Shawn Greenhalgh, James Pfaff, Appellants V State Dept Of Corr, Et Al, Respondents (Majority)

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G4, FILED OF APPALS DIVISION ? i 2OR APR 29 AM 8: 38 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II No. 44222 -1 - II SHAWN GREENHALGH and JAMES PFAFF, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. PUBLISHED OPINION DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ELDON VAIL, and the STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondents. Shawn - Greenhalgh and James - Pfaff appeal- -he superior- court' s t JOHANSON, J. - - -summary dismissal and Pfaff previously argue of their that ( 1) authorized claims against the Department of Corrections ( DOC). Greenhalgh RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) and WAC 137 -36 -060 require DOC to store their property until their release; ( 2) DOC' s revised policy 440. 000 ( DOC 440. 000) constitutes impermissible and unconstitutional forfeiture under RCW 9. 92. 110 and Wash. Const., art. I, § 15; and ( 3) DOC violated state and federal due process when it deprived them of their previously authorized property. We hold that the superior court did not err in dismissing Greenhalgh and Pfaff' s claims because the State is that DOC store all entitled to judgment as a matter of inmate property, Greenhalgh and law. There is no statutory requirement Pfaff were not subject to illegal forfeiture of No. 44222 -1 - II their property, and DOC gave them adequate due process. Therefore, we affirm the superior court' s summary judgment order. FACTS In January 2009, DOC informed its inmates that it amended DOC 440. 000 to eliminate inmate had the inmates could clothing items possession of excess or unauthorized personal following disposition could send out give options: ( the clothing at between 1) DOC' the clothing to a visitor; or ( 3) July 1, by January 2010. Inmates 2009 and September 30, 2009, 2) through December 31, 2009, inmates s after December 31, 2009, inmates had 30 days to dispose of excess or unauthorized clothing. If an inmate was indigent, refused to pay postage, or failed to designate someone to receive the clothing, DOC donated or destroyed it. After January 1, 2010, all unauthorized personal clothing became contraband. In March 2009, Greenhalgh filed a grievance and requested a revision of the policy to allow him to keep the unauthorized property or to require DOC to store his clothing until his release sent from custody. his DOC denied Greenhalgh' unauthorized personal clothing to s requested relief. Scott Frakes, In April 2010, Greenhalgh Superintendent_ of the Monroe Correctional Complex, with a request that Frakes keep the clothing until Greenhalgh' s release from custody. Frakes denied Greenhalgh' s request. Although Greenhalgh claimed that he had no one to ship his personal clothing to, he had previously shipped property to other people. In January 2011, Pfaff received notification from McNeil Island Corrections Center MICC) that MICC would destroy one box of his personal clothing in 30 days unless he paid to 1 Per WAC 137 -36 -040 and RCW 72. 02. 045( 3), after DOC' s offer to pay shipping costs expired on September 30, 2009, the inmate could pay to have the clothing shipped to nonincarcerated third parties at their own expense. No. 44222 -1 - II ship it to a third party. Pfaff, claiming indigence, directed MICC to dispose of the property. Pfaff' s spending account records show that within the 30 -day window, he had funds to cover the postage. Greenhalgh and Pfaff filed a class action suit alleging that DOC 440. 000 violated RCW RCW 9. 92. 110, WAC 137 -36 -060, Wash. Const. 72. 02. 045( 3), Const. amend. XIV. art. I, §§ 3 and 15, and U.S. Greenhalgh and Pfaff contend that RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) and WAC 137 -36- 060 required DOC to store the clothing inmates obtained before January 2010, and that DOC 440. 000 constituted impermissible and unconstitutional forfeiture under RCW 9. 92. 110 and Wash. Const. art. I, § 15. Additionally, Greenhalgh and Pfaff claimed the enforcement of DOC 440. 000 deprived inmates of due process. DOC filed a summary judgment to dismiss. motion The superior court granted DOC' s motion, dismissing all of Greenhalgh and Pfaffs claims. Greenhalgh and Pfaff now appeal. ANALYSIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT We review summary judgment de novo, considering all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Inc., 134 Wn. App. 819, TransAlta Centralia Generation LLC v. Sicklesteel Cranes, 825, 142 P. 3d 209 ( 2006), review denied, 161 Wn.2d 1013 ( 2007). We affirm summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56( c). When we review a grant of summary judgment, we consider only the issues and evidence presented to the superior court. RAP 9. 12. 3 No. 44222 -1 - II I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION First, Greenhalgh and Pfaff argue that the superior court incorrectly interpreted the term custodian" in RCW 72.02. 045( 3), 2 and that RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) and WAC 137 -36 -060 require DOC to store the excess personal clothing inmates possessed before January 2010 and to return the property upon an inmate' We hold that RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) and WAC 137 -36 -060 s release. do not require DOC to store all of an inmate' s property including previously authorized contraband. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF LAW We review statutory interpretation de LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P. 3d 4 ( 2002). novo. Dep' t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwynn, Our duty is to carry out the legislature' s intent and if the statute' s meaning is plain on its face, that plain meaning is an expression of legislative intent. Campbell, 146 Wn.2d legislature has not at 9 -10. We cannot add words to an unambiguous statute when the included that language. Durland v. San Juan County, 174 Wn. App. 1, 23, 298 P. 3d 757 ( 2012). B. - PLAINMEANING We discern the plain meaning of a statute from all that the legislature has said in the statute and its related statutes that disclose legislative intent about the provision in question. Jametsky v. Rodney A., _ Wn.2d _, 317 P. 3d 1003, 1006 ( 2014). We consider the natural and contextual meanings that attach to a term, giving words their usual, ordinary, and commonly 2 Neither party Pfaff explicitly argues assert that RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) is that RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) is ambiguous in its meaning. unambiguous. Greenhalgh and DOC argues that the superior court' s plain language interpretation of RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) is correct. Because we agree with the parties that the plain language of RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) language arguments presented in the parties' briefing. 4 controls, we rely solely on the plain No. 44222 -1 - I1 accepted meaning, and we may look to a dictionary for an undefined term' s ordinary meaning. State v. Wn. Ratliff, 140 App. 12, 16, 164 P. 3d 516 ( 2007); Bremerton Pub. Safety Ass 'n v. City ofBremerton, 104 Wn. App. 226, 230 -31, 15 P. 3d 688 ( 2001). RCW 72. 01. 050( 2) gives the secretary of corrections, and DOC, a broad grant of power to manage and govern correctional facilities; only other laws that govern correctional facilities limit that DOC power. administration and safety of superintendents make, amend, his/ her institution. RCW 72. 02. 045( 4). authority to " determine the types 72. 02. 045( 3). may and amounts of an property" and repeal rules for the The superintendent has the inmate may have. RCW Any property an inmate may not have is contraband, and authorized property that is above the allowed amounts is contraband and is disposed of either by the inmate at their own expense or DOC. by 137 -36- 020( 1), - See RCW 72. 09. 015( 5); RCW 72. 02. 045( 3); RCW 63. 42. 020( 3); WAC 030( 4), - 040; WAC 137 -48- 020( 1). RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) states that the superintendent shall be the custodian of all funds and valuable personal property of convicted persons [ in their possession on arrival, sent to or earned by the inmate while in custody, or forwarded to the superintendent on behalf of the inmate]. [ A] ll funds and valuable personal property in the possession of the superintendent belonging to such convicted persons shall be delivered to them. And WAC 137 -36 -060 Upon states, "[ release], all personal property in the custody of the superintendent shall be returned to the inmate." Ch. 72. 02 RCW does not include a definitions section, and WAC 137 -36 -020 does not define " custody." We determine the plain meanings behind RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) and WAC 137- 36 -060 to definitions by looking Black' s Law custody ( of Dictionary a child, of words and related statutes. defines " property, custodian" as "[ a] person or institution that has charge or papers, or other valuables)." 5 See Campbell, 146 Wn.2d at 11. BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 441 ( 9th No. 44222 -1 - II ed. 2009). And " custody" preservation, or the definition security." of BLACK' t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection, S, supra, custody, Greenhalgh for " purposes stated means "[ and As care and control." 441. 3 By emphasizing the word " preservation" in Pfaff seemingly ignore the " read in the definition of or" custody, " included in the preservation" of Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s property is not a requirement, but an option. To support their argument that DOC is required to store their excess personal clothing, Greenhalgh and Pfaff rely on our Supreme Court' s holding in Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 426, 103 P. 3d 1230 ( 2005) ( 72. 02. 045( 3) required stating that the meanings of "transfer" and " deliver" in RCW DOC to ship inmate property to their new institution). 4 Unlike Burton, where the statute clearly required DOC' s action to transfer and deliver personal property, here the definition of " custodian" does not require DOC to " preserve or store" Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s contraband, even if previously authorized. Greenhalgh and Pfaff that their interpretation concede of RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) does not require storage of contraband, but they argue that DOC should not treat previously authorized property the same as other contraband. Greenhalgh 3 Pfaff rely and on Blum v. To support their -nterpretation of RCW 72... 045( 3), i 02 Arizona, 171 Ariz. 201, 829 P. 2d 1247 ( 1992). In Blum, Greenhalgh and Pfaff go beyond the definitions of "custody" and " custodian" to define words not included in either RCW 72. 02. 045 or WAC 137 -36 -060. Because we cannot add words or clauses to a statute that the legislature did not include, engaging in such an exercise goes beyond the plain meaning of the statute. See Yousoufian v. Office ofRon Sims, 152 Wn.2d 421, 437, 98 P. 3d 463 ( 2004). 4 Burton involved authorized property that DOC was required to ship when it transferred an inmate to another facility, and DOC' s policy forced inmates to choose between paying for their property to be shipped to the new facility or losing their ownership. The Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of RCW 72.02. 045 prohibited DOC from forcing inmates to make that choice. Burton, 153 Wn.2d at 426 -27. 6 No. 44222 -1 - II the Arizona Court of Appeals held that disposal of contraband violated former Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31- 228( A) ( 1987). constituted a The Blum large court 5 171 Ariz. portion of at the property 205. The previously authorized contraband in Blum inmates held in Blum, 171 Ariz. at 202. their cells. held that former Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31- 228( A) was clear in its intent that all property, authorized and unauthorized, was to be stored and returned to the inmate upon release. 171 Ariz. at 207. Greenhalgh and Pfaff argue that the Arizona statute in Blum is identical to RCW 72. 02. 045( 3). We disagree. The statute in Blum clearly requires the Arizona department of corrections to store and return everything of value to the inmates upon release. 171 Ariz. at 205. In contrast, RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) requires DOC to return only the " property in possession of the superintendent" to the inmate upon release. 72. 02. 045( 3). unauthorized The Blum property. to include, nor is there Compare former ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § court read " everything See Blum, 171 Ariz. at of value" 205 -06. any legislative 'indication of, a 31- 228( A), and RCW to include contraband and other But we do not read RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) duty to store contraband :_Instead, the statutes and regulations related to RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) state that contraband is either sent out at the inmate' s expense or disposed of by DOC. Therefore, Blum is not persuasive. Additionally, Greenhalgh and Pfaff read WAC 137 -36 -060 out of context with the rest of the provisions in the same section, most 5 importantly WAC 137 -36- 020( 1), - Former Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31- 228( A) states, " 030, and - 040( 1)( a). When a prisoner is released on parole or discharged from a facility of the department of corrections there shall be returned to the prisoner everything of value taken upon commitment to the department of corrections, or thereafter received by the prisoner." ( Emphasis added.) 7 No. 44222 -1 - II As a " custodian" of inmate property, DOC is in charge of inmate property and has the authority to make rules and regulations regarding inmate property. See, e.g., RCW 72. 02.045( 3); RCW 72. 01. 050( 2); BLACK' prescribed list their property would S, supra, become DOC determined that personal clothing beyond the January contraband on contraband was 441. after January 1, 1, 2010. 2010. Greenhalgh and Pfaff agree that Although it was previously authorized property, it became contraband and subject to the disposal process in WAC 137- 36- 040( 1)( a), when it became " excess" property under WAC 137 -36- 030( 4). Because the property was contraband, DOC had the authority to require Greenhalgh and Pfaff to either pay to ship their out or property to dispose WAC 137 -36- 020( 1), We hold that property within of it. See RCW 72. 09. 015( 5); RCW 63. 42. 020( 3); RCW 72. 02. 045( 3); 040( 1)( a), - 030( 4); WAC 137 -48- 020( 1). as a " custodian," DOC' s possession. DOC is in charge of the care and control of authorized RCW 72. 02. 045( 3) does not create a statutory duty that DOC store all of Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s property, including property previously authorized but now deemed contraband. Accordingly, the superior court did not err when it determined that DOC " ad no duty to storeunauthorized p ro P ert Y ¢ h Greenhalgh require was the and Pfaff' s superintendent contraband when it to arguments also store contraband was disposed; fail because ( 1) property; ( 3) and ( WAC 137 -36 -060 does not 2) Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s property when read in conjunction with the other provisions in the section, WAC 137 -36 -060 authorizes disposal of contraband. II REMAINING CLAIMS Greenhalgh and Pfaff assert that the superior court erred in granting summary dismissal because the superior court failed to discuss Greenhalgh and Pfaff' s remaining claims. While the 8 No. 44222 -1 - II superior court does not need to state its reasoning in an order granting summary judgment,6 we review all matters in summary judgment de novo7 and address all of Greenhalgh and Pfaff s arguments made in the superior court. A. FORFEITURE CLAIMS ( RCW 9. 92. 110, WASH. CONST. ART. I, § 15) Greenhalgh and Pfaff allege that the enforcement of DOC 440. 000 was impermissible and an unconstitutional forfeiture. We hold that the enforcement of DOC 440. 000 was not an impermissible or an unconstitutional forfeiture and that the loss of the property resulted from Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s incarceration, not their convictions. No art. of nor forfeiture WASH. CONST. of estate. A conviction of crime shall not work forfeiture of any property, real or personal, or I, § 15. any blood, conviction shall work corruption of or right RCW 9. 92. 110. interest therein. Wash. Const. art. I, § 15 only prohibits forfeiture of a convict' s estate on the ground that he or she is prohibited from owning property due to a conviction. Const. art. Wn. State I, § 15 does " App.. at 329 ( citing 32 Wn. App. v. Young, not prohibit 63 Wn. App. forfeiture for review rational and 75' 77, 658 State v Barr, 99 Wn.2d 567, 648 P. 2d 481, 324, 328 -29, 818 P. 2d 1375 ( 1991). legitimate purposes. P. 2d 1247( 1983) denied, 98 Wn. 2d 1008 ( 1982)). Wash. Young, 63 Crape-v. Mount, And there is no violation of RCW 9. 92. 110 when DOC seizes property because of a person' s confinement following a conviction and not Dep 't of Labor & 6 because of the person' s underlying conviction. Willoughby v. Indus., 147 Wn.2d 725, 732, 57 P. 3d 611 ( 2002). See Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wn. App. 748, 755, 82 P. 3d 707 ( citing Chelan County Deputy Sheriff's Ass 'n v. County of Chelan, 109 Wn.2d 282, 294 n. 6, 745 P. 2d 1 ( 1987)), review denied, 152 Wn.2d 1016 ( 2004). Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P. 2d 301 ( 1998). 9 No. 44222 -1 - II DOC confined Greenhalgh and Pfaff because of their criminal convictions; however, DOC disposed of their personal clothing because of their confinement in DOC institutions, not because of their underlying convictions. DOC has a legitimate purpose delegated to them under RCW 72.01. 050 to ensure the safety and efficiency of their institutions. And DOC has the power to promulgate policies to make their institutions efficient and safe; DOC 440. 000 was such a policy. DOC applied the same property policy to all Washington State inmates because of their incarceration and not because of their underlying convictions. Because there is no violation of RCW 9. 92. 110 where property is seized because a person is confined following a conviction, and because institutional efficiency and safety are legitimate purposes for which to regulate inmate property, Greenhalgh and Pfaffs arguments under Wash. Const. art. I, § 15 and RCW 9. 92. 110 fail. B. FEDERAL AND STATE DUE PROCESS Next, Greenhalgh and Pfaff argue that DOC, Washington State, and DOC Secretary Eldon Vail violated their procedural and substantive due process rights under U. S. Const. amend XIV, Wash. Const. art. 1§ 3, and 42 U.S. C. § 1983. We holdthatthenotice and process given to Greenhalgh and Pfaff satisfied procedural due process requirements. 1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Greenhalgh and Pfaff claim that DOC neither provided them notice that they would lose their property nor gave them the opportunity for a hearing. We hold that DOC gave Greenhalgh and Pfaff ample notice of the new rules for personal property, that DOC gave them opportunities to send out or give their personal clothing to a third - arty, and that the notice and procedures p established by DOC satisfied due process requirements. 10 No. 44222 -1 - II The federal constitution protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property due without is process of does similar and art. I, § 3; In law. U. S. CONST. not provide broader amend. XIV. Washington' s protections than its federal constitutional counterpart. WASH. CONST. Pers. Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298,. 310, 12 P. 3d 585 ( 2000). re A threshold matter to a procedural or substantive due process claim is whether the plaintiff See Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F. 2d 898, 904 ( 9th possessed a property interest. Cir. 1993). An inmate' s ownership of property is a protected property interest and may not be infringed upon without due process; however, there is a difference between the right to own and property the right to possess property in while prison. Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F. 3d 1220, 1229 ( 10th Cir. 2002). To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege ( 1) a liberty or property interest a lack F. 2d protected by of process. at 904). the constitution, ( Wright v. 2) a deprivation of the interest by the government, and ( 3) Riveland, 219 F. 3d 905, 913 ( 9th Cir. 2000) ( quoting Portman, 995 We balance the following factors when determining the timing and nature of a hearing due -plaintiff: ( 1) the private interest affected by a the official action; ( 2) the risk of - n erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute involved procedural and fiscal and requirement would entail. safeguards; and ( 3) the government' s interest, administrative burdens that additional or including function substitute procedural Wright, 219 F. 3d at 913 n.6 ( quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 ( 1976)). 8" No person shall CONST. art. be deprived of life, liberty, or I, § 3. 11 property, without due process of law." WASH. No. 44222 -1 - II Greenhalgh and Pfaff have established that ( 1) they had a protected property interest in their personal clothing and ( 2) DOC deprived them of their personal clothing when it amended and enforced DOC 440. 000. But Greenhalgh and Pfaff fail to prove that DOC did not provide them due process. Greenhalgh and Pfaff argue that DOC did not advise them of their right to a hearing and that DOC 1) the gave January them insufficient 2009 implementation memorandum plan sent to all We disagree. notice. to all inmates, DOC gave them at least three notices: inmates the policy about 3) the and ( January change, ( 2) the March 2009 2011 MICC letter to Pfaff. In addition, Greenhalgh filed grievances with DOC in March 2009, stating that the deprivation of his property was unfair. DOC provided sufficient notice. When we balance the factors outlined in Wright, the notice given to the inmates combined with the inmate grievance process was sufficient to afford due process. While DOC' s policy affected Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff's property possession interests, there was no risk of erroneous deprivation because Greenhalgh and Pfaff could direct where their property went or whether it was disposed of.- DOC notified Greenhalgh and Pfaff 12 months- in advance of the effective date of the policy change, and the March 2009 implementation plan notified them of several methods 2009 and to retain ownership DOC told him that he of their property. could not keep his Greenhalgh filed his grievance in early personal clothing. Although he could have directed that MICC treat his property differently, Pfaff directed them to dispose of his clothing, choosing to not send it out of the institution. Finally, Greenhalgh and Pfaff chose not to act and lost ownership of their property only after failing to engage in the process DOC provided for them. Because Greenhalgh and Pfaff were provided a notice and grievance process, we hold that DOC 440. 000 did not violate their procedural due process rights. 12 No. 44222 -1 - II 2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS Greenhalgh and Pfaff allege that DOC Next, 440. 000 is irrational and violated substantive due process. We hold that DOC may change its policies, that DOC 440. 000 achieves a legitimate purpose, and that it is neither irrational nor unduly burdensome. We apply the following three -prong test when subjecting a policy to substantive due 1) process analysis: ( whether the policy aims to legitimate achieve a public purpose, ( 2) whether the means adopted are reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose, and ( 3) whether the policy is unduly Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 51 -52, 830 P.2d 318 ( quoting oppressive. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 330 -31, 787 P. 2d 907, cent. denied, 498 U. S. 911 ( 1990)), cert. prong balances the nature of the harm denied, 506 U. S. 1028 ( 1992). public' s sought to interest avoid, ( against that of Our inquiry into the " unduly oppressive" the property owner and considers ( 1) the 2) the availability and effectiveness of less drastic measures, 3) the economic loss suffered by the property owner, and ( 4) the extent to which the property have owner should anticipated the outcome from such regulation. Robinson, 119 Wn.2d at 51 y - -y p stating that the first and second- prongs of the analysis areofteneasily met g _ gs DOC' legitimate s policy achieved fiscal efficiency public purposes, and was reasonable to and reduction address DOC' s of taxpayer budgetary burdens, both 9 goals. Finally, the public interests DOC sought to achieve with DOC 440. 000 outweighed Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s interest in having excess or unauthorized personal clothing. Moreover, it was foreseeable that the property would have to be shipped out or would be disposed of after January 2010. 9 The January 2009 memorandum stated that DOC considered many cost -cutting measures, including elimination of personal radios, televisions, and musical instruments, but stated that the elimination of personal clothing had much maintenance, and sewage consumption. 13 more impact, reducing water, electricity, No. 44222 -1 - II DOC minimized the burden on inmates by incurring the cost of sending out the inmates' clothing during a period of time and providing 12 months notice before DOC enforced the changes. Finally, Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s economic loss was de minimis10 compared to DOC' s conservative outweigh fiscal savings Greenhalgh' estimates." and s Pfaff' s Thus, the public interests served by DOC 440. 000 interests in their personal clothing. Accordingly, Greenhalgh' s and Pfaff' s substantive due process claims fail because they fail to prove that DOC' s legitimate purpose in amending and enforcing DOC 440. 000 is irrational and unduly burdensome. 3. 42 U. S. C. § 1983 Greenhalgh and Pfaff also allege that they are entitled to relief for the alleged due process violations under under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. We hold that Greenhalgh and Pfaff are not entitled to relief 42 U. S. C. § 1983 because their due process rights were not violated. To state a § 1983 claim, a citizen must show that ( 1) a person acting under color or state law has ( 2) violated a federally protected right. Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wn.2d 834, 843, 881 P.2d 240 ( 1994)_ (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 1-983).- Section -1983 does not create any substantive rights, but only a remedy when a government official or employee violates federally guaranteed rights. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 60 L. Ed. 2d 508 ( 1979). to Greenhalgh claimed damages of $10. 52 in shipping costs, and Pfaff claimed. $ 255. 00 in lost property. 11 DOC conservatively estimated that eliminating personal clothing saved $ 100, 000 annually in addition to reducing water, laundry, and sewage consumption, and reducing man hours required to record, track, and ship inmate personal clothing 14 No. 44222 -1 - II Because Greenhalgh and Pfaff' s underlying procedural and substantive due process claims fail, we hold that they are not entitled to relief under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. After reviewing all of the claims Greenhalgh and Pfaff brought to the superior court' s attention, we hold that the State was entitled to judgment summary judgment was proper. We affirm. 15 as a matter of law. Accordingly,

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