Bidgood v. Town of Cavendish

Bidgood v. Town of Cavendish (2003-555); 179 Vt. 530; 878 A.2d 290

2005 VT 64

[Filed 08-Jun-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 64

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-555

                              APRIL TERM, 2005

  Paul L. Bidgood	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Windsor Superior Court
                                       }	
  Town of Cavendish, et.al.	       }
                                       }	DOCKET NOS. 29-1-99 and 
                                                            436-9-99 Wrcv

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Appellant Paul Bidgood appeals a trial court order denying
  his request to rescind a settlement agreement and resume trial to
  adjudicate issues that the parties had resolved through the settlement
  agreement.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  This case involves a dispute between Mr. Bidgood and the Town
  of Cavendish over the reclassification of a town highway from Class 3 to
  Class 4.  Mr. Bidgood sought to ensure winter access to his property, which
  fronts the highway, by filing two actions in Windsor Superior Court: (1) an
  appeal from the road commissioner's reclassification determination; and (2)
  a civil action seeking a declaration of the highway's legal status and
  asserting various tort claims against the Town of Chester, Cavendish, a
  town manager, and the Agency of Natural Resources.  The trial court
  consolidated both actions and held a trial.

       ¶  3.  During trial, the parties reached a comprehensive settlement
  agreement of all contested matters.  In negotiating the agreement, Mr.
  Bidgood was represented by two attorneys.  The court incorporated the
  settlement agreement into an Order of Dismissal on May 16, 2003, and
  dismissed the case with prejudice "with leave to reopen within ninety (90)
  days" if certain conditions in the settlement agreement were not satisfied. 
  Accordingly, the deadline for reopening the case under the court's order
  was August 14, 2003.
   
       ¶  4.  On August 25, 2003, Mr. Bidgood filed a document dated August
  14, 2003, and titled, "Motion to Inform The Court That Plaintiff Rescinds
  Settlement."  On October 2, 2003, Mr. Bidgood filed another motion titled
  motion to resume trial.  The trial court denied Mr. Bidgood's motion to
  inform stating that it did not contain an appropriate request for court
  action.  The trial court also denied the motion to resume trial, finding
  that plaintiff "has not shown grounds to set aside the Order of May 16,
  2003 in a manner required by Rule 60(b) of the Vermont Rules of Civil
  Procedure,"and that the contingency set out in the dismissal order was
  unsatisfied.  Plaintiff appeals.

       ¶  5.  Mr. Bidgood  requests this court to reach the merits and
  adjudicate his claims against the opposing parties.  He also argues that
  the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case
  because it failed to: (1) follow statutory procedures; (2) appoint
  commissioners; (3) stay the proposed reclassification; (4) make all
  interested persons parties to the action; and (5) bring the controversy
  before the Transportation Board. 

       ¶  6.  We affirm because the doctrine of res judicata precludes Mr.
  Bidgood from collaterally attacking the validity of the order.  "Res
  judicata bars litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final
  judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter, and
  causes of action are identical or substantially identical."  Kellner v.
  Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶ 8, 176 Vt. 571, 844 A.2d 743 (mem.) (quotations
  omitted).  Res judicata also bars parties from litigating claims that the
  parties should have raised in a previous proceeding.  Id.  A settlement
  agreement that is incorporated into a final judgment can be disturbed
  pursuant only to the procedures set forth in Vermont Rule of Civil
  Procedure 60(b).  Id. ¶¶ 6,8 (discussing and relying on Johnston v.
  Wilkins, 2003 VT 56, 175 Vt. 567, 830 A.2d 695 (mem.)).

       ¶  7.  In the present case, the settlement agreement  was
  incorporated into a final order.  The parties are identical.  The subject
  matter-reclassification and maintenance of a town highway-was central to
  the litigation that the settlement agreement resolved.  Thus, Mr. Bidgood's
  renewed claims are barred by res judicata, and the final order controls.

       ¶  8.  The final order permitted Mr. Bidgood to reopen the case by
  August 14, 2003.  He did not file his motion to rescind the settlement
  agreement until after that deadline, and thus the motion did not reopen the
  case.  Although Mr. Bidgood's motion to inform was dated August 14, 2003,
  he filed it with the court on August 25.  V.R.C.P. 3 ("A civil action is
  commenced by filing a complaint with the court . . . ."); V.R.C.P. 5(e)
  (filing of papers with the court "shall be made by filing them with the
  clerk of the court.")  While Mr. Bidgood filed the motion with the clerk of
  the court, he was not timely because it was not filed until August 25,
  after the ninety-day deadline under the settlement agreement.  Therefore,
  the final judgment remains binding on Mr. Bidgood.

       ¶  9.  The final judgment may be disturbed pursuant only to Rule
  60(b).  The trial court treated Mr. Bidgood's motion to resume trial as a
  motion under Rule 60(b) and found that he showed no grounds under the rule
  to set aside the order.  We review a Rule 60(b) decision narrowly, and will
  not overturn it unless the trial court abused its discretion.  Murphy v.
  Dept. of Taxes, 173 Vt. 571, 573, 795 A.2d 1131, 1133 (2001) (mem.).  The
  record contains no evidence that Mr. Bidgood acted under duress, or that an
  unfair bargaining process took place.  Indeed, he was represented by two
  attorneys during trial and the negotiation process.  Thus, the trial court
  did not abuse its discretion.
        
       ¶  10.  Mr. Bidgood attempts to challenge the superior court's
  subject matter jurisdiction over this case by arguing that the trial court
  failed to follow statutory procedures in reclassifying the highway.  Title
  4 V.S.A. § 113 confers jurisdiction on the superior court in all civil
  cases except in certain situations not applicable to this case.  Mr.
  Bidgood invoked the jurisdiction of the superior court when he filed an
  action under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75, and appealed the road
  commissioner's determination.  Under § 113, the superior court had
  jurisdiction over these actions, and Mr. Bidgood's challenges to the
  correctness of the court's decision do not remove its jurisdiction.  Thus,
  the settlement agreement controls and we, therefore, affirm.  

       Affirmed.


                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Frederic W. Allen (Ret.), Chief Justice
                                       Specially Assigned