defendant's kitchen cupboard with a false bottom that concealed 33.18 grams of cocaine and 19.8 grams of marijuana was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(j)(1) and16-13-31(a)(1)(A). The jury was charged on equal access and clearly rejected the defendant's defense that a confidential informant working as a handyman at the defendant's home could have placed the drugs there. Daniel v. State, 306 Ga. App. 48, 701 S.E.2d 499 (2010).

Jury was authorized to reject as incredible the defendant's wife's testimony that the couple went to Georgia to take a trip because they were having marital issues and the wife's claim that the defendant had no knowledge of the crimes the wife committed when the wife's step-brother asked the wife to transport some drugs to Ohio and, thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Calcaterra v. State, 341 Ga. App. 599, 801 S.E.2d 337 (2017).

Defendant's admission to staying at the apartment with the defendant's girlfriend, and the presence of the defendant's clothing and a picture of the defendant and girlfriend in a bedroom supported the jury's determination that the defendant committed the offenses of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute; the defendant's experience in handling cocaine established that the defendant knew the weight of the cocaine was more than 28 grams. Griffin v. State, 331 Ga. App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514 (2015).

- Defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of heroin with intent to distribute was sustained even though the evidence connecting the defendant to the apartment was circumstantial. Williams v. State, 262 Ga. App. 67, 584 S.E.2d 625 (2003).

- Although the superior court erred in admitting hearsay, by allowing the investigating officers to testify that the officers initiated their investigation on the basis of an anonymous tip alleging drug activity in the defendant's home, such error was harmless in view of the defendant's consent to the investigators' search, direct evidence of the defendant's possession of marijuana, and strong circumstantial evidence showing defendant was in possession of cocaine. Carlisle v. State, 242 Ga. App. 253, 529 S.E.2d 385 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that the defendant was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine, marijuana, and pistol found inside the driver's car because the drugs were in plain view inside a car that smelled of raw marijuana, the defendant was nervous about the impending search and gave evasive answers to the officers, the defendant was in possession of an unusually large amount of cash and was in a position to see the pistol when the driver took the driver's proof of insurance from the glove box, and, given the trafficking amount of cocaine found, the jury was authorized to infer that the driver and the defendant possessed a loaded handgun to protect their illegal drug trade; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence of possession to support a defendant's convictions of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime since: the defendant sped off when police tried to stop the defendant for running a stop sign; narcotics and a gun were found in the passenger side of the car; the passenger's story that the passenger had flagged down the defendant for a ride and that the passenger was unaware of the drugs and the gun was corroborated by the passenger's girlfriend; the defendant's sister, who owned the car, testified that there was no contraband in the car before the defendant took the car; the defendant had $1,755 in cash on the defendant's person; and the defendant had prior drug offenses. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1169, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 521 (Ga. 2007).

- Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine or possession of marijuana with intent to distribute as the state failed to show that the defendant owned or rented the house where the drugs were found, lived at the house, occupied the master bedroom or kept personal belongings there, had keys to the house, or received mail at the house. Holland v. State, 334 Ga. App. 600, 780 S.E.2d 40 (2015).

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), and possession of ecstasy, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), although the defendant was neither in actual possession of the contraband nor in control of the vehicle where the contraband was found because there was slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the contraband and, therefore, excluding every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt, as required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), the question of constructive, joint possession was within the jury's discretion. The ecstasy pills were found in a prescription pill bottle belonging to the defendant, and the pill bottle was found in a bag with the cocaine. Ferrell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 122, 717 S.E.2d 705 (2011).

- Evidence that the defendant and the defendant's coconspirators arranged and attempted to purchase one kilogram of cocaine and also attempted to purchase 25 pounds of marijuana from an undercover officer and that the defendant showed the undercover officer money to make the purchases was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine and criminal attempt to traffic in marijuana. Rainey v. State, 319 Ga. App. 858, 738 S.E.2d 685 (2013).

- Evidence that a defendant showed officers a can in the defendant's kitchen cupboard with a false bottom that concealed 33.18 grams of cocaine and 19.8 grams of marijuana was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(j)(1) and16-13-31(a)(1)(A). The jury was charged on equal access and clearly rejected the defendant's defense that a confidential informant working as a handyman at the defendant's home could have placed the drugs there. Daniel v. State, 306 Ga. App. 48, 701 S.E.2d 499 (2010).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of oxycodone and less than one ounce of marijuana, and driving while the defendant's license was suspended because the defendant knew the defendant's license to drive was suspended, and because the defendant knowingly had both the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the controlled substances found in the backpack and was in constructive possession of those substances as the defendant was driving the car in which the backpack was located, and the defendant was linked to the backpack by the defendant's control of the car and evidence that the backpack contained a copy of a fake driver's license the defendant gave to an officer. Armstrong v. State, 325 Ga. App. 690, 754 S.E.2d 652 (2014).

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, trafficking in 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as ecstasy, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for possession of the contraband, which was found in a backpack, based on the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, the defendant's suspicious and nervous behavior, the defendant's joint living arrangement with two other defendants, the defendant's possession of ammunition for another one of the defendant's weapons, and the fact that the defendant was, at times, within arm's reach of the backpack, which showed an intent and power to exercise joint control over the backpack and the drugs found therein; likewise, there was sufficient evidence to support the trafficking charges based on the amounts of the contraband found; and, there was sufficient evidence to support the firearm possession charge since the defendant was found in possession of a magazine that fit the gun located within arm's reach. However, considering that there were four people in the vehicle, the court found that the state's evidence was insufficient to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the marijuana was intended for personal use, therefore, the conviction for the intent to distribute marijuana was reduced to possession. Vines v. State, 296 Ga. App. 543, 675 S.E.2d 260 (2009).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the first defendant of drug trafficking because that the defendant drove a vehicle described in the wiretap intercept to a gas station, and exchanged vehicles there, which was a common method used by drug traffickers to facilitate the clandestine exchange of drugs and money; and once the first defendant retrieved the stash vehicle, the first defendant drove that vehicle to a house where the drugs were tested. Estrada-Nava v. State, 332 Ga. App. 133, 771 S.E.2d 28 (2015).

- When police officers in execution of a no-knock search warrant on the home where the teenage defendant lived with the defendant's mother found a sock with cocaine in the sock floating in a toilet of a bathroom that the defendant had exited, the defendants cousin acknowledged seeing the defendant with the sock earlier and suspecting drugs were in the sock, and the officers also found marijuana and crack cocaine in a cigar box the defendant admitted owning during an earlier detention hearing, the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant was in constructive, joint possession of the drugs. In the Interest of R.S., 253 Ga. App. 409, 559 S.E.2d 143 (2002).

- When the defendants, a married couple who were in a car with a third person, were charged with trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of amphetamine, and possession of a firearm during certain crimes, there was sufficient evidence that the defendants had joint constructive possession of a duffel bag in which drugs and a weapon were found. The evidence showed that one spouse exercised control over the car that transported the contraband and that the other spouse tried to retrieve a paper sack inside the duffel bag at the sheriff's office with suspicious and inconsistent explanations. Howard v. State, 291 Ga. App. 289, 661 S.E.2d 644 (2008).

- Evidence supported convictions for misdemeanor marijuana possession and cocaine trafficking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-2 and16-13-31 when officers executing a search warrant found the defendant alone in a house near bags of marijuana and with the house containing over 28 grams of cocaine, a loaded handgun, and $596; furthermore, an officer conducting surveillance and using an informant had previously observed the defendant's involvement in the sale of drugs at the home. Boyd v. State, 291 Ga. App. 528, 662 S.E.2d 295 (2008).

- Evidence was sufficient to prove that two defendants knowingly possessed cocaine and marijuana found in a house to which both defendants had keys and where the defendants' belongings were located as required by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(j)(1) and16-13-31(a), although the defendants did not own or rent the house. Lott v. State, 303 Ga. App. 775, 694 S.E.2d 698 (2010).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to charges of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of marijuana as the defendant acknowledged, and the record showed, that the trial court advised the defendant of the maximum allowable sentence on both a trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of marijuana charge, as well as the mandatory minimum sentence on the former offense; further, despite the fact that the waiver of rights form the defendant signed incorrectly stated that the maximum term of imprisonment was 30 years, rather than 31 years, given the aforementioned, the mistake did not amount to a manifest injustice requiring reversal of the court's refusal to allow withdrawal. Rodriguez v. State, 280 Ga. App. 423, 634 S.E.2d 182 (2006).

Jury Instruction

Sentencing

- When the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana and on the day of the trial filed a request that the "jury be charged with the substance of § 16-13-30 and § 16-13-31," by seeking an instruction on two entire Code sections the request necessarily included such matter not adjusted to the issues of the case, and for this reason it was not error to fail to give such instructions. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 370 S.E.2d 173 (1988).

- Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6(2) and16-1-7(a)(1) by sentencing the defendant separately for trafficking in methamphetamine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, and trafficking in ecstasy, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31.1, when the substance which was found in the defendant's vehicle tested positive for both methamphetamine and ecstasy as there was no evidence that chemical compounds or elements were shared between the drugs. Ahmad v. State, 312 Ga. App. 703, 719 S.E.2d 563 (2011).

- Trial court did not err in failing to apply the rule of lenity because both of the defendant's offenses, trafficking in methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of marijuana, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(e) and16-13-31(b), were classified as felonies and, thus, the rule of lenity did not apply. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (2010).

- Convictions for violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 40 6 391(2), (4), (6), and 40 5 151 should be reported by the superior court clerk to Department of Driver Services (DDS) and violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 16 13 30(b), 16 13 31, and 16 13 31.1 should be reported to DDS only upon the clerk's determination that the conviction meets the mandate of O.C.G.A. § 40 5 54(a)(2). 2017 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17-4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Sufficiency of random sampling of drug or contraband to establish jurisdictional amount required for conviction, 45 A.L.R.5th 1.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant - Marijuana cases, 1 A.L.R.6th 549.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant - Cocaine cases, 2 A.L.R.6th 551.

What constitutes "aggravated felony" for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) - marijuana offenses under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 76 ALR Fed. 2d 1.

What constitutes "aggravated felony" for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) - cocaine and crack cocaine offenses under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 76 ALR Fed. 2d 61.

What constitutes "aggravated felony" for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) - heroin offenses under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 78 ALR Fed. 2d 133.

What constitutes "aggravated felony" for which aliens can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) - illicit methamphetamine offenses under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 78 ALR Fed. 2d 151.

What constitutes "aggravated felony" for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) - Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 79 ALR Fed. 2d 335.