State v. Stanley
Annotate this Case
State v. Stanley (2005-550)
2007 VT 64
[Filed 16-Jul-2007]
ENTRY ORDER
2007 VT 64
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-550
MARCH TERM, 2007
State of Vermont } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } District Court of Vermont,
} Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit
William Stanley }
} DOCKET NO. 997-7-04 BnCr
Trial Judge: David T. Suntag
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
¶ 1. Defendant William Stanley appeals his conviction of escape
and the corresponding sentence imposed by the district court. He claims
the conviction should be reversed because: (1) the State failed to prove an
element of the crime; (2) the district court erred by permitting the trial
to commence without his presence; and (3) the court abused its discretion
by denying his attorney's motion to withdraw. Defendant further contends
that his sentence should be reversed and remanded because the minimum and
maximum terms provided are effectively the same. We affirm both the
conviction and the sentence.
¶ 2. In July 2004, defendant was incarcerated at Marble Valley
Regional Correctional Facility. Early that month, he met with Department
of Corrections (DOC) employees to discuss the conditions upon which he
would be furloughed. The written furlough agreement specifically
prohibited defendant from contact or attempted contact with a named
individual and required him to stay away from the Best Value Motel in
Pownal, Vermont. In addition, the agreement required defendant to abide by
weekly furlough authorization permits ("weekly schedules") detailing his
whereabouts, as part of his case plan and supervision program. The
agreement was signed by defendant and two DOC employees. On July 19, DOC
personnel made two unsuccessful attempts to contact defendant at his
apartment, where he was required to be according to his approved weekly
schedule. The next day, when defendant could not be found, the DOC
personnel entered defendant's apartment with the landlord's assistance;
defendant was not there. On July 29, 2004, the State charged defendant
with escape in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1501(a)(1) and filed a request for
an arrest warrant. Defendant was found on October 1, 2004, hiding in the
closet of the named individual's room at the Best Value Motel in Pownal and
was arrested.
¶ 3. Defendant was arraigned on October 4, 2004 and assigned a
public defender. The matter was set for jury draw on March 3, 2005;
however, in late February 2005, the public defender moved to withdraw as
defendant's counsel. The motion was granted on March 2, 2005, and conflict
counsel was assigned to represent defendant. The matter was reset for jury
draw on July 21, 2005. On July 6, 2005, conflict counsel moved to
withdraw. The court granted the motion on July 18, 2005 and appointed
another attorney to represent defendant at trial. A status conference was
held, and the court set jury draw for September 19, 2005. Prior to the
commencement of jury draw, defendant filed a complaint against his attorney
with the Professional Responsibility Board.
¶ 4. On September 19, the court held a preliminary hearing at
which the court officer informed the court that defendant was in a holding
cell but refused to come into the courtroom because he had filed a
complaint against his attorney and did not want to be represented by him at
jury draw. A deputy sheriff further informed the court that defendant's
lawyer had gone to the holding cell but defendant refused to speak with
him. The court declined to physically force defendant's presence,
determining that his deliberate and voluntary act of refusing to enter the
courtroom indicated his intention to waive his presence at trial. Instead,
the court made arrangements for defendant to be periodically updated on the
jury draw's progress and given the opportunity to enter the proceedings at
any point if he so chose. Defense counsel did not object to the court's
decision to proceed, and a jury was selected without defendant's presence.
¶ 5. On the morning of trial, September 21, 2005, the court
addressed defense counsel's motion to withdraw; defendant was present for
the hearing. Defense counsel argued that there was a conflict of interest
because defendant had filed an ethical complaint against him. The court,
however, found that the complaint alone was not enough to create a conflict
of interest necessitating appointment of new counsel, and denied the
motion. At the conclusion of the motion hearing, defendant left the
courtroom and refused to return for the trial that immediately followed.
The court stated that it would not compel defendant's physical presence,
and defense counsel did not object. The court did, however, make
arrangements for a court officer to check in with defendant every thirty to
forty-five minutes to see if he wished to return to the courtroom. At the
close of the evidence, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of
defendant's absence from the courtroom. The court denied the motion,
reiterating its earlier finding that defendant's deliberate acts were a
voluntary waiver of his right to be present at trial. Defendant was
convicted of escape.
¶ 6. After trial, defendant filed a motion for acquittal pursuant
to V.R.Cr.P. 29, claiming the State had not proven an element of the crime
- the existence of an "order." 13 V.S.A. § 1501(b)(2). In support of the
motion, defendant further argued that the court erred in finding
defendant's absence from jury draw and trial to be "knowing and voluntary,"
denying defendant's motion for a mistrial due to his absence, and denying
defense counsel's motion to withdraw. The court denied the motion on all
grounds.
¶ 7. Following this determination, defense counsel filed another
motion to withdraw due to irreconcilable differences and the breakdown of
his relationship with defendant. Counsel claimed this prevented him from
adequately preparing defendant for sentencing and reviewing the
pre-sentencing investigation report with him. The court found that the
breakdown was caused by defendant's deliberate refusal to work with counsel
in an effort to delay proceedings, and denied the motion.
¶ 8. At the sentencing hearing held on December 1, 2005, the court
sentenced defendant to eight-to-nine years to be served concurrently with
his existing sentence, acknowledging that with good-time credit defendant's
maximum and minimum sentences would essentially be the same and would
preclude him from further furlough. Defendant now appeals.
¶ 9. We first address defendant's claim that the district court
erroneously denied his motion for acquittal because the State failed to
establish that there was a furlough "order" in effect in accordance with 28
V.S.A. § 808. On appeal, we review the evidence presented by the State "in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and excluding any modifying
evidence, and determine whether that evidence sufficiently and fairly
supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Baird,
2006 VT 86, ¶ 13, ___ Vt. ___, 908 A.2d 475 (internal citation and
quotations omitted). To prove escape the State must establish that
defendant "fail[ed] to return from furlough to the correctional facility at
the specified time, or visit[ed] other than the specified place, as
required by the order issued in accordance with section 808 of Title 28."
13 V.S.A. § 1501(b)(2). Section 808 of Title 28, in turn, grants the
Commissioner of the DOC the authority to furlough eligible prisoners.
Defendant claims that the conditional reentry form that he signed with DOC
employees was merely an agreement, and therefore, the State did not present
sufficient evidence that a furlough "order" was in place at the time he was
arrested. While the term "order" was not technically used to describe the
document governing defendant's furlough, it was executed in accordance with
28 V.S.A. § 808 by the Commissioner's authority. Furthermore, defendant's
description of the document as an agreement is misguided to the extent that
he had no bargaining power to negotiate its terms. Defendant was required
to accept the terms provided by the Commissioner or he would not be granted
furlough. Thus, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
proving that the conditional reentry form and weekly schedules were an
order for purposes of the escape statute and were issued in accordance with
28 V.S.A. § 808. To determine otherwise would be to frustrate the
legislative purpose underlying the escape statute, as prisoners are often
released on furlough by execution of a conditional reentry form and weekly
schedules, and the Commissioner does not have authority to issue furlough
orders by other means. See State v. Mobbs, 169 Vt. 645, 647, 740 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1999) (mem.) (holding that the Court's interpretation of
criminal statutes "should not frustrate the statutory purpose or lead to
absurd consequences").
¶ 10. Defendant next claims that the court erroneously allowed the
jury to be selected and the trial to proceed without his presence.
Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 provides that a defendant shall be
present at jury draw and every stage of trial, except that "[t]he further
progress of the trial . . . shall not be prevented whenever a defendant,
initially present, . . . voluntarily absents himself after the trial has
commenced, whether or not he has been informed by the court of his
obligation to remain during the trial." See also State v. Koveos, 169 Vt.
62, 72-73, 732 A.2d 722, 729-30 (1999); State v. Bradley, 164 Vt. 346, 348,
670 A.2d 811, 813 (1995). In In re Dunkerley, we determined that under
this rule, a waiver can be construed from the defendant's actions,
"including his deliberate non-attendance at trial," and in light of such
waiver, the trial court may exercise its discretion as to whether a
mistrial should be granted. 135 Vt. 260, 264-65, 376 A.2d 43, 47-48
(1977). Here, defendant was brought to the courthouse by DOC personnel,
but refused to enter the courtroom during jury draw or trial, remaining
instead in the court's holding cell. Throughout the course of jury
selection and trial, he was given numerous opportunities to enter the
proceedings, but continued to refuse. In addition, defendant was
periodically informed of the progress of the proceedings per the court's
instruction. Defense counsel did not object to the court's decision not to
physically compel defendant's presence until the close of evidence when he
moved for a mistrial on the basis of defendant's absence. The trial court
reasonably determined that defendant's refusal to enter the courtroom was
one tactic in an overall strategy to prevent the trial from proceeding, as
evidenced by his failure to cooperate with each of his attorneys and his
consistent requests to substitute appointed counsel. Thus, the court
appropriately exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion for
mistrial because he voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial
under Rule 43 by refusing to enter the courtroom despite the court's best
efforts to encourage his presence.
¶ 11. Nor are we persuaded by defendant's reliance on Crosby v.
United States, for the proposition that a defendant may waive his right to
be present at trial only after trial has commenced. 506 U.S. 255, 262
(1993). In Crosby, the defendant fled the country prior to trial. The
Court held that his behavior could not be construed as a waiver of the
right to be present at trial, as "the defendant's initial presence serves
to assure that any waiver is indeed knowing." Id. at 261.
It did not, however, determine whether a defendant could waive the
protection of Rule 43 in circumstances other than those present in Crosby.
Id.; see also Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 2000).
Here, the concern for the voluntariness of the waiver - the basis of the
high court's opinion - was ameliorated by defendant's presence at the
courthouse, his affirmative refusal to enter the courtroom, and his
continued refusal to attend trial despite being informed of the
proceedings' progress and given numerous opportunities to attend.
Furthermore, defendant's presence at the motion hearing on the morning of
trial belies any contention that he was unaware of his right to be present
at the proceedings affecting him. Particularly here, where defendant
previously engaged in delay tactics, the court was justified in holding
jury draw and trial to prevent defendant "by such deliberate acts, [from]
being able to bar the holding of a trial to determine his guilt or
innocence." Dunkerley, 135 Vt. at 264, 376 A.2d at 47.
¶ 12. Defendant's contention that the court erred by denying
counsel's motion to withdraw is likewise unavailing. The decision to
substitute appointed counsel is left to the discretion of the trial court,
and we will disturb the court's decision only if it abused its discretion.
State v. O'Connell, 147 Vt. 60, 63, 510 A.2d 167, 168 (1986). In
determining whether to appoint new counsel, the court may consider "whether
the defendant is merely engaging in delay tactics," and is not obligated to
substitute new counsel simply because the defendant expresses
dissatisfaction with assigned counsel. State v. Ahearn, 137 Vt. 253, 263,
403 A.2d 696, 703 (1979). The trial court here noted a pattern of the
attorney-client relationship deteriorating to the point where counsel moved
to withdraw on the eve of trial. While the court granted substitution of
counsel twice under such circumstances, it found counsel's motion to
withdraw just prior to the September 21 trial date to be part and parcel of
defendant's strategy to delay the proceedings. Furthermore, the court
determined that the mere filing of an ethical complaint did not rise to the
level of a conflict of interest, and that defendant's refusal to cooperate
with counsel led to any alleged breakdown of their relationship. A
breakdown in communication between a defendant and appointed counsel may
serve as good cause for substitution of counsel, but only where the
defendant has made a good faith effort to work with his appointed attorney.
Id. Here, the court appropriately determined that defendant had not made a
good faith effort to cooperate with counsel. Rather, it found defendant to
be engaging in further delay tactics, and thus, it did not abuse its
discretion in denying counsel's motion to withdraw.
¶ 13. Finally, defendant argues that the eight-to-nine-year sentence
imposed by the court is illegal. Under 13 V.S.A. § 7031, the court cannot
fix a defendant's term of incarceration by imposing minimum and maximum
sentences that are identical. State v. Kimmick, 2007 Vt. 45, ¶ 13, ___ Vt.
___, ___ A.2d ___ (mem.). While the minimum and maximum sentences imposed
here were not identical, defendant argues that they were effectively the
same when taking into consideration his good-time-credit reduction to the
maximum and that the sentence is therefore invalid. As we noted in
Kimmick, nothing in § 7031 requires the court to consider the effect of
good-time credit at sentencing. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. To the extent that the
court does consider the good-time reduction, the sentence is nonetheless
lawful so long as it does not effectively result in a lesser maximum than
minimum sentence, which it did not in this case. See 1999, No. 127 (Adj.
Sess.), § 1 (former 28 V.S.A. § 811(g) (repealed by 2005, No. 63, § 4),
prohibiting reductions in an inmate's sentence that result in the maximum
sentence being less than the minimum sentence); Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 18
(interpreting former 28 V.S.A. § 811(g) to allow reductions that result in
maximum and minimum sentences that are the same). (FN1) Thus, defendant's
sentence is valid.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_________________________________________
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
_________________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_________________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_________________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
_________________________________________
Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes
FN1. Although 28 V.S.A. 811(g) has since been repealed, it was in effect at
the time of defendant's sentencing. See 1 V.S.A. § 214(b).
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
