2012 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 52 - Civil Actions
Chapter 926 - Statute of Limitations
Section 52-584 - Limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice.

No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.

(1949 Rev., S. 8324; 1957, P.A. 467; 1969, P.A. 401, S. 2.)

History: 1969 act changed deadline for bringing action from one year to two years from date injury is first sustained or discovered or should have been discovered, effective October 1, 1969, and applicable to injuries first sustained on or after that date.

See Sec. 52-190a re automatic ninety-day extension to allow reasonable inquiry in malpractice action.

See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.

See Sec. 52-594 re time limits for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to representatives of a deceased person.

Cited. 1 CA 7; Id., 123; Id., 652. Provides no exceptions for minors or insane persons. 3 CA 602. Cited. 6 CA 212. Cited. 11 CA 156. Cited. 14 CA 178. Cited. 16 CA 108. Cited. 18 CA 515. Cited. 19 CA 16. Cited. 21 CA 524. Cited. 22 CA 610. Cited. 24 CA 239. Cited. 25 CA 665. Cited. 29 CA 392. Cited. 31 CA 235; Id., 569. Cited. 32 CA 187; Id., 205. Cited. 33 CA 6; Id., 378; Id., 422; Id., 673. Cited. 34 CA 395. Cited. 38 CA 458; Id., 829. Cited. 42 CA 324; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 236. Cited. 43 CA 397. Cited. 45 CA 775. Cited. 46 CA 712. The continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply after plaintiff discovers the harm. 59 CA 311. Service of prejudgment remedy document did not toll the running of section, even though contained the words “the institution of this action” and included unsigned proposed writ of summons and complaint, since unsigned writ and complaint does not have effect of commencing a civil action. 61 CA 234. Court declined to adopt rule that section is tolled when prejudgment remedy documents are served. Id. Where plaintiff’s suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity, the two-year statute of limitations applies in subsequent suit against the state and the exception under Sec. 52-593 for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. Statute of limitations not tolled by continuous course of conduct doctrine where pathology group failed to diagnose plaintiff’s disease, because to expect pathology group to provide follow-up treatment or to instruct patient on follow-up care after a negative diagnosis when there is no awareness that the diagnosis is wrong and there is no ongoing relationship is beyond the expectation of public policy. 66 CA 518. Because plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to demonstrate that defendant physician had an awareness of risk to plaintiff subsequent to the surgical sterilization procedure, plaintiff could not establish that defendant had a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute. 67 CA 565. Although genuine issue of material fact existed re defendant’s initial alleged negligence, trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant physician was aware of a risk to plaintiff that would have triggered a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute. Id., 576. Statutes of limitation are not tolled by an automatic bankruptcy stay; pursuant to federal law, if the statute of limitations expires during the automatic bankruptcy stay, plaintiff has thirty days from notice of termination or expiration of the stay within which to commence an action. 68 CA 79. Where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff’s property as belonging to another, the case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore the statute of limitations in this section applies rather than the three-year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. 79 CA 290. Doctrines of continuous treatment and continuing course of conduct apply, as a matter of law, only to three-year limitation period and do not apply to toll time period for discovery portion of statute. 82 CA 396. Claim cast in contractual language subject to three-year period of statute because, in light of noneconomic relief sought, it more closely resembles claim based on tortious conduct arising out of negligent performance or nonperformance of contractual duty than claim for breach of contract. 84 CA 1. Sheriff’s attempt to serve defendant with process before he fled and subsequent service in defendant’s mailbox were sufficient to constitute good faith efforts at compliance when defendant was clearly evading service. 93 CA 76.

Cited. 1 CS 142. Includes personal injuries whether or not due to negligence, citing 119 Conn. 500, 507. 3 CS 417. Injury means physical injury. 4 CS 293. Action for malpractice whether founded on tort or contract must be brought within one year. 6 CS 92; but see 11 CS 180. Cited. 8 CS 93; 9 CS 312. Cause of action otherwise barred by statute of limitations is not saved because it is asserted as a counterclaim. Id., 387. Cited. 10 CS 6. Statute should not be passed upon by demurrer unless matters in avoidance of it have been voluntarily inserted in the complaint. Id., 419; 17 CS 1. Cited. 11 CS 119. This section carves out an action ex contractu resulting from tortious or negligent conduct which caused a breach of contract. 12 CS 286. Withholding service for the purpose of allowing insurance company to adjust claim will not estop the statute from tolling if the insurance company is not a party defendant. 14 CS 418. Legal damage and apparent damage distinguished. Id., 464. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution is not limited by this section but by Sec. 52-577. 15 CS 434. Cited. 17 CS 62. See note to Sec. 52-577. Where amendment to complaint made more than two years after accident was based on nuisance, it was not barred since it is a question of fact whether nuisance resulted from positive act or negligence. Id., 114; 20 CS 36. Cited. 18 CS 225. Section controls limitation on action for damage to plaintiff’s fence caused by the crumpling of a stone ledge on defendant’s property near the common boundary. Id., 308. Former statute: Claimed negligence against manufacturer from expulsion of automobile tire while being mounted on rim held barred by statute because manufacture took place more than a year before action was begun; former statute compared. 19 CS 293. Defendant employer and its insurer not required to intervene within the one-year period. 20 CS 31. Prior statute compared. Id., 34. When wrong sued upon consists of continuing course of conduct, statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed. 22 CS 46. The statute of limitations bars the plaintiff from amending his complaint in a personal injury action to add a claim for property damage more than one year after the collision. Id., 472. Where the action is seasonably brought so far as this section is concerned, the legislature did not intend that this section qualify the right of the employee under Sec. 31-293 to join as a plaintiff within thirty days thereafter. 23 CS 106. Counterclaim more than a year after the occurrence is barred unless it may be allowed under the exception. Held that pleadings had been finally closed on the filing of a reply when they terminated in an issue of fact decisive of the merits of the case. That the court might reopen the pleadings at any time to permit amendment did not mean that they were not closed within the intendment of the statute. Id., 139. Cited. Id., 367. Cited. 24 CS 321. Where complaint is broad enough to permit proof of causes in tort and contract, demurrer merely reaching tort action is insufficient. Id., 459. Where plaintiffs alleged only negligence in their complaint, their motion to amend by charging defendant with wanton misconduct stated a new cause of action and could not be granted since the statute of limitations had run. 25 CS 363. This section does not apply to the “Dog Injury” statute, which is governed by Sec. 52-577. 26 CS 294. Impleading under Sec. 52-102a barred by statute of limitations. 27 CS 46. Motion to amend complaint to expand or amplify original allegations does not change cause of action and is not barred by statute of limitations. Id., 60. Cited. 28 CS 162. Where one year period with respect to antemortem injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative under Sec. 52-594 had year from date of death to institute action. Id., 461. Ordinarily, statute of limitations does not commence to run against defendant (third party plaintiff) and in favor of third-party defendant until judgment has been entered against defendant. 29 CS 9. Statute of limitation suspended between decedent’s death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate. Id., 246. Cited. Id. The time does not begin to run in a case involving a failure to warn of a foreign object in a patient’s body until the object is discovered, unless reasonable diligence would have uncovered it earlier. 32 CS 118. Cited. 34 CS 22. Provisions of this section should not be extended to allow codefendant to interpose cross claim when statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id., 247. Statute of limitation is tolled upon the death of a tortfeasor until a fiduciary of his estate is properly appointed and qualified. 36 CS 121. Cited. Id., 269. Cited. 37 CS 735; Id., 899. Cited. 38 CS 318. Cited. 40 CS 266. Cited. 42 CS 187. Cited. 44 CS 148; Id., 527. Cited. 45 CS 136. Continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply to the two-year limitation. Term “injury” in the statute requires an actionable harm. Id., 154. Plaintiff claim fails to toll the statute; defendant’s assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this case. 46 CS 386. Plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence, occurring 21 years before filing of suit, made against named defendant for failure to have valid certificate of occupancy or to design, construct, operate or properly maintain property in accordance with building and fire codes, were not barred as untimely by tort statute of limitations so as to warrant granting of defendants’ motion to strike those counts so alleging; facts demonstrated continuous course of conduct that tolled time limitations of section. 50 CS 28. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.

Action based on claim physician broke contract to achieve certain result from operation is not malpractice action. Malpractice defined. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135. Cause of action brought under Sec. 52-572 not governed by one-year limitation imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379. A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, conduct, representations or fraud from asserting the bar of the statute; provided the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence upon which the judge can base such a finding. Id., 686, 689. In a small claims action, according to the Practice Book, sections 900, 901, the statute of limitation stops running when the case is entered in court even though the service of notice is not made within the statutory period. Id., 690, 697. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 488. Where pleadings showed plaintiffs knew at date of accident they had substantial injuries, they had not met burden of demonstrating an exception to usual running of this statute and defendant’s motion for summary judgment was correctly granted. Id., 85. Defendant insurer’s discussions of settlement did not estop it from pleading this statute as defense to plaintiff’s action where there was no fraud on its part and final offer had been made four months before statute barred action. Id., 127. When defendant accepted plaintiff’s offer of settlement of her cause of action for personal injuries, statute became inoperative as defense as contract had been made between the parties. Id., 274.