In re Route 103 Quarry

In re Route 103 Quarry (2006-546)

2007 VT 66

[Filed 17-Jul-2007]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2007 VT 66

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2006-546

                               JUNE TERM, 2007


  In re Route 103 Quarry              }          APPEALED FROM:
                                      }
                                      }
                                      }          Environmental Court
                                      }  
                                      }
                                      }          DOCKET NO. 205-10-06 Vtec

                                                 Trial Judge: Thomas S. Durkin  

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Neighbors are appealing the Environmental Court's decision
  granting an amended Act 250 permit that allows appellee J.P. Carrara &
  Sons, Inc. to dig deeper into its quarry to extract stone.  They seek to
  enforce what they claim is an automatic stay under V.R.C.P. 62(a), which
  would preclude the quarry from operating under the amended permit during
  the pendency of their appeal.  Based on our conclusion that the Legislature
  has established discretionary stays with respect to environmental court
  appeals, including appeals to this Court, we remand the matter for the
  Environmental Court to determine in the first instance whether a stay is
  appropriate under the relevant criteria.

       ¶  2.  J.J. Carrera & Sons, Inc. (herein "the quarry") first
  obtained an Act 250 permit in 1988.  Over the past nineteen years, the
  permit has been amended several times.  Most recently, the quarry sought an
  amended permit to dig deeper into the ground to obtain stone.  Neighbors
  opposed the permit.  The local district commission granted a permit but
  imposed conditions that were unacceptable to the quarry.  The quarry
  appealed, and neighbors cross-appealed, to the Environmental Court. 
  Following a six-day hearing, the Environmental Court granted a permit with
  conditions that were acceptable to the quarry.  Neighbors appealed the
  decision to this Court.  Months after filing their notice of appeal,
  neighbors asked the Environmental Court to enforce the automatic stay to
  which they claimed they were entitled during the pendency of their appeal. 
  Without taking a position on whether an automatic stay existed, the
  Environmental Court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
  consider neighbors' request for a stay because an appeal had been filed and
  the case was now before this Court.  Neighbors then filed a motion to
  enforce an automatic stay here, and a single justice granted the motion. 
  Upon the quarry's renewed motion, we granted review by the full Court.
   
       ¶  3.  For the most part, the parties argue over the meaning of
  V.R.C.P. 62(a).  We need not parse the language of that rule regarding
  automatic stays because we conclude that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(f) controls and
  establishes discretionary stays in appeals not only to, but also from, the
  Environmental Court.  As part of a comprehensive permit-reform law enacted
  in 2004, the Legislature created a chapter entitled "Consolidated
  Environmental Appeals," 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 74, which explicitly
  governs, in addition to others, "all appeals from an act or decision of the
  environmental court under this chapter."  10 V.S.A. § 8503(d).  One of the
  express purposes of the chapter is to "[s]tandardize . . . the ability to
  stay any act or decision upon appeal."  Id. § 8501(2).  The chapter
  contains a section titled "Appeals to the environmental court," id. § 8504,
  and one entitled "Appeals to the supreme court," id. § 8505.  Only § 8504
  contains a subsection addressing stays, however.  That subsection specifies
  certain situations in which an automatic stay applies, id. § 8504(f)(1),
  none of which exists here, and otherwise provides as follows:

      Upon petition by a party or upon its own motion for a stay of an
    act or decision, the environmental court shall perform the initial
    review of the request and may grant a stay.  Any decision under
    this subsection to issue a stay shall be subject to appeal to the
    supreme court according to the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

  Id. § 8504(f)(2).

  On its face, this subsection is written in general language and is not
  limited to any particular type of proceeding or level of appeal.  Indeed,
  there is a separate stay provision in another chapter of Title 10 dealing
  with requests for stays in appeals from district commissions to the
  Environmental Court.  10 V.S.A. § 6086(f).

       ¶  4.  The fact that § 8504(f)(2) is located within a section
  entitled "Appeals to environmental court" does not necessarily govern or
  limit its reach.  Although a title is part of a statute and may be helpful
  in construing an ambiguous enactment, "it is the substance of the law,
  rather than the designation or name given to it by the legislative body
  that is controlling."  2A N. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Constr. § 47.03, at
  140 (5th ed. 1992) (citation omitted).  Our ultimate goal, of course, is to
  determine the intent of the Legislature.  Hartford Bd. of Library Trustees
  v. Town of Hartford, 174 Vt. 598, 599, 816 A.2d 512, 515 (2002) (mem.). 
  Notwithstanding the title to § 8504, the subsection on stays contained
  therein is written in general language that appears to include
  environmental court appeals to this Court.  Further, the subsection
  explicitly dedicated to supreme court appeals - § 8505 - does not contain a
  subsection on stays, but rather addresses only the basic perimeters of who
  may appeal what.  We find it highly unlikely that the Legislature intended
  to establish discretionary stays only in appeals to the Environmental
  Court, but elected, by default, to make appeals from the Environmental
  Court to this Court subject to the general civil rule of procedure on
  stays.  Rather, we conclude that, notwithstanding the title of § 8504, the
  subsection on stays contained therein applies to appeals both to and from
  the Environmental Court within the context of that chapter.
        
       ¶  5.  Our conclusion is supported by prior Act 250 law.  Before the
  Legislature dissolved the Environmental Board in 2005, a board rule, later
  ratified by the Legislature, precluded automatic stays of board decisions
  under appeal.  By rule, parties aggrieved by a decision of the board could
  seek a discretionary stay before the board, notwithstanding an appeal to
  this Court.  See 10 V.S.A. § 8504(m) ("Prior decisions of the environmental
  board . . . shall be given the same weight and consideration as prior
  decisions of the environmental court.").  Moreover, the Natural Resources
  Board, which replaced the Environmental Board, has proposed a similar rule
  for stay requests before the district environmental commissions. 
  Similarly, as noted, the chapter in Title 10 concerning Act 250 provides
  for discretionary stays in appeals from district commissions to the
  Environmental Court. 10 V.S.A. § 6086(f).  We find no support for the
  notion that the Legislature intended to impose discretionary stays in all
  aspects of environmental court appeals, except for appeals from that court
  to the Supreme Court, which, by default, would be governed by V.R.C.P. 
  62(a).  In concluding that the Legislature intended the subsection on stays
  to apply to all environmental court appeals governed by the chapter,
  including appeals to this Court, we bear in mind the general rule of
  statutory construction "that a specific statute governs over a more general
  one."  Hartford Bd. of Library Trustees, 174 Vt. at 599, 816 A.2d  at 515;
  see Town of Brattleboro v. Garfield, 2006 VT 56, ¶ 10, ___ Vt. ___, 904 A.2d 1157 ("[W]here two statutes deal with the same subject matter, and one
  is general and the other specific, the more specific statute controls."). 

       ¶  6.  In short, a party seeking a stay of an order issued by the
  Environmental Court pending an appeal to this Court must seek the stay, in
  the first instance, from the Environmental Court, see 10 V.S.A. §
  8504(f)(2); V.R.A.P. 8, which must examine the traditional criteria, and
  other relevant factors, in determining whether to grant or deny the stay. 
  See Gilbert v. Gilbert, 163 Vt. 549, 560, 664 A.2d 239, 245 (1995) (listing
  stay criteria).

       The matter is remanded to the Environmental Court to consider
  appellants' request for a stay of its November 22, 2006 decision pending
  their appeal to this Court; a stay will remain in place until the
  Environmental Court resolves appellants' motion, which shall be filed
  within twenty-one days of the date of this entry order.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _________________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice