Claim of Taffner
Annotate this Case
Claim of Taffner
1991 WY 149
821 P.2d 103
Case Number: 91-71
Decided: 11/22/1991
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JOHN H. TAFFNER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLANT (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT),
v.
JOHN H. TAFFNER,
APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT).
Appeal from the Workers'
Compensation Division.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty.
Gen., Joe MacGuire, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Greg L. Goddard of
Goddard, Perry & Vogal, Buffalo, for appellee.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J.,
THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ., and RAPER, J. (Retired).
RAPER, Justice,
Retired.
[¶1.] This is an appeal by
the Workers' Compensation Division (Division) from the order entered by the
district judge which reversed the hearing examiner who held in favor of the
Division and denied Workers' Compensation benefits to employee/appellee
herein.
[¶2.] The Division sets out
the issues to be:
1. Whether substantial
evidence existed to support the administrative hearing officer's decision to
deny the Workers' Compensation coverage to the employee-claimant.
2. Whether the
appellee failed to prove each and every element necessary under W.S. §
27-14-603(b) for compensated benefits at the trial level.
3. Whether the
district court erred as matter of law by accepting jurisdiction to hear the
appeal after it was improperly filed and perfected by petitioner
(employee-claimant).
[¶3.] Employee, as an issue,
only states that: "The trial court correctly ruled in favor of the
claimant."
[¶4.] However, in the body of
his brief, employee states that this appeal primarily involves the issue: "Was
there sufficient evidence of medical causation to enable the Claimant to be
entitled to receive benefits?" We agree that this is the real issue to be
determined by this court.
[¶5.] We will remand to the
district court to follow the precedent hereinafter cited.
[¶6.] Employee, in his brief,
has captured a correct reflection of the record, about which there is really no
dispute. We will paraphrase it to fit this opinion.
[¶7.] Employee is a
sixty-one-year-old male who, at the time of his heart attack, had worked for the
Buffalo, Wyoming, Police Department for a period of
thirty-seven years, including some twenty-five years as Chief of
Police.
[¶8.] In late December of
1989, Buffalo
received a substantial snowfall in excess of three feet, which remained on the
city streets into March of 1990. On January 5, 1990, the residential streets
remained clogged with heavy snow with only one lane of traffic open for travel
and that lane was covered with a heavy layer of ice.
[¶9.] On the afternoon of
January 5, 1990, employee was called upon to assist in the arrest of an
extremely large and violent man who had been located in a residential area of
Buffalo. As
employee was responding to the location, his patrol car became stuck in the deep
snow. Employee then proceeded on foot, in bitterly cold temperatures, to the
location where another officer had the fugitive's vehicle stopped. At that
point, the fugitive was placed under arrest and two other officers and employee
attempted to remove the man from his vehicle. An extended struggle ensued in
which glasses and watches were broken and there was a very physical
confrontation. The fugitive was finally subdued and transported to jail while
employee was left at the location to inventory the fugitive's vehicle. Employee
subsequently returned to his vehicle and attempted to push it from the deep
snow. He was unsuccessful in removing the vehicle from the snowbank and a
wrecker had to be summoned to assist.
[¶10.] At that time, employee began experiencing
chest pains, shortness of breath and general nausea. He completed his shift on
that date but continued feeling ill. He was unable to lie in a prone position
that evening because of the chest pains. These symptoms continued throughout the
following week. Finally, on January 11, 1990, while on shift, he went to the
emergency room at the hospital complaining of the same symptoms. The physicians
at the JohnsonCountyHospital admitted him and began a series
of tests. On the morning of January 12, 1990, while being tested on the
treadmill, employee became extremely ill and it was determined that he was in
fact suffering from a myocardial infarction. He was then medicated and placed on
a life flight to Casper where he was received, treated, and
underwent an angioplasty (balloon) procedure.
[¶11.] Employee's claim for worker's
compensation benefits was duly filed and heard as a contested case before a
hearing examiner. The hearing examiner, in an opinion letter attached as part of
his order, found that employee had established by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1) That there was a
direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was
performed and the cardiac condition.
(2) The causative
condition occurred during an actual period of employment stress clearly unusual
to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment.
(3) That the acute
symptoms of cardiac condition were currently manifested not less than four hours
after the alleged causative exertion.
[¶12.] However, the hearing examiner ruled that
employee had failed to meet his burden with respect to medical causation and,
therefore, denied benefits. The trial court, on the other hand, determined that
employee had met his burden with respect to medical causation and awarded
benefits accordingly.
[¶13.] Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603(b) (1991)
provides:
(b) Benefits for
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused
by an injury, are not payable unless the employee establishes by competent
medical authority that:
i) There is a direct
causal connection between the condition under which the work was performed and
the cardiac condition; and
(ii) The causative
exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to
or abnormal for employees in that particular employment, irrespective of whether
the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual employee;
and
(iii) The acute symptoms
of the cardiac condition are clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours
after the alleged causative exertion.
[¶14.] We are inclined to believe that the only
issue is whether the medical testimony is adequate to establish direct causal
connection between the work activity and the heart condition. Only one expert
medical doctor, a board certified cardiologist, testified, so we must look to
his testimony for the answer. Matter of Injury to Taylor, 718 P.2d 63 (Wyo. 1986). Taylor sets out the rule to be that the causal
connection is established if a medical expert testifies that it is more probable
than not that the work exertion contributed in a material degree to the
precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction. In
Taylor, the
doctor testified that there was an equal possibility that either the work
activity caused the heart condition or that there was no connection between the
work and the heart condition. This court held that testimony was inadequate to
meet the rule enunciated in Taylor.
[¶15.] We see the testimony somewhat differently
in the case now before us. The cardiologist here did testify such connection to
be the case with this employee. There are nuances to the rule.
[¶16.] The following testimony was
developed:
Q. * * * [H]e said he
noted * * * that he felt shortness of breath, a general nausea, subsequently
started having chest pains, had to stay up that entire night in an upright
position because whenever he laid down the chest pains bothered him too much,
and that that continued for a period of time through January 11th, and on that
date while he was on duty, again, the pains and the general feeling became so
much that he checked himself into the emergency room, and he was
admitted.
Now given all of those
facts as I have given them, assuming that that is his testimony or will be his
testimony, how do you interpret that with regard to his condition that he found
himself in on January 12th?[1]
A. Well, I think we
can say he very clearly developed an unstable angina picture and that appears to
have started on the 5th of January. Unstable angina meaning that it came on with
either less activity, or minimal activity, or even at rest. So, he has gone
from, apparently, stating that he did not have any symptoms to now having pain
much of the night following this exposure to a great deal of cold - you said he
had to get his patrol car out of the snow and had to wrestle with an individual
to incarcerate him.
So all of those
factors were there and were an unusual stress for him, and then that night he
has a great deal of discomfort which causes him to be up a great deal of the
night, and throughout the week after that he remained having episodes of pain,
and finally, he takes himself to the hospital a week later.
During that time, he
has what looks like an unstable angina picture.
Q. Can we relate
the one condition with the unusual series of circumstances at least as he has
testified about them?
A. Well, we can now
say that he has given us a history that after having gone through unusual
activities for him he has now become unstable.
Q. So, based upon
that, can we assume or can we connect the two based upon a reasonable medical
certainty? Based on his history and the signs and symptoms as you found them,
can we say that the two are, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
related?
A. Well, Mr.
Taffner clearly developed symptomatology following the episode of extreme
exposure in the very deep snow that we all remember in this part of the state,
and then following that, he had to help incarcerate somebody, and then, he had
pain all night. Following that, he does develop an occlusion of the
artery.
So, I think we can say
that that artery - the instability of that artery appears to have developed at
that point in time and progressed to the point that it occluded.
Later in the testimony of
the cardiologist, this exchange took place:
A. I could not say
that his extreme activity, at this time, physically made the crack in the plaque
occur. I can conjecture that, because of what ultimately happened a week later,
sometime around this time he did have his plaque become unstable, because of the
symptomatology that persisted and seemed similar all of the way through to the
point of myocardial infarction, that something made his plaque unstable at that
time and, ultimately, the myocardial infarction a week later.
Q. I take it that's
conjecture and speculation and not within a reasonable degree of medical
probability?
A. I think it is
within a reasonable degree of medical probability that that occurred. You
know our medical probabilities are different than legal probabilities because we
have to work back from the symptomatology. (Emphasis added.)
Here we have a man
that did develop a myocardial infarction. The symptomatology was fairly
consistent through the preceding week, and ultimately, the same symptoms were
associated with the narrowing. In fact, that make[s] it fairly likely that he
did become unstable the week preceding that.
Q. Let me ask it like
this then, Doctor. Did the heart attack occur within four hours of the activity
on January 5th, 1990?
A. The heart attack
did not occur within four hours.
Q. Yes,
sir.
A. But, the unstable
angina appears to have occurred within four hours.
* * * * * *
Q. And, see, that's the difficulty I have
with you saying or testifying within a reasonable degree of medical probability
that the causative exertion on the 5th actually resulted in the heart
attack.
A. What I said was
that following that exertion, the gentleman did develop the unstable angina
pectoris, utilizing the fact that the symptomatology was consistent up to the
time of the myocardial infarction, including at the time of the myocardial
infarction, and the fact that the chest pain was similar to what he had had a
week before.
[¶17.] The cardiologist consistently stuck to
his testimony that the stressful events created a condition called "unstable
angina pectoris" which a week later resulted in a myocardial infarction (heart
attack).
[¶18.] From the totality of the cardiologist's
testimony here, it is gathered that "it is more probable than not that the work
exertion or stress contributed in a material degree to the precipitation,
aggravation or acceleration of a myocardial infarction." Kaan v. State ex rel.
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 689 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Wyo. 1984) cited
favorably in Matter of Injury to Kemp, 711 P.2d 1142 (Wyo. 1986).
[¶19.] One other question with respect to
procedure should be mentioned before we close. The Division asserts the district
court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal and relies on W.R.A.P. 12.06
which provides that "[t]he petition for review shall include a concise statement
showing jurisdiction and venue and the specific ground or grounds upon which
petitioner contends he is entitled to relief." W.R.A.P. 12.03 declares that
proceedings for judicial review shall be instituted by filing a petition for
review with the district court. Employee filed a "Notice of Appeal" which did
not include such statement.
[¶20.] The statutes in regard to worker's
compensation cases adopted by the legislature in 1986 provided that
"appeals" may be taken from the decisions of a hearing examiner to the
district court "as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act."
Wyo. Stat. §
27-14-602 (1991). The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. §
16-3-114 (1990) (emphasis added), provides in pertinent part:
(b) The supreme
court's authority to adopt rules governing review from agencies to the district
courts shall include authority to determine the content of the record upon
review, the pleadings to be filed, the time and manner for filing the pleadings,
records and other documents and the extent to which supplemental testimony and
evidence may be taken or considered by the district court. The rules adopted by
the supreme court under this provision may supersede existing statutory
provisions.
(c) To the extent
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken
of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
* * * * * *
(ii) Hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
* * * * * *
(E) Unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute.
[¶21.] While employee did not conform to
W.R.A.P. 12 in that only a "Notice of Appeal" was filed without a "statement
showing jurisdiction and venue and the specific ground or grounds upon which
petitioner contends" - and that was error - W.R.A.P. 7.04 sets out that "[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded."
[¶22.] An appellant to this court has the burden
of establishing that error is prejudicial or injurious and warrants reversal.
Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1981). The Division set out no reason
here why it was prejudiced or even concluded that it had been prejudiced by the
error we acknowledge. The parties were directed by the district court to file
briefs, which the Division did. The Division was accorded every right to be
heard. We find no prejudice.
[¶23.] We hold that employee has met all the
requirements to allow benefits for an employment-related coronary condition and
the award of benefits is supported by substantial evidence.
[¶24.] While we agree with the district court
that the conclusion of the hearing examiner is unsupported by substantial
evidence appearing in the record of the agency hearing, we are unable to affirm
its disposition and must remand to the district court with instructions to
follow the concept of State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v.
Hollister, 794 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1990) and remand to the administrative
agency.
FOOTNOTES
1 The facts of employee's
exertion were correctly stated as previously set out in this
opinion.
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