James v. James
Annotate this Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST
VIRGINIA
January 1998 Term
_____________
No. 24677
_____________
DAVID C. JAMES
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
VICKIE V. JAMES
Defendant Below, Appellant
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Braxton County
Honorable A. L. Sommerville, Judge
Civil Action No. 91-C-176
Reversed and Remanded with Directions
______________________________________________________
Submitted: April 29, 1998
Filed: May 18, 1998
Arden J.
Curry William
C. Garrett
Pauley, Curry, Strugeon &
Vandeford Gassaway,
WV 25043
Charleston,
WV Attorney
for Appellant
Attorney for Appellee
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS
1. "A circuit
court should review findings of fact made by a family law master
only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the
application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion
standard." Syllabus Point 1, Stephen L. H. v. Sherry L.
H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995).
2. "Under
the clearly erroneous standard, if the findings of fact and the
inferences drawn by a family law master are supported by
substantial evidence, such findings and inferences may not be
overturned even if a circuit court may be inclined to make
different findings or draw contrary inferences." Syllabus
Point 3, Stephen L. H. v. Sherry L. H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995).
3. "Where,
during the course of the marriage, one spouse transfers title to
his or her separate property into the joint names of both
spouses, a presumption that the transferring spouse intended to
make a gift of the property to the marital estate is consistent
with the principles underlying our equitable distribution
statute." Syllabus Point 4, Whiting v. Whiting, 183
W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).
Per Curiam:See footnote 1
1
Vickie V. James, the appellant in this
divorce appeal, claims that the Circuit Court of Braxton County
erred in failing to adopt the recommendations of the family law
master relating to the distribution of the parties' marital home
and to the distribution of the value of a GTX Plymouth
automobile.
I.
This appeal stems from a property
distribution order entered by the Circuit Court of Braxton County
on May 9, 1997. In that order, the circuit court ruled that
$41,798.84 contributed by the appellant's husband, David C.
James, and his grandfather, toward the construction of the
parties' jointly-owned marital home was the separate property of
David C. James. The circuit court also ruled that the total value
of a GTX Plymouth automobile, purchased by David C. James prior
to the parties' marriage, but restored with marital funds after
the parties' marriage, was wholly the separate property of David
C. James.
In making this order, the circuit court
rejected the recommendations of the family law master that the
contributions to the marital home be treated as marital property
and that the increase in value of the GTX Plymouth automobile,
attributable to the expenditure of marital funds, also be treated
as marital property.
II.
The standard of review in cases such as
this is set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of Stephen L. H. v.
Sherry L. H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995), as
follows:
A circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family
law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should
review the application of the law to the facts under an abuse of
discretion standard.
In Syllabus Point 3 of
the same case, it is stated that under the clearly erroneous
standard, if the findings of fact and the inferences drawn from
them are supported by substantial evidence, the findings and
inferences should not be overturned by the circuit court.
III.
In Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va.
451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990), this Court discussed the
circumstances under which property should be classified as
marital or separate in a divorce proceeding. Among other things,
the Court indicated that where, during the course of the
marriage, one spouse transfers title to separate property into
the joint names of both spouses, a presumption arises that the
transferring spouse intended to make a gift to the marital
estate. Syllabus Point 4, Whiting v. Whiting, id.
The Court also indicated that where the property is jointly
utilized for marital purposes, that fact is an indicium that the
transfer was intended to make the property marital property. Note
18, Whiting v. Whiting, id.
In the present case the evidence shows
that David C. James applied the $41,798.84 which was previously
his separate property, and which was, in part, obtained from his
grandfather, to the construction of the parties' jointly-owned
home, a home which was later jointly utilized by the parties as
their marital residence. These facts, when read in light of the
holding in Whiting v. Whiting, id., indicate to
this Court that there was substantial evidence to support the
family law master's conclusion that the $41,798.84 was converted
into marital property.
With regard to the family law master's
recommendation that the increase in value of the GTX Plymouth
automobile be treated as marital property, the Court notes that
West Virginia Code § 48-2-1(e), specifically provides that
marital property includes:
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property
of either of the parties to a marriage, which increase results
from (A) an expenditure of funds which are marital property,
including an expenditure of such funds which reduces indebtedness
against separate property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise
increases the net value of separate property, or (B) work
performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.
The evidence is clear
that David C. James expended funds from the parties' joint
marital checking account for such things as restoring the GTX
Plymouth automobile and that Vickie V. James helped clean it. In
light of this, this Court believes that there was substantial
evidence to support the family law master's recommendation that
the increase in value after the marriage should be treated as
marital property.
As previously stated, Stephen L. H. v.
Sherry L. H., supra, requires a circuit court to adopt
a family law master's findings of fact and conclusions if they
are supported by substantial evidence and not the result of an
abuse of discretion. Here the family law master's findings and
conclusions that the $41,798.84 contributed to the construction
of the marital home and the increase in value of the GTX Plymouth
automobile after the parties' marriage were marital property were
supported by substantial evidence and were consistent with the
law. In light of this, the Court believes the circuit court erred
in refusing to adopt the family law master's recommendations. The
circuit court's order is, therefore, reversed, and this case is
remanded with directions that the circuit court adopt the family
law master's recommendations relating to the distribution of the
value of the marital home and the increase in value of the GTX
Plymouth automobile.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Footnote: 1 1 We point out that a per curiam opinion is not legal precedent. See Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W.Va. 197, 201 n.4, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4 (1992).
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