Montpelier Board of School Commissioners v. Montpelier Education

Montpelier Board of School Commissioners v. Montpelier Education Assoc.
(96-510); 167 Vt. 570; 702 A.2d 390

[Opinion Filed 30-Jul-1997]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 3-Sep-1997]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-510

                              MARCH TERM, 1997


Montpelier Board of School Commissioners  }       APPEALED FROM:
                                          }
                                          }
     v.                                   }     Washington Superior Court
                                          }
Montpelier Education Association          }
                                          }     DOCKET NO. 289-6-95 Wncv


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The Montpelier Board of School Commissioners appeals from a superior
  court decision that upheld an arbitrator's decision and award in favor of
  the Montpelier Education Association, the teachers' union.  The arbitrator
  found that the Board violated both a collective bargaining agreement and a
  prior grievance settlement by not renewing Robert Sargent's teaching
  contract. The superior court denied the Board's application to vacate the
  arbitration award.  We affirm.

       In 1990, the Board hired Robert Sargent to teach eighth grade science
  at the Montpelier Middle School.  During 1992-1993, the school principal
  observed Sargent, evaluated him as "needs improvement," and required him to
  establish a plan for improving his performance.  The union responded by
  filing a grievance on behalf of Sargent, and the parties reached a
  settlement in the fall of 1993 under which the superintendent changed
  Sargent's evaluation to "satisfactory" and eliminated the requirement that
  he improve.  During the 1993-1994 school year, the superintendent observed
  Sargent, evaluated him "unsatisfactory," and recommended to the Board that
  his contract not be renewed for 1994-1995.  The union filed a second
  grievance on behalf of Sargent, and under the collective bargaining
  agreement, the parties went to arbitration.

       The parties submitted the following question to the arbitrator:  "Did
  the school district violate the Master Agreement when it did not renew the
  Grievant teacher's contract for the 1994-1995 school year?  And if so,
  what shall the remedy be?"  The arbitrator concluded that the district
  violated the agreement, citing two flaws in the 1993-1994 evaluation
  process:  (1) the superintendent should not have evaluated Sargent because,
  under the collective bargaining agreement, only the principal, associate
  principal, or department leader could evaluate teachers; and (2) requiring
  Sargent to improve over the previous year's performance violated the terms
  of the fall 1993 settlement.  The arbitrator ordered the Board to reinstate
  Sargent and provide him with back pay.  Pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 5677(a),
  the Board applied to the superior court to vacate the arbitration award. 
  The court denied the application, and the Board appeals.

       Generally, we will uphold an arbitrator's award whenever possible.  In
  re Robinson/Keir Partnership, 154 Vt. 50, 53, 573 A.2d 1188, 1189 (1990). 
  Review of an arbitrator's decision is limited.  Id. at 53, 573 A.2d  at
  1190.  Our task is not to review the decision for errors of fact or law,
  Muzzy v. Chevrolet Div., General Motors Corp., 153 Vt. 179, 184, 571 A.2d 609, 612 (1989); rather, it is to ensure that the parties have been
  afforded due process.  Matzen Constr., Inc. v. Leander Anderson Corp., 152
  Vt. 174, 177, 565 A.2d 1320, 1322 (1989).

 


       The Board claims that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by relying
  on procedural issues, and therefore, the Court must vacate the award.  See
  12 V.S.A. § 5677 (a)(3) (court shall vacate award where arbitrator exceeded
  powers).  The Board first argues that the evaluation process was not within
  the scope of the question submitted to the arbitrator; rather, the question
  covered only the substantive issue of Sargent's performance as a teacher. 
  Second, the Board argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
  addressing the evaluation  procedure because the union failed to grieve
  these issues when they first arose.  According to the Board, the union
  waived any challenge to the superintendent conducting the observations and
  evaluation because it failed to file a grievance within thirty days of the
  first observation.  In addition, it maintains that the union was required
  to file a grievance within thirty days after the teacher received the
  superintendent's letter in October 1993 indicating that failure to improve
  could result in a nonrenewal.

       In response, the union contends that the Board is precluded from
  objecting to the arbitrator's consideration of the procedural issues
  because it failed to object before the arbitrator. Indeed, the Board failed
  to challenge the scope of the question or the timeliness of grievances
  before the Board.  "It is important that any objections to arbitration
  jurisdiction be raised at the earliest possible moment to allow that issue
  to be addressed and resolved before the parties expend significant time and
  resources trying the case."  Joder Bldg. Corp. v. Lewis, 153 Vt. 115, 121,
  569 A.2d 471, 474 (1989).  A party who participates in an arbitration
  proceeding without raising a procedural objection cannot raise that
  objection for the first time in court.  Id. at 119-20, 569 A.2d  at 473. 
  The Board concedes that it did not object during arbitration to
  consideration of procedural issues.  It claims that it could not have
  objected until the arbitrator issued his decision relying on procedural
  grounds because it did not know that the arbitrator would rely on
  procedural grounds.  According to the Board, § 5677(a)(3) expressly covers
  this situation and allows it to raise a jurisdictional challenge for the
  first time before the superior court.

       For purposes of this decision, we assume that a claim that the
  arbitrator decided issues beyond the scope of the question is
  jurisdictional and may be raised for the first time in court. We interpret
  questions submitted to arbitrators "as broadly as possible in order to
  quickly and economically resolve disputes."  In re Robinson/Keir, 154 Vt.
  at 55, 573 A.2d  at 1190-91. Thus, we generally resolve disputes about the
  scope of such questions to favor coverage.  Id. at 55, 573 A.2d  at 1191. 
  The question in this case was, "Did the school district violate the Master
  Agreement when it did not renew the Grievant teacher's contract for the
  1994-1995 school year?"  The Board maintains that the question "by its
  express terms, related to the substantive `just and sufficient cause'
  determination" the Board made to not renew the contract. On the contrary,
  however, the question says nothing about "just and sufficient cause" but
  refers to violating the Master Agreement.  Evaluation procedures are
  covered by the agreement.  Thus, the procedural violations upon which the
  arbitrator relied were expressly within the scope of the question.

       The Board's second claim -- that the union failed to file timely
  grievances concerning the evaluation procedure -- is merely an error of law
  or fact and does not show that the arbitrator exceeded his powers.  See
  Cape Elizabeth Sch. Bd. v. Cape Elizabeth Teachers' Ass'n, 459 A.2d 166,
  174 (Me. 1983) (if arbitrator erred in deciding board lacked just cause for
  dismissal, such error cannot serve to vacate award for exceeding power);
  City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 558 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (arbitrator determined that procedural error
  could be considered in evaluating whether "just cause" for dismissal
  existed; such definition of "just cause" amounts, at most, to mere error of
  law, which does not warrant reversal).  This second claim is, therefore,
  not a jurisdictional claim and cannot

 

  be raised for the first time in court.  Jurisdictional error requires an
  exercise of power clearly outside the agreement of the parties.  No such
  error occurred here as evaluation procedures were covered by the parties'
  agreement.  The Board even introduced evidence that fair procedures were
  followed to support its just-cause claim.

       Affirmed.
                              BY THE COURT:


                              _______________________________________
                              Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
                              Specially Assigned