2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Administration
Article 2 - Obstruction of Public Administration and Related Offenses
§ 16-10-24. Obstructing or Hindering Law Enforcement Officers; Penalty

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer, prison guard, jailer, correctional officer, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
2. Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard, jailer, correctional officer, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon a first conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years. Upon a second conviction for a violation of this subsection, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than ten years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction for a violation of this subsection, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years nor more than 15 years.
3. Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard, jailer, correctional officer, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by knowingly and willfully throwing, projecting, or expelling human or animal blood, urine, feces, vomitus, or seminal fluid on or at such individual shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years.
4. A person convicted under this Code section shall be punished, in addition to any term of imprisonment imposed, by a fine as provided by law which shall be at least $300.00. With respect to $300.00 of the fine imposed, after distributing the surcharges and deductions required by Chapter 21 of Title 15, Code Sections 36-15-9 and 42-8-34, and Title 47, it shall be earmarked for the Georgia State Indemnification Fund for purposes of payment of indemnification for death or disability as provided for in Part 1 of Article 5 of Chapter 9 of Title 45.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 806; Code 1863, § 4370; Ga. L. 1865-66, p. 233, § 2; Code 1868, § 4408; Code 1873, § 4476; Code 1882, § 4476; Penal Code 1895, § 306; Penal Code 1910, § 311; Code 1933, § 26-4401; Code 1933, § 26-2505, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 484, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-22/HB 310; Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 3-4/SB 160; Ga. L. 2019, p. 808, § 7/SB 72.)

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted the present provisions of subsection (a) for the former provisions, which read: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor."; in subsection (b), in the first sentence, inserted "jailer," near the beginning, substituted "person shall be guilty" for "person is guilty" in the middle, inserted "a first" and inserted "year" near the end, and added the second and third sentences; and added subsections (c) and (d).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "game warden" for "conservation ranger" in subsections (a), (b), and (c).

- Interference with arrest by conservation officer, § 27-1-25.

State-wide alert system established, § 35-3-191.

- Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.

Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 1-1/SB 160, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Back the Badge Act of 2017.'"

- For article, "Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 8 (2001). For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004). For article, "Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law," see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 511 (2006). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 89 (2017). For comment on Westin v. McDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1991), cited below, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1345 (1992).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Lawful Discharge of Official Duties
• Knowledge
• Application
• Jury Instructions

Former Code 1933, § 26-2505 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24) was made purposefully broad to cover actions which might not be otherwise unlawful, but which obstructed or hindered law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23. - Crimes of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and simple battery on a law enforcement officer did not address the same criminal conduct, there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime, and the rule of lenity did not apply; although the defendant was convicted of both charged crimes, the trial court properly merged the misdemeanor battery conviction into the felony obstruction conviction. McMullen v. State, 325 Ga. App. 757, 754 S.E.2d 798 (2014).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20. - Appeals court rejected the defendant's claim that under the rule of lenity, the defendant's act of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 could only be considered a misdemeanor, because the acts alleged met the definition of misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer, as both O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 and § 16-10-24 did not define the same offense, did not address the same criminal conduct, and there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime; hence, the rule of lenity did not apply. Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 642 S.E.2d 51 (2007).

Application with O.C.G.A. § 16-10-56. - Defendant's act of swinging the defendant's fist at the deputy satisfied the elements of both riot in a penal institution under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-56(a), and obstruction of a law enforcement officer by offering violence under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b), and because the two defined crimes did not address the same criminal conduct, there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime and the rule of lenity did not apply. Chynoweth v. State, 331 Ga. App. 123, 768 S.E.2d 536 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 396 (Ga. 2015).

- It was not error to refuse to merge the defendant's convictions of obstructing a public passage and obstructing a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24 and16-11-43 after the defendant placed a barricade across a roadway, refused to move the barricade when ordered to do so, and then, after the officer moved the barricade, replaced the barricade after being told by the officer not to do so. The evidence required to prove the obstruction of a law enforcement officer was not "used up" in proving the obstruction of a public passage. Davis v. State, 288 Ga. App. 66, 653 S.E.2d 358 (2007).

- Because misdemeanor obstruction was a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the defendant's convictions for felony and misdemeanor obstruction should have been merged; therefore, the defendant's sentence was void. Reid v. State, 339 Ga. App. 772, 792 S.E.2d 732 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

- Record clearly showed that the crime of obstruction was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the crime of aggravated assault on a peace officer; thus, the convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and felony obstruction of a peace officer should have merged. Reid v. State, 339 Ga. App. 772, 792 S.E.2d 732 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

- Because injuring another's ankle amounted to doing violence, the defendant's convictions for felony obstruction merged into aggravated battery; thus, the defendant was entitled to resentencing. Cooper v. State, 350 Ga. App. 365, 829 S.E.2d 433 (2019).

- Trial court did not err by failing to merge the convictions for aggravated assault and felony obstruction because each offense required proof of an additional element that the other did not. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

- Former Code 1933, § 26-2505 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24) was meant to cover obstruction of law enforcement officers in general by use of violence, threat of violence, or other unlawful means. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975).

- Juvenile's adjudications on the charges of loitering and obstruction of an officer arising out of the July 18 incident were reversed for failure to prove venue because, although the officer testified that the officer observed two individuals loitering outside the apartment complex, the officer never testified that the complex was in Spalding County or that the officer's pursuit of the juvenile occurred there; the state presented no other evidence of venue, and nothing in the record indicated that the trial court took judicial notice of the location of the apartment complex; and defense counsel's statements were not intended to be a stipulation of venue or that the juvenile authorized a stipulation as to venue. In the Interest of A. A., 334 Ga. App. 37, 778 S.E.2d 28 (2015).

- In an intentional tort action against a retailer and one of the retailer's employee's, the employee could be impeached with a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 which occurred after that employee gave a deposition, as the length of punishment that could be imposed thereunder satisfied the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609) for impeachment with a conviction, and no other evidence was presented which prohibited the conviction. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

- Injured party was not able to recover under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 for the declarant's alleged violation of the criminal statutes O.C.G.A. § 16-10-26, prohibiting giving a false report of a crime, and O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, prohibiting obstructing or hindering the police, as these statutes did not provide for a civil cause of action; furthermore, the legislature provided statutory civil remedies in the form of false arrest under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1 and malicious prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40. Jastram v. Williams, 276 Ga. App. 475, 623 S.E.2d 686 (2005).

- In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se inmate appealed a district court's 28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal of the inmate's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment as barred by the Heck decision, the district court's dismissal was premature since the inmate had not been convicted of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 when the district court conducted the court's frivolity review. Nonetheless, the error was harmless since the inmate failed to demonstrate that the inmate's conviction under § 16-10-24 had been reversed or invalidated; the inmate's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were now barred by the Heck decision. Taylor v. Freeman, F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2011)(Unpublished).

After an arrestee refused a deputy's order to turn around and pushed away from the deputy, the arrestee's excessive force claim failed because, inter alia, the arrestee was uncooperative, a video showed the close contact and the escalating nature of the incident, and the arrestee's refusal to comply with the deputy's instructions was, at least, misdemeanor obstruction. Anthony v. Coffee County, F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2014)(Unpublished).

- Defendant officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim because the officer had no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) or disorderly conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(3) as it was undisputed that the plaintiff uttered an epithet as the plaintiff was walking away, thus ending any face-to-face confrontation, and that the officer was the only one to hear the phrase. Further, there was no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Merenda v. Tabor, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2012), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, No. 12-12562, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2351 (11th Cir. Ga. 2013).

- Defendant failed to show that the charge against defendant for obstructing an officer by becoming verbally combative, refusing repeated orders, and resisting restraint under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, for which defendant was acquitted, was a lesser included offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6 of the charge against defendant of interfering with government property by kicking the sink off the wall and flooding defendant's jail cell under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-24, for which defendant was convicted; a comparison of these two offenses shows that they have entirely different elements and require proof of entirely different facts. Carter v. State, 267 Ga. App. 520, 600 S.E.2d 637 (2004).

- Defendant's convictions and sentence for terroristic threats and obstruction of an officer did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. The crimes are mutually independent and each is aimed at prohibiting specific conduct. Lemarr v. State, 188 Ga. App. 352, 373 S.E.2d 58 (1988).

Force or violence is not an element of misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a); lying with the intent of misdirecting an officer as to the performance of the officer's official duties can certainly constitute a hindrance and authorize a conviction under that subsection. Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992); Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 397, 474 S.E.2d 228 (1996).

To consummate an offense of misdemeanor obstruction, some form of knowing and willful opposition to the officer sufficient to constitute obstruction or hindrance is required, but actual violence or threat is not. Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 476 S.E.2d 18 (1996).

Woodward v. Gray, 241 Ga. App. 847, 527 S.E.2d 595 (2000); Ballew v. State, 245 Ga. App. 842, 538 S.E.2d 902) (2000); and Cooper v. State, 270 Ga. App. 346, 606 S.E.2d 869 (2004), are disapproved to the extent that these cases imply that misdemeanor obstruction still requires proof of forcible resistance or threats of violence. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009).

Injury to the officer is not an element of felony obstruction of an officer. Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. 562, 436 S.E.2d 752 (1993).

- Indictment charging defendant with misdemeanor obstruction was sufficient to apprise defendant of the acts of which defendant was accused because the indictment was substantially in the language of the statute. Turner v. State, 274 Ga. App. 731, 618 S.E.2d 607 (2005).

- As a security officer was on school property when a fellow officer told the security officer that a truant juvenile was hiding behind a house, the juvenile could be pursued on suspicion of hindering an officer in the lawful discharge of duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, even if the officer left school grounds, as the officer did so in hot pursuit of a suspected offender. In the Interest of M.P., 279 Ga. App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (2006).

- On plaintiff arrestee's claim that defendant deputy sheriff falsely arrested the plaintiff for obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) after entering plaintiff's home without a warrant to search for the subject of a civil commitment order, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, while the deputy's entry into the arrestee's home was unlawful, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as the commitment order's averments indicated the subject was a danger to oneself and others and a reasonable officer could have interpreted those averments as indicating an emergency situation. Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 419, 172 L. Ed. 2d 289 (2008).

- Upon convictions of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and obstructing a law enforcement officer, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial as: (1) a challenged juror affirmed the guilty verdict; (2) details about a government witness's plea deal would not have changed the trial outcome; and (3) lab results confirming the purity of the contraband seized was sufficient to show that the substance defendant possessed was cocaine. Tate v. State, 278 Ga. App. 324, 628 S.E.2d 730 (2006).

In the prosecution on charges of interference with government property and obstruction of a law enforcement officer, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's 1993 interference with government property conviction; a new trial was properly denied because the evidence was properly admitted, not as substantive evidence of the offense at issue, but only as to the issue of credibility, providing support for admission of the evidence. Tate v. State, 289 Ga. App. 479, 657 S.E.2d 531 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0986, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 386 (Ga. 2008).

- Trial court erroneously granted suppression of the evidence seized in a traffic stop involving two defendants in which an officer, after arresting the first defendant for obstruction, searched the car and found a substance which a field test showed to be cocaine, as the stopping officer was authorized to make the stop based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 and because the officer could search the passenger compartment of the car incident to the arrest of the first defendant. State v. Stafford, 288 Ga. App. 309, 653 S.E.2d 750 (2007), aff'd, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008).

- Because state's written notice sufficiently notified defendant of the state's intent to seek a recidivist sentence under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 upon conviction of felony obstruction of an officer, and during plea negotiations the state again referenced defendant's prior criminal history and reiterated the state would seek recidivist punishment, no error occurred in imposing the sentence based on lack of notice. Evans v. State, 290 Ga. App. 746, 660 S.E.2d 841 (2008).

- Following the state agreeing to dismiss the RICO and theft charges against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea to one misdemeanor count of hindering and obstructing a law enforcement officer conditioned upon the defendant testifying truthfully at the trial against the co-defendants, the trial court erred by imposing a sentence upon the defendant which differed from the understood terms of the negotiated plea. Lewis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 412, 767 S.E.2d 771 (2014).

- Trial court did not improperly increase the defendant's sentence because, although the trial court orally declared that the defendant would serve two concurrent 12-month sentences for the battery and obstruction convictions, and the defendant was taken into custody immediately, on the same day, before the defendant was taken into custody and began to serve the defendant's sentence, the trial court signed a written sentence stating that the defendant would serve two consecutive 12-month sentences for the two convictions. Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 793 S.E.2d 156 (2016).

- Federal district court did not abuse the court's discretion by imposing the highest possible sentence permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) after revoking defendant's supervised release term because the defendant was arrested for the misdemeanor of obstruction of officers under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) during an undercover drug sting, the defendant possessed crack cocaine and marijuana, the defendant violated the technical terms of the defendant's supervised release by failing to report to the defendant's probation officer, and the defendant associated with a known felon. United States v. Webb, F.3d (11th Cir. June 22, 2007)(Unpublished).

- Defendant was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal because the defendant's 1998 Georgia felony conviction for obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer was a violent felony and the defendant's 1998 Georgia felony conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute fell squarely within the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition of a serious drug offense. United States v. Dixon, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 991, 194 L. Ed. 2d 12 (U.S. 2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1222, 194 L. Ed. 2d 222 (U.S. 2016)(Unpublished).

- After the defendant was convicted for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, the federal district court did not err by applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the defendant had three qualifying predicate offenses; two convictions for felony obstruction and a conviction for selling cocaine. Defendant's two Georgia convictions for felony obstruction of justice counted as predicate offenses for ACCA purposes because the offenses categorically meet the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" requirement of the elements clause of ACCA; Georgia's felony obstruction statute applies only to those who obstruct a law enforcement officer by offering or doing violence to the officer's person. United States v. Brown, 805 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2015).

- Defendant's motion to suppress suspected cocaine was properly granted as: (1) police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction of justice upon the defendant's flight; (2) an initial uncoercive encounter with the police did not constitute a seizure, and the defendant was free to leave at any time; and (3) the record was devoid of any evidence about the details of an anonymous tip that the defendant was seen selling drugs in the area of the encounter; moreover, given the tip's lack of detail and failure to predict future behavior, observation of the defendant's conduct might have warranted further investigation, but it did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion needed to briefly detain or even arrest. State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 630 S.E.2d 847 (2006).

While the defendant police officer did not have to move the officer's car, the officer could not arrest the plaintiff arrestee for reasonably and politely asking the officer to move a foot so that the arrestee could enter the arrestee's driveway, and because the argument that the officer was impeded in the officer's duty under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 lacked merit, granting the officer summary judgment on a false arrest claim was reversed; the idea that the request provided a basis for arrest collided with the First Amendment, whether or not the officer knew the officer was blocking the arrestee's driveway. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2007).

- Defendant waived the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding whether a police officer was in the lawful discharge of official duties for purposes of the defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), as defense counsel conceded at trial that the officer's arrest was "legitimate," and no action was taken to suggest otherwise. Jenkins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 811, 714 S.E.2d 410 (2011).

Cited in Shaw v. Jones, 226 Ga. 291, 174 S.E.2d 444 (1970); Shaw v. State, 121 Ga. App. 726, 175 S.E.2d 150 (1970); Ratliff v. State, 133 Ga. App. 256, 211 S.E.2d 192 (1974); Wooten v. State, 135 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975); Logan v. State, 136 Ga. App. 567, 222 S.E.2d 124 (1975); Allen v. State, 137 Ga. App. 21, 222 S.E.2d 856 (1975); Pate v. State, 137 Ga. App. 677, 225 S.E.2d 95 (1976); United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1976); Smith v. State, 144 Ga. App. 785, 242 S.E.2d 376 (1978); Edmonds v. City of Albany, 242 Ga. 648, 250 S.E.2d 458 (1978); Beard v. State, 151 Ga. App. 724, 261 S.E.2d 404 (1979); Rushing v. City of Plains, 152 Ga. App. 884, 264 S.E.2d 319 (1980); In re Long, 153 Ga. App. 883, 267 S.E.2d 481 (1980); Duffie v. State, 154 Ga. App. 61, 267 S.E.2d 501 (1980); Evans v. State, 154 Ga. App. 381, 268 S.E.2d 429 (1980); Latty v. State, 154 Ga. App. 751, 270 S.E.2d 38 (1980); Jenga v. State, 166 Ga. App. 26, 303 S.E.2d 170 (1983); Pugh v. State, 173 Ga. App. 670, 327 S.E.2d 745 (1985); Sapp v. State, 179 Ga. App. 614, 347 S.E.2d 354 (1986); In re M.E.H., 180 Ga. App. 591, 349 S.E.2d 814 (1986); Dickerson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 852, 350 S.E.2d 835 (1986); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Banks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 280, 370 S.E.2d 38 (1988); Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 905, 392 S.E.2d 330 (1990); Westin v. McDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1991); O'Neal v. State, 211 Ga. App. 741, 440 S.E.2d 513 (1994); Copeland v. State, 213 Ga. App. 39, 443 S.E.2d 869 (1994); Norman v. State, 214 Ga. App. 408, 448 S.E.2d 219 (1994); Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 834, 449 S.E.2d 532 (1994); Cline v. State, 221 Ga. App. 175, 471 S.E.2d 24 (1996); Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 289, 491 S.E.2d 500 (1997); Cook v. State, 235 Ga. App. 104, 508 S.E.2d 473 (1998); Askew v. State, 248 Ga. App. 230, 546 S.E.2d 15 (2001); Mathis v. State, 250 Ga. App. 500, 552 S.E.2d 97 (2001); Johnson v. State, 255 Ga. App. 537, 566 S.E.2d 349 (2002); Zachery v. State, 257 Ga. App. 539, 571 S.E.2d 529 (2002); Penland v. State, 258 Ga. App. 659, 574 S.E.2d 880 (2002); Grier v. State, 262 Ga. App. 777, 586 S.E.2d 448 (2003); Myers v. State, 268 Ga. App. 607, 602 S.E.2d 327 (2004); Monas v. State, 270 Ga. App. 50, 606 S.E.2d 80 (2004); Glanton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 232, 641 S.E.2d 234 (2007); State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 643 S.E.2d 262 (2007); Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008); Sillah v. State, 291 Ga. App. 848, 663 S.E.2d 274 (2008); Diaz v. State, 296 Ga. App. 589, 676 S.E.2d 252 (2009); Mathis v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (May 20, 2009); Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011); Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012); Taylor v. State, 319 Ga. App. 850, 738 S.E.2d 679 (2013); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688 (2013); Harper v. State, 337 Ga. App. 57, 785 S.E.2d 691 (2016); Johnson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017); State v. Brienza, 350 Ga. App. 672, 829 S.E.2d 894 (2019).

Essential element of offense is that officer be engaged in lawful discharge of official duties. Dixon v. State, 154 Ga. App. 828, 269 S.E.2d 909 (1980).

Off-duty deputy sheriff moonlighting as a bouncer for a private establishment was engaged in performance of official duties within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Duncan v. State, 163 Ga. App. 148, 294 S.E.2d 365 (1982).

Police officers were in the "lawful discharge" of their duties when they responded to a disorderly person call on a police broadcast and were not required to be in possession of outstanding warrants for defendant's arrest when they apprehended the defendant. Singleton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 423, 390 S.E.2d 648 (1990).

- Officers who were summoned to the scene of a domestic disturbance and saw defendant forcibly march defendant's family into their dwelling, quite possibly at gunpoint, had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a battery constituting a family violence and, thus, were engaged in the performance of official duties for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Duitsman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 348, 441 S.E.2d 888 (1994).

When a police officer observed the defendant driving unsafely, the officer had an articulable suspicion sufficient to justify further questioning, and the defendant's flight and subsequent struggle with the officer obstructed the investigation. Tuggle v. State, 236 Ga. App. 847, 512 S.E.2d 650 (1999).

When the totality of the circumstances, including the location of the car and the defendant's position in the car, indicated that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and in possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage, even though the defendant was not seen driving the car, there was sufficient evidence that the police officers' act of questioning the defendant was more than a consensual inquiry and was within the scope of the officers' official duties so that a jury could reasonably determine that the defendant's use of a false name was a violation. Wynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 98, 511 S.E.2d 201 (1999).

Officers were lawfully discharging their official duties, despite their unlawful presence in the home with respect to the homeowner, because they had probable cause and a warrant to arrest defendant and defendant had no standing to object to the search of the house. Brown v. State, 240 Ga. App. 321, 523 S.E.2d 333 (1999).

Dispatcher who reported a crime at a specified location gave police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene, particularly because police observations on arriving at the scene corroborated the report. Overand v. State, 240 Ga. App. 682, 523 S.E.2d 610 (1999).

Evidence that the defendant repeatedly disobeyed the officer's lawful directive to remain in the car for the officer's safety, that the defendant jumped out of the car and confronted the officer, and that the defendant resisted the officer's attempts to physically place the defendant in the car was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for obstruction of an officer as the evidence showed the defendant knowingly obstructed the officer in the officer's lawful discharge of the officer's duties. Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 571 S.E.2d 456 (2002).

Officer was not required to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to approach a vehicle parked in a neighborhood the officer was patrolling in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties; therefore, when the defendant exited the vehicle and attacked the officer, the evidence was sufficient to allow the trier of fact to convict defendant of interference with a law enforcement officer. English v. State, 257 Ga. App. 741, 572 S.E.2d 86 (2002).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of obstruction of a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), where defendant struck the officer after the officer grabbed defendant's grandson's hand; the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties, as the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the grandson had a marijuana cigarette in the grandson's hand. Smith v. State, 258 Ga. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 472 (2002).

Because a high school principal told a school security officer to be on the lookout for a juvenile who was skipping class and would be involved in an after-school fight, the officer was engaged in the lawful discharge of official duties when the officer sought to find and detain the juvenile. In the Interest of M.P., 279 Ga. App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (2006).

Although the evidence that the probationer made the probationer's arrest warrant unavailable to the officers was circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the trial court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer obstructed the officers. Carlson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 595, 634 S.E.2d 410 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C2099, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 215 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant's misdemeanor obstruction of an officer conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was supported by sufficient evidence; although an officer was not lawfully discharging the officer's duty when the officer attempted to detain a person without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the defendant failed to recognize that the defendant's unprovoked flight, given other suspicious circumstances including the sudden departure of a truck into which the defendant had been leaning when the officer arrived on the scene, gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Copeland v. State, 281 Ga. App. 11, 635 S.E.2d 283 (2006).

Juvenile's interference with a juvenile probation officer's attempt to take the juvenile into custody, after the juvenile tested positive for illegal drug use, was sufficient to support an adjudication under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). In the Interest of M.M., 287 Ga. App. 233, 651 S.E.2d 155 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 95 (Ga. 2008).

Because there was sufficient evidence that a road that the defendant was obstructing was a public passage, there was no merit to the defendant's argument that an officer who ordered the defendant not to block the road was not lawfully discharging the officer's official duties. Davis v. State, 288 Ga. App. 66, 653 S.E.2d 358 (2007).

Defendant juvenile's arrest was not defective because a law enforcement officer was engaged in the discharge of a juvenile court's pick-up order, which the defendant resisted, thus providing probable cause for the defendant's arrest for obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. In re C. R., 294 Ga. App. 164, 669 S.E.2d 193 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying a defendant juvenile's motion for a directed verdict and in adjudicating the defendant delinquent on an obstruction charge because an officer working as a security guard at a restaurant was engaged in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties at the time of the officer's encounter with the defendant as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. In the Interest of D.S., 295 Ga. App. 847, 673 S.E.2d 321 (2009).

Defendant was lawfully detained and searched for weapons because the defendant matched a citizen's specific description and location of a person who had been shooting a gun, and the defendant had threatened to kill the sheriff (who was physically present) on as many as six previous occasions. The jury could find that when the defendant elbowed the chief in the course of the pat-down, the defendant committed felony obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). Meadows v. State, 303 Ga. App. 40, 692 S.E.2d 708 (2010).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) because an investigator had ample specific and articulable facts to justify stopping the defendant, and the circumstances were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct; minutes after having heard a lookout bulletin, the investigator arrived at the scene to discover a person there matching the description provided in the lookout bulletin, including having a red bag in the person's possession, the victim pointed to the person as the perpetrator, and gathered onlookers were shouting as the onlookers pointed the investigator to the defendant. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

- Officers who attempted forcibly to resolve a civil dispute were not engaged in the lawful discharge of their official duties and did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff for "obstruction" of their unauthorized actions. Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir. 1998).

Accusation must disclose official character of officer. Hunter v. State, 4 Ga. App. 579, 61 S.E. 1130 (1908); Paschal v. State, 16 Ga. App. 155, 84 S.E. 725 (1915).

Sworn reserve officer with arrest powers was a "law enforcement officer" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Dennis v. State, 220 Ga. App. 420, 469 S.E.2d 494 (1996).

- County jail corrections officer was acting in the discharge of the officer's lawful duties when the officer repeatedly commanded a defendant to take only one food tray at meal time, when the defendant insisted on taking two trays, and in knocking the trays from the defendant's hands when defendant refused to step out of the line and began eating from one of the trays. Williams v. State, 301 Ga. App. 731, 688 S.E.2d 650 (2009).

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of felony and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer and driving without carrying a license because the on-duty and uniformed conservation ranger had authority to arrest and was authorized to enforce traffic offenses and the state showed that the ranger was acting within the lawful discharge of official duties when the defendant was asked to turn down the music from the vehicle. Thornton v. State, 353 Ga. App. 252, 836 S.E.2d 541 (2019).

- In a lawful arrest based upon probable cause, an officer has the right to use that force reasonably necessary to effect the arrest, and the defendant does not have the right to resist the use of such reasonable force. The officer's use of forearm strikes was reasonable and in compliance with departmental policies. Long v. State, 261 Ga. App. 478, 583 S.E.2d 158 (2003).

- Contrary to the defendant's argument, the trial court did not err in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in defendant's trial for obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), based on the defendant's claim that the defendant was entitled to resist an unlawful search of the defendant's premises; among other things, exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' warrantless entry onto the defendant's property because officers observed that the defendant's dogs did not have their required rabies tags, and further investigation, including the capturing of the animals, was necessary to protect the public against a risk of rabies. Jarvis v. State, 294 Ga. App. 482, 669 S.E.2d 477 (2008).

- Using profanity, an arrestee challenged an officer's authority to clear an area (as the officer had been instructed by a judge), thus, the officer could arguably, if mistakenly, think probable cause existed for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) and qualified immunity entitled the officer to summary judgment on an illegal arrest claim. Spruell v. Harper, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2011).

One cannot be guilty of offense of hindering an officer unless that person knew official character of officer. Hardaway v. State, 7 Ga. App. 555, 67 S.E. 222 (1910); McLendon v. State, 12 Ga. App. 691, 78 S.E. 139 (1913).

- Although the arresting officer was not in uniform or driving a marked car, evidence that the officer wore a badge on the officer's belt and told defendant the officer was conducting an investigation was sufficient to show that defendant knew the person was a law enforcement officer. Mangum v. State, 228 Ga. App. 545, 492 S.E.2d 300 (1997).

On a charge of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer, the evidence that the defendant knew that the defendant was dealing with law enforcement officers was sufficient. An officer testified that the officers at the scene were in a patrol or police car, and the defendant testified that a caller summoned "the law" and that the defendant saw a police car come up. Reddick v. State, 298 Ga. App. 155, 679 S.E.2d 380 (2009).

- Evidence that the defendant and another were carrying stolen items toward a police officer's car and that they dropped the items and ran when they realized it was a police car, despite a uniformed officer shouting at them to stop, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and obstruction of justice in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a) and16-10-24(a). Mitchell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 293, 718 S.E.2d 126 (2011).

- Other acts evidence regarding two earlier instances of obstructing a law enforcement officer was relevant and admissible because, by expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging the officer's official duties, the defendant implicitly challenged the defendant's own knowledge that the officer's commands to the defendant were lawful; and it established that, on past occasions, the defendant had encountered officers under similar circumstances and been apprehended or accused of obstructing the officers when the defendant fled, such that the defendant knew that the officer's command that the defendant talk with the officer was made in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties and that the defendant was not free to flee. Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 793 S.E.2d 156 (2016).

Application

Obstruction was a "crime of violence" for federal Armed Career Criminal Act.

- In sentencing the defendant to 120 months for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a district court erred by failing to impose a minimum sentence of 15 years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, because the defendant's prior Georgia conviction of felony obstruction, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b), qualified as a violent felony. United States v. Cook, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017)(Unpublished).

Something more than mere disagreement or remonstrance must be shown. McCook v. State, 145 Ga. App. 3, 243 S.E.2d 289 (1978).

For an act to constitute obstructing an officer, the act must evidence some forcible resistance or objection to the officer (not mere argument) in the performance of the officer's duties. Kelley v. State, 171 Ga. App. 222, 319 S.E.2d 81 (1984); Webb v. Ethridge, 849 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1988).

- Defendant's conduct in providing false information to a booking officer constituted obstruction of an officer. Carter v. State, 188 Ga. App. 464, 373 S.E.2d 277 (1988).

City ordinance regarding resisting arrest is null and void since offense was addressed by former Code 1933, § 26-2505 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24). Evans v. City of Tifton, 138 Ga. App. 374, 226 S.E.2d 471 (1976).

Flight, or attempted flight, after command to halt constitutes obstruction of officer. Tankersley v. State, 155 Ga. App. 917, 273 S.E.2d 862 (1980); Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 439 S.E.2d 510 (1993); Okongwu v. State, 220 Ga. App. 59, 467 S.E.2d 368 (1996).

Defendant's conviction for obstruction of an officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) was supported by sufficient evidence because the evidence showed that defendant fled after police officers ordered defendant to halt, and flight after a lawful command to halt constitutes obstruction of an officer. Dukes v. State, 275 Ga. App. 442, 622 S.E.2d 587 (2005).

Defendant's conviction of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer was supported by sufficient evidence as defendant fled when an officer first attempted to place defendant under arrest. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. 544, 623 S.E.2d 725 (2005).

Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed as the defendant's flight from an improper Terry stop gave the police officers an independent basis to arrest the defendant; the methamphetamine found in close proximity was admissible. Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712, 634 S.E.2d 842 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency based on obstruction of a law enforcement officer; the juvenile defendant's claim that an officer had not ordered the defendant to halt before the defendant ran off was contradicted by the officer's testimony; flight, or attempted flight, after a command to halt constituted obstruction of an officer. In the Interest of E.G., 286 Ga. App. 137, 648 S.E.2d 699 (2007).

When an officer asked the defendant, who was on a bicycle and had been looking into parked cars, what the defendant was doing, the defendant yelled obscenities at the officer and pedaled away; the defendant did not comply with the officer's command to come back so the officer could check the defendant's identification. This evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of the charge of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer beyond a reasonable doubt because the officer who first encountered the defendant had a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain the defendant based on a9-1-1 call and dispatch, and when the officer requested that the defendant place the defendant's hands on the officer's vehicle in order to allow the officer to conduct a weapons pat-down, the defendant fled. Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 318, 690 S.E.2d 683 (2010).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked for obstructing an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). The officers' detention of the defendant was a second-tier encounter because the officers had an articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on the defendant's matching the description and being in the area of an armed robbery; therefore, the defendant was not free to leave the encounter as the defendant did. Avery v. State, 313 Ga. App. 259, 721 S.E.2d 202 (2011).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstruction and fleeing because the evidence showed that both deputies were in uniform and driving marked patrol vehicles when the deputies ordered the defendant to stop and the defendant ignored those commands while the deputies were attempting to conduct, with justification, at the very least a second-tier detention of the defendant. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

- Defendant, upon seeing a police officer, ran away. As the officer never told the defendant to stop running, there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction. State v. Fisher, 293 Ga. App. 228, 666 S.E.2d 594 (2008).

- Public college's chief of police who objected to the college administration's directive that the chief of police speak with the district attorney about having the charges against a suspected laptop thief dropped reasonably believed that the chief was objecting to illegal conduct, obstruction of justice under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), and this was protected activity under O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(3) of the whistleblower statute. Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 330 Ga. App. 58, 766 S.E.2d 520 (2014).

- Defendant who screamed at an officer at the time the officer was attempting to arrest the defendant's spouse did not commit obstruction of the officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a); however, the defendant's later actions in refusing to comply with police requests to show the defendant's hands and put down the defendant's cell phone were obstruction. Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 808 S.E.2d 724 (2017).

- Legislature clearly intended former Code 1933, § 26-2505 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24) to include forms of speech which may reasonably be interpreted as a threat of violence and which amount to an obstruction or hindrance. Wells v. State, 154 Ga. App. 246, 268 S.E.2d 74 (1980); Dumas v. State, 159 Ga. App. 517, 284 S.E.2d 33 (1981).

O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 encompasses statements by a party to a law enforcement officer which may reasonably be interpreted as a threat of violence and which amount to an obstruction or hindrance. Moccia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (1985).

Felony obstruction conviction was reversed since there was no evidence that defendant's verbal threats made against the arresting officer obstructed completion of the officer's duties, the threats were made while defendant was already in custody and cooperating with the officer, and concerned future acts of violence, and not imminent acts that if carried out would have prevented the officer from completing the arrest. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 511, 583 S.E.2d 172 (2003).

- Juvenile court, as factfinder, had sufficient circumstantial and direct evidence to support the court's adjudication of defendant, a juvenile, as a delinquent for acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted two counts of armed robbery and one count of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-10-24; two women were robbed at knifepoint and had their purses taken, and the description of the perpetrator, including the clothing worn, matched that of the juvenile, who was found three blocks from where the incident occurred and who attempted to flee when ordered to stop by police. In the Interest of R.J.S., 277 Ga. App. 74, 625 S.E.2d 485 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence that the defendant, a juvenile, had done acts that would constitute misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) if done by an adult; an officer witnessed the defendant behaving in a threatening manner toward a vice principal, who asked the officers to arrest the defendant, and the defendant refused to permit handcuffing by a single officer, requiring the assistance of a second officer. In the Interest of D.B., 284 Ga. App. 445, 644 S.E.2d 305 (2007).

An officer's testimony that a juvenile defendant assumed a "fighting stance," placed the defendant's fists in front of the defendant's face, and yelled obscenities at officers while refusing to obey the officers' commands was sufficient to show that the defendant "offered to do violence" to the officers under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b); actual violence or injury to an officer was not necessary. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Evidence that as a deputy sheriff attempted to handcuff defendant juvenile while the defendant was in the back of a car and that the defendant jumped out the other side of the car swinging a handcuff at the deputy was sufficient to support the defendant's adjudication as delinquent on a charge of obstruction of a police officer. In the Interest of E.J., 292 Ga. App. 69, 663 S.E.2d 411 (2008).

Evidence sufficiently supported a juvenile defendant's adjudication of delinquency based upon obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) as the officer was in the lawful discharge of official duties when the officer asked the juvenile to stop in order to investigate the possibility of truancy pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-698 and20-2-699; the juvenile's actions in running away despite the officer's command to stop gave the officer further reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was involved in illegal activity. In re E.C., 292 Ga. App. 798, 665 S.E.2d 896 (2008).

Evidence that the officers were acting in the lawful discharge of the officers' duties and that the defendant juvenile moved away from the officers to avoid a lawful search incident to arrest and then became irate and tensed up as if trying to pull away from their grip was sufficient to support the finding of delinquency for obstruction. In the Interest of G. M. W., 355 Ga. App. 151, 842 S.E.2d 920 (2020).

Defendant's failure to respond immediately to a police officer's orders was insufficient to sustain a conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer, even though defendant did not verbally or physically threaten the officer and, in fact, did not speak to, or argue with the officer. Coley v. State, 178 Ga. App. 668, 344 S.E.2d 490 (1986).

Although the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant stalked the victim and obstructed an officer by fleeing in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-91(a) and16-10-24(a), defendant had a constitutional right to stand silent during a police officer's questioning; as a result, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of an officer based on defendant's silence. Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 889, 592 S.E.2d 507 (2003).

Mere verbal exchange with an officer accompanied by no verbal or physical threats of violence does not constitute obstruction or hindering of a law enforcement officer. In re G.M.M., 179 Ga. App. 800, 348 S.E.2d 126 (1986).

- Criminal trespass count of a defendant's indictment was sufficient because the indictment alleged that the defendant was attempting to elude and hide from a police officer when the defendant committed the trespass, which was a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). Scruggs v. State, 309 Ga. App. 569, 711 S.E.2d 86 (2011).

- When arrest of an individual in defendant's house was based on officer's hot pursuit of that individual, such arrest was a lawful activity and defendant's interference therein constituted obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Brown v. State, 163 Ga. App. 209, 294 S.E.2d 305 (1982).

- Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of misdemeanor hindering of an officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, based on the defendant's conduct of fleeing into the house and hiding in the attic when the police officers arrived; thus, the defendant hampered and delayed the police in the lawful execution of police duty. Martinez v. State, 322 Ga. App. 63, 743 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

- After the officer arrived at the scene and tried for two to three minutes to persuade the defendant to calm down, but the defendant persisted in defendant's verbal barrage of obscenities and insults addressed to defendant's spouse and the police, it was this interference with the officer's attempt to maintain the peace that formed the basis for the officer's ultimate decision to arrest the defendant for misdemeanor obstruction, and the fact that the officer delayed the officer's decision until the defendant retreated to the apartment, and continued to disrupt the peace (eventually producing a crowd of 60 to 80 onlookers) did not detract from the propriety of that basis for arrest. Animashaun v. State, 207 Ga. App. 156, 427 S.E.2d 532 (1993).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because undisputed facts showed that the initial stop of the vehicle on the highway ramp did not result in a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment since the defendant fled with the vehicle and, after the defendant fled from the initial stop, the officer pursued the defendant and observed the defendant commit traffic violations, speeding, running a red light, and improper lane usage, which provided a valid basis for the second stop. Jenkins v. State, 345 Ga. App. 684, 813 S.E.2d 438 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 807 (Ga. 2018).

- When defendant attempted to push past federal officers during a brief investigatory stop, making contact with one of the officers, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for battery and obstruction of an officer, and defendant could be fully searched in connection with such an arrest. Alex v. State, 220 Ga. App. 754, 470 S.E.2d 305 (1996).

Because an investigative stop of the defendant matured into a de facto arrest when officers transported defendant, without consent, to a police investigative site, the officers needed probable cause to arrest defendant for a criminal drug activity, and, based on what the officers knew at the time of the de facto arrest, probable cause did not exist to arrest defendant for such an activity; however, defendant lied to the officers, providing probable cause to arrest defendant for attempted obstruction under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-10-24(a) and therefore, the seizure of defendant's person was not illegal, and the evidence gathered as a result of the seizure was not suppressed. United States v. Virden, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Ga. 2006), aff'd, 488 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).

- Evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find that the defendant obstructed or hindered a law enforcement official in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) when the defendant refused to obey commands to return to the defendant's vehicle while the officer was attempting to investigate a DUI in another vehicle containing a driver and three passengers. Kendrick v. State, 324 Ga. App. 45, 749 S.E.2d 45 (2013).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the contraband found on the defendant's person as a result of a traffic stop that came to fruition after an officer observed the defendant making a U-turn in front of a recently robbed bank because the defendant admitted to having a knife in the defendant's pocket but refused to remove the defendant's hand therefrom. As a result, the police were justified in frisking the defendant for safety reasons and the contraband was, therefore, legally obtained from the defendant. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 27, 656 S.E.2d 161 (2007).

- Deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff's federal civil rights claims, which were properly dismissed on summary judgment, because plaintiff did not show that the deputy violated plaintiff's constitutional rights; the deputy had probable cause to stop plaintiff for a tag-light violation under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-23(d), and that probable cause was sufficient to permit the deputy to arrest plaintiff for that violation. Plaintiff's refusal to comply with the deputy's instructions, as well as plaintiff's belligerent and confrontational behavior, provided ample probable cause to arrest plaintiff for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24; finally, the use of a taser gun in effectuating plaintiff's arrest was reasonably proportionate to the difficult, tense, and uncertain situation that the deputy faced, and did not constitute excessive force. Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 988, 125 S. Ct. 507, 160 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer; disobeying the officer's lawful commands to wait and to back off constituted a misdemeanor violation under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), and striking and pushing the officer were crimes of felony obstruction and simple battery against a police officer under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24(b) and16-5-23(e), respectively; thus, there was more than adequate probable cause to support defendant's warrantless arrest. Harris v. State, 276 Ga. App. 234, 622 S.E.2d 905 (2005).

Police officer had both actual and arguable probable cause to arrest a suspect for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) based upon the suspect's admission to making the statement that the defendant was "going to have his people get" the officer and that the defendant was going or wanted to "clip" the officer; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the suspect's related false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alfred v. Powell, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2005).

Defendant argued that, because the traffic stop for a license tag light had ended, the deputy needed probable cause or articulable suspicion of another offense or valid consent to search, and further argued that, because the continued detention was illegal, defendant's consent to search was invalid and that therefore defendant was justified in physically struggling with the deputy. However, once the vehicle was lawfully stopped, the officer was allowed to ask for the driver's consent to search the car and no additional probable cause or articulable suspicion was required to simply ask the question and therefore defendant's conviction for obstructing an officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was justified. Hampton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 896, 652 S.E.2d 915 (2007).

An officer had probable cause to arrest a defendant for public drunkenness and for obstruction of a police officer. Loudly playing a car radio in the early morning hours and quarreling with police officers was sufficient to constitute boisterousness for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-41, and once the defendant refused to exit the defendant's vehicle and physically and verbally threatened an officer, officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstructing a police officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 662 S.E.2d 185 (2008).

When a defendant fought an officer during an attempted detention for an investigative stop, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction of an officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. McClary v. State, 292 Ga. App. 184, 663 S.E.2d 809 (2008).

An officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for disorderly conduct, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39, based on the defendant's yelling obscenities at the officer. Therefore, the defendant's claim that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on charges of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer because the defendant was resisting an unlawful arrest was without merit. Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009).

When an initial stop was lawful and the defendant failed to stop when ordered to do so, there was probable cause to believe O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) was violated and the defendant's apprehension and arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Foskey, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 956, 133 S. Ct. 460, 184 L. Ed. 2d 283 (2012)(Unpublished).

When a deputy arrested an arrestee for being drunk at a high school football game, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as to the arrestee's excessive force claim because, inter alia, probable cause or arguable probable cause existed for the deputy to arrest the arrestee for obstructing a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) since the facts and circumstances would cause a prudent person to believe that the arrestee's negative responses to questions about drinking were intentional lies or, at least, constituted stubborn obstinance. Collins v. Ensley, 498 Fed. Appx. 908 (11th Cir. 2012)(Unpublished).

When officers arrested a defendant after responding to a report that a person resembling the subject of a "be on the lookout for" (BOLO) flyer had been in a bank, suppression was not warranted because when the defendant actively struggled with the officers, the officers acquired probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. United States v. Akinlade, F.3d (11th Cir. May 22, 2013)(Unpublished).

- County police officers were properly granted summary judgment in the surviving spouse's civil rights action, arising from the fatal shooting of decedent when the decedent broke into the decedent's own house as officers did not use excessive force by using tasers on two occasions because the decedent refused to put the knife down or heed the officers' instructions, and officers had probable cause to arrest the decedent for simple assault or obstruction of officers, and it was reasonable to believe that the decedent posed a danger. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).

- Pushing the officer when the officer tried to handcuff a defendant was sufficient to support O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) misdemeanor obstruction of an officer. McCarty v. State, 269 Ga. App. 299, 603 S.E.2d 666 (2004).

- Defendant may commit the offense of resisting arrest even after being informed that the defendant is under arrest. Moreover, the fact that an officer has managed to apply handcuffs to a struggling arrestee does not foreclose continuing efforts to resist arrest, such as refusing to enter a patrol car or continuing to struggle with officers. Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 820 S.E.2d 679 (2018).

- Defendant's conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), was proper because the evidence showed that the defendant shoved a deputy and failed to obey orders made by the deputy in efforts to assist an animal control officer capture the defendant's dogs, who did not have their required rabies tags; it was unnecessary for the state to prove the underlying offense that caused the officers to act. Jarvis v. State, 294 Ga. App. 482, 669 S.E.2d 477 (2008).

- There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for obstructing an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) because defendant cursed at police when police arrived at the restaurant where defendant had been asked to leave, defendant laid on the floor of the restaurant and did not heed the officer's request to stand up, and continued to physically resist the officers as the officers handcuffed and arrested defendant. Lord v. State, 276 Ga. App. 209, 622 S.E.2d 887 (2005).

Evidence that the defendant refused to get into a patrol car and struggled with two officers, then told the defendant's spouse, "I will kill you when I get out of jail," supported the defendant's convictions of terroristic threats and obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24(a) and16-11-37(a). For there to be a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), a defendant did not have to have the immediate ability to carry out a threat. Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. App. 544, 654 S.E.2d 449 (2007).

Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer based on the testimony of the arresting officer that defendant failed to stay in defendant's vehicle as ordered for safety and thereafter jerked away from the officer while being placed under arrest. Council v. State, 291 Ga. App. 516, 662 S.E.2d 291 (2008).

Because defendant swung at a police officer's face with a loose handcuff and violently struggled during an attempted arrest, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a felony obstruction conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 579, 669 S.E.2d 530 (2008).

Evidence that a defendant gave a fake name and address, sped from the scene of a traffic stop, abandoned the truck, and continued to run from, hide from, and fight with police was more than sufficient to support convictions for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) and fleeing or attempting to elude in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a). Lightsey v. State, 302 Ga. App. 294, 690 S.E.2d 675 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of attempting to remove a firearm from a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-33(a) and obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) because the defendant refused to comply with the officer's demands that the defendant show the defendant's hands, which were hidden under a pillow and under a bed, and the defendant lunged at an officer, grabbing the barrel of the officer's gun, and trying to take the gun away from the officer. The defendant also kicked and flailed at the officers, preventing the officers from handcuffing the defendant. Daniel v. State, 303 Ga. App. 1, 692 S.E.2d 682 (2010).

- When police officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for simple assault, the fact that the defendant was ultimately acquitted of the simple assault did not invalidate the arrest or the defendant's charge and conviction for felony obstruction of law enforcement officers in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) for resisting that arrest; evidence regarding the defendant's resistance of the officers as the officers lawfully tried to place the defendant in custody supported the defendant's conviction for felony obstruction. Lammerding v. State, 255 Ga. App. 606, 565 S.E.2d 908 (2002).

- Although a deputy sheriff, while working off-duty in a private position as a security guard, acted in a private capacity when the deputy/guard first approached the patron at a concert who was obstructing an aisle, the guard's capacity changed to that of a law enforcement officer discharging official duties when the patron became disorderly and threatened to break the peace. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. App. 113, 335 S.E.2d 622 (1985).

- Defendant was guilty under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 for shooting a police officer who was "moonlighting" as a security guard and who intervened in a disturbance occurring on premises outside of the officer's immediate employment area's domain. Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S. Ct. 396, 126 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1993).

Although an officer was working an off-duty job providing security for a store, the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties when the officer detained a defendant's girlfriend for shoplifting and also for purposes of charging the defendant with misdemeanor obstruction after the defendant disobeyed the officer by removing the girlfriend's car from the store parking lot. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009).

- Because a team leader and a program manager were authorized to supervise defendant juveniles at a school and manage a wilderness program, they were legally authorized persons protected by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b); despite conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact was authorized to resolve the issue of self defense against the juveniles. In the Interest of M. W., 296 Ga. App. 10, 673 S.E.2d 554 (2009).

- Acquittal on simple battery charge showed that jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with deputy or that appellant physically harmed the deputy intentionally, but did not show that the jury necessarily found that appellant did not obstruct or hinder the deputy in performing official duty. Duncan v. State, 163 Ga. App. 148, 294 S.E.2d 365 (1982).

Simple battery is not a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, because it is a separate and independent offense wherein the intent is to make physical contact or cause physical harm. Pearson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 467, 480 S.E.2d 911 (1997).

- Fact that the indictment used the word "fighting" did not require the state to prove the defendant physically fought with the officer; it was enough to show the defendant verbally threatened the officer and acted in opposition to the officer's authority by wielding a tire iron. Jackson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 520, 444 S.E.2d 875 (1994).

Verbal threats of force or violence can obstruct an officer and authorize a felony conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Pearson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 467, 480 S.E.2d 911 (1997).

- Because the acts of obstruction committed by defendant consisted of attempts to resist arrest, the state was required to prove the lawfulness of the arrest in order to prove an essential element of the offense. Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 774, 525 S.E.2d 154 (1999), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

When an officer arrested the defendant based on information from another officer that the defendant had been arguing with his ex-girlfriend and broke glass at the ex-girlfriend's house, and the officer observed a fresh, bleeding wound on the defendant's hand, caused by his beating on the ex-girlfriend's door, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for disorderly conduct, following which defendant's attack on the officer allowed a conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Additionally, it was not necessary to introduce the city ordinance on disorderly conduct in order to convict. Thompson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 518, 577 S.E.2d 839 (2003).

Evidence supported defendant's obstruction of a law enforcement officer conviction because the officers were acting within the lawful discharge of their duties in arresting defendant for theft under either O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 or O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) and defendant violently resisted the arrest; the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause as: (1) an officer observed defendant banging on and breaking into a coin-operated air compressor in the middle of the night; (2) the officer recognized the air compressor as belonging to a gas station; (3) the officer had seen defendant at the gas station less than 24 hours earlier; and (4) defendant refused to provide information that would verify the claim that defendant had lawfully obtained the compressor. Cole v. State, 273 Ga. App. 259, 614 S.E.2d 883 (2005).

Summary judgment based on qualified immunity was properly denied in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case where a claim of unlawful arrest and a properly subsumed excessive force claim as to Fourth Amendment violations were sufficiently alleged; there were disputed issues as to whether a deputy and others engaged in a lawful discharge of official duties when they arrested the claimant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), and there was no error in concluding that the deputy had a duty to intervene in an unlawful arrest. Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County Comm'Rs, F.3d (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2005)(Unpublished).

- It is not necessary for the state to prove the underlying offense that causes the officers to act; it is only necessary to prove the elements of the obstruction statute, i.e., that the act constituting obstruction was knowing and willful, and that the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties. Whaley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 493, 333 S.E.2d 691 (1985).

It is unnecessary for the state to prove that defendant was guilty of criminal trespass in order to prove defendant guilty of obstruction of an officer. Kight v. State, 181 Ga. App. 874, 354 S.E.2d 202 (1987).

- Counts of felony obstruction of an officer and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer did not merge; with regard to the felony, the defendant struck and kicked one officer, and with regard to the misdemeanor, the defendant refused to comply with the commands of a second officer. Ojemuyiwa v. State, 285 Ga. App. 617, 647 S.E.2d 598 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

- Accusation charging defendant with "knowingly and wilfully [obstructing] officer ... in the lawful discharge of his official duties as a law enforcement officer in violation of [this section]" sufficiently apprised the defendant of the acts of which defendant was accused. Reed v. State, 205 Ga. App. 209, 422 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, No. S92C1446, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 865 (1992).

In an action in which the state charged that defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a) by willfully failing or refusing to bring defendant's vehicle to a stop or otherwise fled or attempted to elude a pursuing police officer when given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, and the state charged that defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) in that defendant knowingly and willfully obstructed or hindered the officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's duties by refusing to follow the officer's reasonable and lawful commands, the offenses as charged in the case were not mutually exclusive as the offenses had different elements and neither guilty verdict legally or logically excluded the other. Golden v. State, 276 Ga. App. 538, 623 S.E.2d 727 (2005).

- Trial court did not err in preventing defense counsel from arguing the "illegality" of defendant's arrest, where defendant testified that defendant struck a police officer in defense of defendant's spouse, not in resistance to an unlawful arrest. Williams v. State, 196 Ga. App. 154, 395 S.E.2d 399 (1990).

- Upon conviction of defendant of three counts of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, since there were three separate victims, the trial court did not err in treating the counts as discrete offenses for sentencing. Denny v. State, 222 Ga. App. 674, 475 S.E.2d 698 (1996).

- Jury could find that refusal to provide identification to officer might hinder execution of duties. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975); Bailey v. State, 190 Ga. App. 683, 379 S.E.2d 816 (1989).

Since there was no evidence that defendant was unruly or threatened to breach the peace or even that the officer thought defendant was drunk, and defendant's sole offense was to refuse to give the defendant's name, there was no probable cause for arrest; the arrest was not lawful and defendant's physical resistance did not hinder the officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties. Wagner v. State, 206 Ga. App. 180, 424 S.E.2d 861 (1992).

After an officer stopped a vehicle on the reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven without a proper tag, and possibly for investigation of drug possession, refusal of defendant to provide identification in such circumstances could be the basis for prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 and the argument that detaining defendant under threat of such prosecution tainted the searches was without merit. Clark v. State, 243 Ga. App. 362, 532 S.E.2d 481 (2000).

- Because all evidence showed that obstruction offense occurred at the location of the stop and arrest in a particular city, but there was no evidence that the location was within Glynn County as charged, the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that venue for the offense was properly laid in Glynn County; accordingly, defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer required reversal.

- Inmate's obstruction of a correctional officer conviction was upheld on appeal, based on sufficient evidence describing how the officer was attacked and the extent of the officer's injuries suffered at the hand of the inmate, and testimony from one of the officer's responding to the altercation describing the altercation; hence, the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's rejection of the inmate's self-defense claim. Pugh v. State, 280 Ga. App. 137, 633 S.E.2d 439 (2006).

- In a parent's tort action arising from an accusation by store employees that the parent's child stole from the store, the trial court properly refused to strike evidence of an employee's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 by obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers because the fact that the employee was convicted after a deposition was not a bar to the use of the conviction for impeachment at trial and the conviction could be used for impeachment under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609) because the violation was a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

- Admission of similar transaction evidence in a case charging the defendant with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, was proper because in both the similar transaction and the incident leading to the charges being tried, the defendant was arrested in possession of cocaine and "sale-sized" baggies after seeking to avoid police; the trial court also gave an instruction that the similar transaction evidence was limited to the purpose of showing the defendant's bent of mind in committing the charged offenses. Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 664, 678 S.E.2d 128 (2009).

- Defense counsel was not deficient for failing to object to an officer's testimony that while violently resisting arrest, the defendant repeatedly screamed, "I'm not going back to jail," as evidence of these statements demonstrated the defendant's intent to commit the crimes of obstructing and hindering law enforcement officers, and were not rendered inadmissible merely because the statements incidentally put the defendant's character at issue. Bubrick v. State, 293 Ga. App. 502, 667 S.E.2d 666 (2008).

- Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions for making false statements and misdemeanor obstruction of justice failed because there was evidence that the defendant was involved with and assisted the codefendant in the ruse to keep the police from arresting the defendant's son. Reeves v. State, 346 Ga. App. 414, 816 S.E.2d 401 (2018).

- See Manus v. State, 180 Ga. App. 658, 350 S.E.2d 41 (1986); Salter v. State, 187 Ga. App. 178, 369 S.E.2d 798 (1988); Patterson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 359, 381 S.E.2d 754 (1989); Powell v. State, 192 Ga. App. 688, 385 S.E.2d 772 (1989); Gordon v. State, 199 Ga. App. 704, 406 S.E.2d 110 (1991); Holloway v. State, 201 Ga. App. 204, 410 S.E.2d 799 (1991); Hall v. State, 201 Ga. App. 328, 411 S.E.2d 274, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 903, 411 S.E.2d 274 (1991); Herren v. State, 201 Ga. App. 509, 411 S.E.2d 552 (1991); Hendrix v. State, 202 Ga. App. 54, 413 S.E.2d 232 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992); Hardwick v. State, 210 Ga. App. 468, 436 S.E.2d 676 (1993); Onwuzuruoha v. State, 217 Ga. App. 645, 458 S.E.2d 675 (1995); Imperial v. State, 218 Ga. App. 440, 461 S.E.2d 596 (1995); Miller v. State, 218 Ga. App. 606, 462 S.E.2d 630 (1995); Strickland v. State, 221 Ga. App. 516, 471 S.E.2d 576 (1996); Harris v. State, 222 Ga. App. 83, 473 S.E.2d 245 (1996); Cunningham v. State, 222 Ga. App. 740, 475 S.E.2d 924 (1996); Reddin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 148, 476 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Burk v. State, 223 Ga. App. 530, 478 S.E.2d 416 (1996); Brown v. State, 224 Ga. App. 42, 479 S.E.2d 454 (1996); Nunn v. State, 224 Ga. App. 312, 480 S.E.2d 614 (1997); Pearson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 467, 480 S.E.2d 911 (1997); Miller v. State, 226 Ga. App. 133, 486 S.E.2d 368 (1997); Youhoing v. State, 226 Ga. App. 475, 487 S.E.2d 86 (1997); Veal v. State, 226 Ga. App. 897, 487 S.E.2d 696 (1997); In re C.W., 227 Ga. App. 763, 490 S.E.2d 442 (1997); Basu v. State, 228 Ga. App. 591, 492 S.E.2d 329 (1997); Larkin v. State, 230 Ga. App. 129, 495 S.E.2d 605 (1998); Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760, 500 S.E.2d 627 (1998); Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 688, 505 S.E.2d 774 (1998); Johnson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 218, 507 S.E.2d 13 (1998); Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga. App. 675, 516 S.E.2d 537 (1999); Nichols v. State, 238 Ga. App. 412, 519 S.E.2d 20 (1999); Richardson v. State, 239 Ga. App. 345, 521 S.E.2d 239 (1999); Russell v. State, 243 Ga. App. 378, 532 S.E.2d 137 (2000); Burge v. State, 243 Ga. App. 673, 534 S.E.2d 132 (2000); Wilder v. State, 243 Ga. App. 807, 534 S.E.2d 487 (2000); Patterson v. State, 244 Ga. App. 222, 535 S.E.2d 269 (2000); McLeod v. State, 245 Ga. App. 668, 538 S.E.2d 759 (2000); Shaw v. State, 247 Ga. App. 867, 545 S.E.2d 399 (2001); Brackins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 788, 549 S.E.2d 775 (2001); Evans v. State, 250 Ga. App. 70, 550 S.E.2d 118 (2001); Adams v. State, 263 Ga. App. 694, 589 S.E.2d 269 (2003); Bounds v. State, 264 Ga. App. 584, 591 S.E.2d 472 (2003); Hayes v. State, 281 Ga. App. 749, 637 S.E.2d 128 (2006).

- Because defendant was convicted of a traffic offense and given an alternative sentence of a fine or jail term, defendant was not justified in resisting an officer's attempts to jail the defendant after defendant refused to pay the fine. Scott v. State, 227 Ga. App. 625, 490 S.E.2d 104 (1997).

- Evidence that defendant purposefully kicked and attempted to bite officers as they were assisting in the investigation of a shooting was sufficient to support a conviction. Stepherson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 219, 483 S.E.2d 631 (1997).

- Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, evidence that defendant violently assaulted two officers who arrived at the scene of a heated argument between defendant and defendant's spouse was sufficient to allow a jury to find defendant guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer; although the officers' version differed from defendant's version, such differences were a matter for the jury to resolve. Taylor v. State, 231 Ga. App. 73, 498 S.E.2d 552 (1998).

- Construed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence that defendant sold cocaine to undercover officers was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find defendant guilty of selling a controlled substance, selling a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, and resisting arrest. Mikell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 85, 498 S.E.2d 531 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery, aggravated assault, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, attempting to elude a law enforcement officer and driving under the influence of drugs. Chisholm v. State, 231 Ga. App. 835, 500 S.E.2d 14 (1998).

- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction since the defendant told a police officer that "if he saw [him] again, he was going to pop a cap in his ass," which is street slang for shooting somebody. Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. 156, 545 S.E.2d 312 (2001).

- Evidence that the handcuffed defendant kicked at the arresting officer and threatened to break the officer's leg was sufficient to convict defendant of felony obstruction, as the jury could have reasonably found that the threat of violence and attempts to kick the officer tended to hinder and impede the officer's efforts to secure defendant. Gillison v. State, 254 Ga. App. 232, 561 S.E.2d 879 (2002).

- Police officer's testimony that defendant threw a bottle at the officer while the officer was trying to protect other officers who were arresting a violent suspect was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer with violence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). Gibbs v. State, 255 Ga. App. 183, 564 S.E.2d 789 (2002).

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for felony obstruction of a police officer as it showed that the officer, who was assisting the officer's brother in apprehending defendant after defendant was suspected of shoplifting, was in the lawful discharge of police duties, that defendant knew the officer was a police officer, and that defendant knowingly or willfully tried to injure the officer by driving defendant's vehicle while the officer was hanging half-in and half-out of the vehicle. Frayall v. State, 259 Ga. App. 286, 576 S.E.2d 654 (2003).

Where defendant fit the description given for a fleeing suspect, was seen walking in the same direction as the suspect, and was found only minutes after the police "lookout" call regarding the fleeing suspect was sent, defendant's brief seizure by a police officer for questioning was warranted; thus, contrary to defendant's contention challenging the denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the officer was lawfully discharging the officer's official duties during that brief seizure when defendant struck the officer, and the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of obstruction of a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Hamm v. State, 259 Ga. App. 412, 577 S.E.2d 85 (2003).

- Defendant's convictions of obstruction of peace officers, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, were supported by sufficient evidence as the evidence indicated that defendant was involved in an altercation with jail detention officers in which an officer was physically injured. Williams v. State, 260 Ga. App. 286, 581 S.E.2d 313 (2003).

- Evidence that defendant gave police a fictitious name and social security number when police questioned defendant about a burglary was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of burglary and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Wilson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 576, 583 S.E.2d 243 (2003).

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer, as the state proved defendant committed the obstruction act knowingly and willfully, and that the officer was lawfully discharging the officer's duties at the time of the obstruction; the state was not also required to prove the underlying offense. Mai v. State, 259 Ga. App. 471, 577 S.E.2d 288 (2003).

Evidence was legally sufficient to support the five convictions against defendant for obstruction of a law enforcement officer as it showed defendant twice obstructed officers by fleeing, twice obstructed officers by offering to do violence to their persons, and once obstructed an officer by doing violence to the officer, all while committing crimes during a six-week period. Brown v. State, 259 Ga. App. 819, 578 S.E.2d 516 (2003).

Defendant obstructed an officer where defendant consented to the deputy's entry into the home and defendant knowingly and willfully grabbed the deputy's arm to stop the deputy from arresting another occupant of the dwelling. Schroeder v. State, 261 Ga. App. 879, 583 S.E.2d 922 (2003).

Testimony from an eyewitness at the scene that the eyewitness heard suspicious noises in the adjacent government offices, which were closed for business for the day, then saw defendant flee from police while removing items from defendant's pocket, when coupled with the discovery of 169 quarters which were found in the immediate vicinity of the tree where defendant was apprehended, the presence of tools at the crime scene, visible pry marks on the door which defendant attempted to open, and the destroyed gum ball machines, authorized the jury to infer that although defendant did not have the tools in defendant's possession, defendant used them to break into the offices, steal the money from the destroyed machines, and attempt to flee the police and avoid apprehension; thus, defendant's convictions for burglary, possession of tools for the commission of a crime, interference with government property, and obstruction of an officer were all affirmed. Harris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 866, 589 S.E.2d 631 (2003).

- There was no evidence that the arresting officer assaulted defendant first, but the appellate court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of obstruction of an officer by refusing to obey the officer's lawful commands and by striking the officer in the face. Dudley v. State, 264 Ga. App. 845, 592 S.E.2d 489 (2003).

- State's evidence was sufficient to find juvenile defendant committed criminal trespass, obstructed a police officer, and interfered with government property, and the juvenile court properly adjudicated the juvenile delinquent; the juvenile threw an egg at an officer's car damaging a plastic strip on the car window, broke at least two windows in the police substation, and obstructed an officer by fleeing after the officer was identified and ordered defendant to stop. In the Interest of M.M., 265 Ga. App. 381, 593 S.E.2d 919 (2004).

After the defendant was lawfully arrested for attempted possession of cocaine, the defendant was not justified in obstructing the police and resisting arrest, and thus the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of justice under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 600 S.E.2d 437 (2004).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) since the issue of whether the police officers provided inconsistent testimony was for the jury to decide, the defendant admitted that the defendant knew that the individual who defendant struck was a police officer, there was no requirement of proving actual injury as an element of the offense, and the officers were in lawful discharge of their duties at the time of the alleged obstruction because the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant on a probation violation warrant; upon the officer approaching the defendant, the defendant fled and the defendant struggled, punched, and hit the officers as the officers tried to arrest the defendant. Phillips v. State, 267 Ga. App. 733, 601 S.E.2d 147 (2004).

- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer because, when officers came to defendant's home to execute an arrest warrant on a third party, defendant tried to shut the door, but officers pushed the door open, forcing defendant into the front room, where defendant yelled at the officers, stood face-to-face with one officer while yelling, pointed a finger in the face of another officer, and defendant also blocked a hallway, forcing officers to move defendant to the side so that they could search the rest of the home and defendant was told several times to sit down and remain in one place, but was uncooperative. Cooper v. State, 270 Ga. App. 346, 606 S.E.2d 869 (2004), overruled on other grounds, Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009).

Misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer conviction was supported by sufficient evidence because: (1) defendant refused to cooperate when officers requested a pat down; (2) the officer then told defendant that defendant was under arrest for obstruction and ordered the defendant to turn around and place defendant's hands behind defendant's back; (3) defendant turned around, but did not follow the officer's instructions, choosing instead to grab a rail on top of the van; (4) defendant continued to hold on to the rail despite the officers' several requests for the defendant to place defendant's hands behind defendant's back; (5) the officer attempted to physically place defendant's hands behind defendant's back but could not do so because defendant continued to resist by keeping defendant's hands on the rail; and (6) a second officer showed defendant a can of pepper spray and, eventually, used the pepper spray on defendant, which caused defendant to chase the officer, and punch the officer. Wilson v. State, 270 Ga. App. 555, 607 S.E.2d 197 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer as the evidence showed that following the traffic stop of defendant's vehicle, defendant, who was handcuffed, fled the scene, requiring that officers pursue and apprehend defendant. Kates v. State, 271 Ga. App. 326, 609 S.E.2d 710 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, criminal trespass, misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and possession of marijuana conviction because: (1) a victim testified that defendant choked her, slammed her around a room, and raped and sodomized her, then drank a beer, took her BC powder packets, and a cell phone, and left; (2) defendant fled from the police, kicked two officers, and had marijuana, BC packets, and a cell phone on his person; (3) defendant's DNA matched the DNA on the beer can; (4) a nurse testified that the victim's bruise was consistent with strangulation; and (5) a doctor testified that the victim's injuries were consistent with rape and sodomy. Lewis v. State, 271 Ga. App. 744, 611 S.E.2d 80 (2005).

Because the defendant ignored the officers' requests to provide identification, and instead engaged in a fight and wrestling match with the officers in an attempt to get to a brother's residence, while a search warrant was being executed, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a); it was not an inconsistent verdict that the jury acquitted the defendant of felony obstruction charges under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) as the jury could have found that the conduct did not rise to the level of "offering and/or doing violence" to the officer's person. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. App. 66, 622 S.E.2d 425 (2005).

Evidence that the defendant failed to comply with the officers' request that the defendant answer the door was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction. Lee v. State, 347 Ga. App. 508, 820 S.E.2d 147 (2018).

Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied as the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two misdemeanor counts of obstructing a law enforcement officer because there was ample testimony about the existence and purpose of the order pursuant to which they assisted the deputies in taking the defendant into custody for transport to a mental health facility; the defendant refused to comply with the officers' verbal commands, and began fighting with the officers when the officers tried to detain the defendant; the defendant hit, kicked, and scratched the officers; and the officers and the defendant fell to the ground, and the defendant continued fighting until the officers were able to gain control of the defendant. Gille v. State, 351 Ga. App. 875, 833 S.E.2d 573 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of an officer as the captain stated the captain was a law enforcement officer while displaying a badge and informed the defendant that the captain was acting on behalf of the property owners, authorizing the jury to conclude that the defendant had the requisite knowledge of the captain's identity, and testimony that the captain directed the defendant to stop filming or leave three times and told the defendant that failure to comply would result in an arrest before the captain forced the defendant from the venue while the defendant struggled authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant was given adequate time to comply. Tisdale v. State, 354 Ga. App. 735, 841 S.E.2d 82 (2020).

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer because: (1) an officer went to a residence to perform a safety check after a9-1-1 hang-up call was received from the residence; (2) comments made to the officer by a child trying to climb out of a front window led the officer to believe that a domestic violence incident might be in progress inside the residence; (3) the officer entered the home and saw defendant, who uttered profanities, walked toward the officer and ordered the officer out of the house, and the officer then stepped outside the house; (4) after another officer arrived, the officers told defendant that they needed to enter the house to investigate the call, but defendant refused to allow the officers into the house; and (5) eventually, the officers were required to arrest defendant to enter the house. Berrian v. State, 270 Ga. App. 582, 608 S.E.2d 540 (2004).

- Evidence that defendant repeatedly exited defendant's vehicle against the officer's orders to remain seated in the vehicle was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction. Turner v. State, 274 Ga. App. 731, 618 S.E.2d 607 (2005).

Because the defendant acknowledged hunting doves in an open field without a hunting license and "fading" into the woods when the rangers approached, the rangers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred; consequently, the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure were not violated and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on the charges of illegal hunting and obstruction. Sharp v. State, 275 Ga. App. 487, 621 S.E.2d 508 (2005).

- Defendant's conviction of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer was supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant kicked an officer in the groin and violently struggled with the officer while the officer was placing the defendant under arrest. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. 544, 623 S.E.2d 725 (2005).

- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for malice murder, burglary, and hindering a police officer because the defendant was at the back door of the mother's home without authorization, and fled when an officer tried to handcuff the defendant, the defendant's mother was found dead from massive head injuries, and the mother's rings, a lawn mower blade, and a hatchet were found on the defendant's person or stashed in bags outside the home. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 172, 611 S.E.2d 1 (2005).

Evidence indicating that while officers were attempting to arrest the defendant in a domestic dispute, the defendant, after intentionally striking the victim one last time, intentionally punched one of the officers and then, intentionally or accidentally, struck the other with an elbow, was sufficient to support convictions for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and simple battery. Pinkston v. State, 277 Ga. App. 432, 626 S.E.2d 626 (2006).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) conviction for felony obstruction of a police officer after the officer tried to arrest the defendant on an outstanding warrant and after the officer was identified and ordered defendant to stop, the defendant struck and kicked the police officer as the defendant attempted to flee. Panzner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 868, 616 S.E.2d 201 (2005).

Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction was supported by sufficient evidence which established that when an officer activated the patrol vehicle's flashing blue lights, giving a visual signal for the defendant to remain stopped, the defendant fled from the scene and led the officers on a chase until defendant was apprehended and arrested. Prather v. State, 279 Ga. App. 873, 633 S.E.2d 46 (2006).

- Obstruction of a prison guard conviction was upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was provided by the prison-guard witnesses; thus, a psychologist's testimony regarding the defendant's competency did not influence the outcome of the trial. Griffin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 249, 635 S.E.2d 853 (2006).

Given the evidence provided by law enforcement that: (1) the defendant hindered and obstructed one officer in the lawful discharge of that officer's duties while the officer went to check on the welfare of the defendant's wife; (2) the defendant's act of resisting the other officer while that officer was arresting the defendant; and (3) the defendant's act of breaking off the interior door handle of the patrol vehicle and forcing the vehicle's window off the window's frame, the defendant's convictions for both felony and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer and a felony count of interfering with government property were upheld on appeal. Meeker v. State, 282 Ga. App. 77, 637 S.E.2d 806 (2006).

Given evidence from an ensuing police officer identifying the defendant as the driver of the vehicle stopped, and because the jury was the judge of the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial, and was authorized to reject the defendant's alibi defense, sufficient evidence was presented to support the defendant's convictions for reckless driving, failure to maintain a lane, driving with defective equipment, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and obstruction of a police officer. Daniel v. State, 282 Ga. App. 291, 638 S.E.2d 430 (2006).

Despite the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically, that no evidence showed the malice element of a cruelty-to-children offense, and that the evidence failed to show the defendant harmed the police officer to support an obstruction offense, convictions on those offenses were upheld on appeal as: (1) the severity of the bite marks inflicted on the child victim allowed the court to infer malice; (2) actual harm to the officer was not an essential element of an obstruction charge; and (3) the defendant's act of swinging at the officer's face during an effort to resist arrest supported an obstruction. Sampson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 92, 640 S.E.2d 673 (2006).

- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer by spitting on the officer; although the defendant denied spitting and argued that only two witnesses had testified otherwise, a fact could be established by one witness, and credibility was a jury matter. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. App. 211, 645 S.E.2d 692 (2007).

Evidence adduced at trial authorized any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony obstruction of law enforcement officers in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) because a police officer testified that the defendant interfered with the officer's attempts to interview the defendant's daughter and her mother after the officer was dispatched to the defendant's home in response to a domestic disturbance call, that the defendant ordered the officer to leave, and that the defendant approached the officer and took up a fighting stance; the officer was forced to wrestle the defendant to the ground in order to handcuff the defendant, and the defendant spat into the officer's face as the officer was putting the defendant in the patrol car. Andrews v. State, 307 Ga. App. 557, 705 S.E.2d 319 (2011).

Testimony of the arresting officer that defendant attempted to spit on the arresting officer was sufficient to support a charge of misdemeanor obstruction. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 675, 705 S.E.2d 906 (2011).

- When a deputy testified that the defendant resisted the deputy's efforts to break up a prison fight, then turned on the deputy, punched the deputy, and swung at the deputy repeatedly, injuring the deputy, there was sufficient evidence of mutiny in a penal institution and felony obstruction of an officer; the trial court was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6 to infer from the circumstances that the defendant both knowingly and willfully obstructed the deputy by the use of violence and intended to cause the deputy serious bodily injury by striking the deputy with a fist, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), it could rely solely on the deputy's account of the events. Butler v. State, 284 Ga. App. 802, 644 S.E.2d 898 (2007).

Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant physically assaulted an off-duty sheriff's officer prior to arrest and continued to resist and obstruct the officer's official duties thereafter, the defendant was properly denied an acquittal and a new trial; moreover, given that the trial court properly charged the jury on the obstruction offense, explaining that a person committed the offense by knowingly and willfully obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of that officer's official duties, nothing beyond such was required. Helton v. State, 284 Ga. App. 777, 644 S.E.2d 896 (2007).

Because: (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain identification evidence alleged to be hearsay, as testimony relative to the identification was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; (2) the defendant's requested instruction was not tailored to the facts and was potentially confusing; and (3) the defendant's character was not placed in issue, convictions of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and obstruction were all upheld. Jennings v. State, 285 Ga. App. 774, 648 S.E.2d 105 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1576, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 667 (Ga. 2007).

Given evidence that the defendant attempted to forcefully resist being handcuffed and threatened the officers as the officers were exercising the officers' lawful duties, that evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007).

Given the evidence of the defendant's effort to resist law enforcement officers, which hindered the officers in carrying out the officers' duties, the defendant's misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer convictions were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence. Lipsey v. State, 287 Ga. App. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870 (2007).

Because the testimony from the deputy named in the challenged count charging the defendant with felony obstruction testified that the defendant was making a scene, hollering, cussing, carrying on, kicking, screaming, resisting arrest, pulling away, and attempting to kick someone in the crowd, which was confirmed by the testimony of a second deputy, sufficient evidence was presented to support the felony obstruction charge. Owens v. State, 288 Ga. App. 771, 655 S.E.2d 244 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 274 (Ga. 2008).

- Evidence that the defendant's creation of a fake Facebook account after the child was reported missing resulted in three investigators wasting twelve hours looking in the wrong direction for the juvenile and hindered law enforcement's ability to track the child's possible whereabouts for about six hours was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice. Libri v. State, 346 Ga. App. 420, 816 S.E.2d 417 (2018).

- Given evidence that the defendant: (1) knowingly provided the officer with a false name and date of birth; (2) failed to provide written identification when asked to do so; and (3) refused to respond when the police repeatedly knocked and telephoned, the defendant's obstruction conviction, and hence, the denial of a directed verdict of acquittal, were supported by the facts. Moreover, the trial court properly excluded a letter that the defendant claimed explained or justified the aforementioned actions as irrelevant. Williams v. State, 289 Ga. App. 402, 657 S.E.2d 556 (2008).

Because direct eyewitness testimony from three eyewitnesses supported a finding that defendant struck a correctional officer while that officer was attempting to handcuff defendant, this evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of felony obstruction of an officer. Evans v. State, 290 Ga. App. 746, 660 S.E.2d 841 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated assault on a peace officer, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, interference with government property, and criminal trespass after the defendant admitted obstructing officers and damaging a patrol car and the victim's vehicle; although the defendant denied assaulting the victim and the responding officer, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's testimony. Gartrell v. State, 291 Ga. App. 21, 660 S.E.2d 886 (2008).

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for giving false identifying information to and obstruction of law enforcement officers engaged in the lawful discharge of their official duties, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24 and16-10-25. When defendant gave false identifying information to officers after a traffic stop, the defendant provided the officers with probable cause for arrest; it followed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 761, 669 S.E.2d 735 (2008).

Testimony of an arresting officer that the defendant acted as if the defendant were going to flee and generally refused to cooperate with police, and that this conduct hindered the officer in making the arrest was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of an officer. Frasier v. State, 295 Ga. App. 596, 672 S.E.2d 668 (2009).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for obstruction of a police officer and other related crimes, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the single testimony of the officer involved. Because it was the function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh any conflict in the evidence, the testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact; therefore, the testimony of the police officer who was involved in the altercation with the defendant was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the defendant. Whatley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009).

- As a defendant offered to do violence to police officers when the defendant threatened to kill the officers while being searched, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of felony obstruction of an officer. Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009).

An officer arrested the defendant, whose vehicle was stopped on a road, for refusing to comply with the officer's order to leave the area. The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) as the state proved that the officer was engaged in the lawful discharge of the officer's duties with evidence that the officer was responding to a9-1-1 call reporting that the defendant had followed the frightened caller's vehicle to the caller's home. West v. State, 296 Ga. App. 58, 673 S.E.2d 558 (2009), overruled on other grounds, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

An officer's testimony that the defendant struggled with both the officer and a second officer at a jail before the officers could restrain the defendant was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of obstructing the non-testifying officer. Mackey v. State, 296 Ga. App. 675, 675 S.E.2d 567 (2009).

- Defendant was a suspect in a shooting. Evidence that, when police went to the defendant's home, the defendant hid in a closet and refused police orders to come outside was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of obstruction. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009).

- Contrary to the defendant's claim, police officers were lawfully discharging their official duties when the officers responded to a 911 call by the defendant's mother regarding the defendant's suicidal and erratic behavior and, thus, the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstructing law enforcement. Copley v. State, 347 Ga. App. 309, 819 S.E.2d 294 (2018).

- Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction was supported by the evidence which showed that after learning that the defendant's girlfriend had been detained for shoplifting and being told by the off-duty police officer who had detained the girlfriend that the defendant should not move the girlfriend's car as the officer needed the car for the officer's investigation, the defendant had a whispered conversation with the girlfriend after which the defendant had a friend remove the car from the parking lot, and that it took over an hour for the defendant to have the car returned as directed by the officer; the state was not required to prove forcible resistance or a threat of violence. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for improper lane change, serious injury by vehicle while driving under the influence, and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the state disproving the defendant's affirmative defense of accident that the bad weather and alleged malfunctioning brakes caused the single-car crash, an officer's testimony that the defendant attempted to leave the scene several times, and the evidence of the defendant's vehicle passenger suffering a severe injury to the left eye after the eye was forced out of the eye socket. It was unnecessary to show that the passenger's eye was permanently rendered useless. Wells v. State, 297 Ga. App. 153, 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009).

- Evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find an inmate guilty of two counts of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 beyond a reasonable doubt because, during a prison disciplinary report hearing, the inmate became loud and agitated and two officers were instructed to remove the inmate from the hearing room and place the inmate in a nearby holding cell; the inmate resisted by pulling from side to side, and then resisted being placed in the holding cell by repeatedly kicking the officers, causing the officers to wrestle the inmate to the floor to subdue the inmate. Cobble v. State, 297 Ga. App. 423, 677 S.E.2d 439 (2009).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstruction of an officer as officers shouted to the defendant to show the officers the defendant's hands, but the defendant did not respond. The defendant resisted when officers tried to put handcuffs on the defendant and the officers were forced to wrestle the defendant to the ground before the officers could handcuff the defendant. Dulcio v. State, 297 Ga. App. 600, 677 S.E.2d 758 (2009).

Evidence that after being arrested, the defendant head-butted an officer in the face and yelled death threats at the officer was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of an officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), and terroristic threats, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (2009).

Officer who responded to a9-1-1 call regarding a victim being harassed by the defendant testified that the officer repeatedly instructed the defendant to calm down, to stop being loud and irate, and to step back from where the officer was interviewing the victim; the defendant was arrested for not complying. As the jury was entitled to find that the defendant's refusal to obey the officer's commands hindered or obstructed the officer, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Mayhew v. State, 299 Ga. App. 313, 682 S.E.2d 594 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2059, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 786 (Ga. 2009).

- Evidence supported the defendant's felony conviction for obstruction of an officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). The defendant offered to do violence to the person of an officer by swinging a rake at the officer in a threatening manner when the officer sought to approach the defendant to have the defendant move from blocking the officer's vehicle. Wilcox v. State, 300 Ga. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 108 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b): the defendant, incarcerated in a county jail, repeatedly refused to obey a corrections officer's commands to take only one food tray at meal time, struck the officer, wrestled the officer to the floor, and choked the officer until the defendant was tasered. Williams v. State, 301 Ga. App. 731, 688 S.E.2d 650 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant, age 35, met a girl online whom the defendant believed was 15, that the defendant made numerous comments about how the defendant could get in trouble or go to jail, that the defendant engaged in sexually explicit conversations and directed the child to pornography sites showing black men having sex with white women, that the defendant drove to an arranged meeting place, and, that, when officers appeared, the defendant fled, was sufficient to convict defendant of violating O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 (attempt),16-6-4 (child molestation),16-6-5 (enticement of a child), and16-10-24 (obstruction). Smith v. State, 306 Ga. App. 301, 702 S.E.2d 211 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant obstructed an officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) when the arresting officer observed defendant waiving a weapon around inside a bar, near a waitress and eventually near the officer personally, defendant disobeyed the officer's commands to drop the weapon and only complied when the officer engaged the defendant with a threat of force, and when the officer attempted to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct, defendant resisted. Moreover, defendant's behavior was threatening enough to compel the officer to draw a weapon and to order defendant to lie on the floor, facts from which the court could have inferred the officer was in reasonable fear of injury and thus had probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct, despite the lack of testimony from the bar owner or the waitress. Zeger v. State, 306 Ga. App. 474, 702 S.E.2d 474 (2010).

- Officer's second-tier Terry frisk of defendant did not constitute an illegal detention considering all of the circumstances including the defendant's repeated refusal to keep the defendant's hands away from the pockets of the defendant's baggy clothes at the officer's request, defendant's nervous demeanor, the presence of two companions, and the officer's knowledge of violent crime in the area. Therefore, the defendant was not justified in elbowing the officer and resisting arrest. Santos v. State, 306 Ga. App. 772, 703 S.E.2d 140 (2010).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 because the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant had obstructed or hindered two officers; there was evidence that although the defendant had been informed of the purpose of the encounter, the defendant persisted in refusing to provide a driver's license, assumed a physically aggressive stance, and refused to comply with commands to stop fighting or resisting, and there also was evidence that after being informed that the defendant was under arrest for obstruction, the defendant physically resisted the arrest. Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. App. 569, 707 S.E.2d 917 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) because the defendant bit two officers and kicked one several times in the abdomen as the officers were attempting to arrest the defendant; so, the evidence clearly established that the defendant was "offering or doing violence" to the officers at the time of the obstruction. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), was supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant was advised by an officer that the defendant was under arrest, whereupon the defendant resisted the officer's handcuffing attempts, ran from the officer, and failed to comply with the directive to stop. Jenkins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 811, 714 S.E.2d 410 (2011).

Evidence that police responded to a home to investigate a crime after speaking to an injured man, that the officer saw the defendant standing with the defendant's hands concealed in a baggy jacket and instructed the defendant, whom the officer thought might be armed, to display the defendant's hands, and that the defendant failed to comply and attacked the officer supported the defendant's conviction for felony obstruction of an officer. Alvarez v. State, 312 Ga. App. 552, 718 S.E.2d 884 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of obstructing a police officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), because defendant impeded the officer in the discharge of the officer's duties, and the defendant hindered the officer not just by the defendant's arguments and obstinacy, but also by placing both defendant's and the officer's safety at risk by refusing to return to defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop. Timberlake v. State, 315 Ga. App. 693, 727 S.E.2d 516 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony obstruction of an officer because the record showed that the defendant pushed the officer and that the officer suffered scratches on a hand and knee as a result. Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 798, 728 S.E.2d 317 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for obstruction of an officer as the officer testified that the officer was unable to complete the search of the defendant prior to the defendant's arrest because the defendant had been swinging at the officer's head and the officer needed to gain control of the situation; there was no indication that the officer was acting unlawfully. Brown v. State, 320 Ga. App. 12, 739 S.E.2d 32 (2013).

Defendant's conviction for obstruction was supported by evidence the defendant fled and thereby knowingly and wilfully hindered police officers in the lawful discharge of the officers' official duties. Hughes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 4, 746 S.E.2d 648 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstructing an officer based on the evidence that showed that the defendant failed to follow the officer's instructions in that the defendant refused to exit the truck when told to do so; the defendant locked the door, rolled up the window and indicated calling9-1-1; and, after the officers pulled the defendant out of the truck, the defendant struggled with the officers, refused to be handcuffed, and tried to get up from the ground. Taylor v. State, 326 Ga. App. 27, 755 S.E.2d 839 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer because the defendant jumped on the officer's back and began choking the officer after the officer, in an effort to avoid being hit, took the defendant's son to the ground and placed a hand on the back of the son's neck; and, as the officer released the son and secured the defendant, the defendant struck the officer twice in the face and once in the neck. McMullen v. State, 325 Ga. App. 757, 754 S.E.2d 798 (2014).

Based on evidence that the defendant's conduct in hollering and cursing outside the house prevented an officer from continuing to photograph the scene and going inside to collect evidence and caused another officer to stop the officer's activities inside the house and come outside to assist, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the defendant knowingly and willingly hindered the officer in the lawful charge of duties for purposes of a conviction for obstruction of an officer. Johnson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 75, 766 S.E.2d 533 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction, possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, and disorderly conduct because the defendant slammed the refrigerator door twice, breaking items stored in the door; the victim called9-1-1 seeking assistance for a domestic dispute in progress; when one of the responding officers told the defendant that the defendant would have to leave the house as the victim did not want the defendant living there, the defendant told the officer that the officer could not make the defendant leave; and, when the officer unsnapped a taser from the taser's holster and approached the defendant, the defendant grabbed a knife with an eight-inch blade and threatened the officers with the knife. Owens v. State, 329 Ga. App. 455, 765 S.E.2d 653 (2014).

Officer's testimony that the defendant's heel grazed from the officer's knee cap down the officer's leg to the ankle, leaving a red mark and causing the officer's leg to sting, supported the defendant's conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Glispie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 177, 779 S.E.2d 767 (2015), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 300 Ga. 128 793 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of felony obstruction because a jury could reasonably conclude that, when the defendant cried out immediately after the single shot was fired by the defendant's grandfather, the defendant was encouraging the grandfather to discharge the revolver for a second time at or near the officers before they had succeeded in returning to safety, and was thus offering violence to those officers; and, when the defendant shouted out immediately after the single shot was fired, the arresting deputies were forced to extinguish their flashlights so as to prevent being seen and shot by the grandfather, thus hindering their efforts to secure the defendant's arrest. Hoglen v. State, 336 Ga. App. 471, 784 S.E.2d 832 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer because, by resisting the officers as the officers performed the officers' duty of investigating the domestic disturbance call, the defendant obstructed or hindered the officers. Haygood v. State, 338 Ga. App. 189, 789 S.E.2d 404 (2016).

- Since the defendant made neither a verbal nor physical threat of violence to the officer but was merely obnoxious and contemptuous, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for obstructing a law enforcement officer. Moccia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (1985).

Since there was no evidence showing that defendant's arrest was lawful, defendant had the right to resist with all force necessary for that purpose, and defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was not authorized. Woodward v. State, 219 Ga. App. 329, 465 S.E.2d 511 (1995).

Although the defendant fled at the sight of the police, there was no evidence that the officers called out to the defendant to halt or that defendant failed to submit to a show of lawful authority; therefore, conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was not warranted. Porter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 276, 480 S.E.2d 291 (1997).

When the evidence established that the officer never had the opportunity to turn on the officer's emergency lights or siren when following defendant's vehicle, to issue a verbal command within earshot of defendant, or otherwise to communicate a command for defendant to halt, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for obstruction of an officer. Phillips v. State, 269 Ga. App. 619, 604 S.E.2d 520 (2004).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of obstructing a law enforcement officer; the officer, though following the defendant in a marked patrol car, had never activated the car's emergency lights or siren or attempted to stop the defendant, and once the defendant stopped the car the defendant was driving and ran, the officer did not order the defendant to stop. Williams v. State, 285 Ga. App. 190, 645 S.E.2d 676 (2007).

Evidence did not support the defendant's conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer since the only evidence of obstruction was that the defendant did not open the door to police officers fast enough when the officers they came to the defendant's house to look for a missing juvenile; there was no evidence that the defendant knew of an ongoing investigation or that the defendant was attempting "knowingly and willfully" to impede such an investigation. Beckom v. State, 286 Ga. App. 38, 648 S.E.2d 656 (2007).

On a summary judgment motion, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force plaintiff arrestee's version of the facts, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the arrestee as a non-movant, no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) because: (1) ten minutes elapsed since the alleged aggressor in the domestic violence dispute had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car; (2) the arrestee patiently waited after approaching an officer standing outside for a few minutes before making a request that law enforcement vehicles be moved and then requested to speak with the officer in charge; (3) throughout the exchange the arrestee maintained a calm voice and demeanor; and (4) the arrestee did not impede or hinder the officer in the performance of the officer's police duties; though the arrestee may have refused to obey an order to leave the scene by attempting to approach another officer, an arrest for obstruction could not be predicated upon such a refusal to obey a command to clear the general area entirely beyond the zone of police operation, which, in the circumstances described, was clearly an overly broad and unreasonable demand that exceeded reasonable law enforcement procedure and needs. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008).

An officer testified that if the officer determined, after completing the officer's consent frisk, that the defendant had no weapons, the defendant was free to leave. As the defendant had no weapons, and the drugs the officer removed from the defendant's pockets were illegally seized, the defendant's act of fleeing from the officer did not constitute obstructing an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008).

Conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), was not supported by sufficient evidence under circumstances in which a deputy investigating an armed robbery stopped the defendant's car, but then chased the defendant's passenger who had exited the car and fled, and the defendant then drove away from the scene; although the defendant drove away after being stopped, the encounter with the deputy apparently had ended and the defendant had not been instructed to remain on the scene. Further, the defendant had not been made aware that the defendant was going to be arrested for the robbery being investigated by the deputy. Connelly v. State, 298 Ga. App. 223, 679 S.E.2d 790 (2009).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's misdemeanor conviction for obstruction of an officer because the defendant was charged with knowingly and wilfully obstructing and hindering a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of official duties by running from the officer as the officer attempted to take the defendant into custody; although the evidence established that the officer saw the defendant running and followed the defendant in a marked patrol car, the officer's own testimony established that the defendant stopped immediately upon seeing the police vehicle and that the defendant immediately complied with the officer's order to stop. Lackey v. State, 286 Ga. 163, 686 S.E.2d 112 (2009).

Evidence was not sufficient as to the obstruction count as there was no evidence that the officer commanded, rather than requested, that the defendant stop. The evidence established only that the officer asked the defendant to come over here to talk to the officer, which was not a command. Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 746 S.E.2d 216 (2013).

- When an officer suspected that the defendant might have swallowed contraband, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for obstructing a law enforcement officer because, although there was evidence that the defendant's mouth was closed, and that the defendant made chewing motions, there was simply no evidence that any of the officers commanded the defendant to open the defendant's mouth; and, in the absence of that evidence, the state failed to establish that the defendant knowingly or willfully failed to submit to lawful authority by disobeying a command to open the defendant's mouth. Taylor v. State, 349 Ga. App. 185, 825 S.E.2d 552 (2019).

- After an arrestee followed an officer to the police car after a traffic stop, leaned over the hood with a pen in hand ready to write the officer's name down, and was arrested, the wrongful arrest claim survived summary judgment because the officer lacked arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) since a reasonable officer could not have interpreted the conduct as a knowing and willful act of hindrance or obstruction or as a threat to officer safety. Turner v. Jones, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2011)(Unpublished).

When the defendant refused to answer an officer's questions and instead exercised the right to walk away, the officer lacked probable cause to justify an arrest for obstruction, even after the defendant began running because the defendant had the right to avoid the first-tier police-citizen encounter. Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 727 S.E.2d 257 (2012).

When an arrestee allegedly called an officer "a fucking asshole" and was arrested, the officer was properly denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the arrestee's claims under the Fourth Amendment because the officer did not have arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for obstructing an officer since the arrestee was within the arrestee's rights to hold the arrestee's arms stiffly because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the arrestee for disorderly conduct. Merenda v. Tabor, 506 Fed. Appx. 862 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

- Because the defendant could commit felony obstruction only if the defendant offered violence against an officer while the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties and felony obstruction could occur regardless of whether it involved the use of an offensive weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury, unlike aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2), the two offenses were not proved by the same evidence and the rule of lenity did not apply. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

- Defendant's sentence for obstruction of a law enforcement officer of 12 months confinement to be served on probation following 60 days of confinement, $1,500 in fines, 100 hours of community service, and a mental health evaluation was within the statutory limits set by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24(b),40-2-20(c), and40-6-10(b), and did not shock the conscience. Smith v. State, 311 Ga. App. 184, 715 S.E.2d 434 (2011).

- U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement was proper as the defendant concealed a gun in the defendant's pants during the police encounter, and attempted to reach for the gun when the gun fell; the offense was "in connection with" another felony offense as the possession had a potential to facilitate obstruction of an officer with violence under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) when the defendant struggled with the officers over the vehicle. United States v. Linker, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2013)(Unpublished).

Jury Instructions

Jury instruction on "lawful discharge of official duties".

- Trial court did not err in not defining further for the jury the phrase "lawful discharge of official duties" as that term was set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 as defendant did not make a specific request that the phrase be defined, and the trial court fully and accurately charged the jury on the statutory definition of the crime charged. Poe v. State, 254 Ga. App. 767, 563 S.E.2d 904 (2002).

When the evidence showed completion of the greater offense of felony obstruction of an officer, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer. Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. 562, 436 S.E.2d 752 (1993).

- Because a count of the indictment stated that defendant committed obstruction "by offering or doing violence" to an officer "by hitting him on his face," the count charged both means of committing obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 and the court did not err in charging both means to the jury. Hambrick v. State, 242 Ga. App. 550, 529 S.E.2d 381 (2000).

In defendant's trial for felony obstruction of an officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, the state did not introduce evidence that the defendant did violence to the officer on the date in question other than by striking the officer with a motor vehicle and, as such, no due process violation occurred in the giving of the jury instructions because there was no reasonable probability that the jury convicted the defendant for obstructing the police officer in a manner not specified in the indictment. Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga. App. 834, 717 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in limiting the recharge of the jury to the statutory definition of "obstruction" rather than giving a more comprehensive instruction as there was no indication that the jury was confused or left with an erroneous impression of the law. Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 571 S.E.2d 456 (2002).

- When defendant contended that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the felony offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, thereby precluding defendant's counsel from arguing to the jury the absence of the elements of the offense, and when the record indicated that the trial court fully instructed the jury on the misdemeanor grade of the offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, since the defendant was not accused of committing the felony offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, it was unnecessary to so charge the jury. Williams v. State, 192 Ga. App. 350, 385 S.E.2d 28 (1989).

When the defendant was not indicted nor tried for felony obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, and there was no evidence to support such a charge in law or in fact, the trial court did not err in refusing to deny defendant's request to give a charge thereon. Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 474 S.E.2d 708 (1996); Stewart v. State, 243 Ga. App. 860, 534 S.E.2d 544 (2000).

- Given that the state adduced sufficient evidence establishing all the elements of the offense of felony obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request to charge on the lesser-included offense of reckless conduct. Helton v. State, 284 Ga. App. 777, 644 S.E.2d 896 (2007).

- Trial court did not err in the court's charge on felony obstruction of an officer merely because the court also included the elements of misdemeanor obstruction as the judge was authorized to charge on a lesser crime if that was included in the indictment or accusation, and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer was a lesser included offense of the indicted offense of felony obstruction. Pugh v. State, 280 Ga. App. 137, 633 S.E.2d 439 (2006).

Charge on the right to resist an unlawful arrest was not required since the jury was instructed, among other things, that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer was acting in the lawful discharge of official duties. Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 774, 525 S.E.2d 154 (1999), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

On appeal from convictions entered against the defendant for misdemeanor battery on a police officer, and misdemeanor obstruction of that officer entered against the defendant's parent, a charge that one could resist an unlawful arrest with reasonably necessary force was not required in either case as such was covered by the charge on the elements of the offense; moreover, as to the battery charge, because the defendant testified to never touching the officer, there was no requirement to charge on this affirmative defense. Curtis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 298, 645 S.E.2d 705 (2007), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

- Trial court properly refused to give a jury instruction that was an incorrect statement of the law. Forcible resistance was not required in a misdemeanor obstruction of an officer case. Wilcox v. State, 300 Ga. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 108 (2009).

- In a prosecution for obstructing a law enforcement officer, it was reversible error for the trial court to give the jury a definition of "offering violence" containing a reference to threats of violence since there was no evidence that defendant used verbal threats. Strobhert v. State, 241 Ga. App. 354, 526 S.E.2d 863 (1999).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request to charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction as a lesser included offense of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b), because such a charge was not warranted by the evidence; the evidence plainly showed the completion of the greater offense, obstruction that involved "offering or doing violence" to an officer. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011).

Trial court did not err by rejecting the defendant's written request for a jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer as a lesser included offense of felony obstruction because the evidence established that the defendant committed felony obstruction or no crime at all, thus, there was no evidentiary basis for the charge on the lesser included offense. Watson v. State, 328 Ga. App. 832, 763 S.E.2d 122 (2014).

- Because the defendant was neither indicted nor tried for felony obstruction of justice, the court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge that an accomplice was the one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or an accessory before the fact; moreover, the court's own charge, which included pattern charges on parties to a crime, knowledge, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and mere association with others committing a crime, substantially covered the same legal principles as the requested charge. Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 629 S.E.2d 438 (2006).

In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not deficient in not requesting jury charges on the law of abandonment and accessory after-the-fact as there was no evidence that the defendant abandoned the crime before an overt act occurred or that the defendant was an accessory after the fact rather than a party to the robbery. Bihlear v. State, 295 Ga. App. 486, 672 S.E.2d 459 (2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that "Something more than mere disagreement or remonstrance must be shown." The charge as a whole adequately covered the principle of law and allowed the defendant to argue that the defendant should have been acquitted because the state proved only disagreement or remonstrance. Kendrick v. State, 324 Ga. App. 45, 749 S.E.2d 45 (2013).

Requested jury instruction on an unlawful arrest claim incorrectly stated the law; a statement that a detainee was not required to respond to an officer's questions was contrary to Georgia law as failure to identify oneself could constitute obstruction. Williams v. Hudson, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2015)(Unpublished).

Because the defendant did not admit to using any force against the officers, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the defendant's allegedly justified use of reasonable force to resist the defendant's arrest, and the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request for such an instruction. Haygood v. State, 338 Ga. App. 189, 789 S.E.2d 404 (2016).

- Because trial counsel made a reasonable decision to pursue an all-or-nothing defense strategy based on counsel's review of the evidence, the appellate court found no merit in the defendant's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance due to failure to request a charge on misdemeanor obstruction as a lesser included offense of felony obstruction of an officer. Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 732 S.E.2d 456 (2012).

- Because the defendant decided to pursue an "all or nothing" defense, the trial court did not err in making the decision to not charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction, sua sponte, as such would have undermined that defense. Owens v. State, 288 Ga. App. 771, 655 S.E.2d 244 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 274 (Ga. 2008).

Since the evidence showed completion of the greater offense of felony obstruction, the trial court did not err in failing to charge on misdemeanor obstruction as a lesser included offense. Carlson v. State, 329 Ga. App. 309, 764 S.E.2d 890 (2014).

- Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to a jury charge on the entire obstruction code section, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, although there was no evidence that the defendant offered or threatened violence. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence in light of the charges in the indictment. Williams v. State, 309 Ga. App. 688, 710 S.E.2d 884 (2011).

- Trial court did not err in failing to grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor's allegedly impermissible argument because the trial court immediately reminded the jury of the limited purpose for which the jury could consider the other acts evidence regarding two earlier instances in which the defendant obstructed a law enforcement officer and that reminder supplemented the other points in the trial when the trial court instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of the other acts evidence. Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 793 S.E.2d 156 (2016).

- Whether actions hinder or impede officers in carrying out assigned duties is for jury determination. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975).

Given the sheriff's uncontradicted statement that the sheriff ordered the streets cleared in the face of large scale rioting, and the evidence that the arrestees - later plaintiffs in a civil rights action - were among those who refused to obey the order and were arrested for obstructing the efforts of police officers to restore order, a jury issue was presented on whether their conduct hindered or impeded the sheriff in the lawful discharge of the sheriff's official duties. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985).

Since the defendant had been indicted for felony obstruction of an officer, the trial court properly let the case go to the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in light of evidence demonstrating that the defendant did no more than grab the officer's arm and say "no" as the officer tried to arrest the defendant's spouse and put that spouse in a patrol car. Williams v. State, 196 Ga. App. 154, 395 S.E.2d 399 (1990).

Whether or not the evidence established that actions taken by the defendant hindered or obstructed the officer in making the arrest is for the jury to decide. Cason v. State, 197 Ga. App. 308, 398 S.E.2d 292 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992).

In a case involving charges of obstruction of an officer and attempting to elude, a motion for directed verdict was properly denied where the officer was investigating the defendant for driving under the influence and the defendant did not respond to the officer's orders and forced the officer to get a warrant to effectuate an arrest. Reed v. State, 205 Ga. App. 209, 422 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, No. S92C1446, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 865 (1992).

Although the defendant's testimony deviated significantly from the officers', such differences were matters for the jury to resolve. Jones v. State, 242 Ga. App. 357, 529 S.E.2d 644 (2000).

Maintenance of records by Georgia Crime Information Center regarding violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. See 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-33.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Obstructing Justice, § 52 et seq.

Excessive Force by Police Officer, 21 POF3d 685.

- 67 C.J.S., Obstructing Justice or Governmental Administration, §§ 4, 18.

- Dispute over custody as affecting charge of obstructing or resisting arrest, 3 A.L.R. 1290.

Scienter as element of offense of assaulting, resisting, or impeding federal officer [18 USC § 111], 10 A.L.R.3d 833.

Criminal liability for obstructing process as affected by invalidity or irregularity of the process, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146.

What constitutes obstructing or resisting an officer, in the absence of actual force, 44 A.L.R.3d 1018.

Right to resist excessive force used in accomplishing lawful arrest, 77 A.L.R.3d 281.

Use of citizens' band (CB) radios as violation of state law, 87 A.L.R.3d 83.

Performance of public duty by off-duty police officer acting as private security guard, 65 A.L.R.5th 623.

What constitutes obstructing or resisting officer, in absence of actual force, 66 A.L.R.5th 397.

Defenses to state obstruction of justice charge relating to interfering with criminal investigation or judicial proceeding, 87 A.L.R.5th 597.

Criminal and civil liability of civilians and police officers concerning recording of police actions, 84 A.L.R.6th 89.