Lambert v. Beede

Lambert ex rel. Estate of Lambert v. Beede (2002-452); 175 Vt. 610;
830 A.2d 133

2003 VT 75

[Filed 23-Jul-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 75

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-452

                              APRIL TERM, 2003


  Frank H. Lambert for the Estate      }	APPEALED FROM: 
  of Jane Charron Lambert and          }
  Office of Child Support	       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Windsor Family Court
                                       }	
  Francis Beede	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 283-12-82 WrDm

                                                Trial Judge: Paul F. Hudson

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Disabled veteran Francis Beede appeals from an order of the
  Windsor Family Court denying his motion for driver's license reinstatement
  pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 798(c) due to his failure to make child support
  payments to the estate of decedent Jane Charron Lambert.  He argues that
  Vermont law does not allow license suspension where the obligor's permanent
  disability makes repayment unfeasible, and that the trial court erred in
  basing its decision on Beede's failure to make a good faith effort to pay
  his support prior to the onset of his disability.  We agree that the trial
  court's application of § 798(c) in this case improperly transforms a
  measure designed to coerce payment into a punitive device.  Accordingly, we
  reverse.       

       ¶  2.  Beede and Lambert divorced in 1984, assigning Lambert full
  custody of their two children.  Over the next twelve years, Beede paid only
  $2035 of his total child support obligation. In 1996, Lambert successfully
  moved for revocation of Beede's driver's license under 15 V.S.A. § 798,
  which authorizes license removal as a means of providing financially
  capable noncompliants with additional incentive to make their payments.  

       ¶  3.  In 1997 Beede developed a permanently disabling case of
  spinal stenosis, which left him financially unable to make his periodic
  payments.  The family court subsequently suspended his current child
  support obligation, while assessing Beede's debt to the state as $1,278.00
  and to Lambert as $29,269.28.  In 1998 Beede lived off Supplemental
  Security Income (SSI) benefits of $604 dollars per month, which increased
  to $794 per month in November of 2001 when he began receiving Veteran's
  Administration disability benefits. 
   
       ¶  4.  Because of his condition and limited income, Beede filed a
  motion in Windsor Family Court to reinstate his driver's license and to
  permanently modify his child support payments and outstanding arrearage to
  zero.  In an October 25, 2001 hearing where Beede appeared pro se, the
  Office of Child Support (OCS) and Lambert waived any right to arrears
  accruing since 1998, and OCS waived any remaining right to collect on
  arrears due to the State.  The magistrate then (1) modified Beede's child
  support obligation to $0 because he lacked the requisite income and both
  children had reached the age of majority, (2) denied defendant's request to
  reduce his arrearage, but reduced payments on the arrearage to $0, and (3)
  denied Beede's motion to reinstate his driver's license.       

       ¶  5.  In addressing the issue of driver's license reinstatement,
  the magistrate explained that she views a defendant's request in the
  context of his overall behavior, taking his efforts to pay the support into
  account.  Although noting that Beede now lived only with basic necessities,
  she found his payment of $2035 in child support during the entire minority
  of his two children and the accrued arrearages of $29,269.28 dispositive. 
  Because she believed the minimal payments defendant had made over the years
  did not establish a good faith effort to fulfill his child support
  obligations, she denied his request for reinstatement.  

       ¶  6.  Beede filed a motion to reconsider, requesting license
  reinstatement on two grounds.  First, Beede argued that because 15 V.S.A. §
  798(c) provides for reinstatement when "the parent is in compliance with
  the underlying child support order," and he complied with his reduced
  payment order of zero, the magistrate should have reinstated his license. 
  Second, he argued that the inability to make payments toward his
  outstanding arrearage should provide a defense to continued license
  suspension, noting that the magistrate's interpretation made it impossible
  for him to ever regain his license.   

       ¶  7.  The magistrate denied his motion to reconsider, explaining
  that although inability to pay is relevant to the initial motion for
  license revocation according to § 798(a), § 798(c) provides no statutory
  mandate that the court consider the same upon a request for reinstatement. 
  She also upheld her interpretation of § 798(c)'s reinstatement requirement
  of "compliance with the underlying child support order" as requiring a good
  faith effort towards payment not evidenced by Beede's outstanding
  $29,269.28 arrearage. 

       ¶  8.  On appeal, the Windsor family court affirmed the magistrate's
  earlier decision and subsequent denial of Beede's motion to reconsider
  under a deferential standard of review.  Citing  Garrow v. Garrow's
  instruction that trial court decisions are to be disturbed "only in the
  presence of legal error or the absence of factual support for the result,"
  150 Vt. 426, 428, 553 A.2d 569, 571 (1998) (quoting Romano v. Romano, 133
  Vt. 314, 316, 340 A.2d 63, 64 (1975)), the court determined that the
  magistrate acted within her discretion in reading the requirement of a good
  faith effort into § 798(c) and determining that Beede had failed to meet
  this criterion.  Beede appealed.  
   
       ¶  9.  The issue on appeal here - the interpretation of § 798(c) -
  is not subject to a deferential standard of review because it is a question
  of law.  See Cantin v. Young, 171 Vt. 659, 661, 770 A.2d 449, 451 (2000)
  (question of whether disability payments received by children should be
  included within father's gross income under 15 V.S.A. § 653 is a question
  of law and thus subject to de novo review).  Thus, whether a disabled
  individual with an inability to pay can be denied reinstatement of his
  license under § 798(c) is reviewed under a de novo rather than an abuse of
  discretion standard.  

       ¶  10.  Beede argues that because he is in compliance with the child
  support order of $0  and the arrearage repayment order of $0 per month, the
  magistrate erred in not reinstating his license.  We agree.  Section 798 of
  Title 15 governs license suspension and reinstatement.  Subsections (a) and
  (b) provide that when an obligor with a support order fails to pay, and at
  least one-quarter of the annual support obligation is in arrears, the court
  may order a license suspension.  Inability to pay is a defense to
  suspension. Id. § 798(a).  Subsection (c) provides that  

    [t]he license shall be reinstated within five days of a
    reinstatement order from the court or notification from the office
    of child support or the custodial parent . . . that the parent is
    in compliance with the underlying child support order.

  To the extent that subsection (c) imposes any standard for license
  reinstatement, it is only that the obligor parent be in compliance with the
  underlying child support order.  Logically, however, if inability to pay
  provides a complete defense to license suspension, no matter how large the
  arrearage, inability to pay must be relevant to reinstatement.  Even though
  § 798(c) does not explicitly designate the inability to pay as a grounds
  for license reinstatement, we will "not presume that the legislature
  intended absurd or irrational consequences."  In re Judy Ann's Inc., 143
  Vt. 228, 232, 464 A.2d 752, 755 (1983).

       ¶  11.  Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative scheme
  for the enforcement of support.  Although the payment of child support is a
  serious obligation, the State enforces payment orders against noncompliants
  through various civil rather than criminal sanctions.  See 15 V.S.A. §§ 603
  (authorizing civil contempt orders), 785 (withholding wages), 791 (issuing
  liens),  793 (affecting credit reports), 795 (revoking licenses or
  governmental contracts), 796 (holding assets in escrow).  To avoid
  qualifying as punishment, a civil sanction such as license suspension "must
  be capable of being avoided by defendants through adherence to the court's
  order."  Sheehan v. Ryea, 171 Vt. 511, 512, 757 A.2d 467, 468 (2000)
  (mem.); see also Russell v. Armitage, 166 Vt. 392, 399, 687 A.2d 630, 635
  (1997) (citing ability to comply as one of three issues requiring
  consideration in every hearing regarding civil contempt for failure to pay
  child support).    
   
       ¶  12.  In contrast to criminal sanctions, civil sanctions aim to
  compel compliance rather than to punish those in contempt.  A court must
  therefore consider a child support debtor's ability to pay before imposing
  a civil sanction.  Sheehan, 171 Vt. at 512-13, 757 A.2d  at 468-69
  (declaring incarceration an improper sanction for an individual in contempt
  of child support obligations who does not have the ability to pay these
  obligations); Spabile v. Hunt, 134 Vt. 332, 335-36, 360 A.2d 51, 52-53
  (1976) (sanction for noncompliance with child support payments
  inappropriate where it does not contain any findings as to the husband's
  ability to meet his court-decreed obligations);  Andrews v. Andrews, 134
  Vt. 47, 49, 349 A.2d 239, 241 (1975) ("Civil contempt can be found where a
  party, though able, refuses to comply with a valid, specific court
  order.").  We have also required courts to consider ability to comply
  before ordering sanctions that are less restrictive than incarceration. 
  Mayo v. Mayo, 173 Vt. 459, 463-64, 786 A.2d 401, 407 (2001) (rejecting
  modification of a noncompliant's final divorce order as an inappropriate
  child support enforcement sanction where evidence did not establish
  financial ability to make support payments).  We must therefore administer
  § 798(c)'s license suspension provisions consistent with our other civil
  sanctions, recognizing ability to comply as a prerequisite to enforcement. 

       ¶  13.  The purpose of the child support enforcement statutes is to
  ensure that children enjoy  the "standard of living [they] would have
  enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved."  15 V.S.A. § 650 (setting out
  the purpose of all child support provisions and enforcement measures). 
  Here, where an individual is unable to pay due to an income of only $796
  per month in disability benefits and his children have reached the age of
  majority, the statutory purpose can no longer be satisfied.  Along with
  producing little benefit, upholding the decision below would improperly
  convert § 798 into a punitive measure, as Beede cannot pay his outstanding
  arrearage of $29,269.28 or regress in time to make the good faith efforts
  required of him by the magistrate.  If Beede should ever receive an
  inheritance, or should he win the lottery, 33 V.S.A. §§ 3902(e) and 3903
  will ensure that these funds go towards settling his arrearage.  In the
  meantime, Vermont law does not allow the state to continue his license
  suspension under 15 V.S.A. § 798 as a punishment for his past behavior.

       Reversed.     

                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.) 
                                       Specially Assigned