Lorrain v. Lorrain Carpets

Lorrain v. Lorrain Carpets  (95-610); 167 Vt. 574; 705 A.2d 536 

[Filed 30-Sep-1997]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-610

                              APRIL TERM, 1997


Derek Lorrain                         }     APPEALED FROM:
                                      }
                                      }
     v.                               }     Chittenden Superior Court
                                      }
Lorrain Carpets, Atlantic Mutual      }
Insurance Company, Peerless           }     DOCKET NO.  S1127-95CnC , B-17679,
Insurance Company and Aetna Life      }                 Z-448, X-19106 & 84-
and Casualty Company                  }                 16207


               In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Claimant Derek Lorrain was denied workers' compensation for a back
  condition that resulted in a diskectomy and spinal fusion surgery in 1991. 
  Claimant alleged that the back condition resulted from a 1985 accident that
  occurred while he was working for Derek Lorrain Carpet Installers, Inc., a
  business he owned and operated.  The Commissioner of Labor and Industry
  concluded that claimant was collaterally estopped from claiming causation
  between the 1985 accident and the 1991 condition because of the jury
  verdict in a tort suit he brought against the owners of the home where the
  carpet was installed and where the 1985 accident occurred. Claimant first
  appealed to the Chittenden Superior Court which dismissed his claim for
  lack of jurisdiction.  Claimant then appealed to this Court.  We conclude
  that we can reach the merits of this appeal and affirm the decision of the
  commissioner.(FN1)

       The workers' compensation carrier at the time of the accident was
  Aetna Life and Casualty Company.  In response to the claim, Aetna moved for
  summary judgment based on the jury verdict in the tort suit.  In August
  1995, the commissioner granted summary judgment to Aetna based on defensive
  collateral estoppel.  Claimant appealed the commissioner's decision to
  Chittenden Superior Court pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 670.  On November 7,
  1995, the superior court granted Aetna's motion to dismiss on the ground
  that the appeal raised a pure question of law for which the superior court
  lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  On November 28, 1995, claimant
  appealed to this Court from both the August decision of the Commissioner
  and the November decision of the superior court.  Aetna argues that the
  appeal from the commissioner is untimely and that the jurisdictional
  decision of the superior court should be affirmed.

       We agree with Aetna that the applicability of collateral estoppel to a
  given set of facts is a question of law.  See, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v.
  General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 571 (1951); Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska
  Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949, 951 (Alaska 1990). Because the superior
  court's jurisdiction extends only to "questions of fact or questions of
  fact and law," 21 V.S.A. § 671, that court has no jurisdiction over
  questions that are purely legal.

 

  See Pitts v. Howe Scale Co., 110 Vt. 27, 35, 1 A.2d 695, 698 (1938).  We
  therefore affirm the superior court's dismissal of the appeal for lack of
  subject matter jurisdiction.

       Aetna contends that claimant's appeal of the commissioner's August 3
  decision was not timely filed in this Court.  See V.R.A.P. 4 (appeal must
  be filed within thirty days of entry of judgment appealed from).  In
  workers' compensation cases, however, we may grant leave to enter an
  untimely appeal where the appellant "has been prevented by fraud, accident
  or mistake from taking or entering an appeal within the time allowed by
  law."  21 V.S.A. § 673.  Because of the lack of prejudice to Aetna, and the
  technical reason for the untimely filing, we exercise our discretion under
  the statute to allow the appeal.

       The merits of this appeal depend upon the effect of the jury verdict
  in Lorrain v. Ryan, the tort suit against the homeowner.  Although claimant
  prevailed in that case, he appealed to this Court arguing that the damage
  award was inadequate and the court erroneously charged the jury on damages. 
  See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 628 A.2d 543 (1993).  We upheld the
  award, relying in part on our understanding of what the jury decided:

     Defendant's expert testified that the accident resulted in only a
     temporary increase in plaintiff's symptoms, and that plaintiff's
     continuing physical problems were due solely to the degenerative
     [arthritis] condition, which he described as permanent and likely
     to worsen over time. . . .  The jury award covered all of the
     medical expenses incurred during the July 1985 to August 1986
     period, and none thereafter.  Thus, the jury apparently concluded
     that 100 percent of plaintiff's damages incurred in the thirteen-
     month period were attributable to the accident and all damages
     incurred after August 1986 were attributable to the preexisting
     condition or later accidents.

     Plaintiff was awarded damages for medical expenses, pain
     and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of daily
     activities, and lost earnings to August 1986.  The jury awarded
     plaintiff no damages whatsoever for future lost earning capacity,
     future pain and suffering, or future general disability.  It is clear
     that the jury concluded that the disability plaintiff suffered as a
     result of defendants' negligence was merely temporary, and did not
     create or substantially contribute to the continuing medical
     problems plaintiff experienced.

  Id. at 207-08, 628 A.2d  at 547.  From this analysis, the commissioner
  concluded that the jury had decided there was no causal connection between
  the 1985 accident and the 1991 surgery, and she relied on collateral
  estoppel to prohibit relitigation of that issue.

       Collateral estoppel applies with respect to an issue when:


    (1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party or in privity
    with a party in the earlier action; (2) the issue was resolved by a final
    judgment on the merits; (3) the issue is the same as the one raised in the
    later action; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
    issue in the earlier action; and (5) applying preclusion in the later
    action is fair.

 

  Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265, 583 A.2d 583, 587
  (1990).  Claimant contends that collateral estoppel does not apply
  primarily because the liability and causation standards for a workers'
  compensation claim are different from those for a negligence claim.
  Specifically, he argues that the workers' compensation issue is whether the
  accident "aggravated" the preexisting condition or "accelerated [it such
  that it] . . . `came upon the claimant earlier than otherwise would have
  occurred,'" City of Burlington v. Davis, 160 Vt. 183, 184, 624 A.2d 872,
  873 (1993) (quoting Jackson v. True Temper Corp., 151 Vt. 592, 595-96, 563 A.2d 621, 623 (1989)), and that the negligence causation standard is
  narrower.

       The issue in the workers' compensation case is whether the 1985
  accident "aggravated, accelerated, or combined with a preexisting
  impairment or injury to produce a disability greater than would have
  resulted from" the 1985 accident alone.  Pacher v. Fairdale Farms, 8 Vt.
  L.W. 173, 173 (June 2, 1997) (mem.).  If the claimant reaches a preaccident
  condition, then the determinative causation returns to the preexisting
  impairment or condition.  See id. at 174.  We concluded in Lorraine v. Ryan
  that the jury found that "the disability plaintiff suffered as a result of
  [the 1985 accident] . . . was merely temporary, and did not create or
  substantially contribute to the continuing medical problems plaintiff
  experienced." 160 Vt. at 208, 628 A.2d  at 547. Although there are slight
  differences between the wording of the workers' compensation standard and
  our phrasing in Lorrain, we conclude that the causation issue claimant
  raises in this case was resolved against him in Lorrain.

       Affirmed.




                              BY THE COURT:



                              _______________________________________
                              Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice


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                                  Footnotes



FN1.  Claimant also made claims for two other injuries, each involving
  a different workers' compensation carrier.  Both of these carriers were
  originally involved in this appeal, one by way of cross-appeal, but these
  claims have now been settled and are no longer before us.