Slade v. Slade

Slade v. Slade  (2004-097); 178 Vt. 540; 872 A.2d 367

2005 VT 39

[23-Mar-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 39

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-097

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 2005


  Tammy Slade                       }     APPEALED FROM:
                                    }
                                    }
       v.                           }     Windsor Family Court
                                    }     
  Jeffrey Slade                     }
                                    }     DOCKET NO. 395-11-01 Wrdm

                                          Trial Judge: Amy Marie Davenport

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶ 1.     Wife appeals the family court's final divorce order, arguing
  that the court's division of marital property and its award of spousal
  maintenance are deficient, given the law and the circumstances of this
  case.  We affirm.

       ¶ 2.     The parties married in 1982 and separated in 2001.  They have
  two children, the first born in 1986 and the second in 1989.  Wife and
  husband both worked full-time until the first child was born, at which
  point wife became a full-time homemaker.  Wife returned to work part-time
  in 1993 and resumed full-time work in 1999.  At the time of the hearing
  before the magistrate in December 2002, wife was earning $25,000 per year
  working as an administrative assistant for a public school district. 
  During the marriage, husband's income as a town employee gradually rose
  from approximately $25,000 to $50,000 per year until 1999 when he began
  earning significantly more money selling heavy equipment for a private
  company.  In December 2002, the magistrate found that husband had gross
  income of approximately $150,000 per year.  The parties saved little money
  during their marriage, however, and thus, at the time of the divorce, the
  entire marital estate, including the marital home, was worth about
  $150,000.

        
       ¶ 3.     On December 20, 2002, after a contested hearing, the
  magistrate issued a temporary order requiring husband to pay wife $1,432 in
  monthly child support and $2,000 in monthly maintenance.  The magistrate
  also awarded wife $88 in monthly supplemental maintenance to "equalize the
  incomes in the households and thereby ensure that the children have the
  same standard of living with each parent."  The parties reached an
  agreement regarding parental rights and responsibilities, and they settled
  some issues related to the marital property.  They could not agree on how
  to split up the remainder of their property or on the duration of spousal
  maintenance.  On January 21, 2004, following hearings in November and
  December 2003, the family court issued a final divorce order.  The court
  awarded wife approximately $75,000 in assets, roughly one-half of the
  marital estate, and $2,000 in monthly maintenance for a period of twelve
  years.  The court ordered the parties to continue abiding by the
  magistrate's order on child support and supplemental maintenance.  Wife
  filed the present appeal. 

       ¶ 4.     On appeal, wife argues that the court abused its discretion
  by (1) failing to award her spousal maintenance for the twenty years she
  requested; (2) inequitably distributing the marital property; (3) requiring
  the parties to share uninsured medical expenses; (4) giving husband a small
  set-off against his child support arrears; and (5) allowing husband to
  claim a tax exemption for his son. 
   
       ¶ 5.     Before reaching the merits of wife's arguments, we must
  address the standard of review because the final order omits findings of
  fact.  The family court must issue fact findings if any party timely
  requests them, but it is not compelled to do so absent a request.  V.R.C.P.
  52(a); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 143 Vt. 102, 104, 463 A.2d 223, 224 (1983).  Even
  if not required, however, findings and conclusions are "an invaluable aid
  to appellate courts," and "review is rendered more difficult" without them. 
  Kaplan, 143 Vt. at 105, 463 A.2d  at 225.  If the court makes findings of
  fact-whether upon request or on its own initiative-the findings must be
  adequate to explain to the parties, and to this Court on appeal, how the
  family court arrived at its decision.  Maurer v. Maurer, 2005 VT 26, ¶  12,
  16 Vt. L. Wk. 53.  Thus, a failure to request findings has "the effect of
  precluding any claim challenging the adequacy of the findings" when the
  court does not make them on its own initiative.  Helm v. Helm, 148 Vt. 336,
  338, 534 A.2d 196, 197 (1987).  The appealing party is still entitled to
  review, however.  Where findings are neither requested nor made, this Court
  must assume that the trial court found every contested issue of fact
  necessary to sustain the judgment.  Powell v. Powell, 645 A.2d 622, 623-24
  (Me. 1994); Pizziconi v. Yarbrough, 868 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App.
  1993).  "The question becomes whether or not, viewing that evidence in the
  light most favorable to the prevailing party, there is support in the
  evidence for the decree of divorce as made."(FN1)  Helm, 148 Vt. at 339, 534 A.2d  at 198; see Maurer, 2005 VT 26, ¶  22 (Katz, J., dissenting).  In
  cases like this where the appeal centers on the family court's property
  distribution and award of spousal maintenance, we must also determine
  whether the final order falls within the bounds of the family court's wide
  discretion.   Johnson v. Johnson, 155 Vt. 36, 40, 43, 580 A.2d 503, 506,
  507 (1990). 

        
       ¶ 6.     Wife first challenges the duration of the spousal maintenance
  award.  The family court may award maintenance if the recipient spouse
  lacks sufficient income or capital to meet his or her reasonable needs
  after divorce and cannot support him or herself through appropriate
  employment.  15 V.S.A. § 752(a)(1), (2); Kohut v. Kohut, 164 Vt. 40, 43,
  663 A.2d 942, 944 (1995).  The court must consider a number of factors when
  deciding the amount and duration of spousal maintenance, including the
  length of the marriage, the parties' ages and respective incomes, and the
  standard of living established during the marriage.  15 V.S.A. § 752(b). 
   
       ¶ 7.     Essentially, wife disagrees with how the court weighed the
  evidence in light of the statutory factors, but we find no abuse of
  discretion because the award fell within the range of the evidence.  See
  Stickney v. Stickney, 170 Vt. 547, 549, 742 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1999) (mem.)
  (explaining that Supreme Court will set aside a maintenance award "only
  when there is no reasonable basis to support it").  At the final hearing,
  wife justified the request for twenty years of maintenance payments on her
  belief that husband owed her such payments because she saw him "through
  thick and thin" while they were married.  Husband agreed that wife was
  entitled to some maintenance, but he disagreed with wife's request for an
  award lasting twenty years.  Husband testified that twelve years was more
  appropriate given the length of the marriage.  As husband points out on
  appeal, the twelve year period the court ordered means that wife will
  continue to receive monthly maintenance payments for approximately nine
  years after the parties' youngest child, who is now sixteen-years old,
  reaches the age of majority.  

       ¶ 8.     In ordering $2,000 in monthly maintenance for twelve years,
  the court stated that it reviewed the magistrate's findings on the matter,
  and took into consideration the length of the marriage, the age of the
  parties, the parties' relative expenses, the level of husband's income
  throughout the marriage, and the standard of living the parties established
  throughout the marriage.  In addition, the court stated that the award's
  duration took into consideration husband's support of wife for two and a
  half years after the parties separated.  The court's decision shows that it
  considered the statutory factors and the evidence that the parties
  presented on the issue of maintenance.  Wife has failed to demonstrate that
  the court abused its discretion in awarding wife maintenance lasting twelve
  years. 

       ¶ 9.     Wife next argues that the fifty-fifty split of marital
  property was inequitable and contrary to 15 V.S.A. § 751, which requires
  the family court to equitably divide the marital estate.  Dividing property
  to achieve an equitable result is not a science susceptible to hard and
  fast rules, however.  Plante v. Plante, 148 Vt. 234, 237, 531 A.2d 926, 928
  (1987).  Thus, § 751 provides guiding criteria for the family court to
  consider when deciding how to divide a marital estate, including the length
  of the marriage, the contribution of each spouse in acquiring and
  preserving assets, each party's education and vocational skills, the age
  and health of the parties, and the respective merits of each spouse.  15
  V.S.A. § 751(b).  

       ¶ 10.     Wife claims the inequity in the family court's decision is
  apparent in four ways: (1) she received the marital home contingent on her
  ability to refinance it; (2) the court failed to allocate joint credit-card
  debt; (3) wife did not receive any benefit from a retirement fund that the
  parties were forced to liquidate in the mid-1990s to pay for husband's
  legal expenses after criminal charges were brought against him; and (4) the
  court's order fails to account for the parties' respective merits.  None of
  these claims, whether considered in isolation or in the aggregate,
  demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

        
       ¶ 11.     As to the marital home, wife testified that she wanted the
  home so that she and the children could remain there after the divorce. 
  Wife also testified that she would assume the outstanding debt on the
  property.  The court granted her request, but ordered her to refinance the
  mortgage to eliminate husband's liability for it.  Once wife assumed sole
  responsibility for debt on the home, husband was ordered to quit claim his
  interest in the property.  Wife argues that the family court erroneously
  assumed that she could refinance the property, which she may or may not be
  able to do considering her low income.   We fail to see the inequity wife
  claims, and we note that this kind of arrangement is common in divorce
  cases as wife conceded in her brief.  In light of wife's sworn trial
  testimony, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering her to
  refinance the marital home before requiring husband to quit claim his
  interest in it.

       ¶ 12.     Wife claims that the property division was inequitable
  because the court did not divide the parties' credit card debt equally
  between them. What is equitable is a matter committed to the family court's
  discretion after considering all of the evidence.  Wife has not shown that
  the allocation here was inequitable.  The record shows that after the
  parties separated and before the final divorce decree, husband contributed
  a substantial amount towards the parties' joint debts.  Directing each
  party to assume sole responsibility for debt in his or her own name, as the
  order in this case requires, appears fair under those circumstances.  

       ¶ 13.     We also find no abuse of discretion in the court's apparent
  rejection of wife's request that she receive some reimbursement for
  retirement funds the parties spent to pay for husband's legal expenses in
  the mid-1990s.  Wife's argument presumes that she received no benefit from
  the expenditure, and it ignores the contractual nature of marriage.  During
  their marriage, husband and wife were legally bound to support each other
  and their two children.  Keeping husband from being imprisoned, the obvious
  purpose of the money they took from the retirement account, allowed husband
  to continue earning a living to help support the family, including wife. 
  The court's decision was within its discretion.

       ¶ 14.     We next address wife's argument that husband's fault should
  have resulted in wife receiving a greater share of the marital property. 
  In essence, wife challenges the weight the court afforded to the fault
  criteria set forth in § 751.  See 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(12) (allowing family
  court to consider the parties' respective merits when dividing the marital
  estate).  A review of the transcript shows that the court was well aware of
  husband's fault, namely his infidelity and legal troubles.  What weight to
  assign husband's fault in fashioning the overall property award is an issue
  only the family court may decide.  See   LaMoria v. LaMoria, 171 Vt. 559,
  561, 762 A.2d 1233,1236 (2000) (mem.) (restating the principle that weight
  and credibility determinations are matters for the trier of fact).  Again,
  the record demonstrates that the court considered the statutory factors and
  the evidence introduced at the final hearing.  The court exercised its
  broad discretion and gave the weight it felt was appropriate to husband's
  marital misconduct.  No abuse of that discretion has been shown.

        
       ¶ 15.     Finally, wife contests the court's decision to permit
  husband to claim their son as a dependent on his tax returns and gain the
  benefit of any associated deduction.  Wife also claims the court erred by
  offsetting husband's child support and maintenance arrearage by $189.50,
  and that it was unfair to make the parties share the children's uninsured
  medical expenses.  None of these claims has merit.

       ¶ 16.     As to the issue of tax deductions, wife mischaracterizes the
  court's order.  The final order permits husband to claim the parties' son,
  now almost nineteen-years old, as a dependent, and wife to claim the
  parties' daughter, if  (1) both children qualify as deductions for tax
  purposes, and (2) husband is current on his support obligations as of
  December 31 of the relevant tax year.  When only one child is eligible as a
  deduction, the parties must claim the deduction on an alternating basis. 
  We find no reason to overturn the court's decision considering that wife
  grounds her argument on a mischaracterization of the court's order and does
  not explain the real-world impact of the order on her circumstances.

       ¶ 17.     The remaining two claims require little discussion.  Wife
  argues that it is manifestly inequitable to offset husband's nearly $14,000
  child support and maintenance arrearage by $189.50, labeling the court's
  decision a "Robin-Hood arrangement."  We fail to see how a $189.50 offset
  to a $14,000 arrearage in the context of a divorce with an estate worth
  approximately $150,000 is "manifestly inequitable."  The issue of uninsured
  medical expenses for the children, like the other issues wife raised here,
  is a discretionary matter for the family court's determination, and wife
  has not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion by dividing the
  responsibility for those expenses equally between the parties.

       Affirmed.


       BY THE COURT:


  _______________________________________
  Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

  _______________________________________
  John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

  _______________________________________
  Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

  _______________________________________
  Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

  _______________________________________
  Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.),
  Specially Assigned

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                                  Footnotes

  FN1.  In Maurer v. Maurer, we reversed and remanded a decision
  concerning parental rights and responsibilities because the family court's
  findings were inadequate to aid our review.  2005 VT 26, ¶  16, 16 Vt. L.
  Wk. 53.  Like this case, the parties in Maurer did not ask the court to
  enter findings.  Unlike this case, however, the family court in Maurer
  issued findings on its own initiative.  Id. ¶  12.  That difference is
  critical.  As the dissent in Maurer pointed out, the standard of review
  applicable to cases where no findings were requested or made seeks to
  ensure that the family court's decision has support in the record.  Id. ¶ 
  22.  That is the standard we apply in this case because, in contrast to
  Maurer, no findings were made here.  We note that wife does not challenge
  the adequacy of the family court's findings in this case as the appellant
  in Maurer did, nor does she advocate for a different standard of review.