Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Robert Crawford
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2001 WI 96 SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN Case No.: 00-0640-J Complete Title of Case: In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Robert Crawford, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge. Wisconsin Judicial Commission, Complainant, v. The Honorable Robert Crawford, Respondent. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CRAWFORD Opinion Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Oral Argument: July 9, 2001 April 6, 2001 Source of APPEAL COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: JUSTICES: Concurred: Dissented: Not Participating: ATTORNEYS: For the respondent there were briefs by Thomas J. Crawford, Mark E. Hersh and Mark Hersh Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas J. Crawford. For the complainant there was a brief by Thomas J. Basting and Brennan, Steil, Basting & MacDougall, S.C., Janesville, and James C. Alexander, Wisconsin Judicial Commission, and oral argument by Thomas J. Basting. 2 2001 WI 96 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 00-0640-J STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT FILED In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Robert Crawford, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge. JUL 9, 2001 Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI Wisconsin Judicial Commission, Complainant, v. The Honorable Robert Crawford, Respondent. JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding. Judge suspended from office. ¶1 is not PER CURIAM about: it We emphasize at the outset what this case is not about a judge's right to comment publicly on or criticize the administration of the courts, the justice system or the district attorney's office. Judge Robert Crawford did not forfeit his right to speak freely and petition about such matters when he took the bench, nor does any judge. However, the conduct at issue in this case went beyond mere criticism of the administration of the justice system, and descended into threats and attempted coercion, undertaken with No. 00-0640-J the purpose of overcoming another judge's legitimate, reasoned judgment on an administrative issue. ¶2 This intimidate case is another about judge. Judge Judge Crawford's Crawford attempts made to numerous allegations against Milwaukee County's chief judge, the chief judge's daughter (an attorney in the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office) and the district court administrator, suggesting that they had engaged in "influence peddling" and other misconduct in office. He threatened to "go public" with his allegations unless the chief judge dropped his attempts to regulate Judge Crawford's court hours. ¶3 In other words, Judge Crawford tried to coerce the chief judge to change an administrative order by threatening to publicly accuse the chief judge, a member of his family, and his top administrator of professional misconduct. That is, Judge Crawford tried to force the chief judge's hand, by threatening public disclosure of extraneous, unfounded, but nevertheless potentially embarrassing professional and personal matters. ¶4 Judge Crawford's attempt to intimidate a judge in the performance of his official duties is a direct assault on the independence and integrity of the judiciary. 60.03(2) states a principle of judicial Supreme Court Rule independence. It provides that "[a] judge may not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment." Judge Crawford attempted to induce Chief Judge Michael Skwierawski to violate this provision of the Code of 2 No. Judicial Conduct. 00-0640-J This case, therefore, goes to the heart of judicial independence. ¶5 We conclude,1 as did the panel, that Judge Crawford's attempt to intimidate another judge violated SCR 60.03(1), which provides that "[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law [including the Code of Judicial Conduct] and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." in the By attempting to intimidate a fellow judge to decide a disputed matter on the basis of family and political considerations rather than the merits, Judge Crawford acted in a manner that undermined rather than promoted public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.2 1 We review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.91 (1999-2000), the judicial conduct panel's findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation for discipline. Section 757.91 provides: Supreme court; disposition The supreme court shall review the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations under s. 757.89 and determine appropriate discipline in cases of misconduct and appropriate action in cases of permanent disability. The rules of the supreme court applicable to civil cases in the supreme court govern the review proceedings under this section. All subsequent statutory references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the (1999-2000) edition. 2 SCR 60.03(1) states: (1) A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 3 No. ¶6 00-0640-J The panel recommended that Judge Crawford be suspended from judicial office for one year.3 We conclude that a 75-day suspension of Judge Crawford from the bench is appropriate. The panel also found that Judge Crawford violated SCR 60.04(2)(a) requiring a judge to discharge administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and encouraging cooperation with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business. SCR 60.04(2)(a) states: (2) In the performance of the duties under this section, the following apply to administrative responsibilities: (a) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and should cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business. Wisconsin Stat. § 757.81(4)(a) provides: (4) "Misconduct" includes any of the following: (a) Wilful violation of a rule of the code of judicial ethics. 3 The panel also concluded that Judge Crawford's conduct violated Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4). Wisconsin Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4) provides: (1) Whoever, either verbally or by any written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse or accuses another of any crime or offense, or threatens or commits any injury to the person, property, business, profession, calling or trade, or the profits and income of any business, profession, calling or trade of another, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against the person's will or omit to do any lawful act, is guilty of a Class D felony. 4 No. 00-0640-J I ¶7 On March 6, 2000, the Judicial Commission (Commission) filed a complaint with this court alleging that Judge Crawford had violated the Code of Judicial Ethics. Judge Harry G. Snyder, Judge Richard S. Brown, and Judge Daniel P. Anderson, all of District II of the Court of Appeals, were appointed to serve as members of the judicial conduct panel Commission's allegations against Judge Crawford. to hear the On September 18-21, 2000, the panel conducted an evidentiary hearing in this matter at which both the Judicial Commission and Judge Crawford appeared with counsel. ¶8 Judge Crawford recited below occurred. does not dispute that the events Further, he does not dispute that the various oral and written statements attributed to him were, in fact, made by him. ¶9 court Although his written and oral arguments before this were imprecise on the subject,4 it appears that Judge Crawford's specific dispute with the facts of this matter is reflected in the assertion that Chief Judge Skwierawski "did not provide neutral leadership while enforcing his stop-work order," (4) Whoever violates sub. (1) by attempting to influence the official action of any public officer is guilty of a Class D felony. 4 Notwithstanding general concessions on his part that, for example, "the factual basis may be mistaken" for the petition he filed with this court, he also asserts that "his beliefs were substantially correct" and "he continues to believe the gist of the petition is true." 5 No. 00-0640-J and that his allegations regarding the chief judge s daughter, Assistant District Attorney Audrey Skwierawski, had a factual foundation. The panel concluded that these allegations against Chief Judge Skwierawski and Audrey Skwierawski were unfounded, and, as factual deference. In findings, any event, its conclusions however, our are entitled disposition of to this matter does not depend on the factual basis for Judge Crawford's allegations Chief about Judge Assistant Skwierawski. District That Attorney Judge Skwierawski Crawford used or these personal and professional misconduct allegations in an effort to gain leverage over the chief judge in an effort to pressure him to change an administrative order is the material point. ¶10 We need not review or adopt every finding of fact of the panel since we base our decision solely on the following facts as drawn from those findings and as supported by the record.5 ¶11 Shortly after Judge Crawford took the bench in August 1996, he began to regularly remain on the bench into the lunch hour and discussions after in regular 1997 with business then hours. Chief Judge He had Patrick several Sheedy regarding the impact of these hours on Judge Crawford's staff. 5 The standard of review to be applied to the panel's findings of fact by this court is the clearly erroneous standard, formerly expressed in terms of "against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence." See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d 57, 69, 429 N.W.2d 759 (1988); In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 509, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980). 6 No. This situation resulted in the issuance of a July 00-0640-J 2, 1997, administrative order ("the Sheedy order") which directed Judge Crawford to give the staff various breaks during the day and to consult with Chief Judge Sheedy before proceeding with extended hours. Judge Crawford was warned that the directives in the order were mandatory and his failure to follow them would result in sanctions. He did not question the authority of Chief Judge Sheedy to issue the order nor did he seek review of it by this court. The Sheedy order was issued under the authority given to a chief judge by SCR 70.20 and SCR 70.19(1), (3)(c), and (3)(f) and 70.20.6 6 SCR 70.19(1), (3)(c) and (3)(f) provides: (1) The chief judge is the administrative chief of the judicial administrative district. The chief judge is responsible for the administration of judicial business in circuit courts within the district, including its personnel and fiscal management. The general responsibility of the chief judge is to supervise and direct the administration of the district, including the judicial business of elected, appointed and assigned circuit judges. (3) In the exercise responsibility, the chief duties: (c) Where necessary, hours for court operation. (f) of his or her general judge has the following establishment of days and Establishment of policies and plans. SCR 70.20 provides: Authority of the chief judge The chief judge shall exercise within the judicial administrative district the full administrative power of the judicial branch of government subject to the administrative control of 7 No. ¶12 to Judge 00-0640-J A March 23, 1998, memorandum from Chief Judge Sheedy Crawford reiterated the limitations on his court schedule, absent prior approval from Chief Judge Sheedy. Once again Judge Crawford did not seek review of this restriction. ¶13 Chief Judge Sheedy was succeeded as chief judge by Judge Michael Skwierawski in August 1998. Receiving information suggesting that Judge Crawford was violating the Sheedy order, Chief Judge Skwierawski, with the assistance of District Court Administrator Bruce Crawford's compliance. Harvey, examined the status of Judge The information received, primarily from Judge Crawford's staff, was that he was continuing to deprive his staff of required breaks and was conducting court beyond the specified hours. ¶14 As a result, Chief Judge Skwierawski requested that Judge Crawford meet with him on November 20, 1998. Mr. Harvey and another circuit judge also attended the meeting during which Chief Judge Skwierawski confronted Judge Crawford with the information concerning his alleged noncompliance with the Sheedy order.7 Judge Crawford denied violating the order and accused Chief Judge Skwierawski of pressing this matter only because the supreme court. The chief judge may order that his or her directives, policies and rules be carried out. Failure to comply with an order of the chief judge may be grounds for discipline under sections 757.81 to 757.99 of the statutes. 7 The panel further found that Judge Crawford had continued to violate the Sheedy order, requiring the actions taken by Judge Skwierawski, and that Judge Crawford's various allegations against the other individuals were without factual foundation. 8 No. Judge Crawford had been previously critical of 00-0640-J Assistant District Attorney Audrey Skwierawski, Chief Judge Skwierawski's daughter, and the district attorney's office in general. Judge Crawford further accused Chief Judge Skwierawski of "influence peddling." He stated he would "go public" with his criticisms of Audrey Skwierawski if Chief Judge Skwierawski did not drop the criticism of his hours. ¶15 arose out Judge Crawford's allegations about Audrey Skwierawski of circumstances beginning with her assignment to Judge Crawford's court for a few months in 1996, after which she asked to be reassigned because of what she considered the adverse working conditions in that court. ¶16 complaint In as May a 1998 Audrey "negotiated Skwierawski issuance," prepared alleging a a criminal misdemeanor fourth-degree sexual assault against a defendant who had already agreed to plead guilty to the charge as part of a plea bargain. The case was assigned to Judge Crawford's court and scheduled for a guilty plea proceeding. ¶17 The complaint recited the 14-year old female victim's account of the incident, in which she alleged that the defendant held a gun to her neck, threatened to kill her, and forced her to have non-consensual sexual intercourse. The complaint also recounted the statement of the 17-year old defendant, in which he admitted the sexual intercourse, but said it was consensual and not the result of any threats, nor at gunpoint, and that the victim was retaliating against him because he had ended their relationship. One of the investigating 9 officers uncovered No. 00-0640-J material inconsistencies in the victim's version of the incident and concluded that she had either lied about or substantially exaggerated what had occurred. Nevertheless, because the victim was underage, and consent was therefore not a defense, the case was charged, but as a "negotiated issuance" misdemeanor instead of a felony. ¶18 Audrey Skwierawski did not handle the plea in front of Judge Crawford on July 22, 1998, because it was reassigned to the regular assistant district attorney handling matters in his court at the time. questioned whether During the plea colloquy, Judge Crawford the case had been appropriately charged, although he eventually accepted the plea. ¶19 sent a Michael Two months later, in September of 1998, Judge Crawford memorandum McCann to Milwaukee claiming that County Audrey District Skwierawski Attorney had filed E. a criminal complaint that "she knew was materially false." ¶20 Chief Judge Skwierawski reissued Chief Judge Sheedy's hours-of-operation order for Judge Crawford's court on November 24, 1998, ("the Skwierawski order"). In general, Judge Crawford was again required to adhere to the designated scheduling and not to deviate without permission from Chief Judge Skwierawski or Mr. Harvey. ¶21 On January 11, 1999, Judge Crawford sent a memorandum to Chief Judge Skwierawski in which he threatened to petition this court if Judge Skwierawski did not vacate his work hours order within three days. of Judge Crawford also sought the removal District Court Administrator Harvey, 10 who is married to a No. 00-0640-J Milwaukee County assistant district attorney, complaining that he was "misusing his administrative position by entertaining complaints from the district attorney's office on my rulings." Judge Crawford also asserted that on several prior occasions, both in public and in private, Mr. Harvey had criticized his sentencing practices. ¶22 Judge Crawford and Chief Judge Skwierawski met January 14, 1999, with two other circuit judges present. on Judge Crawford denied violating either the Sheedy or the Skwierawski orders and claimed that Chief Judge Skwierawski was merely retaliating against him because of his prior criticism of Audrey Skwierawski and the district attorney's office. ¶23 At this meeting, Judge Crawford also claimed that in March 1997 he received an anonymous letter, which he had since destroyed, stating that he would be a "one-term judge" and that he was "cuckoo." Judge Crawford told Chief Judge Skwierawski that he believed, based on the handwriting and other factors, that Audrey Skwierawski had sent him the letter. ¶24 Once again Judge Crawford told Chief Judge Skwierawski that if he did not withdraw his work hours order, he would "go public" concerning "influence Skwierawski and Mr. conduct his court, in considered to be Harvey, peddling" and including a false criminal sending of the anonymous letter. by about Audrey her drafting complaint and Chief Skwierawski's of what her he alleged Judge Crawford was agitated at this meeting and his tone and demeanor were threatening. 11 Judge Chief No. Judge Skwierawski informed Judge Crawford that he 00-0640-J would not vacate either his order or the Sheedy order. ¶25 Later that day Judge Crawford sent an e-mail to all circuit judges in Milwaukee County, recounting the meeting with Chief Judge Skwierawski and again threatening to "go public" with allegations of "insider lobbying and influence peddling," as well as what he perceived to be irregularities in Milwaukee judges' work hours. ¶26 On January 28, 1999, Judge Crawford filed a "Petition for Review of Administration in First Judicial District" with this court, asking it to vacate the Skwierawski order, remove Chief Judge Skwierawski as chief judge, and fire Mr. Harvey as district court administrator. The petition repeated the allegations against these two, as well as Audrey Skwierawski and the district attorney's Commission took up the office. matter Ultimately and Judge Crawford with this court. filed a the complaint Judicial against The matter was referred to the chief judge of the court of appeals for the selection of a judicial conduct panel. ¶27 Crawford unfounded The panel concluded wilfully violated allegations as SCR against a matter 60.03(1) other of by members law that making of the Judge numerous justice system, and that this did not promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It also concluded that Judge Crawford wilfully violated SCR 60.04(2)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4) by his conduct during the January 14, 1999, meeting with Chief Judge Skwierawski and his subsequent 12 No. filing of the petition before this court. 00-0640-J In this regard, the panel concluded that Judge Crawford s conduct demonstrated that he had failed to maintain professional competence in matters of judicial and administration and failed to cooperate with Chief Judge Skwierawski and other court officials in the administration of court business. II ¶28 Judge Crawford was charged with violating SCR 60.03(1) requiring a judge to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence judiciary. The in panel the integrity concluded and that impartiality he had of violated the this standard.8 ¶29 The Comments to standard to actual conduct. the rule assist in applying the The Comments recognize that the standard might be violated in a variety of ways and that it is not practical to list every conceivable prohibited act in the Code itself. Improprieties under the rule include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of the Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities 8 with integrity, This court determines whether the facts found by the panel constitute a violation of this provision independently of the panel. See Wis. Stat. § 757.91 (rules applicable to civil cases govern the review); Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 223 Wis. 2d 417, 426, 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999) (application of facts to pertinent law is question of law which supreme court reviews independently of lower courts' determinations). 13 No. impartiality and competence is impaired. 00-0640-J The Comment reads in full as follows: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the chapter. Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this chapter. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired. ¶30 As we explained previously, the events that led to this proceeding started with a dispute between Judge Crawford and two successive chief judges over the hours of his court. Judge Crawford had a right to disagree with the restrictions placed upon him, to express his disagreement publicly and to petition this court for redress. ¶31 Judge But Judge Crawford was not entitled to threaten Chief Skwierawski administrative in an decision. effort In to this compel case, him the to change threat to his Chief Judge Skwierawski involved members of the chief judge's family and the district court administrator. 14 In the meetings with No. 00-0640-J Chief Judge Skwierawski on November 20, 1998, and January 14, 1999, and the January 11, 1999, memorandum, as well as in the January 14, 1999, e-mail, Judge Crawford attempted to force Chief Judge Skwierawski to change his administrative order by threatening to "go public" with his "influence peddling" and misconduct allegations. Judge Sheedy duties as before him was chief judge administrative order. with those Chief actions, Judge acting in Skwierawski and within issuing the and scope Chief of enforcing his the Whatever the validity of his disagreement Judge Crawford improperly pressured the chief judge to alter the situation by use of threats instead of reason. ¶32 in Judge Crawford's threats against the chief judge were, effect, Judge attempts Crawford was to induce pressuring him the to chief violate judge SCR to 60.03(2). decide the administrative dispute on the basis of family relationships and political considerations rather than the merits, conduct which, if committed, would itself violate the Code. Supreme Court Rule 60.03(2) specifically provides: "[a] judge may not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment." ¶33 Judges are obligated to "comply with the law." SCR This includes court rules such as the Code. SCR 60.03(1). 60.01(10).9 9 SCR 60.01(10) provides: In this chapter: 15 No. ¶34 Judge Crawford compromise Chief Judge was plainly Skwierawski's attempting judgment to in 00-0640-J improperly the ongoing dispute over court hours by appealing to his relationship with his daughter, his top system. order administrator and others in the court Had Chief Judge Skwierawski altered his administrative in Crawford capitulation would have to Judge succeeded in Crawford's coercing threats, another Judge judge to violate the Code. ¶35 to Judges are sworn to exercise independent judgment and decide without cases regard pressures, to such relationships. and administrative improper as matters extraneous family, social, on influences political the merits, or outside or other Judge Crawford threatened the chief judge in an attempt to overcome his otherwise legitimate, reasoned judgment on an administrative issue. This conduct undermines public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in general10 and in Judge Crawford's integrity and impartiality in particular. A judge who attempts to manipulate administrative (10) "Law" means constitutional provisions published court decisions. 10 court rules, statutes, and legal conclusions in See generally In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1970): [C]riticism taken by methods which prevent honest discussion and a fair rebuttal can be expected only to have a destructive result . . . [I]f the methods used raise suspicion of motives among the judges, and renders the courts all suspect to the public, the result can only be an increase in disrespect for law and order . . . . 16 No. decisions by demonstrates threats an of attitude a retaliatory about the and 00-0640-J personal boundaries of nature legitimate judicial decision-making that is inconsistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Judge Crawford's conduct in this regard violated of SCR 60.03(1).11 ¶36 There can be no dispute that Judge Crawford's conduct was wilful. Indeed, he does not assert that it was anything other than freely made, and does not claim that it was the 11 Judge Crawford has challenged the panel's conclusion that his conduct violated SCR 60.04(2)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4) although he has not been criminally charged with this offense. With respect to the latter, it was the panel's opinion that once Judge Crawford threatened to "go public" with his allegations, he violated this statute because he was threatening injury to the "profession, trade or calling" of Judge Skwierawski, a public official, "with intent to compel" him to vacate his earlier order against his will. Crawford has argued that this statute is overbroad as it criminalizes the dissemination of information which is merely fair comment on the administration of justice. We do not need to reach the issue concerning the application of SCR 60.04(2)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) to Judge Crawford's conduct. As a general rule, when resolution of one issue disposes of a matter, we will not address additional issues. See, e.g., Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998). We have concluded that Judge Crawford violated SCR 60.03(1), and impose a sanction on that basis alone. We also reach no conclusion as to whether Judge Crawford maintained improper court hours to begin with and whether he violated the Sheedy and Skwierawski orders. The sanction which we impose in this case does not reflect any determination with respect to this matter. We do, however, caution Judge Crawford that after his suspension is completed he must follow these, and any similar, orders of the chief judge unless directed otherwise by this court. 17 No. product of duress or coercion.12 00-0640-J Further, no judge could have reasonably concluded that it was proper to attempt to influence the actions of a chief judge by means of threats. ¶37 We do not seek by this decision to stifle criticism by judges regarding matters of concern to the administration of justice and to the public. But the right to voice criticism 12 The statutory definition of judicial misconduct requires "wilful violation" of the Code and past cases have defined that term. In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d 708, 729, 580 N.W.2d 307 (1998) stated: Prior judicial disciplinary cases have established that "wilful" means that the judge's conduct was not the result of duress or coercion and that the judge knew or should have known that the conduct was prohibited by the Code of Judicial Ethics. In [citation omitted], the statutory term "wilful" was understood to mean "freely made and not the result of duress or coercion." 18 No. does not exist in a vacuum. 00-0640-J Rather, the right must be exercised in a fashion that comports with the Code of Judicial Ethics.13 III ¶38 In reprimand, standard imposing censure, stated in discipline suspension, In the in this or removal,14 Matter of case, which we Judicial may employ be the Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dreyfus, 182 Wis. 2d 121, 129, 513 N.W.2d 13 Judge Crawford asserts that his conduct is protected by his rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government. But that defense is irrelevant as we have decided this case. Unlike the panel, we have not ruled on the factual basis for his various allegations. Thus it is unnecessary to decide whether, as he claims, his conduct is sanctionable only if it violates an actual malice standard. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation claim by public official against newspaper requires proof of actual malice). We also are not sanctioning Judge Crawford for having petitioned this court, whatever the truthfulness of the statements in that petition. Finally, we note regardless that in general judges are subject to some limitation on their constitutional rights that might not otherwise apply to private citizens. See In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989); In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975); Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485. As Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 1990) stated: "[T]he state may restrict the speech of elected judges in ways that it may not restrict the speech of other elected officials." 14 Article VII, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: Each justice or judge shall be subject to reprimand, censure, suspension, removal for cause or for disability, by the supreme court pursuant to procedures established by the legislature by law. No justice or judge removed for cause shall be eligible for reappointment or temporary service. This section is alternative to, and cumulative with, the methods of removal provided in sections 1 and 13 of this article and section 12 of article XIII. 19 No. 00-0640-J 604 (1994): "[t]he discipline imposed should be determined by the extent that the public needs protection from unacceptable judicial behavior, based upon the seriousness of the judge's misconduct and the likelihood that it would recur." Discipline is we not intended discipline on to a punish de novo the judge. basis, Further, although recommendation is entitled to some deference. impose the panel's In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 513, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980). ¶39 The sanction that we impose must convey to the public the gravity with which this court views judicial misconduct. Those who sit in judgment in both civil and criminal matters, in which the lives and livelihood of the citizens of this state are involved, must be above reproach. When a judge fails to live up to the demanding, but necessary, standards that are imposed upon the elected judiciary, the integrity of the entire judicial process can be only reaffirmed by a sanction commensurate with the conduct. ¶40 Past judicial misconduct cases before this court are of limited usefulness in setting the sanction appropriate for this case, which involves unique circumstances. We have not established, nor will we here, a "bright line" standard when, for example, reprimand or censure is warranted as opposed to suspension. basis of Each case is different, and is considered on the its own facts. This individualized approach discipline, however, is guided by some general principles. 20 to No. ¶41 Suspension measures," 00-0640-J are "drastic or repeated Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d at 513. Factors and generally removal reserved violations of the Code. from for very office serious considered in establishing the length of a suspension, either in aggravation or in mitigation, have included a history of prior judicial misconduct (in Gorenstein and In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van Susteren, 118 Wis. 2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984)), and the presence of a remorseful and cooperative attitude (in Dreyfus). ¶42 Judge Crawford has engaged in seriously unacceptable judicial behavior. impropriety of his remorse for it. as a He has demonstrated no understanding of the behavior and therefore has expressed no Indeed, he has continuously portrayed himself maverick, an innocent victim of a "hostile work environment" who has an absolute "right to be obnoxious in [his] public expression." He apparently believes that it is perfectly ethical for one judge to threaten another in order to overcome his reasoned judgment and decide a disputed issue on the basis of something other than the merits, indeed, on the basis of extraneous personal and political considerations. This demonstrates a serious disregard for the responsibilities of a judge. ¶43 been On the other hand, Judge Crawford has not previously disciplined. Accordingly, we invitation to remove him from office. decline the Commission's While Judge Crawford's misconduct was serious, it was not so substantial a threat to the public as to warrant the ultimate sanction of removal. 21 It No. 00-0640-J did not occur in the performance of his adjudicative role, and it did not affect the specific rights of any litigant or member of the public. His misconduct occurred in the context of an internal administrative matter, and implicated more generalized concerns. ¶44 To be sure, Judge Crawford's willingness to resort to personal, political threats in his running feud with successive chief judges unethical. and was disturbingly and clearly His tactics were vigorously and properly resisted, therefore did not contains out-of-bounds no accomplish evidence that their Judge purpose. Crawford has The record engaged in unethical behavior in the cases that come before him on the bench. Therefore, we also conclude that Judge Crawford's conduct does not warrant the one-year suspension recommended by the panel. A lesser sanction will suffice both to protect the public and to convey to Judge Crawford the impropriety of his conduct such that it is unlikely to recur. ¶45 Clearly, insufficient. however, Judge reprimand Crawford misused or censure alone is his judicial position, calling into question his understanding of and capacity to abide by the rules that govern all judges in their conduct on and off the bench. ¶46 We conclude that the appropriate sanction suspension from judicial office for a period of 75 days. period is misconduct commensurate and the with extent the to gravity which it of Judge is a This Crawford's jeopardized public confidence in the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 22 No. This suspension is sufficiently long to impress 00-0640-J upon Judge Crawford the fundamental requirements of judicial office and to demonstrate to the public the judiciary's dedication to preserving integrity within its ranks. ¶47 IT discipline. IS ORDERED that Judge Crawford's conduct merits He is hereby suspended from the office of circuit judge without compensation, and prohibited from exercising any of the powers or the duties of a circuit judge in the state of Wisconsin, for a period of 75 days, commencing July 31, 2001. 23 No. 24 00-0640-J
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