Menard v. Lavoie

Menard v. Lavoie (2001-355); 174 Vt. 479; 806 A.2d 1004

[Filed 08-Jul-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-355

                               MAY TERM, 2002


  Sandra Menard	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Addison Superior Court
                                       }	
  Mark and Nancy Lavoie	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 183-8-00 Ancv

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Plaintiff Sandra Menard appeals from a superior court decision
  granting summary judgment to defendants Mark and Nancy Lavoie.  Plaintiff
  claims issues of fact remain regarding the trial court's determination that
  a "social guest" relationship existed between the parties.  Alternatively,
  plaintiff argues that this Court should abandon the current status-based
  standards of landowner liability in favor of a general standard of
  "reasonable care."  Because we find that defendants were not negligent
  under any standard of care, we affirm.  	

       Defendants own their home, sharing it with Mary Lavoie, the mother of
  defendant Mark Lavoie.  Mary Lavoie originally owned the home with her
  husband, but sold it to defendants in 1978.  Upon purchasing the property,
  defendants built a garage-apartment where Mary lived until 2001.  As part
  of these renovations, defendants installed a spiral staircase connecting
  Mary's apartment to the rest of the house.  Mary used this staircase while
  she lived in the garage-apartment.  The staircase had guardrails at its
  top, but did not have railings along its sides.
   
       Sandra Menard is Mary Lavoie's daughter and the sister of Mark Lavoie. 
  Throughout the 20 years that Mary lived in the garage apartment, plaintiff
  made annual visits to defendants' home.  Plaintiff had used the staircase
  only once because, as she testified in her deposition, it made her nervous. 
  Instead, she chose to use an alternate staircase in a different part of the
  house.  On September 14, 1999, while visiting her mother, plaintiff chose
  to descend the spiral staircase.  Not watching the stairs, she missed the
  first step.  Plaintiff was not holding on to the railing and fell
  completely off the stairs.  She dropped nine feet to the floor below,
  breaking her leg.  She brought suit in superior court against defendants,
  seeking damages for her injury.  The trial court found that a "social
  guest" standard of care applied to the situation, which requires a
  plaintiff to prove affirmative negligence.  Finding insufficient evidence
  to support this claim, the court granted summary judgment to defendants.  

 
        
       Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary
  judgment because issues of fact remain regarding the relationship between
  defendants and herself.  She argues that the determination of a "social
  guest" relationship was in error, as Mary Lavoie engaged in a
  landlord-tenant relationship with defendants.  As such, plaintiff argues
  that she was entitled to be treated as a "business invitee," which imposes
  a higher standard of "reasonable care" on defendants.  See Ball v. Melsur
  Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 43, 633 A.2d 705, 711 (1993).  Alternatively, plaintiff
  argues that this Court ought to abandon the status-based approach to
  landowner liability, instead applying the "reasonable care" standard
  regardless of the parties' relationship.  See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973); see also Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631,
  633 (N.H. 1976).

       Plaintiff's requested standard would impose a higher duty of care on
  defendants than the "affirmative negligence" standard used by the trial
  court.  Currently in Vermont, a landowner is liable to a social guest when
  the guest suffers injury as a result of active or affirmative negligence by
  the landlord.  Lomberg v. Renner, 121 Vt. 311, 315, 157 A.2d 222, ___
  (1960).  A "social guest" is one who enters or remains on land with the
  consent of the landowner.  Id. at 314.  A business invitee, by contrast,
  enters the land for the purpose of business dealings with the landowner. 
  Id.  Plaintiff's contends that a landlord-tenant relationship existed
  between Mary and Mark Lavoie would create a "business invitee"
  relationship, triggering the "reasonable care" standard.  Under this
  standard, defendants have the added duty of keeping the premises free from
  unreasonable risks.  See Ball, 161 Vt. at 43, 633 A.2d  at 711.  This
  standard requires that landowners use "reasonable care to keep [the]
  premises in a safe and suitable condition so that the invitee will not be
  unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger."  Seewaldt v. Mount Snow,
  Ltd., 150 Vt. 238, 241, 552 A.2d 1201, 1202 (1988) (internal alterations
  omitted), quoting Garafano v. Neshobe Beach Club, Inc., 126 Vt. 566, 572,
  238 A.2d 70, 75 (1967).  Although we have applied this standard in the past
  to business invitees, see, e.g., Ball, 161 Vt. at 43, 633 A.2d  at 711,
  plaintiff would have us apply this standard to all landowner liability
  cases. 

       We need not reach the issues of when and whether the business invitee
  or reasonable care standard applies, as we find that defendants' actions
  meet even this higher standard.  Defendants fulfilled their duty to keep
  their home free from unreasonable risks.  They took steps to insure the
  safety of the staircase by installing a guardrail at the top of the stairs. 
  As plaintiff admitted in her deposition, this guardrail was within reach as
  one descended the staircase.  The staircase had been in place for 20 years
  and was used by plaintiff's mother without incident.  On September 14, the
  area was well lit and there was no allegation that a foreign substance made
  the stairs more dangerous than usual.  There were no hidden defects or
  risks.  Whatever dangers the stairs posed were obvious to any observer, and
  were well known by plaintiff.
        
       Additionally, we note that the cause of the accident was as much a
  result of plaintiff's carelessness as any potential negligence by
  defendants.  Plaintiff did not use such care as a person exercising
  reasonable care would have used in descending a spiral staircase.  First,
  she admits in her deposition that she did not use the available railing. 
  Further, she did not look down at the stairs but was looking "straight
  ahead" as she stepped off the landing.  Finally, despite plaintiff's stated

 

  apprehension regarding the spiral staircase, she chose not to use other
  stairs that were available for descending to the first floor.  

       We therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that defendants met the
  standard of "reasonable care" and summary judgment was appropriate.
   
       Affirmed.



                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice