Flores v. State
Annotate this Case
Flores v. State
1991 WY 159
822 P.2d 369
Case Number: 91-156
Decided: 12/11/1991
Supreme Court of Wyoming
ARLAN RAY FLORES, A/K/A ARLAN RAY LaFROMBOISE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),
v.
THE STATE OF
WYOMING,
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Appeal from the District
Court, ParkCounty, Hunter Patrick,
J.
Micheal K. Shoumaker,
Sheridan, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty.
Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Larry M. Donovan, Sr. Asst. Atty.
Gen., for appellee.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J.,
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
URBIGKIT, Chief
Justice.
[¶1.] In this case, we review
the issue of a trial court's discretion to rule on a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33(d).1 Appellant Arlan Ray Flores asserts
he was misled by his trial counsel, that trial counsel had spent only a minimal
amount of time with him before he entered his guilty pleas, and that he made the
guilty pleas anticipating he would receive a lighter sentence than what was
actually entered.
[¶2.] We affirm.
[¶3.] On the night of June
14, 1989, Flores hosted a party at his apartment in Powell, Wyoming. As the evening progressed, Flores and
several of his guests became intoxicated. In the early morning hours of June 15,
Flores became angry, obtained a knife from his kitchen, stabbed his half-sister
in the stomach when she tried to calm him down and prevent him from attacking
his half-brother, and then proceeded to inflict multiple, fatal stab wounds to
his half-brother.
[¶4.] Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Flores pled guilty to one count of
intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon in
violation of W.S. 6-2-502(a)(ii)2 for the
assault on his half-sister. He also pled guilty to one count of second degree
murder in violation of W.S. 6-2-1043 for
the killing of his half-brother.
[¶5.] Prior to sentencing,
Flores filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas. At the hearing on March 20, 1990, Flores
orally withdrew his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court then
proceeded with sentencing. At sentencing, the county attorney chose to present
evidence from some of the witnesses who were present the night the crimes were
committed. Flores's counsel objected to that
testimony because the record already contained a complete recitation of the
events which transpired the night of the crimes. The trial court chose to hear
the testimony because it was not familiar with the testimony given at the
preliminary hearing in the justice of the peace court. At the sentencing
hearing, Flores's counsel vigorously
cross-examined all witnesses who were called. He argued intelligently and
convincingly for a lenient sentence and for the trial court to consider
probation. He also reminded the trial court, in Flores's presence, that the county attorney had agreed
that the State would not ask for anything more than concurrent sentences for the
two crimes. Flores was sentenced to serve not
less than twenty-five years, nor more than life, for second degree murder, and
not less than nine, nor more than ten years, for aggravated assault and battery,
the sentences to be served concurrently. Flores
was given credit for time served in jail pending incarceration in the Wyoming
State Penitentiary on both his minimum and maximum sentences.
[¶6.] During these
proceedings, Flores was first represented by
Kenneth M. Koski, a public defender. Flores was dissatisfied with Koski's
representation, so Wyatt Skaggs, the State Public Defender's Chief Trial Counsel
and one of the most experienced defense counsel in the state of Wyoming, was appointed to represent Flores. Later in the proceedings, Flores also attempted to "fire" Skaggs.
[¶7.] On January 18, 1991,
Flores, appearing pro se, filed a document in
the trial court entitled "Motion for Appeal of Sentence." The time for appeal,
of course, had long since passed. The judgment and sentence had been entered on
March 28, 1990. The trial court treated the filing as a notice of appeal and
forwarded the record to this court. The gist of Flores's pleading was that he was not guilty of the
charges to which he had pled guilty. Upon review for purposes of ascertaining
jurisdiction, this court remanded the matter to the district court for the
purposes of disposing of the motion as a motion to withdraw guilty pleas and to
appoint counsel.
[¶8.] Micheal K. Shoumaker
was appointed as Flores's counsel and a testimonial hearing was held during
which Flores was provided an opportunity to
fully explain what happened and why he pled guilty. It was his testimony that
before he entered his guilty pleas he had seen Skaggs three times for a half an
hour to forty-five minutes at each meeting. These visits occurred before each of
the hearings the trial court held in his case. Flores also testified he met with an investigator for the
public defender several times before entering his guilty pleas. Further,
Flores claimed that during their very first
meeting Skaggs told him he should plead guilty. Following this meeting,
Flores attempted to obtain new counsel,
claiming he was firing Skaggs because the attorney was not doing an adequate job
and he wanted a new attorney. Flores related
that Skaggs had told him he was not going to drop his case. He described efforts
to contact Skaggs by telephone, but was never able to reach him.
[¶9.] Flores stated it was his understanding regarding the plea
bargain that the sentences would not be consecutive and that he was guaranteed a
thirty to forty year sentence on the second degree murder charge and a small
sentence on the aggravated assault and battery charge. Flores further claimed that he was instructed by Skaggs as
his attorney how to answer the questions for the plea bargain hearing and he
answered the questions asked of him, as directed, even though he did not
necessarily agree with the statements he made. It was then his testimony that he
stated to the trial court at the plea/sentencing proceeding that he was
satisfied with his counsel because he was "instructed" that was how he should
answer.
[¶10.] On June 13, 1991, the trial court entered
an order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. That order provides
the basis for this present appeal. Osborn v. State, 806 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1991).
[¶11.] Our standard of review for analysis of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing is well-delineated. After
sentencing, a defendant must justify the withdrawal of a guilty plea by showing
manifest injustice. The determination of such a motion is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134 (Wyo. 1989);
Garnett v. State, 769 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1989); Angerhofer v. State, 758 P.2d 1041
(Wyo. 1988); Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 1975); 3 Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 539 (1982); Annotation, Withdrawal of Plea
of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, After Sentence, Under Rule 32(d) of Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 9 A.L.R.Fed 309 (1971).
[¶12.] Thus, our search in this case is to
detect an occurrence of manifest injustice. Flores claims his defense counsel did not spend adequate
time with him prior to entry of his guilty pleas. Skaggs is an experienced
defense counsel, and we cannot discern from the record that, under the
circumstances of this case and accepting as true Flores's allegations, the time he spent with his client
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. See King v. State, 810 P.2d 119
(Wyo. 1991)
and Annotation, supra, 9 A.L.R.Fed. 309. Flores
maintains he should be permitted to withdraw his pleas because he has defenses
in the nature of provocation and self-defense. However, Flores does not assert,
nor will the record as a whole support, a claim that trial counsel failed to
investigate or to thoughtfully consider the defenses which Flores now wishes to raise. Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247
(Wyo. 1987).
Cf. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986).
[¶13.] Flores
also claims he did not fully understand the terms of his plea bargain. The
record tells us otherwise and we do not perceive a manifest injustice based upon
his explication of the so-called "misunderstanding" of the bargain. At the time
the pleas were entered, Flores was informed
that the prosecution's only commitment was to concurrent sentences. Flores received concurrent sentences. See Percival v.
State, 745 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1987) (including dissenting opinion of
Justice Urbigkit).4
[¶14.] Flores
claims he anticipated receiving a more lenient sentence. Again, nothing in the
record serves to demonstrate a manifest injustice in this regard. The only
guarantee of the plea bargain was that the sentences would be concurrent and
they were concurrent. See Angerhofer, 758 P.2d 1041.
[¶15.] Finally, Flores claims he was denied defenses that sound in the
nature of self-defense and provocation. Flores
retrieved a knife, killed one relative and severely injured another. Tragically,
those facts are clear in this record beyond any possible doubt. Osborn, 806 P.2d 259. There is no evidence in the record of any kind, save Flores's self-serving and conclusory statements that he
had possible defenses, let alone sufficient to demonstrate manifest injustice.
Indeed, all the evidence contained in the record belies the existence of either
defense. See Garnett, 769 P.2d 371.
[¶16.] The order of the trial court denying
Flores's motion for withdrawal of his guilty
pleas, made after sentencing, is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1 W.R.Cr.P. 33 states in
part:
Sentence and
judgment.
* * * * * *
(d) Withdrawal of
plea of guilty or nolo contendere. - A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment or conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw his plea.
2 W.S. 6-2-502
states:
(a) A person is guilty of
aggravated assault and battery if he:
(i) Causes serious
bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life;
(ii) Attempts to
cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon;
(iii) Threatens to use
a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his
person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another;
or
(iv) Intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a woman whom he knows is
pregnant.
(b) Aggravated assault
and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10)
years.
3 W.S. 6-2-104
states:
Whoever purposely and
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of
murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any
term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life.
4 Conjecturally, dependent on
penitentiary behavior, Flores received a more
lenient sentence than he expected - dependent upon parole board action. A
twenty-five to life term can be better with favor from the parole board than a
thirty to forty year sentence, e.g., with good time maximums, a minimum
confinement time of about seventeen years compared to an approximate twenty year
term for what he said he expected.
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