State v. Graves

State v. Graves (99-194); 170 Vt. 646; 757 A.2d 462

[Filed 26-Apr-2000]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-194

                              APRIL TERM, 2000


State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit
                                       }
Judy Graves	                       }	DOCKET NO. 99-2-99 & 5-2-99 Osc	


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Defendant Judy Graves appeals the denial of her motion to suppress. 
  She drove into a port of  entry between Canada and the United States where
  a Vermont State Police officer observed signs  of intoxication.  He then
  conducted field sobriety tests and arrested her.  She argued in her motion 
  to suppress and argues on appeal that warrantless arrests by state officers
  are prohibited in the  federal enclave.  We affirm.

       Defendant stopped at the port of entry in Derby, Vermont, returning
  from Canada to the United  States.  While stopped, a Vermont officer
  observed that her eyes were watery and bloodshot, and  that she smelled of
  alcohol. When questioned, she said she had three drinks, and that her last 
  drink had been about a half-hour earlier.  The officer asked her to perform
  field sobriety tests.  As a result of her performance, the officer believed
  that she had been operating a motor vehicle  on a public highway under the
  influence of alcohol.  He therefore arrested her and administered  a breath
  test, the results of which showed a blood-alcohol content of .154%
  approximately one  hour after operation. 

       Defendant moved to suppress the results of the breath test, arguing
  that the arrest was  extrajurisdictional.  She contends that although
  federal and state statutes provide concurrent  jurisdiction for crimes
  committed within a federal enclave, the Vermont statute permitting service 
  of criminal or civil process does not permit warrantless arrests in a
  federal enclave.  See 1 V.S.A.  § 551.  The trial court denied her motion
  to suppress, citing our decision in State v. Armstrong,  148 Vt. 344, 533 A.2d 1183 (1987), and defendant appeals this denial.  Our review is de
  novo.  See State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 360, 371, 658 A.2d 536, 543 (1995)
  (questions of law reviewed  de novo). 

 

  State jurisdiction over crimes committed in areas ceded to the federal
  government is granted by  8 U.S.C. § 1358, which provides:

     The officers in charge of the various immigrant stations shall admit 
     therein the proper State and local officers charged with the 
     enforcement of the laws of the State or Territory of the United 
     States in which any such immigrant station is located in order that 
     such State and local officers may preserve the peace and make 
     arrests for crimes under the laws of the States and Territories.  For 
     the purpose of this section the jurisdiction of such State and local 
     officers and of the State and local courts shall extend over such 
     immigrant stations.

  (Emphasis added.)  Vermont enacted a related statute, providing that, when
  the federal  government has exercised its power to purchase state lands for
  necessary federal buildings or  enclaves, "concurrent jurisdiction is
  reserved for the execution upon such lands of all process,  civil or
  criminal, issued by the courts of the state and not incompatible with the
  cession."   1 V.S.A. § 551.  

       We have previously indicated that Vermont has jurisdiction over crimes
  committed in the federal  enclaves of ports of entry.  See Armstrong, 148
  Vt. at 346, 533 A.2d  at 1185 (noting that 8  U.S.C. § 1358 expressly
  provides for concurrent jurisdiction and that "courts have regularly 
  upheld state court jurisdiction over similar offenses arising out of stops
  or arrests at border  stations.").  Indeed, defendant has not challenged
  the officer's authority to arrest, only the  procedure of warrantless
  arrests.  Defendant reads § 551 to mean that law enforcement officers  may
  act in the federal enclave only with the prior authorization of a court.
  Armstrong's  observation does not answer defendant's argument.  The
  question of authority to make warrantless  arrests within the federal
  enclave was raised in State v. Vanhouten, 165 Vt. 572, 679 A.2d 900  (1996)
  (mem.), but not reached due to our remand for further factual findings. 
  See id. at 573,  679 A.2d  at 901.  Thus, to date, we have not directly
  addressed this argument.

       Section 551 uses inclusive language to make clear the broad scope of
  the State's concurrent  jurisdiction.  Under the statute, Vermont retains
  jurisdiction for "all process, civil or criminal."  1 V.S.A. § 551.  The
  fact that the statute denotes process "issued by the courts of the state"
  does  not mean that a court order must authorize anything done inside the
  federal enclave.  Rather, it  means that the exercise of law-enforcement
  authority must be governed by the procedures  established by the Vermont
  courts. 

       Here, in order to determine the process required under the rules of
  the courts of Vermont, we  must look to the rules of criminal procedure,
  which provide a variety of procedures for arrests.  Those rules are created
  by this Court. See V.R.Cr.P. Forewords ("The Vermont Rules of  Criminal
  Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme Court on January 31, 1973."). 
  Rule 3  provides: "A law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant a
  person whom the officer has 

 

  probable cause to believe has committed a crime in the presence of the
  officer."  V.R.Cr.P. 3(a).  It is uncontested that the officer had probable
  cause to believe defendant was operating her car  under the influence of
  alcohol.  He had observed her red, watery eyes and slurred speech.  Her 
  performance of the field sobriety tests further attested to her impairment. 
  Finally, he had seen  her in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. 
  Therefore, he needed no warrant to make the  arrest under Rule 3. 
  Defendant received the appropriate process, as governed by the Vermont 
  Rules of Criminal Procedure.  

       We have found only one case that presented the issue of arrests within
  a federal enclave pursuant  to a state statute referencing process issued
  by the courts.  In State v. Allard, 313 A.2d 439 (Me.  1973), the court
  dealt with a Maine statute that contained language similar to our § 551. 
  The  statute provided that Maine retained a concurrent jurisdiction "'so
  far that civil process . . . and  such criminal or other process as shall
  issue under the authority of the state of Maine against any  person . . .
  charged with crimes or misdemeanors . . . may be executed [in the
  enclave]."  Id. at  447 (quoting R.S. 1930, ch 2 § 11) (first alteration in
  original).  The court determined that "the  statute on its face seeks to
  retain state authority to execute criminal process . . . inside the ceded 
  area," id, and therefore concluded that the state intended to reserve
  jurisdiction "to arrest and  prosecute for crimes under state law committed
  [on the ceded land],"  id. at 449. As the court  noted, such reservation of
  jurisdiction is sometimes deemed necessary to prevent federal lands  from
  becoming a haven for criminals.  Id. at 446. 

       While we have not found any other cases presenting exactly this claim,
  we find support for a  broad definition of "process" in a number of cases
  considering the term "process" in a variety of  contexts.  See, e.g., Adams
  v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)  ("Process
  is action taken pursuant to judicial authority."); Kirchner v. Greene, 691 N.E.2d 107,  117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("'[P]rocess' is defined 'as any
  means used by a court to acquire or  exercise jurisdiction over a person or
  over specific property.'");  State v. Joos, 735 S.W.2d 776,  779 (Mo. Ct.
  App. 1987) ("'process' is used as a general term and denotes the means
  whereby  a court compels compliance with its demands").  But see Bruett v.
  18328 11th Ave. N.E., 968 P.2d 913, 918 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) ("'Process
  is interpreted to be a judicial writ.").   In interpreting a statute, "we
  must look not only at the letter of [the] statute but also its reason and 
  spirit."  In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 301, 553 A.2d 1078, 1083  (1988).  
  Further, we must avoid  results that are irrational or unreasonable.  See
  id.  We therefore cannot agree with defendant that,  without an arrest
  warrant, a Vermont officer in a federal enclave may do nothing when a crime 
  is committed in the officer's presence.  Defendant does not contest the
  officer's authority to arrest  her; she challenges only the procedure of
  effecting the arrest. Where, as here,  the authority is  clearly provided,
  there must be some way to effectuate that authority, to save the statute
  from  leading to an irrational result.   

 


       Affirmed.


                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice