Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Adkins (dissenting)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 31592 Horace Mann Insurance Company v. Charles W. Adkins, Jr., individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Cory Adkins, deceased, and Sandra K. Adkins Maynard, Chief Justice, dissenting: FILED June 30, 2004 released at 3:00 p.m. RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA I would affirm the ruling of the circuit court that Horace Mann was not obligated to pay UIM benefits to Mr. Adkins because he did not, in settling his underlying claim, exhaust the available limits of liability coverage. This Court has held that [w]here provisions in an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous and where such provisions are not contrary to a statute, regulation, or public policy, the provisions will be applied and not construed. Syllabus, Tynes v. Supreme Life Ins. Company of America, 158 W.Va. 188, 209 S.E.2d 567 (1974). The majority opinion acknowledges that the exhaustion clause incorporated by Horace Mann into the Adkins policies of insurance appears to be facially capable of but one construction: that all applicable policies of liability coverage must be exhausted before an insured may recover UIM benefits thereunder. I would have ended my analysis there and upheld the policy language. Unlike the majority opinion, I simply do not believe this language violates public policy, and I see no need to adopt a new-fangled and confusing legal doctrine to get around the policy s plain language. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
