Erwin v. Henson etc.
Annotate this Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST
VIRGINIA
January 1998 Term
___________
No. 24181
___________
FRANK M. ERWIN, Legal Guardian of
JODY R. HENSON, an infant,
Plaintiff below,
v.
JODY R. HENSON, an infant,
Defendant below,
and
DENNIS R. HENSON, Administrator of the
estate of Shirley A. Henson,
Plaintiff below,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant below, Appellee.
ROBIN L. GODFREY,
Guardian ad Litem, Appellant.
________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Hon. Charles E. King, Judge
Case No. 96-MISC-39
REVERSED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________
Submitted: January 20, 1998
Filed: May 8, 1998
Robin L. Godfrey,
Esq. Mark
A. Atkinson, Esq.
Charleston, West
Virginia Dianna
G. Canfield, Esq.
Attorney for
Appellant Rose
& Atkinson
Charleston,
West Virginia
Attorneys
for the Appellee
JUSTICE STARCHER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "Where
attorney's fees are sought against a third party, the test of
what should be considered a reasonable fee is determined not
solely by the fee arrangement between the attorney and his
client. The reasonableness of attorney's fees is generally based
on broader factors such as: (1) the time and labor required; (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards
in similar cases." Syllabus Point 4, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986).
2. In
cases where a trial court appoints an attorney as a guardian ad
litem to represent the interests of an infant, in determining
the appropriate fee to be paid to the guardian ad litem,
the trial court shall consider the factors enunciated in Syllabus
Point 4 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176
W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986), except for factor number six.
3. Trial
courts must give an explanation on the record for any order
reducing the amount of fees or costs claimed by an attorney
appointed as a guardian ad litem by the court. The
explanation must provide enough guidance for the guardian ad
litem to respond meaningfully by petitioning the trial court
for reconsideration of the reduction order and allowing the
attorney to submit additional supporting written documentation or
explanation for the fees and costs. The trial judge's award is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Starcher, Justice:
The appellant in
this matter, Robin L. Godfrey ("Godfrey"), is an
attorney who was appointed as guardian ad litem for the
infants, Jody R. Henson and Jeremy Henson, in two cases before
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The appointment was made
pursuant to an insurance settlement offer in both cases. The
settlement was offered as a result of a car wreck in which one of
the infants was injured, and the mother of both children was
killed. The
guardian ad litem represented the interests of the infants
throughout the proceedings and requested his fees and costs at
the final hearing. The guardian ad litem outlined all of
the tasks he had undertaken as a result of his appointment and
presented this information to the trial court in a proposed order
in which the guardian ad litem also requested a certain
fee. The trial court signed the order confirming the duties
performed by the guardian ad litem, but crossed out the
requested fee and interlineated a fee that was half the requested
amount without an explanation.
The guardian ad
litem appeals, claiming that the circuit court abused its
discretion by reducing the guardian's requested fees by half.
I.
Facts and Background
On January 25,
1995, a car wreck occurred in St. Albans, West Virginia, when a
car driven by Robert Bonar ("Bonar"), insured by State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company ("State Farm"),
struck the side of a car driven by Dennis Henson
("Henson"), an
uninsured motorist. Henson was traveling with his wife,
Shirley Henson, and their two-year- old daughter, Jody Henson.
While driving in an area of heavy traffic, Henson attempted to
make a left turn across two lanes of traffic without the benefit
of a green arrow turn light. Bonar, coming in the opposite
direction, struck the Henson vehicle on the side, killing Shirley
Henson and seriously injuring two-year-old Jody Henson.
After being
released from the hospital, Jody Henson, along with her 11-year-
old brother Jeremy Henson, began living with their maternal
grandparents. An attorney was hired to represent the estate of
Shirley Henson, with Dennis Henson as the administrator of her
estate. The maternal grandfather, Frank Erwin, became the legal
guardian of the children.See
footnote 1 1
State Farm,
Bonar's insurance carrier, offered the policy limits of
$50,000.00 for two-year-old Jody Henson's bodily injury claim,
and $50,000.00 to the estate of Shirley Henson for the wrongful
death claim, without admitting liability. A petition was filed
with the Circuit Court of Kanawha County for permission to settle
the infant Jody Henson's claim under W.Va. Code, 44-10-14
[1929].See footnote 2 2
At the same time a petition was filed on behalf of the
estate of Shirley Henson requesting approval of the proposed settlement and for a distribution of the settlement funds pursuant to W.Va. Code, 55-7-6(b) [1992].See footnote 3 3 The circuit court
appointed attorney Robin Godfrey ("Godfrey") as
guardian ad litem for Jody R. Henson and Jeremy Henson in
both cases.See footnote 4 4
It appears from
the record that a hearing was set for February 15, 1996, but was
actually held on February 20, 1996. At the hearing, the court
proceeded to hear evidence on the bodily injury claim of Jody
Henson, but deferred action on the claim of the estate of Shirley
Henson until a later date.See
footnote 5 5
At the hearing on
the settlement of Jody Henson's claims, the guardian ad litem,
Godfrey, filed a motion for a stay of the case proceedings with
the circuit court due to the actions of Henson. Godfrey notified
the court that while the children had resided with their maternal
grandparents, the father of the children had apparently been
taking the
children's social security benefits and using the money for
his own benefit.See footnote
6 6 In his motion, Godfrey further set forth his
belief that Henson and the grandparents had entered into an
agreement by which the grandparents would be allowed to keep the
children without interference from Henson, with Henson being
permitted to retain the children's social security benefits.
According to the guardian ad litem, it was only when
settlement of the claims became imminent that Henson began
visiting his children on a frequent basis. He ultimately removed
the youngest child, Jody, from the home of the grandparents.
Because of the
guardian ad litem's concern for the children and his
suspicion that Henson's primary interest in the children was to
secure the children's benefits for his personal use, in his
motion to stay the proceedings the guardian ad litem
requested that the court: (1) order Henson to return the child to
the grandparents; (2) direct Henson not to remove either child
from the care of their grandparents except for limited
visitation; (3) order Henson to remove himself as representative
payee of the social security benefits for the children; (4)
remove Henson as the administrator of Shirley Henson's estate;
(5) require Henson to post bond to secure his compliance with the
court's order; and, (6) set a hearing for distribution of the
proceeds of the settlements, conditioned upon the immediate
return of Jody to her grandparents.
Also, because the
guardian ad litem did not believe that Henson should share
in the wrongful death benefits resulting from Shirley Henson's
death, negotiations relating to the distribution of the
settlement proceeds for the claims of Shirley Henson's estate
failed. On the day set for the hearing, the trial court first
approved the settlement offer from defendant insurance company,
and then proceeded with a bench trial on the issues relating to
"the conduct of Dennis R. Henson, a proposed beneficiary,
towards the decedent prior to her death."
The court
determined that Henson was "primarily at fault" for the
accident, and therefore was not permitted to share in the
insurance proceeds, except for his medical bills.See footnote 7 7 The
insurance proceeds for the wrongful death claim were divided
among the three children of the decedent.See footnote 8 8
The guardian ad
litem, in his representation of the two infant children in
both claims, recognized that the children would receive social
security benefits until the age of majority. Therefore, the
guardian ad litem went to extensive efforts to ensure that
the infant children's money was to be put into annuities, which
would begin providing each a monthly income when each of the
children reached the age of 18 years old.
Guardian ad
litem Godfrey also prepared releases and a proposed order in
which he set forth the work he had performed on behalf of the two
infant children, and his fees and costs. Godfrey requested
payment at a rate of $100.00 per hour. He provided a detailed
statement indicating that he worked a total of 83.6 hours on the
case. The trial
court, after several requests by the guardian ad litem,
accepted and signed the proposed order which stated that the rate
of payment was reasonable, and that the work performed was
reasonable and necessary. However, without explanation, the court
cut in half the total amount the guardian ad litem was to
be paid.See footnote 9 9
This appeal followed.
II.
Discussion
We have
previously discussed in detail the duties of a guardian ad
litem in abuse and neglect proceedings. In re Jeffrey
R.L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993).See footnote 10 10 However,
we have never discussed the unique role of a guardian ad litem
who has been appointed to represent the interests of an
infant for an insurance settlement.
America's courts have generally adopted the English common law regarding the guardianship of infants and those deemed incompetent. Under English common law, the King was entrusted with protecting infants and incompetents.See footnote 11 11 When it was determined that a guardian needed to be appointed to represent an infant, the King would issue a letter patent. This duty was eventually assumed by the Chancery Courts, which gave protection to infants who were deemed to lack the discretion necessary to manage their own interests.See footnote 12 12 American courts quickly adopted the policy of appointing guardians to protect the interest of minors, and today representation in the form of a guardian ad litem is provided for children in certain civil and criminal proceedings.See footnote 13 13 West Virginia has likewise followed the common law and allows for the appointment of guardians ad litem when an incompetent person, an infant, or a convict requires representation. W.Va. Code, 56-4-10 [1923].See footnote 14 14
The role of
the guardian ad litem is extremely valuable in our
judicial system. Without a guardian, those who most need justice
and protection may be denied it. To properly fulfill his or her
role, a guardian ad litem must be a vigorous advocate for
the client, but must throughly investigate the matter before the
court, to determine what would be in the client's best interest
-- often without assistance from the client.See footnote 15 15
We note with
approval that the guardian ad litem in this matter
performed those tasks demanded of his position in a professional
and thorough manner. He protected his clients from those who
might take financial advantage, examined various tax implications
of the proffered settlements, ensured that social security
benefits were being properly utilized, and established annuities
for his clients to ensure their financial security. We would hope
that all attorneys assigned to the role of guardian ad litem would
perform their responsibilities with as much dedication and
professionalism.
We now turn our
attention to the specific issue before this Court, which is the
appropriateness of a circuit court reducing the requested fees of
the appointed guardian ad litem, without providing reasons
why the requested fees were reduced.
We have
previously addressed other situations in which attorney fees are
paid by a third party, either by a government agency or a private
entity.See footnote 16 16
We have also established factors which must be examined when
an attorney is seeking fees from a third party in civil cases.
Those factors were set forth in Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Pitrolo;
Where attorney's
fees are sought against a third party, the test of what should be
considered a reasonable fee is determined not solely by the fee
arrangement between the attorney and his client. The
reasonableness of attorney's fees is generally based on broader
factors such as: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8)
the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Syllabus Point 4, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156
(1986).
Similar language
providing for the payment of attorneys' fees for the legal
representation of infants in cases where a court sanctioned
settlement is sought is found in W.Va. Code, 44-10-14
[1929]. This provision provides that, in determining the
attorney's fee (as opposed to a guardian ad litem fee),
the trial court shall:
. . . [take] into
consideration the amount to be paid as damages [to the infant],
the necessities of the infant, the nature of the injury, the
probability of recovery in case of suit, the difficulties
involved in effecting the settlement, and such other matters as
may properly have a bearing on the reasonable compensation to be
allowed to such attorney.
The fee of a guardian ad litem should be given the same
sort of consideration.
In the instant
case, the circuit court's order examined the factors set out in Aetna
Casualty, supra, and found that: (1) this matter required
substantial work; (2) that there were difficult questions
presented in this matter; (3) particular skill was required of
the guardian; (4) the attorney was precluded from other work due
to the amount of time expended on this case; (5) the request of
$100.00 per hour was reasonable, due to the difficult work
involved; (6) there was no previous fee agreement so this factor
was not relevant; (7) there were time limitations imposed on the
attorney; (8) the amount involved in the case was substantial;
(9) the attorney has been practicing law for over 20 years; (10)
that due to the difficulty involved, this would not be a very
"desirable case;" (11) due to the age of the children,
this case was made even more difficult; and (12) "given the
amount of work and the difficulty of the case, . . . the fees
proposed by the guardian ad litem are reasonable in light of
similar case[s]." After finding all of these facts, the
trial court without explanation reduced the attorney's requested
fees in half.
We believe the
factors, from the Aetna Casualty case, except for factor
number six, should be examined when determining fees for a
guardian ad litem. Therefore, we hold that in cases where
a trial court appoints an attorney as a guardian ad litem
to represent the interests of an infant, in determining the
appropriate fee to be paid to the guardian ad litem, the
trial court shall consider the factors enunciated in Syllabus
Point 4 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176
W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986), except for factor number six.
This Court
recognizes that the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the quality, quantity, and necessity for the legal work
pursued by a guardian ad litem on behalf of an infant. As
such this Court will give deference to the trial court in the
determination of the amount of attorney's fees to be allowed to a
guardian ad litem.
Nevertheless,
when a fee is requested of the trial court by a guardian ad
litem, as the trial court should have a standard to review
the request, supra, the guardian ad litem should
not be without recourse to challenge the trial court's award.
In Judy v.
White, 188 W.Va. 633, 425 S.E.2d 588 (1992), an attorney who
had been appointed to represent an indigent in a criminal appeal
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 29-21- 13a [1990] had his fees
reduced without explanation. In Judy we held that when a
circuit court reduces the amount of a fee requested by an
attorney who was appointed by the court to represent an indigent
criminal defendant, the trial court must provide some explanation
for the reduction. This explanation will provide the attorney a
meaningful opportunity to address the specific concerns of the
court and present evidence to support his claim.
We believe the reasoning in Judy, supra should also apply to fee requests made by guardians ad litem in civil cases. Therefore, trial courts must give an explanation on the record for any order reducing the amount of fees or costs claimed by an attorney appointed as a guardian ad litem by the court. The explanation must provide enough guidance for the guardian ad litem to respond meaningfully by petitioning the trial court for reconsideration of the reduction order and allowing the attorney to submit additional supporting written documentation or explanation for the fees and costs. The trial judge's award is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
III.
Conclusion
We therefore
reverse and remand this matter to the circuit court for
reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
Footnote: 1 1 The County Commission of Kanawha County appointed Frank Erwin legal guardian of the children on January 30, 1996, approximately one year after the car wreck.
Footnote:
2 2
W.Va. Code, 44-10-14 [1929] provides, in part:
In any case
where an infant is injured . . . , the legal guardian of such
infant may negotiate . . . for the settlement of any claim for
damages therefor. But the [legal] guardian shall, when proceeding
under this section, before making final settlement, file his
petition in equity with the circuit court of the county, . .
. in which he was appointed, for permission to
settle such claim . . . . The court . . . shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for the ward who shall answer the
petition. Upon the hearing thereof, the court . . . may
grant or refuse the petition by a proper order, as may seem just
and proper. In case the court or judge shall grant the petition,
there may be included in such order permission to the [legal]
guardian to pay to his attorney such amount in connection with
the settlement of the claim as in the discretion of the court or
judge is reasonable and proper, taking into consideration the
amount to be paid as damages, the necessities of the infant, the
nature of the injury, the probability of recovery in case of
suit, the difficulties involved in effecting the settlement, and
such other matters as may properly have a bearing on the
reasonable compensation to be allowed such attorney. In case the
court or judge approves the prayer of the petition, the [legal]
guardian may be authorized to settle and receive the amount of
the settlement, and to execute to the tort- feasor a release
therefor. . . .
Also, for a discussion on appointing
guardians ad litem, see State ex rel. West
Virginia Fire & Casualty Company v. Karl, 199 W.Va. 678,
487 S.E.2d 336 (1997).
Footnote:
3 3
W.Va. Code, 55-7-6(b) provides for the distribution of
"damages [settlement proceeds]" in a wrongful death
action. It states, in part:
In every such
action for wrongful death the jury, or in a case tried without a
jury, the court, may award such damages as to it may seem fair
and just, and, may direct in what proportions the damages shall
be distributed to the surviving spouse and children, including
adopted children and stepchildren, brothers, sisters, parents and
any persons who were financially dependent upon the decedent at
the time of his or her death or would otherwise be equitably
entitled to share in such distribution after making provision for
those expenditures, if any, specified in subdivision (2),
subsection (c) of this section [including reasonable funeral,
hospital and medical expenses]. If there are
no such survivors, then the damages shall be distributed in accordance with the decedent's will or, if there is no will, in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution as set forth in [W.Va. Code, 42-1-1] . . . .
Footnote: 4 4 One petition was filed for the bodily injury claim arising from the injuries sustained by infant Jody Henson, and a separate petition was filed for the wrongful death claims of the estate of Shirley Henson. These cases were later consolidated.
Footnote: 5 5 The trial court bifurcated the consolidated actions. The circuit court order reflects that the settlement for the bodily injury action of Jody Henson was approved at the hearing on February 20, 1996, and the issues involving the claim of the estate of Shirley Henson were heard at a bench trial on April 29, 1996. A single order covering both the hearing on the claims of Jody Henson, and the trial on the claims of the estate of Shirley Henson was not entered until July 29, 1996.
Footnote: 6 6 The guardian ad litem informed the circuit court that Henson had received over $11,000.00 in social security benefits that belonged to the children but had given the grandparents only $500.00 or $600.00.
Footnote: 7 7 In the order the court stated that because it found Henson "primarily at fault" for the accident and for "other reasons" which the court did not specify, Henson was entitled to no distribution except for his medical bills.
Footnote: 8 8 Shirley Henson, in addition to the children represented by the guardian ad litem, had a third child who was an adult at the time of the accident.
Footnote: 9 9 Godfrey also asserted that his costs were $645.57. This amount was left intact and is not at issue here.
Footnote:
10 10
We said in In re Jeffrey R.L.:
. . . each child in an abuse and
neglect case is entitled to effective representation of counsel.
To further that goal, W.Va. Code, 49-6-2(a) [1992]
mandates that a child has a right to be represented by counsel in
every stage of abuse and neglect proceedings. Furthermore, Rule
XIII of the West Virginia Rules for Trial Courts of Record
provides that a guardian ad litem shall make a full and
independent investigation of the facts involved in the
proceeding, and shall make his or her recommendations known to
the court. Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the West Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct, respectively, require an attorney to
provide competent representation to a client and to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
190 W.Va. at 39, 435 S.E.2d at 177.
For a more detailed explanation of the
duties of a guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect cases
see Appendix A in Jeffrey.
Footnote:
11 11
According to William Blackstone, a scholar of English laws:
[The King] is the general guardian of
all infants, idiots, and lunatics; and has the general
superintendence of all charitable uses in the kingdom. And all
this, over and above the vast and extensive jurisdiction which he
exercises in his judicial capacity in the court of chancery:
wherein, as in the exchequer, there are two distinct tribunals;
the one ordinary, being a court of common law; the other
extraordinary, being a court of equity.
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 47
(1768).
Footnote: 12 12 See Ellen K. Solender, The Guardian Ad Litem: A Valuable Representative or An Illusory Safeguard?, 7 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 619 (1976); see also Note, Guardianship in the Planned Estate, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 360 (1960).
Footnote: 13 13 See Jennifer L. Anton, Comment, The Ambiguous Role and Responsibilities of a Guardian Ad Litem in Texas in Personal Injury Litigation, 51 SMU L. Rev. 161 (1997).
Footnote: 14 14 A guardian ad litem may also be appointed in proceedings to sell, lease or mortgage
an infant's, an incompetent's, or a convict's land. W.Va. Code, 37-1-3, 37-1-12 [1949]. A guardian ad litem should also be appointed for adult respondents in abuse and neglect proceedings when they are involuntarily hospitalized for mental illness. Syllabus Point 3, In re Lindsey C., 196 W.Va. 395, 473 S.E.2d 110 (1995). A guardian ad litem will also be appointed in certain circumstance to represent infants in paternity suits. See Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 191 W.Va. 65, 443 S.E.2d 222 (1994). See also note 2, supra.
Footnote: 15 15 See Chris A. Milne, The Child's Tort Case: Ethics, Education and Social Responsibility, 30 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1097 (1997).
Footnote: 16 16 See, e.g. Statler v. Dodson, 195 W.Va. 646, 466 S.E.2d 497 (1995) (attorney for a pretermitted infant seeking fees for their services); Brown v. Thompson, 192 W.Va. 412, 452 S.E.2d 728 (1995) (attorney for an inmate working on civil rights matter); Sowa v. Huffman, 191 W.Va. 105, 443 S.E.2d 262 (1994) (what services will be compensated for when guardian ad litem represents an individual ruled incompetent); Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 191 W.Va. 65, 443 S.E.2d 222 (1994) (guardian ad litem appointed to represent infant in paternity suit); Judy v. White, 188 W.Va. 633, 425 S.E.2d 588 (1992) (attorney appealing reduction of fees in criminal matter); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986) (attorney seeking fees from insurance company which refused to defend insured without justification).
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