Stanley v. Stanley
Annotate this Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF
WEST VIRGINIA
September 1997 Term
_____________
No. 24031
_____________
JUDITH A. STANLEY,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee ,
v.
STEPHEN T. STANLEY,
Defendant Below, Appellant.
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County
Honorable George W. Hill, Judge
Civil Action No. 95-D-492
REVERSED AND REMANDED
____________________________________________________________________
Submitted: September 10, 1997
Filed: October 6, 1997
Henry R.
Glass Richard
A. Bush
Lovett, Cooper &
Glass Bush
& Trippel
Charleston, West
Virginia Parkersburg,
West Virginia
Attorney for
Appellant Attorney
for Appellee
The opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "In
reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master that
also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of
review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable
distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory
interpretations are subject to a de novo review." Syl. Pt.
1, Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264
(1995).
2. "'An
order directing a division of marital property in any way other
than equally must make specific reference to factors enumerated
in Sec. 48-2-32(c), and the facts in the record that support
application of those factors.' Syllabus Point 3, Somerville v.
Somerville, 179 W.Va. 386, 369 S.E.2d 459 (1988)." Syl.
Pt. 6, Wood v. Wood, 184 W.Va. 744, 403 S.E.2d 761 (1991)
3. "Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake." Syl. Pt. 2, McGinnis v. Cayton, 173 W.Va. 102, 312 S.E.2d 765 (1984).
Per Curiam:See
footnote 1 1
This appeal
arises from a final order of the Circuit Court of Wood County
granting a divorce to Stephen Thomas Stanley,
appellant/defendant, and Judith A. Stanley, appellee/plaintiff.
Mr. Stanley contends on appeal that the circuit court committed
error in denying his motion, under West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 60(b), to set aside the final judgment due to a
mistake in valuation of his pension plan. We agree.
I.
The relevant
facts of this case show that during the pendency of the divorce,
Brooks A. Cottle, CPA, was appointed to value Mr. Stanley's
pension plan. Mr. Cottle valued the pension plan at $360,712.00See footnote 2 2 Based
upon the valuation, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement, wherein Mrs. Stanley would receive
$98,000.00 in installments to satisfy her equitable claim
against the pension plan.See
footnote 3 3 The family law master submitted
recommendations to the circuit court which incorporated the
agreement. Prior to the circuit court's ruling on the
recommendations, Mr. Stanley learned that the valuation of the
pension plan was inaccurate.See
footnote 4 4 Mr. Stanley timely motioned the circuit
court to amend his previously filed petition for review. The
amended Petition for Review set forth the valuation error in the
pension plan. The circuit court denied the motion and entered a
final decree adopting the pension plan value as recommended by
the family law master. Mr. Stanley then timely filed a motion
under Rule 60(b) seeking to set aside the final decree. The
circuit court denied the motion. On appeal Mr. Stanley contends
that it was error to deny his Rule 60(b) motion. We agree.
II.
We have
succinctly set out in Syl. Pt. 1, Burnside v. Burnside,
194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995), the standard of review
appropriate to the instant proceeding. The facts involving the
alleged error in the valuation of the pension plan are consistent
with our decision in Langdon v. Langdon, 182 W.Va. 714,
391 S.E.2d 627 (1990). See also Syl. Pt. 6, Wood v.
Wood, 184 W.Va. 744, 403 S.E.2d 761 (1991);
Cross v. Cross, 178 W.Va. 563, 363 S.E.2d 449 (1987);
Syl. Pt. 2, McGinnis v. Cayton, 173 W.Va. 102, 312 S.E.2d 765 (1984). We therefore find it was error for the circuit court
to deny Mr. Stanley's Rule 60(b) motion.
Reversed and Remanded.
Footnote: 1 1 We point out that a per curiam opinion is not legal precedent. See Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W.Va. 197, 201 n.4, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n 4. (1992) ("Per curiam opinions ... are used to decide only the specific case before the Court; everything in a per curiam opinion beyond the syllabus point is merely obiter dicta.... Other courts, such as many of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, have gone to non-published (not-to-be-cited) opinions to deal with similar cases. We do not have such a specific practice, but instead use published per curiam opinions. However, if rules of law or accepted ways of doing things are to be changed, then this Court will do so in a signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion.").
Footnote: 2 2 By report dated December 28, 1995, Mr. Cottle determined the present value of the accrued pension benefit to be $360,712.00 (assuming a 1.9% COLA calculation or $292,453.00 assuming no COLA calculation).
Footnote: 3 3 Judith A. Stanley received other assets in the settlement, such that her equitable distribution share of all of the marital property --- including the pension valued at the minimum value of $292,345.00 was one-half of the marital estate.
Footnote: 4 4 In fact, the pension plan was overvalued at least $92,396.00.
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