Hapchuck v. Pierson, Jr., M.D.
Annotate this Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST
VIRGINIA
September 1997 Term
___________
No. 23782
___________
MARY M. HAPCHUCK,
Plaintiff below, Appellant,
v.
BRUCE PIERSON, JR., M.D., and
BRUCE PIERSON, JR., M.D., P.D.,
a West Virginia Corporation,
Defendants below, Appellees.
________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County
Hon. Robert A. Waters, Judge
Civil Action No. 92-C-683
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________
Submitted: September 10, 1997
Filed: October 24, 1997
John E. Triplett, Jr.,
Esq. Charles
M. Love, III, Esq.
Theisen, Brock, Frye, Erb & Leeper
Co. Stuart
A. McMillan, Esq.
Marietta, Ohio
Bowles,
Rice, McDavid,
Attorney for
Appellant
Graff & Love
Charleston,
West Virginia
Attorneys
for Appellees
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "It
is the general rule that in medical malpractice cases negligence
or want of professional skill can be proved only by expert
witnesses." Syllabus Point 2, Roberts v. Gale, 149
W.Va. 166, 139 S.E.2d 272 (1964).
2. "Although
expert medical testimony is not required under the patient need
standard to establish the scope of a physician's duty to disclose
medical information to his or her patient, expert medical
testimony would ordinarily be required to establish certain
matters including: (1) the risks involved concerning a particular
method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of treatment, (3)
the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment and
(4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains
untreated." Syllabus Point 5, Cross v. Trapp, 170
W.Va. 459, 294 S.E.2d 446 (1982).
3. "A
trial court is vested with discretion under W.Va. Code § 55-7B-7
(1986) to require expert testimony in medical professional
liability cases, and absent an abuse of that discretion, a trial
court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal." Syllabus
Point 8, McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hospital, W.Va. , 488 S.E.2d 389 (1997).
Per Curiam:See footnote 1
1
Mary M. Hapchuck
appeals a summary judgment order of the Circuit Court of Wood
County dismissing her complaint against Bruce Pierson, Jr., M.D.
and Bruce Pierson, Jr., M.D., P.C., a West Virginia corporation.
On appeal, Ms. Hapchuck argues that summary judgment should not
have been granted because: (1) there was a material issue of fact
concerning whether Dr. Pierson's treatment of Ms. Hapchuck was
negligent, and (2) Dr. Pierson failed in his duty to warn Ms.
Hapchuck of the risks involved in his treatment of her. Because
Ms. Hapchuck did not present an expert opinion stating that the
treatment given by Dr. Pierson was the cause of her injury, and
because she did not present an expert opinion that Dr. Pierson
breached any duty to warn her in relationship with the treatment
rendered, we affirm the circuit court's order.
I.
Beginning sometime in the 1980's, Mary M. Hapchuck began suffering from various problems with her fingernails, including nail discoloration, deformity and general discomfort. In 1989 Ms. Hapchuck began seeing Dr. Bruce Pierson, a dermatologist, for her
condition. After evaluating Ms. Hapchuck, Dr. Pierson
diagnosed her with an uncommon nail disease, "Yellow Nail
Syndrome."
Dr. Pierson began
treating Ms. Hapchuck with corticosteroid injections in the
proximal nail fold. Dr. Pierson discussed the treatment with Ms.
Hapchuck explaining that she could suffer some pain, thinning of
the skin and/or decreased pigmentation in the area of the
injection. These injections took place over a period of months.
Five weeks after
the last injection, Ms. Hapchuck suffered an injury to her index
finger on her left hand while pushing up on a bolt in a door. As
a result of this injury, Ms. Hapchuck began to suffer from
"mallet finger" -- in which the tendon is injured,
causing the end of the finger to droop down. In addition to this
problem, six months after her last injection Ms. Hapchuck began
to notice a "swan neck" deformity on the other fingers
of her left hand.
Ms. Hapchuck
brought suit against Dr. Pierson for medical malpractice in Wood
County. After discovery was concluded and before the trial began,
counsel for Dr. Pierson moved for summary judgment. The circuit
court examined the record and granted summary judgment, ruling
that the plaintiff failed to present evidence as required by W.Va.
Code, 55-7B-3 [1986].See
footnote 2 2 The circuit court concluded no genuine
issue of material fact
remained to be tried. This appeal followed.
II.
The standard of
review applicable to summary judgment is set out in Syllabus
Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755
(1994); that review is de novo. The standard for granting
summary judgment is set forth in Syllabus Point 3, Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of N.Y., 148
W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963):
A motion for
summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that
there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application
of the law.
In accord, Syllabus Point 1, Williams v. Precision
Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995); Syllabus
Point 2, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755
(1994). More recently this Court held in Fayette Co.
National Bank v. Lilly, 199 W.Va. 349, 484 S.E.2d 232 (1997)
that the circuit court shall set forth adequate findings of fact
to support a summary judgment. We held:
Although our
standard of review for summary judgment remains de novo, a
circuit court's order granting summary judgment must set out
factual findings sufficient to permit meaningful appellate
review. Findings of fact, by necessity, include those facts which
the circuit court finds relevant, determinative of the issues and
undisputed.
Syllabus Point 3, Fayette County National Bank, supra. The circuit court in the instant case
complied with these principles.
The standard of
review under W.Va. Code, 55-7B-7 [1986]See footnote 3 3 of
a circuit court's requiring expert testimony in a medical
malpractice case was discussed in McGraw v. St. Joseph's
Hospital, W.Va. , 488 S.E.2d 389 (1997); we stated in
Syllabus Point 8:
A trial court is
vested with discretion under W.Va. Code § 55- 7B-7 (1986) to
require expert testimony in medical professional liability cases,
and absent an abuse of that discretion, a trial court's decision
will not be disturbed on appeal.
This Court
also addressed the need for expert testimony in medical
malpractice cases in Roberts v. Gale, 149 W.Va. 166, 139 S.E.2d 272 (1964). In Syllabus Point 2 of Roberts, we
said, "[i]t is the general rule that in medical malpractice
cases negligence or want of professional skill can be proved only
by expert witnesses." In accord, Syllabus Point 1, Farley
v. Meadows, 185 W.Va. 48, 404 S.E.2d 537 (1991); Syllabus
Point 5, McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hospital, W.Va. , 488 S.E.2d 389 (1997). Further, in addressing the issue of a
physician's duty to warn a patient of the potential consequences
of medical treatment, this Court has stated:
Although expert
medical testimony is not required under the patient need standard
to establish the scope of a physician's duty to disclose medical
information to his or her patient, expert medical testimony would
ordinarily be required to establish
certain matters including: (1) the risks involved concerning a
particular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of
treatment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of
treatment and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient
remains untreated.
Syllabus Point 5, Cross v. Trapp, 170
W.Va. 459, 294 S.E.2d 446 (1982).
We find that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion, and that it correctly
found the plaintiff's case wanting for expert testimony on the
issue of medical malpractice generally, and on the issue of the
physician's duty to warn specifically. Summary judgment was,
therefore, appropriate in this case.
In view of the
lack of competent expert testimony on the issues before this
Court, we affirm the ruling of the Circuit Court of Wood County.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1 1 We point out that a per curiam opinion is not legal precedent. See Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W.Va. 197, 201 n.4, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4. (1992) ("Per curiam opinions . . . are used to decide only the specific case before the Court; everything in a per curiam opinion beyond the syllabus point is merely obiter dicta . . . . Other courts, such as many of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, have gone to non-published (not-to-be-cited) opinions to deal with similar cases. We do not have such a specific practice, but instead use published per curiam opinions. However, if rules of law or accepted ways of doing things are to be changed, then this Court will do so in a signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion.")
Footnote:
2 2
W.Va. Code, 55-7B-3 [1986].
The following
are necessary elements of proof that an injury or death resulted
from the failure of a health care provider to follow the accepted
standard of care:
(a) The health
care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and
learning required or expected of a reasonable,
prudent health care provider in the
profession or class to which the health care provider belongs
acting in the same or similar circumstances; and
(b) Such failure
was a proximate cause of the injury or death.
Footnote:
3 3 W.Va.
Code, 55-7B-7 [1986] states, in part, that:
The applicable standard of care and a defendant's failure to meet
said standard, if at issue, shall be established in medical
professional liability cases by the plaintiff by testimony of one
or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses if required by
the court.
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