Charles Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, Inc.
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2001 WI 68 SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN Case No.: 98-0445 Complete Title of Case: Charles Johnson and Karen Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, Inc., Heartland Counseling Services, Defendants-Respondents, South Street Clinic, Defendant, Kay Phillips, Ph.D., Jeff Hollowell and Tim Reisenauer, Defendants-Respondents, ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company, GHI Insurance Company, JKL Insurance Company, MNO Insurance Company, and PQR Insurance Company, Defendants, Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, Defendant-Respondent. REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 2000 WI App 166 Reported at: 238 Wis. 2d 227, 616 N.W.2d 903 (Published) Opinion Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Oral Argument: Source of APPEAL COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: JUSTICES: Concurred: Dissented: Not Participating: June 19, 2001 April 6, 2001 Circuit Dane Daniel R. Moeser ATTORNEYS: For plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by William Smoler and Smoler Law Office, LLC, Madison, and Gregory P. Seibold and Murphy & Desmond, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by William Smoler and Gregory P. Seibold. For defendant-respondent, Rogers Memorial Hospital, Inc., there was a brief by Lori Gendelman, Jeffrey J.P. Conta and Otjen, Van Ert, Lieb & Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lori Gendelman. For defendant-respondent, Kay Phillips, Ph.D., there was a brief by David E. McFarlane and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by David E. McFarlane. For defendants-respondents, Jeff Hollowell and Tim Reisenauer, there was a brief by Bradway A. Liddle, Jr., Mario D. Mendoza and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Mario D. Mendoza. 2 2001 WI 68 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 98-0445 STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT Charles Johnson and Karen Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, FILED v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, Inc., Heartland Counseling Services, Defendants-Respondents, JUN 19, 2001 Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI South Street Clinic, Defendant, Kay Phillips, Ph.D., Jeff Hollowell and Tim Reisenauer, Defendants-Respondents, ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company, GHI Insurance Company, JKL Insurance Company, MNO Insurance Company and PQR Insurance Company, Defendants, Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, Defendant-Respondent. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. cause remanded. Reversed and No. ¶1 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. Charles Karen and 98-0445 Johnson (Johnsons) seek review of two determinations by the court of appeals relating to their claims for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligent treatment of their adult daughter, Charlotte, by various therapists and a hospital. The court first determined that the Johnsons' claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against three therapists for implanting false memories of sexual and physical abuse in their child must be dismissed based on public policy concerns of confidentiality relationship. breach of in the therapist-patient Second, the court concluded that the Johnsons' contract dismissed based on Johnsons contend claim the that against same these the public hospital policy determinations insufficient factual record. We agree. must also concerns. were based be The on an Further development of the factual record is necessary before a decision can be made on these issues. We also review and reject the hospital's arguments that the Johnsons lack standing to sue the hospital and that their claim against statute of limitations. the hospital is barred by the Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand for further proceedings. I ¶2 a complaint against the defendants, alleging the following facts. Beginning in the On May late 29, summer 1996, or the fall Johnsons of 1991, filed Charlotte began psychotherapy treatment with defendant Kay Phillips (Phillips) 2 No. and defendant thereafter, Heartland Phillips Counseling referred Services. Charlotte to 98-0445 Shortly defendant Rogers Memorial Hospital (RMH) for treatment in specialty programs that focused on eating disorders, addictive disorders, and sexual and physical abuse issues. Charlotte was admitted to RMH as an inpatient in early November 1991. The Johnsons entered into a financial agreement with RMH in which they agreed to pay for this inpatient care. ¶3 Jeff At RMH, Charlotte received treatment from defendants Hollowell (Hollowell) and Tim Reisenauer (Reisenauer). During this treatment, Charlotte developed the belief that her parents had sexually and physically abused her as a young child. Charlotte remained as an inpatient at RMH until November 29, 1991, but continued to receive treatment from Reisenauer after that time as an outpatient. Hollowell and She confronted her father about this abuse on November 22, 1991, and confronted her mother on October 28, 1993. Both confrontations occurred during meetings where Charlotte's therapists were present, although it is unclear who was present, including which therapists. ¶4 The Johnsons Nevertheless, Charlotte parents. denied that terminated her such abuse occurred. relationship with her The Johnsons were unsuccessful in reestablishing any relationship with her. Charlotte continues to believe that her parents abused her. ¶5 causes In their complaint, the Johnsons alleged three primary of Phillips, action. Hollowell, First, and they alleged Reisenauer 3 negligence (therapists) for against their No. treatment of Charlotte. They claimed that the 98-0445 treatment provided by the therapists resulted in Charlotte's false beliefs that she had been abused and that their continued treatment of Charlotte reinforced these false beliefs. contended that the therapists failed or The Johnsons also refused to counsel Charlotte to determine the validity of these memories despite being informed by the Johnsons that these beliefs were false. Under this cause of action, they sought the following damages: past and future mental and emotional pain and suffering, past and future loss of enjoyment of life, loss of the relationship of Charlotte, and loss of funds paid for the negligent treatment. ¶6 of A second cause of action alleged negligent infliction emotional claim, the treatment distress Johnsons of against asserted Charlotte, the that which therapists. the Within therapists' included the this negligent confrontation meetings, caused them to suffer severe emotional damages. ¶7 against A third cause of action alleged a breach of contract RMH for failing to provide appropriate treatment to Charlotte pursuant to its financial agreement with the Johnsons. The Johnsons sought the following damages under this cause of action: emotional pain and suffering, past and future loss of enjoyment of life, loss of the relationship with Charlotte, and loss of payments made for inpatient care. ¶8 The complaint also alleged that RMH was liable for the conduct of Hollowell and Reisenauer under an ostensible agency theory. The Johnsons also sought recovery from various unnamed 4 No. 98-0445 insurance companies for coverage provided to the defendants and from the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund for coverage provided to RMH. ¶9 The defendants answered and denied the allegations. series of motions to dismiss followed. A In her motion, Phillips argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could limitations presented be granted barred similar the and that claim. arguments in the applicable Hollowell a separate statute and motion. of Reisenauer In its motion, RMH alleged a failure to state a claim, a failure to comply with the statute of limitations, and a lack of standing to sue under Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 (1997-98).1 RMH's motion also sought summary judgment in the alternative.2 ¶10 The Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable Daniel R. Moeser, dismissed the complaint.3 The court concluded that the claims against the therapists failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted and that the claims against RMH required dismissal because the Johnsons did not have standing to sue RMH. 1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 2 Although not filing a separate motion to dismiss, Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund joined the arguments of the movants. South Street Clinic was dismissed prior to the circuit court's decision on these motions. 3 RMH contends that, because it moved for summary judgment, we may review this case under summary judgment standards. However, because the circuit court decided this case as a motion to dismiss based solely on the pleadings, we address the defendants' motions in a similar manner. 5 No. 98-0445 The court also noted that the Johnsons' claims against RMH were barred by the statute of limitations. ¶11 The Johnsons appealed. While their appeal was pending, we decided Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999). Sawyer directly addressed an issue central to the Johnsons' case, that is, whether the parents of an adult child can maintain a third-party professional negligence claim against a therapist when the therapist's treatment resulted in the implanting of alleged false memories of abuse in the child. Id. at 129, 136. Applying public policy concerns from Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988), as well as collateral burdens to a therapist-patient relationship that are presented by such claims, we concluded that the Sawyers' claim was not prohibited by such policy concerns. Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 142-151. ¶12 After our decision in Sawyer, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss the Johnsons' complaint. See Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., 2000 WI App 166, ¶20, 238 Wis. 2d 227, 616 N.W.2d 903. In its decision, the court noted that the Johnsons' claims presented a significant collateral burden on confidentiality within the therapist- patient relationship that was not present in Sawyer, and this burden precluded the Johnsons from continuing their claims. at ¶¶17-18. Id. In particular, unlike Sawyer, where the plaintiff parents, as administrators of their deceased child's estate, had custody of the child's medical records, neither the Johnsons nor the therapists had any such access. 6 Id. at ¶¶11, 17. No. 98-0445 Charlotte, the court noted, had neither waived her rights to the confidentiality privilege to therapists. ¶13 to her the medical privacy of records her nor relinquished communications with any her Id. at ¶11. Because the court of appeals believed that these medical records and confidential communications were necessary to the fair resolution of the Johnsons' claims, it precluded the Johnsons from pursuing their claims "in order to further the public policy of protecting the therapist-patient relationship." confidentiality Id. at ¶18. of the The court also dismissed the Johnsons' claims against RMH, concluding that the breach of contract claim was nothing more than a malpractice claim that was similarly precluded because it too relied on Charlotte's confidential communications and health care records. Id. at ¶19. II ¶14 Our review is limited to the following three issues: (1) whether the Johnsons' claims against the therapists must be dismissed in light of the potential burden of such claims on confidentiality in the therapist-patient relationship; (2) whether the Johnsons have standing to sue RMH in light of Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 and may sustain this claim despite any public policy concerns; and (3) whether the Johnsons' claim against RMH is barred by the statute of limitations. ¶15 We first review whether the Johnsons' negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against the therapists state claims upon which relief may be granted. 7 The No. 98-0445 question of whether a complaint states a claim is one of law. Koestler v. Pollard, 162 Wis. 2d 797, 802, 471 N.W.2d 7 (1991). We apply a Elections Bd. (1999). We de novo standard v. WMC, proceed 227 in when Wis. 2d the reviewing such 650, 660, 597 manner in following decisions. N.W.2d 721 determining whether dismissal is warranted: We review the complaint in the same manner as the circuit court and the court of appeals, benefitting from their analyses and opinions. Pleadings are to be liberally construed, and a claim will be dismissed only if "it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover." The complaint must be viewed most favorably to the plaintiff. Accepting the allegations as true, we must decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 635-36, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994) (citation omitted). ¶16 The court of appeals determined that required based on public policy considerations. dismissal was Application of such considerations "is a function solely of the court." Id. at 654. policy As a result, the court may make its public determination based solely on the pleadings without proceeding to trial. Id. at 654-55. However, if the issues are complex or the facts not fully presented, it may be desirable for the court to allow further discovery or even a full trial before making its determination. See id. at 655. In this case, the facts of record do not fully present the question of public policy. As a result, we conclude that the court of appeals should not have decided this issue based on the present record. 8 No. ¶17 98-0445 In Sawyer, we permitted the plaintiffs to move forward on a claim of professional negligence against two therapists to recover for direct injuries resulting from treatment of their adult child that lead to false memories of abuse. Wis. 2d at 137-51. with a claim of Sawyer, 227 We also permitted the plaintiffs to continue negligent against one therapist. infliction of Id. at 154-58. emotional distress The defendants argue that Sawyer does not control this case because, in this case, the claim affects a collateral burden on the therapist-patient relationship, which was addressed but did not apply in Sawyer. See id. at 150. The confidentiality in the concerns that such burden involved therapist-patient claims would the importance relationship jeopardize of and the confidentiality within this relationship and that confidentiality would prevent therapists from being able to adequately defend themselves from such actions. Id. The defendants only focus on these concerns as distinguishing characteristics between this case and Sawyer. The parties have provided detailed analyses on these concerns. ¶18 Indeed, these concerns are significant and may prevent a claim from moving forward in some instances. Based on the current record, however, we are unable to determine whether the Johnsons' claims will place a burden on such confidentiality. The facts of record do not reveal whether Charlotte has waived her rights concerning confidentiality of her health care records or her privilege therapists. to confidential communications See Wis. Stat. §§ 146.82, 905.04. with her Further, we are unable to determine whether any privilege applies based on the 9 No. fact that method the was Johnsons privilege Johnsons revealed. have See raised applies attended an to meetings § 905.04(1)(b). issue the of In fact therapists this where as in 98-0445 therapy addition, the to this whether the case. See § 905.04(1)(e). ¶19 Accordingly, we conclude that a determination on whether the Johnsons' claims should be dismissed is premature. As a result, the defendants' motions to dismiss on the claims against the therapists must be denied.4 equally to the Johnsons' claims This conclusion applies against RMH under their ostensible agency theory. ¶20 The second issue presented is whether the Johnsons have standing to bring their breach of contract claim against RMH and may pursue considerations. RMH this claim argues that in view the of public Johnsons lack policy standing because Wis. Stat. Ch. 655, Wisconsin's health care liability law, provides health care the exclusive providers and remedy because for the such claims Johnsons do against not fall within the list of individuals who may bring such a claim under the chapter. We conclude, however, that the question is more 4 The court of appeals concluded, and the Johnsons concede, that, to the extent the Johnsons' claims allege injuries related to the loss of society and companionship of an adult child, the Johnsons may not recover for such injuries. See Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., 2000 WI App 166, ¶7 n. 3, 238 Wis. 2d 227, 616 N.W.2d 903 (citing Estate of Wells v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 183 Wis. 2d 667, 677-78, 515 N.W.2d 705 (1994)). We agree with the court of appeals that the Johnsons' claim for loss of relationship with Charlotte must be construed as such and must be barred. 10 No. 98-0445 appropriately characterized as whether the Johnsons have stated a viable cause of action, rather than whether they have standing to sue. As noted by the court of appeals, this action, although labeled as professional a contract claim, because negligence is actually it is an for on based action whether RMH provided appropriate treatment to Charlotte. We specifically allowed such claims to move forward outside the realm of chapter 655 in Sawyer. See also Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d 223. Accordingly, chapter 655 is not the exclusive remedy for such claims, like the Johnsons' claim, brought consistent with our holding in Sawyer. The Johnsons may proceed with their claim. We note that, similar to the claims against the therapists, this claim also presents concerns surrounding the burden it may place on confidentiality in the therapist-patient relationship. However, again, based on the current insufficient state of the record, we decline to make a determination on whether this concern requires dismissal. ¶21 The final question on review is whether the statute of limitations barred the Johnsons' claim against RMH because any negligent treatment provided by RMH occurred more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint in violation of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1). We conclude, however, that this issue also cannot be determined based on the factual record present at this time. The treatment complaint with RMH during November 1991. is unclear extended as beyond to her whether inpatient Charlotte's treatment As Judge Dykman noted in his dissent at the court of appeals in this case, a reasonable inference can be 11 No. drawn from the complaint that RMH provided care as 98-0445 late as October 28, 1993. See Johnson, 2000 WI App 166 at ¶24 (Dykman, P.J., dissenting). The factual record must be developed on this issue before a determination on the statute of limitations can be made. In turn, the defendants' motions to dismiss on the claim against RMH must also be denied. III ¶22 conclude In sum, in view of the current state of the record, we that the Johnsons relief may be granted. have presented claims upon which The record is insufficient for us to determine whether public policy considerations bar the Johnsons' claims. Further, the factual record is insufficient for us to determine whether the statute of limitations bars the Johnsons' claim against RMH. As a result, we reverse the court of appeals' decision, which upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint. By the Court. The court of appeals' decision is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 12 No. 1 98-0445
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