State of WV v. McL., Robert K.
Annotate this Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF
WEST VIRGINIA
September 1997 Term
___________
No. 23951
___________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee,
v.
ROBERT K. McL.,
Infant Respondent, Appellant.
________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fayette County
Hon. John W. Hatcher, Jr., Judge
Case No. 96-JD-5
AFFIRMED
_______________________________________________________
Submitted: September 17, 1997
Filed: October 24, 1997
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.,
Esq. David
A. Eustis, Esq.
Attorney
General Assistant
Public Defender
Rory L. Perry, II,
Esq. Fayetteville,
West Virginia
Assistant Attorney
General Attorney
for Appellant
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellee
JUSTICE STARCHER delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. The provisions of W.Va. Code,
49-5-13 [1995] provide a "safety- valve" which assures
that the "automatic transfer" provisions of our
juvenile transfer law do not unconstitutionally divest and
deprive a circuit court of its ability to meaningfully consider
and weigh personal factors going to the suitability and
amenability of a juvenile for the rehabilitative purposes of the
court's juvenile jurisdiction.
2.
The "automatic transfer" provisions of W.Va.
Code, 49-5-10 [1995], when read in pari materia with
the provisions of W.Va. Code, 49-5-13 [1995], do not
unconstitutionally divest and deprive a circuit court of the
ability to consider personal factors going to the amenability of
a juvenile for the rehabilitative purposes of the court's
juvenile jurisdiction and to, in its discretion, return a child
to juvenile jurisdiction.
Starcher, Justice:
The
Circuit Court of Fayette County transferred the appellant, Robert
K. McL., a 15-year-old, to the adult criminal jurisdiction of the
court. The appellant argues that the "automatic
transfer" provisions of the juvenile transfer statute
violate his constitutional rights. Noting that there is a
specific statutory provision that authorizes the circuit court to
return the appellant to the court's juvenile jurisdiction if the
juvenile is convicted as an adult, we find that the
"automatic transfer" statute does not operate to
violate the appellant's constitutional rights. We affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
I.
Facts and Background
On February 14, 1996, the prosecuting attorney of Fayette County made a motion in the circuit court of Fayette County, pursuant to the provisions of W.Va. Code, 49-5-10(d) [1995],See footnote 1 1 to transfer the juvenile appellant, Robert K. McL., to the court's adult criminal jurisdiction. The appellant had been previously arrested and charged with killing his mother. At the time of the alleged offense, the appellant was 15 years old.
A
transfer hearing was held before the circuit court on August 9,
1996. On August 15, 1996, the circuit court entered an order
finding that there was probable cause to believe that the
appellant committed the crime of murder. Pursuant to that
finding, the circuit court ordered that the appellant be
transferred to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit court to
stand trial as an adult.
The circuit court
entered a separate order denying several motions made by the
appellant, including the appellant's motion to declare W.Va.
Code, 49-5-10(d) [1995] unconstitutional. On October 18,
1996, the appellant filed an interlocutory petition for appeal
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 49-5-10(j) [1995].See footnote 2 2
The appellant
does not contest the circuit court's finding of probable cause to
believe that the appellant had committed the crime of murder. The
appellant's principal contention in the instant case is that the
"automatic transfer" provisions of W.Va. Code,
49-5-10(d) [1995] violate the guarantees of equal protection and
due process contained in Article III, Section 10 of the West
Virginia Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The pertinent
parts of W.Va. Code, 49-5-10 [1995] stated (with emphasis
added):
(a) Upon written motion of the prosecuting attorney filed at
least eight days prior to the adjudicatory hearing . . . the
court shall conduct a hearing to determine if juvenile
jurisdiction should or must be waived and the proceeding
transferred to the criminal jurisdiction of the court. . . .
(d) The court shall transfer a juvenile proceeding to
criminal jurisdiction if there is probable cause to believe that:
(1) The child is at least fourteen years of age and has committed
the crime of treason . . . the crime of murder . . . the crime of
robbery involving the use or presenting of firearms or other
deadly weapons . . . the crime of kidnaping . . . the crime of
first degree arson . . . or the crime of sexual assault in the
first degree . . . or
(2) The child is at least fourteen years
of age and has committed an offense of violence to the person
which would be a felony if the child were an adult: Provided,
That the child has been previously adjudged delinquent for the
commission of an offense of violence to the person which would be
a felony if the child were an adult; or
(3) The child is at least fourteen years of age and has committed
an offense which would be a felony if the child were an adult:
Provided, That the child has been twice previously adjudged
delinquent for the commission of an offense which would be a
felony if the child were an adult.
The most notable word in this statutory language, for purposes of the instant appeal, is found in the first sentence of subsection (d): "The court shall transfer a juvenile proceeding to criminal jurisdiction if there is probable cause to believe . . . ", etc. (Emphasis added.) In 1995 this statute was amended, and the word "may" in the previous version of the statute was replaced with the "shall transfer" language quoted above.
The
1995 amendment also removed language which authorized a court to
consider personal or individual factors about a juvenile where
there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed
one of the enumerated serious offenses. These personal factors go
to the suitability or "amenability" of the juvenile for
the rehabilitative purposes of the circuit court's juvenile
jurisdiction, and include a juvenile's mental and physical
condition, maturity, emotional attitude, home or family
environment, school experience and similar personal factors. See
W. Va. Code, 49-5-10(g) [1997].
The appellant's
challenge to the constitutionality of this 1995 statutory
language change provides the principal basis for the instant
appeal.See footnote 3 3
II.
Discussion
We have not
confronted the issue of nondiscretionary, "automatic"
transfer of a juvenile to adult jurisdiction before.
However, we have
previously found that a circuit court is not required in
the exercise of its discretion to consider personal factors, when
presented with probable cause that a juvenile has committed a
statutorily enumerated offense.
In State ex
rel. Cook v. Helms, 170 W.Va. 200, 202-203, 292 S.E.2d 610,
612-613 (1981), this Court held that under the 1978 amendments to
W.Va. Code, 49-5-10
[1978], when a juvenile court is considering a
motion to transfer a juvenile charged with an enumerated crime,
. . . transfer may
be ordered solely on a finding of probable cause to believe that
the child committed any one of those enumerated crimes . . . [but]
the statute does not preclude a trial court judge from
considering evidence about the child's 'personal factors,' even
in circumstances where the child is accused of the enumerated
serious crimes. [And] [t]he trial court may
still determine to treat a child under the juvenile laws, even
where serious crimes are committed, if the court believes such
treatment is warranted. (Emphasis added).
In the instant
case we are faced with a change in statutory language that
diverges substantially from the standards and procedures set
forth in Cook. The 1995 statutory language (1) removes the
circuit court's statutory authorization to consider personal
factors, and (2) makes any consideration of personal factors
(whether by statutory authorization or not) irrelevant -- because
transfer to adult jurisdiction is automatic upon a finding of
probable cause.
The issue
presented by this substantial statutory change is whether
divesting and depriving a circuit court of the ability to
consider personal and other factors going to the suitability and
amenability of a juvenile for the circuit court's juvenile
jurisdiction -- and effectively assigning solely to the
prosecuting attorney the task of deciding which individuals of a
class of juveniles will be transferred to adult jurisdiction --
runs afoul of the constitutional guarantees of equal protection
and due process of law.
In
considering this issue, we first note that the United States
Supreme Court enunciated the rationale for juvenile transfer
statutes in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535, 95 S. Ct. 1779, ____, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 359 (1975).
[T]here appears
to be widely shared agreement that not all juveniles can benefit
from the special features and programs of the juvenile-court
system and that a procedure for transfer to an adult court should
be available. . . . [S]uch transfer provisions represent an
attempt to impart to the juvenile-court system the flexibility
needed to deal with youthful offenders who cannot benefit from
the specialized guidance and treatment contemplated by the
system.
In
State v. M.M., 163 W.Va. 235, 248, 256 S.E.2d 549, 556-557
(1979), in discussing juvenile transfer proceedings, we stated:
The decision to
try a juvenile as an adult has enormous and lifelong consequences
for the child and for society. The right to be treated as a
juvenile is a valuable right. But, the right must be balanced
against society's legitimate and ever-growing concern about
rapidly rising levels of juvenile crime. It is a balance that is
difficult to strike. Yet, in each case we must make a good faith
attempt to strike the balance.
Thus, our opinion
today is another chapter in the "continuing, perhaps eternal
search for a proper balance between the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system and the need to protect the general
public." State v. D.D., 172 W.Va. 791, 794, 310 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1983).
The juvenile law
of this state has developed both statutorily and judicially. State
v. Sonja B., 183 W.Va. 380, 384, 395 S.E.2d 803, 807 (1990).
We identified the
rights associated with our juvenile justice
system as having a substantive constitutional dimension in State
ex rel. R. S. v. Trent, 169 W.Va. 493, 497, 289 S.E.2d 166,
170 (1982) ("Juveniles are constitutionally entitled to the
least restrictive treatment that is consistent with the purpose
of their custody," citing State ex rel. K. W. v.
Werner, 161 W.Va. 192, 242 S.E.2d 907 (1978).)
We have also
stated that the determination of juvenile vs. adult jurisdiction
is the ultimate province of the court. In State v. D.D., supra,
we held that the transfer decision was properly with the courts,
and we questioned a system whereby whether a juvenile/adult
transfer occurs is "determined simply by the . . . [manner]
in which the prosecutor brings the charges . . .". 172 W.Va.
at 796, 310 S.E.2d at 862-863. We have said that in making such a
transfer determination, a court is not limited to considering the
specific personal factors about a juvenile which may be
enumerated by a transfer statute, and may consider other factors
which are promulgated by this Court. State ex rel. Cook,
supra. See also Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Smith v.
Scott, 160 W.Va. 730, 238 S.E.2d 223, (1977).
Our cases have
reflected a view of the role of courts in the adult/juvenile
jurisdiction determination which was shared by the Supreme Court
of Delaware in Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Del. 1994).
In Hughes, the court found unconstitutional a Delaware
statute which precluded all judicial review of the
appropriateness of adult jurisdiction for a minor charged with
serious offenses.
The
Delaware court said in Hughes:
In essence, the
statutory amendment has stripped the judiciary of its independent
jurisdictional role in the adjudication of children by granting
the charging authority the unbridled discretion to unilaterally
determine which forum has jurisdiction . . . . [T]he statute has
deprived children . . . [of] the judicial counterweight which
they are constitutionally entitled to receive.
653 A.2d at 249 (Emphasis added).
The
Hughes court held that a "reverse amenability"
hearing, at which a juvenile may present evidence tending to show
that he or she is amenable to the rehabilitative functions of
juvenile jurisdiction, was constitutionally required to be
provided for all juveniles, and that denying such a hearing
violated equal protection and due process. Id. at 253.
Turning for a
moment away from the altered role of the circuit court under the
new statutory language of W.Va. Code, 49-5-10 [1995], we
look to the role of the prosecuting attorney under the statutory
language in question.
W.Va. Code,
49-5-10 [1995] requires a circuit judge to automatically transfer
a juvenile to adult criminal jurisdiction (1) if the prosecution
makes a motion for such transfer, and (2) if the evidence
presented at the hearing shows probable cause that the juvenile
committed one of the enumerated offenses.
The statute does
not state or suggest that the prosecutor is required to make a
transfer motion for all juveniles for whom there is evidence
which might support a
finding of probable cause. Indeed, at oral
argument in the instant case, it was suggested that the Fayette
County prosecutor does not make transfer motions in many such
cases.
The statutory
language thus vests the prosecutor with the exclusive authority
to select which of the juveniles -- for whom he believes there is
evidence which might support a finding of probable cause -- will
be presented to the circuit court for "automatic
transfer" (presuming that the circuit court finds probable
cause that an enumerated offense was committed). W.Va. Code,
49-5-10 [1995] provides no standards to guide such a
determination by a prosecutor, and no mechanism for the review of
such a determination.
This
statutorily-unfettered grant of authority to the prosecuting
attorney to decide which juveniles will be presented to the
circuit court for transfer implicates particular concerns about
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
For example, if
two juveniles in different counties commit essentially the same
offense, and are essentially alike in terms of their
"personal factors," one juvenile could be transferred
to adult status and one remain as a juvenile -- depending solely
upon the different philosophies of two different prosecutors.
The equal
protection concerns which arise from such a grant of
(statutorily) unreviewable and standardless authority to a
prosecuting attorney recently led the Supreme Court of Utah to
hold that a Utah statute which gave prosecutors the role of
determining which minors would be treated as adults in the
criminal justice system violated Utah's state
constitutional guarantee of "uniform
operation of the laws." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991
(Utah 1995).
The court in Mohi
applied the traditional equal protection "reasonable
relationship" test to the Utah statute. The court found that
the prosecutor's decision as to which juveniles to file adult
charges against was arbitrary and standardless and in the sole
discretion of "prosecutors who have no guidelines as to how
it is to be exercised." Id. at 999. The Mohi
court noted that:
It is ironic that
the Act sets out in thirteen full paragraphs all of the factors
that a court must consider to certify a juvenile into the
adult system . . . but contains no guidelines for a
prosecutor who may choose for any reason or no reason to place
that juvenile into the adult system.
Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
Similarly, W.Va.
Code, 49-5-10 [1995] poses no obstacle to the prosecutor's
considering an unrestrained spectrum of personal and other
factors about a juvenile offense and offender, in deciding
whether to make a transfer motion. And the prosecutor's
consideration is -- according to the statute in question --
entirely one-sided, private and unreviewable.
Under the
"automatic transfer" provisions of W.Va.Code,
49-5-10 [1995], the crucial exercise of discretion in the
transfer process has shifted from the circuit court -- where
interested parties compete for justice under established rules of
an adversarial
system and are subject to appellate review --
to the private forum of an unreviewable, subjective decision of
an executive officer.See
footnote 4 4
The Mohi opinion
contrasts the on-the-record, public, reasoned, standards- based
and reviewable judicial transfer determination with the
off-the-record, private, standardless and unreviewable nature of
the determination made by a prosecuting attorney, in deciding
against which juveniles to bring a motion for transfer.
The court in Mohi
also persuasively refutes the argument that the discretion
historically afforded to prosecutorial charging decisions carries
over to the
. . . discretion
to choose which juveniles to prosecute in adult rather than in
juvenile court. . . . The scope for prosecutor stereotypes,
prejudices and biases of all kinds is simply too great. . . . The
challenged statute [unconstitutionally] permits prosecutors to
treat different offenders accused of the same criminal offense
differently. 901 P.2d at 1003-1004.See footnote 5 5
See also State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390,
408-411 (Utah 1989), Durham, J. (concurring and dissenting).
Concededly, until
Hughes and Mohi were decided, "automatic
transfer" mechanisms like that set forth in the 1995 changes
to W.Va.Code, 49-5-10 [1995], which substantially reduce
the ability of the judiciary to play a determinative role in
making the fundamental "amenability to juvenile
jurisdiction" decision, have routinely been held to be
impermeable to constitutional concerns. See, e.g., State in
the Interest of A.L., 271 N.J. 192, 200, 638 A.2d 814, 818
(1994); see also, Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811 (Wyo.
1995) (declining to follow Mohi).
We are guided by
our longstanding jurisprudence emphasizing the constitutional
need for reviewable, standard-driven determinations in connection
with juvenile/adult jurisdictional transfers, and by our
recognition of the unique ability of courts to provide a
constitutionally adequate forum for such a crucial and
fundamental determination.
We agree, in
part, with the reasoning of the Hughes and Mohi
opinions, to the extent that we believe that substantial equal
protection and due process concerns are implicated by the
statutory grant of authority to a prosecuting attorney of the
standardless,
unreviewable power to trigger against certain
juveniles an "automatic transfer" process, in which the
circuit court is itself entirely deprived of the ability to
consider personal factors going to the amenability of a juvenile
for the rehabilitative purposes of the court's juvenile
jurisdiction.
Put another way,
we believe that a statutory scheme which entirely divests and
deprives a circuit court of its ability to meaningfully consider
and weigh personal factors going to the suitability and
amenability of a juvenile for the rehabilitative purposes of the
court's juvenile jurisdiction, and which ascribes such
responsibilities to the standardless and unreviewable discretion
of a prosecuting attorney, might violate the juvenile's
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process of
law.
From these
premises, we then take the next analytical step, and examine the
statute challenged by the appellant, W.Va. Code,
49-5-10(d) [1995].
This statutory
section cannot be considered in isolation. Rather, it must be
considered in pari materia with language contained in a
separate statutory section dealing with the dispositional
alternatives available for juveniles, W.Va. Code, 49-5-13
[1995].
The following
language of W.Va. Code, 49-5-13(e) [1995] was enacted in
1978, at the same time that the offense-specific transfer
provisions of W.Va. Code, 49-5-10 were first put in place.
W.Va. Code,
49-5-13(e) [1995] states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary,
if a child charged with delinquency under this chapter is
transferred to adult jurisdiction and there tried and convicted,
the court may make its disposition in accordance with this
section [dispositions under juvenile jurisdiction] in lieu of
sentencing such person as an adult.
We recognized this statutory provision in State v. Highland,
174 W.Va. 525, 528, 327 S.E.2d 703, 706 (1985), stating that:
[T]he legislature
has provided at least three alternatives to a sentencing court
for the proper disposition of [a child who has been convicted of
an offense under the adult jurisdiction of the circuit court] . .
. the court may, 'in lieu of sentencing such person as an adult,'
make its disposition under the section 49- 5-13 provisions for
treatment of juveniles adjudged delinquent.
Thus, W.Va. Code, 49-5-13 [1995] explicitly recognizes a circuit court's continuing ability to return a child to its juvenile jurisdiction See footnote 6 6 -- and provides that the circuit court, after the adjudicatory process of the court's adult jurisdiction is completed, may determine that a juvenile should be returned to the juvenile jurisdiction of the court. While the statute does not speak to what matters may be considered by the court in making such a determination, we believe that, consistent with our cases, the court is empowered to consider a full range of personal factors in making such a determination.
The
provisions of W.Va. Code, 49-5-13 [1995] provide a
"safety-valve" which assures that the "automatic
transfer" provisions of our juvenile transfer law do not
unconstitutionally divest and deprive a circuit court of its
ability to meaningfully consider and weigh personal factors going
to the suitability and amenability of a juvenile for the
rehabilitative purposes of the court's juvenile jurisdiction .See footnote 7 7
III.
Conclusion
Therefore, we conclude that the "automatic
transfer" provisions of the statute at issue in the instant
case, W.Va. Code, 49-5-10 [1995], when read in pari
materia with the provisions of W.Va. Code, 49-5-13
[1995], do not unconstitutionally divest and deprive a circuit
court of the ability to consider personal factors going to the
amenability of a juvenile for the rehabilitative purposes of the
court's juvenile jurisdiction and to, in its discretion, return a
child to juvenile jurisdiction.
The appellant's
assignment of error based upon his contention that W.Va. Code,
49-5-10 [1995] is unconstitutional is therefore without merit.
The appellant's other
assignments of error are also without merit.See footnote 8 8 The
judgment of the circuit court of Fayette County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1 1 This statute was amended in 1996 and 1997 in a fashion that is not directly pertinent to the principal issue in this appeal, because the 1995 statutory language at issue in this appeal was unchanged. However, because the statute governing the appellant's case is the 1995 version (due to the date of the appellant's alleged offense), this opinion will reference the 1995 statute.
Footnote: 2 2 W.Va. Code, 49-5-10(j) [1995] was amended in 1997 to remove language authorizing interlocutory appeals of transfers made pursuant to the "automatic transfer" provisions of W.Va. Code 49-5-10(d)(1) [1995].
Footnote: 3 3 Our standard of review for a constitutional challenge is, for legal issues, de novo. See State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W.Va. 208, 470 S.E.2d 162 (1996).
Footnote: 4 4 One of the nation's leading scholars on the issue of transfers from juvenile to adult jurisdiction, Professor Barry C. Feld, Centennial Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, has recently repented of his early advocacy for "automatic waiver:" "In my first articles about transferring serious young offenders to criminal court, I naively extolled the virtues of eliminating judicial discretion . . .." Feld, Barry C., "Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform," 79 Minn.L.Rev. 965, 1051 (1995).
Footnote:
5 5
In Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 187 W.Va. 182, 186,
416 S.E.2d 720, 724 we quoted Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L. Ed. 220, 226, (1886):
When we consider
the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that
they do not mean to leave room
for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power.
This court has emphasized that
prosecutorial discretion must be "bounded by law." State
ex rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 173 W.Va. 133, 138, 313 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1984).
Footnote: 6 6 The ability of a court to transfer a case to its juvenile jurisdiction from its adult jurisdiction, even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, was recognized in 1959 in an Opinion of the Attorney General, dated November 18, 1959, Volume 48, Opinion No. 63.
Footnote: 7 7 See O'Connor, Jennifer M. and Treat, Lucinda K., "Getting Smart About Getting Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform," 33 American Criminal Law Review 1299, 1314, n. 116 (1996): "[m]ost [transfer] systems do include a safety valve mechanism for automatically-transferred juveniles to petition for waiver back to juvenile court jurisdiction."
Footnote:
8 8
Appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in transferring
him to criminal jurisdiction because he was not charged
"with a sufficient number of offenses" under the
juvenile transfer statute. Appellant's argument relies entirely
upon the fact that in the 1995 amendments to the transfer
statute, the Legislature placed the word "and" within
the list of enumerated crimes. According to appellant, the use of
"and" within W.Va. Code, 49- 5-10(d) [1995]
required a combination of at least two serious crimes before
automatic transfer became possible.
However, on March 9, 1996, the
Legislature passed a bill containing stylistic changes and other
amendments to the statute governing juvenile proceedings. The
1996 Act removed the word "and" from 49-5-10(d). With
the 1996 amendments, the Legislature cured any stylistic defect
in W.Va. Code, 49-5-10(d), thereby rejecting the
construction now urged by appellant and evidencing an intent that
a juvenile be transferred for any one of the enumerated
crimes.
Appellant's challenge to the validity of
the juvenile petition filed against him is also without merit, as
is his contention that the admission of his birth certificate as
evidence at the transfer hearing was erroneous.
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