Miller v. Town of West Windsor

Miller v. Town of West Windsor (97-048); 167 Vt. 598; 704 A.2d 1170

[Filed 21-Nov-1997]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-048

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1997


Dennis and Judith Miller        }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     Windsor Superior Court
                                }
Town of West Windsor            }
                                }     DOCKET NO. S0145-96WrCa


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The Town appeals from an order of the Windsor Superior Court granting
  taxpayers' motion for summary judgment.  We reverse.

       As part of a general reappraisal of the Town of West Windsor, the
  listers assessed the 1995 value of taxpayers' property at $929,800. 
  Taxpayers appealed that assessment to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA). 
  The BCA raised the assessed value of Taxpayers' property to $1,550,800. 
  Taxpayers then took their case to the superior court for review de novo. 
  There, taxpayers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the BCA
  missed the statutory time limit by not commencing a hearing within fourteen
  days as required by 32 V.S.A. § 4404(b) and failed to provide sufficient
  reasons for its decisions as required by 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c).  Based on the
  BCA's alleged failure to substantially comply with the statutory
  requirements, taxpayers asked the court to apply the remedy provided in §
  4404 and set the value of their property in the 1995 grand list at the
  value established for the prior year.  Upon consideration of taxpayers'
  motion, the court found that the Town substantially complied with the time
  requirements of § 4404.  However, the court found that the BCA failed to
  provide sufficient reasons for its decision and, on that basis, held that
  taxpayers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Town appeals
  the grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether the decision of the
  BCA was adequate in light of § 4404(c).  Taxpayers cross-appeal, claiming
  that the hearing provided was not timely as required by § 4404(b).

       We review a motion for summary judgment using the same standard
  applied by the trial court; summary judgment is appropriate only when the
  materials before the court clearly show that there is no genuine issue of
  material fact and the party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
  See Wesco, Inc. v. Hay-Now, Inc., 159 Vt. 23, 26, 613 A.2d 207, 209 (1992).
  The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proof, and the
  opposing party must be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
  inferences in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
  See Price v. Leland, 149 Vt. 518, 521, 546 A.2d 793, 796 (1988).

       There was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the language of
  the BCA decision. The BCA decision stated:

                                   REASONS

     1. The Miller's [sic] are the owners of a house and 47.15 acres of land
     located on Delano Road.

     2. The value set by the listers was $929,800.00.

 

                                 CONCLUSION

     We conclude that the topography should be changed to good, waterway
     should be enhancing, neighborhood trend should be improving, the
     additional acreage type should be residential, bathrooms changed to 7
     full bath and 2 half baths, a central vacuum system and [an] emergency
     generator added.  (Please see enclosed listers cards.)  The new
     assessment value is $1,550,800.00.

       In its decision, the trial court noted that in 1983 the Legislature
  amended § 4404(c), changing the requirement that the BCA certify in writing
  its "findings" to a requirement that the BCA certify in writing its notice
  of decision "with reasons."  See Harris v. Town of Waltham, 158 Vt. 477,
  481, 613 A.2d 696, 698 (1992) (providing a detailed analysis of the
  legislative history and intent of the 1983 amendment).  The court opined
  that in a case such as Harris, wherein the BCA affirmed the assessment by
  the lister, a brief explanation may be entirely satisfactory, but that a
  more elaborate explanation may be necessary where the parties present
  conflicting evidence and the BCA does not rely upon any presumption of
  validity.  The court measured the considerable increase in assessment
  against the "very little explanation" provided by the BCA for the increase. 
  Specifically, the court faulted the BCA for not explaining why it amended
  the listers' cards and why adjustments in the listers' cards resulted in a
  sixty-seven percent increase in the assessment.  The court granted the
  taxpayers' summary judgment motion on this issue.

       The Town argues that the court erred in concluding that the BCA failed
  to state its "reasons" in accordance with § 4404(c).  It is apparent that
  by citing Beach Properties, Inc. v. Town of Ferrisburg, 161 Vt. 368, 371,
  640 A.2d 50, 51 (1994), the court equated the duties of the State Board of
  Appraisers under 32 V.S.A. § 4467 with those of a town BCA under § 4404. We
  do not agree with this assessment.  The Board of Appraisers, along with the
  superior court, is the primary forum for a full de novo review of municipal
  tax assessments.  As we stated in Harris:

     The requirements of § 4404(c) are technical; taxpayers suffered no
     prejudice from any breach of them.  Taxpayers' rights are fully
     protected by the de novo appeal to the [State Board of Appraisers].
     There is no claim that the reasons given by the BCA, however sparse,
     do not represent its actual determination of the issues raised by the
     taxpayers.

  158 Vt. at 482, 613 A.2d  at 699.  Nowhere in Harris does this Court
  intimate that "reasons" must be more detailed or qualitatively better when
  the BCA's assessment value is markedly different from that of the listers.

       Indeed, in the present case the BCA provided far more detailed reasons
  than did the BCA in Harris, though most of the "reasons" were stated under
  the heading of its "CONCLUSION." Nevertheless, the court imposed a
  requirement that the BCA explain specifically why it changed the values set
  by the listers, again confusing the roles of the BCA and the State Board of
  Appraisers.

       The Legislature made clear in its 1983 amendment to § 4404 that BCAs
  have specific and limited duties, and we held in Harris that once the BCA
  explains itself, however briefly, and without regard to the ultimate merits
  of its determination, its duties end and those of the State Board (or the
  superior court) begin.  The BCA did so in this case, substantially
  complying with its statutory responsibility to provide a notice of decision
  "with reasons."

 

       Taxpayers argued below that the BCA also violated § 4404(b) by failing
  to call a meeting of the BCA "not later than 14 days after the last date
  allowed for the notice of appeal." Taxpayers appealed the listers'
  assessment on August 29, 1995, which was the last day allowed for such
  notice of appeal.  The court found that the BCA began its hearings on
  September 19, 1995, outside the fourteen-day requirement.  The court denied
  taxpayers' motion on this issue, however, concluding that the statutory
  language was directory, not mandatory, and that the BCA substantially
  complied with the requirements of the statute.  Taxpayers raise the issue
  on appeal, claiming entitlement to the statutory remedy as the result of
  the BCA's failure to hold a timely hearing.

       The determination of whether statutory language is mandatory or
  directory is one of legislative intent.  "When the statute is merely
  directory, -- i.e., directs the manner of doing a thing, and is not of the
  essence of the authority for doing it, -- a compliance with its
  requisitions is never considered essential to the validity of the
  proceeding, unless such is the expressed or evident intention of the
  legislature." In re Mullestein, 148 Vt. 170, 174, 531 A.2d 890, 892-93
  (1987).  The statute in question, § 4404(c), requires only that the BCA
  "substantially comply" with its provisions.  As the court noted, there was
  no legislative intent to impose the remedy found in § 4404(c) when minor
  delays occur in BCA hearings.

       Further, the court correctly noted that while § 4404(b) requires that
  the BCA's hearings of tax appeals begin within fourteen days, it also
  provides some flexibility in that the hearings may continue "from day to
  day thereafter."  According to the taxpayers' statement of facts, the BCA
  opened hearings on their appeal on September 19, 1995, and continued them
  on several successive dates.  We agree with the court's denial of
  taxpayers' claim on this point.

       Finally, we note that 32 V.S.A. § 4341 grants a town with less than
  two thousand inhabitants a ten day extension before it is required to
  commence a hearing on a taxpayer's appeal.  The Town of West Windsor had a
  population of 932 in July of 1994.  Vermont Department of Health, Agency of
  Human Services, Population & Housing Estimates, VERMONT 1994 (1995). 
  Therefore, the commencement of the BCA hearing was well within the ten day
  extension automatically granted by § 4341.

       Reversed and remanded.

                              BY THE COURT:

                              _______________________________________
                              Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice