State v. Stahl
Annotate this Case
State v. Stahl
1992 WY 131
838 P.2d 1193
Case Number: 91-267
Decided: 10/13/1992
Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE of Wyoming, Plaintiff,
v.
Glenn H. STAHL,
Defendant.
Appeal from e Justice Court,
ParkCounty, Powell District,
James S. Allison, Justice of Peace.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L.
Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Larry M. Donovan, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne,
for plaintiff.
R. Scott Kath of Coppenhaver, Kath
& Kitchen, Powell, for
defendant.
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN,
JJ.
* Chief Justice at time of appeal.
GOLDEN, Justice.
[¶1.] Pursuant to a bill of
exceptions duly filed with this court, we are requested to resolve the following
issue:
Can a municipal peace officer
acting without an arrest warrant lawfully arrest an individual [for DWUI]
outside the boundaries of that municipality, when that arrest is not the result
of hot pursuit?1
FACTS
[¶2.] On March 23, 1991, a
dispatcher at the Powell Police Department (PPD) received a REDDI (report every
drunk driver immediately) report concerning a motorist parked along side of
Highway 14A, approximately three miles west of Ralston, Wyoming. The dispatcher
radioed PPD Sergeant Steve Oliver to inform him of the report. Sergeant Oliver
subsequently instructed PPD Officer Chuck Birky to investigate. Officer Birky
proceeded to the intersection of Highway 14A and Park County Road R18,
approximately eight miles beyond the Powell city limits. Upon arrival, Officer
Birky found Glenn E. Stahl slumped over the steering wheel of his car. Mr. Stahl
had parked his car along side of Highway 14A, but had left the car running and
the lights on. After having Mr. Stahl perform several field sobriety tests,
Officer Birky arrested him for DWUI in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233(b)
(1989).
[¶3.] Mr. Stahl filed a
motion with the justice court requesting that the complaint against him be
dismissed or, alternatively, that the evidence be suppressed which was obtained
by Officer Birky during the arrest. Mr. Stahl argued that he was the subject of
an unlawful, extrajurisdictional arrest as Officer Birky's arrest jurisdiction
did not extend beyond the Powell city limits. Following a hearing on Mr. Stahl's
motion, the justice court issued a decision letter in which it determined that,
in light of Van Horn v. State, 802 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1990), Mr. Stahl was in fact
unlawfully arrested. Accordingly, the justice court ordered that the criminal
complaint against Mr. Stahl be dismissed. This bill of exceptions
ensued.
STANDARD OF
REVIEW
[¶4.] This court has plenary
review of all questions of law presented by way of a bill of exceptions. Our
objective is to determine the law which will govern all similar pending and
future cases. We may not, however, reverse or affect in any way the judgment of
the court from which the bill of exceptions was taken. Wyo. Stat. § 7-12-104
(1987).
DISCUSSION
[¶5.] This court has
confronted extrajurisdictional arrest issues on at least two prior occasions. In
Van Horn we held that a municipal peace officer could not lawfully execute a
municipal bench warrant outside of the boundaries of the municipality which he
served. This holding was founded primarily upon W.R.Cr.P.J.C. 4(c)(2) which
provides that arrest warrants issued by a municipal judge may not be executed
beyond such judge's "territorial jurisdiction." We did, however, comment
generally upon the jurisdictional reach of a municipal peace officer's arrest
authority:
Generally speaking it may be said
that "a public officer appointed as a conservator of the peace for a particular
county or municipality * * * has no official power to apprehend offenders beyond
the boundaries of the county or district for which he has been appointed
[whether he acts under color or [sic] of a warrant or without
one]."
* * * * *
*
Wyoming has no statute nor has this court
provided a rule which serves to abrogate the common law rule of confined
territorial jurisdiction for municipal peace officers.
Van Horn, 802 P.2d at 886-87
(quoting Annotation, Territorial Extent of Power to Arrest Under a Warrant, 61
A.L.R. 377 (1929)).
[¶6.] In Six Feathers v.
State, 611 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1980), we held that a warrantless arrest of suspected
felons in South Dakota by municipal peace officers from Newcastle, Wyoming was
valid under South Dakota's interstate "fresh pursuit" statute. In the course of
making that decision, we noted: "At common law, a law enforcement officer could
arrest a felon or a suspected felon with or without a warrant in another
jurisdiction only if he were in fresh pursuit of the felon or suspected felon."
Six Feathers, 611 P.2d at 861.
[¶7.] While neither Van Horn
nor Six Feathers is dispositive of the issue presently under consideration, both
cases are useful as they recognize the common law rules regarding the
jurisdictional reach of municipal peace officer's warrantless arrest authority.
To reiterate, a peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest was
confined at common law to the boundaries of the governmental subdivision in
which he held office. The doctrine of "fresh pursuit" provided the only
exception. Under this doctrine, a peace officer could lawfully make an
extrajurisdictional arrest when acting in fresh pursuit of an individual known
to have or reasonably suspected of having committed a felony within the
officer's jurisdiction. E.g., 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest §§ 50-51
(1962).
[¶8.] Simple DWUI is a
misdemeanor criminal offense in Wyoming. Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233(e) (1989). Thus, under
common law, a municipal peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest
for such an offense would be limited to the municipal boundaries. The state
argues, however, that the common law rules of confined jurisdiction have been
greatly liberalized by the Wyoming legislature as they would relate to
the misdemeanor offense of DWUI. The state cites Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-1204 (1989),
which provides in relevant part:
(a) The authority of a police
officer to make an arrest is the same as upon an arrest for a felony when the
officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the person arrested
has committed any of the following offenses and the manner of making arrests
shall be as in misdemeanor cases:
* * * * *
*
(ii) Driving or being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any
substance as prohibited by W.S. 31-5-233.
The state contends that §
31-5-1204(a)(ii) confers upon a municipal peace officer state-wide jurisdiction
to make warrantless arrests for DWUI. The state supports this contention by
reasoning that, since § 31-5-1204 contains no express jurisdictional limitation,
a municipal peace officer may lawfully arrest an individual for DWUI anywhere in
Wyoming so
long as he has "reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person arrested
has committed * * * [the] offense * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-1204(a)
(1989).
[¶9.] The far-reaching effect
of the state's argument is illustrated by reference to Wyoming's general
warrantless arrest statute:
(a) A peace officer may arrest a
person without a warrant and detain that person until a legal warrant can be
obtained when:
(i) Any criminal offense is being
committed in his presence by the person to be arrested;
(ii) He has probable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested has
committed it; or
(iii) He has probable cause to
believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, that the person to be arrested
has committed it and that the person, unless immediately
arrested:
(A) Will not be
apprehended;
(B) May cause injury to himself or
others or damage to property; or
(C) May destroy or conceal evidence
of the commission of the misdemeanor (b):
(i) The misdemeanor is committed by
the person in the officer's presence; or
(ii) The peace officer has probable
cause to believe a misdemeanor has been committed and that the person to be
issued a citation has committed the misdemeanor.
Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-103
(1987).
[¶10.]
Like § 31-5-1204, § 7-2-103 contains no express jurisdictional limitation
on the warrantless arrest authority of a peace officer. Consequently, consistent
application of the state's reasoning would necessarily lead to the conclusion
that all peace officers within Wyoming have state-wide warrantless arrest
jurisdiction for both misdemeanor and felony offenses. We disagree with the
state's proposed analysis.
[¶11.]
The state's statutory construction argument runs awry at its most
fundamental level by failing to distinguish the word "authority" from the word
"jurisdiction." As used in this context, the former refers to what a peace
officer may do, while the latter refers to where a peace officer may do it.
State v. Tingle, 239 Neb. 558, 477 N.W.2d 544, 548 (1991). Both
Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-103 and Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-1204 are "authority" statutes: they
address only what a peace officer may do in his official capacity without
running afoul of the due process provisions of the United States and Wyoming
Constitutions. Rodarte v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Wyo. 1976) (discussing Wyo. Stat. § 7-12.3
(1957 & Supp. 1975)). To also construe § 7-2-103 and § 31-5-1204 as
"jurisdictional" statutes would be in contravention of many of our
well-established rules of statutory construction. Moncrief v. Harvey, 816 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1991) (legislative intent determined as nearly as possible from
statutory language); Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1991) (words of statute
given plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated); McGuire v. State
Dept. of Rev. and Taxation, 809 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1991) (statute viewed in light of
its intent and purpose); Employment Sec. Comm'n of Wyo. v. Swartz, 740 P.2d 401
(Wyo. 1987) (court will not read into statute what is not there); Keser v.
State, 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1985) (legislature presumed to enact statute with
knowledge of existing statutory and common law). Therefore, we are not willing
to accept the state's argument that, without uttering a word, the Wyoming
legislature intended to drastically change the common law rules of confined
jurisdiction by the enactment of § 7-2-103 and § 31-5-1204.2
[¶12.]
Upon a more generalized review, we are unable to locate any Wyoming statute which
addresses the jurisdictional reach of a municipal peace officer's warrantless
arrest authority in the intrastate context.3 Consequently, we rely upon the
common law rules of confined jurisdiction stated above. Under such rules, the
jurisdictional reach of a peace officer's warrantless arrest authority depends
upon the classification of a crime as either a misdemeanor or a felony. A
municipal peace officer may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor only
within municipal boundaries, whereas he may make a warrantless arrest for a
felony outside of those boundaries when acting in "fresh pursuit" of a known or
suspected felon. The plain language of § 31-5-1204 evinces the legislature's
intent that the misdemeanor offense of DWUI, as well as other misdemeanor
offenses enumerated therein, be treated as a felony for the purpose of
warrantless arrest. Accordingly, we conclude that a municipal peace officer
acting without a warrant may not lawfully arrest an individual for DWUI outside
of the boundaries of the municipality which he serves, unless such arrest is the
result of "fresh pursuit."
CONCLUSION
[¶13.]
A municipal peace officer acting without a warrant may not lawfully
arrest an individual for DWUI outside of the boundaries of the municipality
which he serves, unless such arrest is the result of "fresh
pursuit."
FOOTNOTES
1 We limit our
discussion of this issue by addressing only the warrantless arrest jurisdiction
conferred upon a municipal peace officer by virtue of his office. We are
cognizant that municipal peace officers, like other citizens of Wyoming, possess
citizen's arrest powers conferred by statute. However, Wyoming's citizen's
arrest statute, Wyo. Stat. § 7-8-101 (1987), does not authorize private citizens
to make misdemeanor DWUI arrests. We are also cognizant that a county sheriff
may deputize a municipal peace officer for particular law enforcement duties.
See generally, Wyo. Stat. § 18-3-602 (1977).
2 Four of our six sister states -
Colorado, Idaho, South Dakota, and
Utah - have
statutes which specifically address the jurisdictional reach of a peace
officer's warrantless arrest authority. While these statutes appear to
liberalize the common law rules of confined jurisdiction, not one of them goes
nearly so far as the state proposes was done through silence by the Wyoming legislature. See
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-106 (1986); Idaho Code
§ 19-701A (1987); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-3-16 (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 77-9-3
(1990).
Of our two remaining
sister states, Montana authorizes cities and towns to pass ordinances which
extend a peace officer's arrest jurisdiction to all areas within five miles of
the city's or town's boundaries. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-4301 (1991). In the
absence of an applicable city ordinance, however, Montana appears to apply
the common law rules of confined jurisdiction. SeeState v.
McDole, 226 Mont. 169, 734 P.2d 683 (1987). Nebraska has no
applicable statute and follows the common law. State v. Masat, 239 Neb. 849, 479 N.W.2d 131
(1992).
3 Wyoming has entered into an "Interstate Compact for Arrest
of Fugitives and Attendance of Witnesses" with Colorado, Kansas, and
New Mexico.
The Compact is codified at Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-3-301 to 303 (1987). It is a
reciprocal agreement which permits state, county, or municipal peace officers
from any party state to pursue felons or escapees of custody into any other
party state and arrest them there, with or without a warrant. Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-301
(1987).
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