Doyle Muir, Resp. V. Council 2 Wa State Council Of Cty & City Employees/local 49, Pet.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
DOYLE MUIR,
Respondent,
v.
COUNCIL 2 WASHINGTON STATE
COUNCIL OF COUNTY & CITY
EMPLOYEES and LOCAL 1849,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Appellant.
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No. 62380-0-I
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO PUBLISH
Appellant filed a motion to publish the opinion entered December 21, 2009.
Counsel for respondent submitted a response to the motion. The panel has considered
the matter and determined that the motion should be granted.
Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion to publish the opinion is granted.
DATED this ______ day of February, 2010.
FOR THE PANEL:
No. 62380-0-I/2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
DOYLE MUIR,
Respondent,
v.
COUNCIL 2 WASHINGTON STATE
COUNCIL OF COUNTY & CITY
EMPLOYEES and LOCAL 1849,
AFSME, AFL-CIO, a labor union
operating in the state of Washington,
Appellant.
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No. 62380-0-I
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: December 21, 2009
Ellington, J. — Doyle Muir sued his union alleging breach of the duty of fair
representation. Although the undisputed evidence established that the union’s
decision not to take his wage grievance to arbitration was not arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith, the superior court denied its motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
Doyle Muir worked for San Juan County as a road maintenance supervisor. In
August of 2003, the county terminated his employment. Muir filed a grievance. His
union, Council 2 Washington State Council of County & City Employees and Local
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1849 (Council 2), submitted the grievance to arbitration, and in May of 2004, the
arbitrator concluded the county did not have just cause to terminate Muir but was
entitled to take disciplinary action against him. The arbitrator authorized a 30 day
suspension without pay and ordered Muir reinstated to a nonsupervisory position as
road crew equipment operator, a position two steps below his previous job. The parties
disagreed about implementation of the decision, and the arbitrator issued an amended
opinion and order clarifying that he imposed a disciplinary demotion because, although
Muir’s termination was improper, he “was clearly unfit to be reinstated to his prior
supervisory position.”1
The parties agree that Muir’s demotion constituted an involuntary transfer under
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The relevant provision of the CBA
provides:
An employee who is involuntarily transferred to a position in a lower
classification shall be placed on the step of the new pay range equivalent
to their rate of pay prior to the transfer, if such step exists. If no such step
exists, the employee shall be “redlined” until the lower pay range catches
up or until the expiration of twelve (12) months, whichever occurs first.
This section shall not apply to reduction in force situations.[2]
There was no step on the equipment operator pay range equivalent to the pay Muir
received as a supervisor. The county and the union agreed Muir would be “redlined”
and the arbitrator set Muir’s reinstatement date, May 10, 2004, as the redline
commencement date.
Muir was paid at his supervisory rate for 12 months, until May of 2005. The
1
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 137.
2
CP at 52.
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county then reduced his wage to that of an equipment operator.
Muir filed a grievance over his reduction in pay, arguing he should continue to
be paid the higher wage because the involuntary transfer clause does not clearly state
otherwise. He also argued the county was treating him differently than former
employee Gerry Brown, who continued to receive his redlined salary for longer than 12
months after his transfer. The county rejected these arguments and denied the
grievance at each of the three steps of the CBA grievance procedure.
After the final denial of his grievance, Muir requested that Council 2 pursue
arbitration on his behalf. Believing arbitration would be unsuccessful, Council 2
declined. Muir sued the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Council 2
moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. We granted discretionary
review. We apply the usual standard of review for summary judgment.3
DISCUSSION
A union must fairly represent its members.4 This duty is a necessary corollary
to the union’s statutory right to exclusive representation.5 A union breaches its duty of
fair representation when its conduct is discriminatory, arbitrary, or in bad faith.6
3
Appellate courts review decisions on motions for summary judgment de novo,
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving
party. Johnson v. King County, 148 Wn. App. 220, 225, 198 P.3d 546 (2009);
Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. , 101 Wn. App. 323, 329, 2 P.3d 1029 (2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).
4
Allen v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 100 Wn.2d 361, 374, 670 P.2d 246
(1983).
5
Lindsey v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 49 Wn. App. 145, 148, 741 P.2d 575
(1987).
6
Id.
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In the context of grievance processing, the duty of fair representation prohibits a
union from ignoring a meritorious grievance or processing a grievance in a perfunctory
manner.7 But a union has no duty to arbitrate every grievance; it may screen its
members’ grievances and process only those it determines have merit.8 “‘A union’s
duty requires some minimal investigation of employee grievances, the thoroughness
depending on the particular case; only an egregious disregard for union members’
rights constitutes a breach of the union’s duty.’”9
Muir contends Council 2 breached its duty “by discriminating against him; by
refusing to arbitrate the County’s reduction of his wage rate; by arbitrarily asserting his
wage rate had been determined by a prior arbitration; by arbitrarily conducting its
investigation and because the decision was premised upon Council 2’s animosity
toward Muir.”10
Arbitrariness
Muir contends Council 2’s refusal to arbitrate his wage reduction grievance was
arbitrary because his grievance advanced the only reasonable interpretation of the
involuntary transfer clause. We do not agree.
The involuntary transfer clause provided that the employee be “‘redlined’ until
the lower pay range catches up or until the expiration of twelve (12) months, whichever
7
Id. at 149; Womble v. Local Union 73 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO,
64 Wn. App. 698, 701, 826 P.2d 224 (1992).
8
Lindsey, 49 Wn. App. at 149.
9
Id. at 150 (quoting Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
10
Resp’t’s Br. at 31.
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occurs first.”11 Muir insists this means that the transferred worker’s wage is frozen for
up to 12 months and then continues to rise as if the transfer never occurred. This
interpretation is untenable because it ignores half the language. The provision plainly
requires that a transferred worker’s pay remain at the pre-transfer level until one of two
11
CP at 52.
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events occurs: either the new range catches up, or 12 months pass. If the new pay
range has not overtaken the old within 12 months, the new range takes effect. This
protects workers by delaying any wage reduction for one year.
The issue here, however, is not whether the union correctly interpreted the
involuntary transfer clause. Rather, the only question is whether, in declining to
arbitrate Muir’s grievance, the union deliberated the merits of Muir’s argument and
can explain its decision not to pursue it. “[I]n accordance with the broad discretion
traditionally owed to unions, we do not scrutinize the quality of the union’s
decision.”12
The undisputed facts establish that the union both deliberated the merits of
the grievance and has a rational and nondiscriminatory explanation for declining to
pursue it.
Council 2 asked its general counsel, Audrey Eide, to assess the merits of Muir’s
grievance. Eide followed her usual procedures for evaluating a grievance: she
reviewed the CBA and the arbitrator’s opinions and orders, and she consulted with the
attorney who represented Muir at the previous arbitration. She also obtained
information about Gerry Brown, the former employee whom Muir identified as an
example of the county’s disparate treatment. Eide learned that Brown was not demoted
as part of a disciplinary action but had been “reclassified” when his job was eliminated,
and concluded Brown’s experience did not establish a past practice that would bind the
12
Slevira v. Western Sugar Co., 200 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2000); accord
Peters v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 931 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990); Lindsey, 49 Wn.
App. at 152–53.
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county to pay Muir the higher wage indefinitely. Ultimately Eide concluded Muir’s
grievance would likely fail. The union president relied on Eide’s opinion in deciding not
to pursue arbitration.
Even if Council 2’s evaluation was incorrect, “a union’s conduct may not be
deemed arbitrary simply because of an error in evaluating the merits of a grievance [or]
in interpreting particular provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.”13
The superior court focused on the possible merits of the grievance, remarking
that Muir’s interpretation of the involuntary transfer clause was plausible and that the
union should want to have that issue resolved. In so doing, the court ignored the broad
discretion of the union in this area and failed to focus on whether the union’s decision
had a rational basis. Even if we agreed that Muir’s interpretation of the CBA was
reasonable (which we do not), the union clearly acted within its discretion in refusing to
take his grievance to arbitration. Denial of its motion for summary judgment was error.
Discrimination and Bad Faith
Muir’s complaint also alleged that the union breached its duty by discriminating
against him and acting in bad faith. The trial court did not address these issues. We
have reviewed the record and discern no genuine issues of material fact.
Below, the only evidence Muir presented on his discrimination claim was his
impression that the union treated him differently than it treated Brown. But Muir
concedes that the union considered the two situations and found them dissimilar. Muir
also claimed the union was dishonest in certain letters it wrote him, but admits he had
13
Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985).
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no evidence the authors did not believe what they wrote. When asked whether he had
evidence that Council 2 president Dugovich or general counsel Eide had any personal
or professional animosity toward him, Muir stated, “Not that I can recall.”14
On appeal, Muir points to two excerpts from Dugovich’s testimony as proof of
discrimination. Dugovich testified that the union “arbitrate[s] to a fault” and always
“give[s] the benefit of the doubt” to the employee,15 and that “we could get a dozen
people in this room and we could all disagree on exactly what [the involuntary transfer
clause] means.”16 Muir infers from these statements that Dugovich believed Muir had a
meritorious argument, and suggests Dugovich would have submitted the issue
arbitration but for his animus against Muir. But as noted above, Muir had no evidence
that Dugovich declined to arbitrate for any reason other than that expressed, i.e., that
arbitration would likely be unsuccessful. Muir has presented no evidence to suggest a
triable question of fact as to discrimination.
Muir’s claims of Dugovich’s bias and bad faith are similarly unsupported. He
asserts Dugovich instructed the local executive board to ask for Muir’s resignation as
president, but the record does not so indicate. Rather, the evidence is that Local 1949
board members were unhappy with Muir’s conduct as president and wished to file
charges against him. Dugovich advised against it, on grounds that such a process
could be “long, painful and sometimes unsatisfactory” and that “short of doing that,” the
board could request Muir to resign.17 There was no evidence that Dugovich took any
14
CP at 156.
15
CP at 584.
16
CP at 282.
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action to encourage the board to act against Muir, and it does not appear the board
ever sought Muir’s resignation. Muir offered no evidence that the executive board was
involved in deciding whether to pursue arbitration on the second wage grievance.
Muir also cites several letters written by Dugovich after Muir sued Council 2 and
Local 1849 which discuss Muir’s lawsuit and warn members that Muir may not be acting
in their best interests. These letters do not support a finding that Dugovich’s decision
not to pursue arbitration was taken in bad faith or in a discriminatory fashion.
CONCLUSION
Muir has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on his claim of breach of
the duty of fair representation. The evidence shows the union adequately investigated
and deliberated Muir’s grievance and provided a rational and reasoned explanation for
declining to submit the matter to arbitration. The law requires no more. By denying
summary judgment on grounds that reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation
of the relevant CBA clause, the trial court employed an erroneous standard.
We reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment for Council 2.
WE CONCUR:
17
CP at 300–01.
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