Matter of the Adoption of BGH
Annotate this Case
Matter of the Adoption of BGH
1996 WY 172
930 P.2d 371
Case Number: C-95-14
Decided: 12/23/1996
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BGH, a Minor: GWJ,
Appellant,
v.
MH and MWH and MDH and BGH,
Appellees.
Appeal
from the District Court of Lincoln County. The Honorable John D. Troughton,
Judge.
Representing
Appellant: LaVoy O. Taylor, Cokeville, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee MH: James E. Phillips of Phillips &
Lancaster, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming.
Representing Appellees MWH
and MDH: F.L. Thomas, Jr., Kemmerer, Wyoming.
Guardian ad
Litem for BGH: Gerald L. Goulding, Afton, Wyoming.
Before TAYLOR,
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN *, and LEHMAN, JJ.
* Chief
Justice at time of oral argument
THOMAS, Justice.
[¶1] The focal question in this
case is whether the statutes relating to the termination of parental rights,
WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1994), must be invoked in order to terminate the
rights of a biological father instead of the statutory grounds provided in an
adoption proceeding brought pursuant to WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116 (1988).
There are two collateral issues relating to the trial court's application of
WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c): First, whether the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion when it found that the biological father "evidenced an interest in,"
but failed to evidence "responsibility for the child" within the requisite
statutory time frame; and second, whether the trial court applied the "best
interests * * * of the child" factor to the exclusion of other statutory
factors. The final claim of error asserts gender bias in the trial court's
decision that violated the rights of the biological father and his child to
equal protection of the law afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. We hold the trial court correctly invoked the
adoption statutes in this instance, and no other error, as claimed by the
biological father, is present in the record. The Final Decree of Adoption is
affirmed.
[¶2] In his Brief of
Appellant, GWJ, the biological father, states the issues as
follows:
Did
the Court abuse its discretion when it held the Appellant did assert an interest
in, but did not assert responsibility for Baby Girl [H] within
thirty (30) days after Baby Girl [H]'s birth?
Did the Court error in
applying W.S. Ann. § 1-22-108, by giving it preference over W.S. Ann. § 14-2-401
[sic] thru § 14-2-120?
Did the Court error in applying the "best
interest" test in this case in deciding to grant the adoption and terminating
the Appellant's parental rights?
Did the District Court violate the
Appellant, [GWJ]'s and the Appellee, Baby Girl [H]'s equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when it terminated the Appellant's
parental rights by granting the adoption of Baby Girl [H]?
The Brief of Appellees, MWH and MDH (Petitioners to adopt), in which the
natural mother MH, joins, frames the issues before the court in this way:
I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it held that within 30
days after receiving notice of the birth of BGH, the putative father, GWJ,
evidenced an interest in, but did not evidence responsibility for the child?
II. Did the District Court err in applying the adoption statutes
(W.S. 1-22-101 thru 1-22-116) rather than the paternity statutes (W.S. 14-2-101
thru 14-2-120)?
III. Did the District Court err in applying the
"best interest of the child" test?
IV. Did the District
Court violate GWJ's and BGH's right to the equal protection of the laws under
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
In the Brief of Baby Girl [H], Filing by Her Guardian Ad Litem, a
third version of the issues is stated:
(1)
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in making its factual conclusion
that [GWJ] did not "evidence... responsibility for the child within thirty (30)
days after receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the child...."
under W.S. 1-22-108(c)(ii)? (Unless otherwise cited all statutory references are
to the Wyoming Statutes.
(2) Did the District Court err in determining
that 1-22-108 should be applied in this case?
(3) Did the District Court
err in determining that it should consider the "best interests and welfare of
the child" (1-22-108(c)(iv)) in deciding whether to grant the adoption?
(4) In granting the adoption, did the District Court violate [GWJ]'s and
Baby Girl [H]'s right to equal protection under the laws pursuant to the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Wyoming
Constitution?
[¶3] GWJ and MH met when they were both seventeen, and they soon became sexually intimate. In late June or early July 1994, MH informed GWJ she was pregnant. GWJ indicated his preference that MH give birth to, and care for, the baby. He did not want anyone else raising his child and preferred that MH have an abortion rather than give the baby up for adoption.
[¶4] At about the
third month of her pregnancy, GWJ proposed marriage to MH, and later, gave her
an engagement ring. During their engagement, MH furnished money to GWJ, but he
did not give her any money. GWJ did not assume any financial responsibility for
MH or offer any support. Once, GWJ did take MH to the doctor, and he gave her a
baby seat and clothes for the baby. In all other instances, MH's foster mother
took her to medical appointments and generally provided all other care and
assistance. When she was approximately five months pregnant, MH was seriously
injured in a one-car accident in which GWJ was the driver. She was hospitalized
for two weeks, and during that period, the engagement was terminated. GWJ and MH
never married, and the State of Utah paid for prenatal care for MH. Even though
GWJ was employed, he did not contribute to the care or support of MH or the
unborn child.
[¶5] MH
chose to deliver the baby in Wyoming because she believed an adoption could be
accomplished here without the consent of GWJ. MH had decided to give the baby to
MWH and MDH for adoption. GWJ learned of the birth of BGH from the attorney for
MWH and MDH when he received a letter requesting his consent for adoption.
Subsequently, GWJ employed an attorney and filed a paternity action pursuant to
WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120. GWJ also contested the adoption. He participated
in a DNA test, for which he paid the expense of $ 575. The result of the test
demonstrated he was the biological father at a 99.999% probability level. GWJ
also furnished his bedroom in his parent's home with a crib, and he provided
toys, clothes, and pictures. Hearings in the matter were conducted by the
district court on May 1, 1995 and July 10, 1995, during which evidence was
presented in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c). Later, the court entered
a Final Decree of Adoption terminating the parental rights of MH and GWJ and
granted the petition for adoption filed by MWH and MDH. GWJ has appealed from
that Final Decree of Adoption.
[¶6] The threshold claim of error
asserted by GWJ is that the district court erred in invoking the adoption
statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116, and failed to apply the provisions of
the paternity statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120. GWJ contends, once he
filed an action to establish his paternity, his parental rights could be
terminated only by proceeding under WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309 (1994)1 n1 and could not be terminated as
provided in WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108. In arguing this point, GWJ relies upon
language from Matter of Adoption of
GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 987 (Wyo. 1986), where we said: "But the more
liberal adoption test of § 1-22-108 applies to only those adoptions contested by
putative fathers who have already shown their lack of concern for their children
by failing to establish legal paternity." GWJ contends he has shown concern for
his baby daughter by endeavoring to establish his paternity, and for that
reason, the paternity statutes must govern over the adoption statutes.
[¶7] The resolution of this question
flows by analogy from GSD. There, we considered an assertion by a
father seeking adoption of a stepdaughter that a putative father had no standing
because he had failed to establish his paternity as required by WYO. STAT. §
14-2-105. We held the special legislation represented by the adoption statute
controlled over the general rules relating to establishment of paternity, and
the putative father had standing in the adoption proceeding. The conclusion that
must be drawn from GSD is that the adoption statutes control over the
more general provisions found in the paternity statutes. In addition to
providing for the termination of parental rights for the reasons articulated in
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309, the legislature has provided for the termination of
parental rights through the adoption procedure.
[¶8] There was no necessity to establish
GWJ's paternity because all parties agreed that he was the natural father,
therefore, the question of paternity was not an issue in the case. Had paternity
been contested, GWJ would have met the definition of a putative father
articulated in WYO. STAT. § 1-22-101(a)(iv), as "the alleged or reputed father
of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not the paternity rights and
obligations of the father have been judicially determined * * *." Reliance upon
GSD by GWJ is misplaced.
[¶9] In his first and third issues, GWJ
contends the district court did not properly apply WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c). He
argues the district court committed an abuse of discretion in its application of
sub-paragraph (ii) when it found he had asserted an interest in the child, but
he had not accepted responsibility for the child. GWJ contends his acceptance of
responsibility for BGH was demonstrated by filing his Petition to Establish
Paternity. He notes the language of WYO. STAT. § 14-2-113(c) that "the judgment
or order may direct the father to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's
pregnancy and confinement", and he asserts that made him a responsible party as
a matter of law.
[¶10]
Our holding, that this case is controlled by the adoption statutes and is
not impacted by the statutes relating to paternity, causes GWJ's analysis of
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-113(c) to be inapt. The applicable statute is WYO. STAT. §
1-22-108(c) (emphasis added), which requires that:
(c) If the putative father files and serves his objections to the petition to adopt as provided in subsection (b) of this section, and appears at the hearing to acknowledge his paternity of the child, the court shall hear the evidence in support of the petition to adopt and in support of the objection to the petition and shall then determine whether:
(i) The putative father's claim to paternity of the child is established;
(ii)
The putative father having knowledge of the birth or pending birth of the child
has evidenced an interest in and responsibility for the child within thirty (30)
days after receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the
child;
(iii) The putative father's objections to the petition to adopt are
valid; and
(iv) The best interests and welfare of the child will be
served by granting the putative father's claim to paternity or by allowing the
petition to adopt.
[¶11]
The unanimous decision in GSD,
716 P.2d at 987, confirms the requirement that the district court must "base its
decision on the manner in which the [four] factors balance." Because the
decision must be the product of a balancing of these factors, none is entitled
to more weight than any other. Our decision regarding GWJ's claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in applying WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c) and in turning only to the "best
interests test" must be premised on our review of the manner in which the
district court weighed those four factors.
[¶12]
First, there is no question with respect to the establishment of GWJ's
claim to paternity. When MH identified GWJ as the biological father, and when
the appellant acknowledged BGH to be his child, a prima facie case of
his claim to paternity was established. As articulated in WYO. STAT. §
1-22-108(d), he had a right to assert his paternity in the adoption proceeding
because he was known and identified by MH as the natural father, and he
acknowledged the child as his by affirmatively asserting paternity. Going even
further, the district court proceeded to obtain DNA testing that established the
probability of GWJ's paternity at a level of 99.999%. The district court
recognized GWJ had established his paternity of the child for purposes of the
proceeding, and that factor weighed in his favor.
[¶13]
Turning to the second factor, the argument of GWJ rests upon application
of the phrase "has evidenced an interest in and responsibility for the child."
His position is that he had evidenced an interest in his daughter,
as the trial court found, but he also evidenced responsibility for her. The
relevant findings articulated by the court in its decision letter (emphasis
added) are:
1. [MH] is not only the most sensible and mature of the two biological
parents, but in addition she is the most credible. All conflicts between her
testimony and the testimony of [GWJ] are resolved in favor of [MH]. The Court
believes her testimony and finds the conflicting testimony of [GWJ] to be
self-serving.
* * *
3. [GWJ] learned of the
pending birth of the child in late June or early July, 1994. ***
* * *
In October, 1994, [GWJ] gave [MH] an [engagement] ring;
but [GWJ] did not assume financial responsibility for either [MH] or his
child. To the contrary, [MH] gave [GWJ] money.
In
October, 1994, [GWJ] took [MH] to the doctor; and just prior to their break-up,
he gave [MH] a babyseat and some clothes for the child. The foster mother [of
MH] transported [MH] to all other doctor appointments; and in general, provided
all other care, aid and assistance.
* * *
The
parties never married; the State of Utah paid for the prenatal care of
[MH] and her child; and, although gainfully employed, [GWJ] did not contribute
to the care or support of either [MH] or his unborn child.
From these facts, the Court finds and concludes that within 30 days after
receiving notice of the pending birth of the child, [GWJ] "evidenced an interest
in" the mother; and collaterally, the child; and although he acknowledged that
he was the father, he did not "evidence ... responsibility for the child".
4. * * *
After the baby was born, [GWJ] learned
from the attorney for the adoptive parents of the birth of the child as well as
the pending adoption.
As a consequence, [GWJ] hired an attorney,
commenced a paternity action and contested the adoption. In addition, he paid
for DNA testing, visited the child and prepared living quarters for the child in
his home, including the installation of a crib. However, [GWJ] has not
contributed to the support of the child and he has not paid, nor arranged to
pay, for the delivery and postnatal medical care of the child.
From these facts, the Court finds and concludes that within 30
days after receiving notice of the birth of the child, [GWJ] "evidenced an
interest in ... the child".
By demanding custody of the
child, he has demonstrated that he is willing to assume "responsibility" for the
child; but he has not yet "evidenced" such responsibility by the payment of
current medical bills, support and maintenance.
* *
*
6. * * *
Although [GWJ] acknowledges his legal
responsibility for the child he has not yet discharged this responsibility in
any meaningful fashion. For example, he acknowledges that he is legally
responsible for support but he has paid none. He acknowledges he is responsible
for medical care but he has not provided any. He installs a crib in his bedroom,
together with children's pictures, but he provided no home for the child when it
was being carried by its mother. [GWJ] hires a lawyer to file a paternity action
and to contest adoption, but he has nothing to spare for the support and
maintenance of the child.
In short, [GWJ] has evidenced his
interest in protecting his status as a father, but he has not evidenced his
responsibility as a father. The Court finds and concludes that [GWJ] has
carefully done those things which protected his own rights and interest but he
has not yet assumed or discharged the correlative responsibilities to the child
which accompanies those rights.
In summary, the factors listed in W.S. 1-22-108 to be balanced by the Court
weigh heavily in favor of the adoptive parents. [GWJ] is the biological father
of Baby Girl [H]; he has evidenced an interest in the child; and he has made
himself legally responsible for the child; but all other factors weigh in favor
of the adoption. [GWJ] has not yet discharged his legal responsibility in any
significant or material respect, he has no valid objections to the adoption and
the best interest and welfare of the child will be served by the adoption.
[¶14]
These findings are supported by GWJ's testimony in the record. He agreed
he had not paid for any health care for MH, and he had made no offer of support
or actual payment of support to MWH and MDH, the adoptive parents. He did assert
a willingness to pay the medical expenses for BGH's birth if the adoption were
unsuccessful.
[¶15]
In GSD, 716 P.2d at 988 (emphasis added), we articulated principles
applicable to contested adoptions saying:
Several principles which we have applied to contested adoptions under § 1-22-110 should apply equally under § 1-22-108. First,
"'Adoption statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is
against a nonconsenting parent and every reasonable intendment is made in favor
of that parent's claims.'
"Such strict construction is
mandated by the fact that parental rights are fundamental rights." (Citations
omitted.) Matter of Adoption of CCT, [ Wyo., 640 P.2d 73], supra, at
74-75 [(1982)], quoting Matter of Adoption of
Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 485 (1976).
Second, a district court's factual determinations in a contested adoption can be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion.
"'A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is
whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse
of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under
the circumstances.'" Matter of Adoption of
CCT, supra, 640 P.2d at 76, quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838
(1980).
Our determination of whether the district court construed WYO. STAT. §
1-22-108, relating to whether GWJ evidenced responsibility for BGH within thirty
days after he received notice of her pending birth or of her birth, must comport
with these principles.
[¶16]
GWJ relied upon some nine pages from the trial transcript which are
advanced to show he loves his child and has accepted responsibility commensurate
with his obligation owed to the child even before her birth. GWJ states he has
made monthly payments to the State of Utah for MH's medical bills for the injury
she sustained in the car accident in which he was the driver. He provided baby
clothes and a car seat for BGH. He furnished his bedroom with a crib, a baby
bath, and pictures, including a picture of Jesus. He also obtained baby clothes
and stuffed animals. He testified he paid $ 575 for the DNA testing. He made
arrangements for child care for BGH while he was at work, and he filed an
acknowledgment of paternity in Utah and a paternity action in Wyoming.
[¶17]
GWJ quotes Matter of Adoption of
BBC, 831 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1992), for the proposition that an adoption
cannot proceed when a father who does not consent to the adoption shows
"interest in and responsibility for" the child. We distinguish
BBC on its facts. There the father and mother lived together for a
period of time, and the mother was supported, during her pregnancy, by the
payment of $ 200 per week into a joint checking account from which she paid some
of the doctor bills for prenatal care. Even though BBC's mother did not want to
resume the relationship with the father after it was terminated, the father
agreed to pay for the birth and provide child support if she kept the baby. The
instant case is in contrast because GWJ did not pay for any prenatal bills or
provide any meaningful support.
[¶18]
Our examination of this record leads to an ineluctable conclusion, and we
so hold, that the district court reasonably could conclude, as it did, that GWJ
evidenced an interest in BGH and manifested a willingness to assume
responsibility for BGH. This record is equally clear GWJ did not "evidence * * *
responsibility * * *" for BGH either by providing support and payment of medical
bills for MH during her pregnancy and delivery, or the support and payment of
any bills for BGH within thirty days after he received notice of the pending
birth or within thirty days after her birth. The district court aptly
stated, "[GWJ] protected his own rights and interests [as a father] but he has
not yet assumed or discharged the correlative responsibilities to BGH which
accompanies those rights." We hold the statutory language, "evidenced an
interest in and responsibility for the child" is a unitary concept encompassing
both factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion because it
reasonably could conclude GWJ did not evidence responsibility for BGH. The
second factor is to be weighed in favor of MWH and MDH.
[¶19]
Pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c)(iii), the district court was
required to determine whether GWJ's objections to the Petition to Adopt were
valid and to then weigh such objections. The only factual objection asserted by
GWJ, not discussed elsewhere in this opinion, is his objection to the fitness of
the adoptive mother, MDH. In its opinion letter, the district court addressed
that objection and said:
b. [GWJ] objects to the fitness of [MDH] as a parent. The Court adopts the
response of the guardian ad litem:
[Counsel for GWJ] argues that "the IQ of [MDH] was about 70. With this in
mind it is probable that the child will be much more intelligent than the
adoptive mother and able to maneuver the mother at will in later years. Further,
putting the child in the care of a person with an IQ of 70 could be dangerous to
the child".
This is [GWJ]'s only factual objection to the
adoption. [Counsel for GWJ] examined [MDH] at some length about her capabilities
and handicaps during the hearing on July 10, 1995. That testimony in and of
itself proves by a preponderance of the evidence that this objection is not
valid. [MDH]'s measured and clear responses demonstrated her considerable mental
ability regardless of her tested IQ. Even [Counsel for GWJ] could not "maneuver
[this] mother at will". . . . [The baby] is thriving under [MDH]'s care. She is
not in danger. In fact, the testimony is that other families in Kemmerer have
hired [MDH] to care for their children.
In future years when the
child is beset with problems at school or with friends or with any of the other
seemingly insurmountable obstacles of childhood, she will go to [MDH] for
comfort and counsel. [MDH] will take the child in her arms and explain, like all
mother's do, that problems can be overcome; that we can become better and
stronger from our challenges. There will be no doubt in this child's mind that
her mother knows whereof she speaks.
[¶20]
A review of the testimony in the record from MDH, both on direct
examination and cross-examination, discloses she could hold her own and
possessed parenting skills. She testified she had worked for a computer company,
but she lost her job when the company went out of business. Then she began to
care for two little boys, ages three and six, whose parents were going through a
divorce. She stated she went through a lot with them, listening to their
problems and dealing with them as a caretaker. She did that part-time at first,
caring for them between the time the mother went to work and the father came
home. She was the caretaker on a full-time basis when the mother went to work
full time after the divorce. She did that for about three and one-half years,
until the mother remarried. In other testimony on the record, MDH exhibited the
ability to reason, was contemplative, responsive, and logical. On
cross-examination, she admitted she was nervous, but counsel for GWJ could not
manipulate her. The record justifies the conclusion that the trial court
reasonably could conclude as it did that GWJ's objection to the fitness of
MDH as a parent was not valid. Since no valid objections existed for the
district court to weigh in reaching its decision as to the adoption, factor
three weighed in favor of MWH and MDH.
[¶21]
A separate objection to the analysis by the district court of the
evidence in light of WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c) invokes the fourth factor. GWJ
argues the district court erred because it determined the "best interests" of
the child would be served by the adoption. The essence of this argument is that
the district court considered only "the best interests" of the child in its
determination and ignored the other factors. In making this argument, GWJ cites
BBC; John and Jane Doe v. Otakar Kirchner [Doe v. Kirchner], 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995),2 citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); and John Doe and
Jane Doe [Petition of Doe], 159 Ill. 2d 347, 638 N.E.2d 181, 202
Ill. Dec. 535 (Ill. 1994).
[¶22]
Each of the cases invoked by GWJ is distinguishable. In BBC, we
held that the first three factors-paternity, evidence of "interest in and
responsibility for" the child, and the validity of the biological father's
objections-weighed in favor of the biological father. Our holding was that the
"best interests of the child" factor was outweighed by the other three factors.
On the contrary, three factors-evidence of "interest in and responsibility for"
the child, validity of the biological father's objections, and "best interests
of the child"-all weigh in favor of MWH and MDH in this case. No abuse of
discretion can be found in the trial court's conclusion that these three factors
suffice to outweigh the biological father's claim to paternity of the child.
[¶23]
Petition of Doe, relied upon by GWJ, comes from the Supreme
Court of Illinois. Doe v. Kirchner (O'Connell v. Kirchner) is a
dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor to a denial of an application for stay.
GWJ quotes from both to support his assertion that the child's "best interest"
cannot justify termination of parental rights when the parent has not been found
unfit. We are not persuaded by this argument since both quotations are found in
a concurring or dissenting opinion, and as such, afford no precedential value.
The facts are also vastly different. In Petition of Doe, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held there was insufficient evidence that the father had not
shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first thirty days
of the child's birth because he was told the child had died subsequent to birth.
His attempts to locate the child were blocked by the mother, and the adoptive
parents failed to make an appropriate effort to ascertain the name or address of
the biological father even though the mother knew his identity. The court
properly held that, in such an instance, the father's parental interest was
improperly terminated, and there was no occasion to rely upon the best interest
of the child.
[¶24]
In the case before us, the district court also addressed the best
interests of BGH in its decision letter:
[MR] testified she believed it would be better for her child to be with [MWH
and MDH] than to be with either the father or her. However, she also testified
that she believed that she would be a better parent than [GWJ].
A
best interest of the child contest between [MH] and [GWJ] is easily won by [MH].
A best interest of the child contest between [GWJ] and [MWH and MDH] is easily
won by the adoptive parents [MWH and MDH].
The Court finds and
concludes that it is in the best interests of the child to be adopted by [MWH
and MDH].
In its conclusion, the trial court not only ruled that the factors to be
balanced weighed heavily in favor of the adoptive parents, as quoted above, but
it also stated:
[GWJ] has castigated [MH] for surrendering her child for adoption; but it
has been [GWJ], not [MH], who has wavered with respect to the child. For her
abortion was never an option; and she has always wanted her child but has
recognized her own inability to provide all that she believes her child
deserves. She is willing to endure the pain in order that her child should not
suffer. If the decision of the Court is reversed, [MH] will be awarded
custody.
[¶25]
We hold the district court afforded appropriate strict construction to
WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108. The trial court did not premise its decision entirely on
the "best interests of the child" test, and it appropriately balanced the four
factors as it was required to do. We can find no abuse of discretion and must
recognize the district court reasonably could conclude as it did.
[¶26]
The final issue brought before us by GWJ is the contention that there
occurred a violation of his and BGH's rights to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States3 when it terminated parental rights and
granted the adoption. GWJ states:
These decisions have their origin based on sex discrimination, inferring
that a young man cannot take care of his child, while a young woman who does not
want her child, can and is fit because she is a woman. * * * If he was a woman,
the Court would very likely give the child to him. (See Stanley vs. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208.)
GWJ, of course, has no authority to assert BGH's right to equal protection.
His standing does not permit him to assert the rights of another. BGH's guardian
ad litem represents her interest, and the guardian ad litem
stated:
As
the child's guardian ad litem, the undersigned asserts that her right to equal
protection under the laws has not been violated in any way, but has, on the
contrary, been zealously protected by the District Court in these
proceedings.
[¶27] As to his own right, GWJ's argument is at best obscure. We understand the gist to be that, because the court did not rule in his favor, he was denied his right to equal protection.4 GWJ does not attack the Wyoming adoption statute or WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108 as being facially unconstitutional or encompassing a discriminatory motive. We are not able to discern any discrimination. Recently, we summarized the constitutional requirement for equal protection:
Equal protection "mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed." Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo.1984) (quoting State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 602 P.2d 914, 922 (1979)). In this regard, we have held the Wyoming Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination than the federal constitution. Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing Examiner, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo.1992); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo.1978).
Allhusen v. State Mental Health Professions
Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo. 1995).
[¶28] The adoption statute, WYO. STAT. §
1-22-108, does not favor one class over another, and it does not endorse mothers
over fathers or women over men or adoptive parents over birth parents. There can
be no valid argument that the statute is facially unconstitutional or
encompasses a discriminatory motive.
It appears GWJ's objection is that
the district court discriminated against him in its application of the adoption
statute because the court was biased and prejudiced against him due to his
gender. GWJ fails to make any logical argument in support of this claim of
error.5 GWJ quotes two cases, but they do
not support his argument. One emphasizes the importance of family association.
The other holds the Illinois dependency law was unconstitutional, depriving an
unwed father of due process and equal protection, because of its failure to
afford him a hearing on his fitness before his children could be taken away from
him. We have no occasion to disagree, but in this context, these cases are not
appropriate authority.
[¶29] GWJ failed to point to any portion
of the record evidencing a denial of his right to equal protection. We have
reviewed that record carefully, and we cannot identify any such evidence. There
is no justification for the conclusion that GWJ was denied the custody of BGH
based on his gender. The district court appropriately identified characteristics
important in raising a child. In its decision letter, the court stated MH is
"the most sensible and mature of the two biological parents, but in addition she
is the most credible." In considering the factor of the best interest of the
child, the district court ruled both MH and the adoptive parents, MWH and MDH,
"easily won" over GWJ. The court was sufficiently concerned that it also stated:
"If the decision of the Court is reversed, [MH] will be awarded custody." Our
examination of the record does not permit us to conclude the district court was
biased or prejudiced against GWJ on gender grounds in this case. His right to
equal protection of the law was not violated, and his argument must fail.
[¶30] We reaffirm our
rule that the adoption statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116 are applicable
in a contested adoption case without regard to the Wyoming paternity statute.
The district court committed no abuse of discretion when it ruled three of the
four factors articulated in WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c)-evidence of "interest in
and responsibility for" the child, validity of the putative father's objections,
and the best interests of the child-weigh against GWJ and in favor of MWH and
MDH. There is nothing to justify the claim of a violation of the constitutional
right to equal protection. The Final Decree of Adoption is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1 WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309 (1994) provides:
(a) The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:
(i) The child has been left in the care of another person without
provision for the child's support and without communication from the absent
parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In making the above determination,
the court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and
communications;
(ii) The child has been abandoned with no means of
identification for at least three (3) months and efforts to locate the parent
have been unsuccessful;
(iii) The child has been abused or
neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental health
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family
has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health
and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the
parent;
(iv) The parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony
and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the
child.
2 The case cited, properly styled O'Connell v. Kirchner, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1084, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1995), has utterly no precedential value because it is a dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor to the denial of an application for stay entered without any majority opinion. Reliance upon such a citation is really worse than citing no authority at all.
3 The Fourteen Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
GWJ does not invoke the Wyoming Constitution. The following
provisions are relevant:
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 states:
In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
all members of the human race are equal.
WYO. CONST. art. 1 § 34
provides:
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation.
4 We partially base this statement on the following language found in GWJ's brief:
This Appellant loves his child even if she is stolen from him by so called lawful means. He will visit the child at play wherever she is. He will visit the child on her way to school, and he will visit the child at places and times this attorney can not think of, for it is his God given right and duty as a responsible father to do so.
Not only does this confirm our belief that GWJ's equal protection argument is based strictly on the fact he did not receive custody of his child, but GWJ's threats are not to be taken lightly. We caution GWJ that WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506 (1996) prohibits the conduct he proposes in his brief.
5 We prefer to decide issues on their merits and remind the Appellant:
We will not consider issues which are not supported by proper
citation of authority and cogent argument or which are not clearly defined.
Young v. Hawks, Wyo., 624 P.2d 235
(1981); Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980); and Rule 5.01(2), W.R.A.P. (Replaced by WYO. R. App. P.
7.01(f).]
Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Wyo. 1983).
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.