State v. Putnam

Annotate this Case

STATE_V_PUTNAM.95-344; 164 Vt 558; 675 A.2d 422

[Filed 12-Jan-1996]

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

No. 95-344

State of Vermont Supreme Court

On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Joshua S. Putnam October Term, 1995

Stephen B. Martin, J.

Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and James Maxwell, Deputy State's
Attorney, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, and Stephen L. Fine, Athens, for
defendant-appellant

PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

DOOLEY, J. Defendant, who has been charged with two counts of sexual
assault, moved to disqualify Judge Theresa DiMauro, the presiding judge in
the Windham District Court. Pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 50(d)(3), Judge Dimauro
referred the disqualification motion to the administrative judge for the
trial courts, who denied the motion. We granted an interlocutory appeal.
We affirm.

The disqualification motion is before us on a sparse factual record.
State police officers stationed in the Rockingham barracks conducted the
investigation of the sexual assaults allegedly committed by defendant. The
officer who led the investigation, Detective Sergeant David Tetrault, is on
the State's witness list. Two other officers, Troopers Burns and Cutting,
were also involved in the investigation. Judge DiMauro is married to
Vincent DiMauro, who is a state police trooper also stationed in the
Rockingham barracks. Trooper DiMauro was not part of the investigation,
nor do any of the troopers who may testify have a supervisory relationship
over him. In fact, there are two separate units that work out of the
barracks: the bureau of

criminal investigation in which the potential witnesses work and the
uniform patrol division in which Trooper DiMauro works. Defendant
presented no evidence indicating either that Trooper DiMauro has any
connection to the arrest or investigation of defendant, or that Judge
DiMauro is familiar with the investigating officers.

The heart of the decision of the administrative judge is found in his
rejection of defendant's claim that "at least one close working associate
of [Judge DiMauro's] husband and perhaps more than one will testify":

The assertion that "one close working associate" will testify, [with
whom a personal relationship exists between Trooper DiMauro
and/or Judge DiMauro,] is unsupported by any evidence. The
defense does not name the "close associate" or indicate whether
this "associate" has any connection to this case and/or is expected
to testify. Although it may be reasonable to believe that personal,
as well as professional relationships exist, the defense does not
offer any detail to support the assertion. While the existence of a
personal relationship between either Judge DiMauro and/or her
husband and a potential witness in this proceeding would be
relevant to this court's inquiry, no such evidence is presented in
this case.

The judge also concluded that the marital relationship between a judge and
a state police officer who works in the same barracks as an officer who
will testify in a case before the judge does not automatically require
disqualification of the judge.

Some background in our law is important to understanding the issue
before us. We have adopted, with some minor technical variations, the 1990
American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See Reporter's
Notes, A.O. 10, Canon 3. The Code contains specific per se
disqualification rules, none of which are involved here. See A.O. 10,
Canon 3E(1)(a)-(d). It also contains the general standard relied upon by
the defendant here: a judge must disqualify himself or herself "in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." Id., Canon 3E(1).

We have recently detailed our approach to disqualification issues,
relying on procedural reforms. Our former approach was set out in Richard
v. Richard, 146 Vt. 286, 288, 501 A.2d 1190, 1191 (1985), where we held
that a judge must be disqualified "whenever a doubt of impartiality would
exist in the mind of a reasonable, disinterested observer." We observed
that "`if the slightest question exists, all doubts should be resolved' in
favor of disqualification," id.

(quoting Condosta v. Condosta, 137 Vt. 35, 36, 401 A.2d 897, 898 (1979)), a
standard required because the judge subject to the motion to disqualify
would decide if disqualification were appropriate. After Richard, we
adopted a procedure for referring trial judge disqualification motions to
the administrative judge for the trial courts. See V.R.Cr.P. 50(d)(3). As
a result, the "slightest question" standard of Richard is no longer the
law. See Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 39-40, 633 A.2d 705, 710
(1993). In Ball, we emphasized that a judge subject to a disqualification
motion is accorded a presumption of honesty and integrity and that because
reasonable minds can differ on an issue, discretion must be accorded to the
administrative judge for the trial courts in deciding disqualification
issues. Id. at 39-40, 633 A.2d at 709-10. We held that the standard for
review of disqualification decisions of the administrative judge is "abuse
of discretion, that is, if the record reveals no reasonable basis for the
decision." Id. at 40, 633 A.2d at 710.

Defendant urges us to impose a per se rule that disqualifies a trial
judge from a criminal case if his or her spouse is a police officer and
works in the same barracks as an officer who is a potential witness in the
case. For two major reasons, we decline to impose the rule sought by
defendant.

First, "per se" rules are generally inappropriate in judicial
disqualification issues of this type, and such a rule is inappropriate
here. The Code contains detailed per se disqualification rules for
circumstances where we have decided that disqualification is always
required. See A.O. 10, Canon 3E(1)(a)-(d). Thus, the drafting is
generally inconsistent with adding new per se rules. For this primary
reason, we declined to fashion a per se disqualification rule in Ball to
cover instances where the judge is subject to a judicial conduct complaint
by a lawyer who is appearing in a case before the judge. See Ball, 161 Vt.
at 39, 633 A.2d at 709-10 ("On its face, the `reasonable disinterested
observer' standard of Canon 3C(1) [now 3E(1)] forestalls such an inflexible
per se rule, but instead enables the decisionmaker to take particular
circumstances into account.").

Moreover, we clearly decided to move away from overly rigid
disqualification rules when we entrusted these decisions to the
administrative judge. Thus, we stated in Ball that because "reasonable
minds may differ on an issue, a certain degree of discretion inheres in the
determination of whether a judge's impartiality may be doubted in a given
situation." Id. at 39, 633 A.2d at 709. We held that where the trial
judge does not grant a disqualification motion, "the question of recusal
hinges on the administrative judge's exercise of discretion." Id. at 40,
633 A.2d at 710.

There is nothing special about the conflict involved here that
necessitates a per se rule in spite of our holding in Ball.(FN1) Courts
interpreting identical or similar judicial ethics standards have not
adopted per se rules in cases where friends or associates of a judge appear
as witnesses, see United States v. Kehlbeck, 766 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D.
Ind. 1990) (no per se disqualification where "friend appears as counsel,
party, or witness"; collecting cases); State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746, 754
(R.I. 1983) (no per se rule because of judge's "professional, social,

or business relationships"), or in cases where a spouse or other relative
is employed by, or is otherwise aligned with, a party appearing before the
judge, see Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1994) (appeals
judge not disqualified from bankruptcy case in which trustee challenged
exemptions claimed by debtors even though judge's wife was United States
Bankruptcy Trustee for judicial district); Hewlitt-Packard Co. v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (no per se rule where
judge's son employed by plaintiff) cert denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990);
United Farm Workers of America, AFl-CIO v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (in suit over labor strike, judge not
disqualified because his wife worked two days for plaintiff employer as
replacement worker; disqualification decision based on applicable factors);
State v. Calhoun, 511 A.2d 461, 491 (Md. 1986) (in post-conviction relief
proceeding involving defendant who killed police officer, judge not
disqualified because his father was chief of same police department for
fifteen years, because he had other relatives who were police officers, or
because his cousin was police officer who was killed in line of duty) cert
denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); People v. Taylor, 482 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970-71
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984) (no disqualification of judge because his wife was
probation officer and defendant's father was also probation officer in same
county). We see no reason to reject these precedents because the witness
is a police officer.

Second, it was defendant's burden, as moving party, to make a record
on which a decision could be reached. See Ball, 161 Vt. at 40, 633 A.2d at
710 (moving party has burden to make "clear and affirmative showing of bias
and prejudice"). The record here is virtually nonexistent. At best, this
is a case where a party seeks a judge's disqualification because a person
who works in the same office as the judge's husband may be a witness,
giving unspecified testimony. We know that the office contains twelve
police officers, in two divisions (patrol officers and criminal
investigators), and the witness or witnesses are not in the same division
as the judge's husband. We also know there is no supervisory relationship
between the witness or witnesses and the judge's husband. The witness or
witnesses involved, because they are police officers, are aligned with the
State and want it to prevail. As the administrative judge

found, there is no evidence that Trooper DiMauro is a close working
associate with any of the potential witnesses.

To prevent the appearance inquiry from turning into the speculation of
a suspicious mind, the standard necessarily requires that the objective
observer know and understand all the relevant facts. See In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988) cert denied, 490 U.S. 1102 (1989). Moreover, the questioning of the judge's impartiality
must not be based on unsupported opinion, baseless conclusions or rumors.
See State v. Hunt, 147 Vt. 631, 631, 527 A.2d 223, 223 (1987); Maier v.
Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n,
732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987). Media reports are not a proper basis for a
recusal motion. Hunt, 147 Vt. at 632, 527 A.2d at 223.(FN2) We must
"wrestle with the problem . . . and look closely at our ethical and
constitutional obligations." In re Vermont Supreme Court Admin. Decision
#17, 154 Vt. 217, 224, 576 A.2d 127, 131 (1990).

Defendant's arguments are in direct conflict with these requiremen ts.
Because we know few of the relevant facts, it is easier to say that the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Moreover, defendant's
argument is based on the assumption that there is some overriding
significance to a state police "barracks" in determining whether to
disqualify the judge.(FN3) Thus, defendant seeks a per se rule that applies
to cases investigated by

an officer in the same barracks, but not at all to cases investigated by
officers from a different barracks. Nothing in the record addresses that
significance. For all we know, uniformed patrol officers have no
professional and social interaction with criminal investigators within the
barracks, but do have extensive interactions with uniformed officers from
other barracks and other police forces. We decline to speculate on the
inner workings of law enforcement units without some evidence from the
party who seeks the disqualification on which the law enforcement
relationships are based.

We review the administrative judge's decision on a motion to
disqualify only for abuse of discretion, looking to determine "if the
record reveals no reasonable basis for the decision." Ball, 161 Vt. at 40,
633 A.2d at 710. Based on the very limited record supplied by defendant,
the administrative judge thoroughly examined defendant's grounds for
questioning the trial judge's impartiality and rejected them. We find no
abuse of discretion.

Defendant has also argued that Judge DiMauro's involvement in his case
denies him due process of law because "the marital relationship between one
of those who enforces the law and one who interprets the law is far too
cozy for the comfort of the Due Process Clause." We agree that defendant
is constitutionally entitled to a "fair trial in a fair tribunal." In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). For essentially the same reason that
we reject defendant's ethical challenge, we reject the due process
challenge. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Judge DiMauro will be
other than fair and impartial.

Affirmed.

FOR THE COURT:

_______________________________________
Associate Justice

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes

FN1. Justice Johnson argues in her dissent that a police officer
should be treated the same as a prosecutor so that we should view this case
as if Judge DiMauro were married to a prosecutor. Although we do not agree
with this premise, we do not see a different result even if the premise is
accepted. The commentary to Canon 3E(1) of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, from which the provision before us is taken, states this directly:
"A lawyer in a governmental agency does not ordinarily have an association
with other lawyers employed by that agency. . . ." and goes on to add
"[t]he fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm
with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself
disqualify the judge." Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1), cmt.
(1990). Addressing this exact question, a recent commentary wrote:

[T]he very nature of these intangible considerations prevents the
formulation of a bright line rule stating when such a conflict
necessitates recusal. Thus, each case must undergo a fact specific
and party specific analysis and be decided in accordance with those
individual findings. That is, one must ask, given the facts of the
case, the people involved and the potential issues relating to the
facts and people involved, whether the interest of the judge's
spouse and the involvement of that spouse are extensive enough to
warrant the judge's recusal.

M. Brandsdorfer, Lawyers Married to Judges: A Dilemma Facing State
Judiciaries -- A Case Study of the State of Texas, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
635, 660 (1993).

FN2. Although acknowledging this rule, defendant attached to his
brief a newspaper editorial categorizing the recusal question as "vexing
and urgent," but requiring a "well-considered but speedy resolution."
There is no indication that the editorial is based on any more facts than
are before us.

FN3. According to published sources, the Vermont State Police are
organized primarily around troops. The officers in the case are in Troop
D, which includes stations (or barracks) in Rockingham and Brattleboro.
See Vermont Dep't of Public Safety, 1990 Annual Report 2, 9 (1991); The
National Survey, Vermont Year Book 26 (1995). Troopers are also members of
special units and teams, like the tactical support unit (ten troopers) and
the dive team (eight troopers). 1990 Annual Report at 11, 16. We also
understand from cases argued in this Court that state police officers can
be members of task forces, organized to combat specific criminal activities
like child sexual abuse, domestic violence or drug selling and usage. We
have no information on whether the judge's husband is a member of any of
these organizational units. Nor do we have any information on how close the
working relationship is among officers in separate stations, but within the
same troop.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dissenting

No. 95-344

State of Vermont Supreme Court

On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Joshua S. Putnam October Term, 1995

Stephen B. Martin, J.

Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and James Maxwell,
Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, and Stephen L. Fine,
Athens, for defendant-appellant

PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that a judge may
preside over a criminal trial even though the judge is married to a state
police officer who works in the same small barracks as the investigating
officers in the case. Today's decision, rather than simply requiring Judge
DiMauro's disqualification in every case in which officers of the
Rockingham Barracks are involved as investigators, arresting officers, or
witnesses, instead requires a fact-specific determination in every such
case in which the defendant seeks Judge DiMauro's disqualification.
Because I believe the majority's decision encourages defendants to pry into
the personal lives of Judge DiMauro and her husband, creates an unnecessary
administrative burden for the administrative judge and this Court, and,
most importantly, permits the public and

criminal defendants to entertain doubt as to the integrity of the criminal
process, I respectfully dissent.

Both the majority and the administrative judge emphasize the lack of a
detailed factual record showing any relationship between Judge DiMauro or
Trooper DiMauro and the officers involved in this case, other than Trooper
DiMauro's position as a fellow officer in the twelve-officer Rockingham
Barracks. Yet the "heart of the decision of the administrative judge,"
ante, at 2, includes an acknowledgment that "it may be reasonable to
believe that personal, as well as professional relationships exist" and,
moreover, that "the existence of a personal relationship between either
Judge DiMauro and/or her husband and a potential witness . . . would be
relevant." Ante, at 2. The majority apparently accepts that (1) a
personal relationship between Judge DiMauro or Trooper DiMauro and an
officer involved in the case might be enough to require Judge DiMauro's
disqualification, and (2) a reasonable person would likely believe, under
these circumstances, that such relationships do exist. Nonetheless, the
majority holds that Judge DiMauro may preside over defendant's case.

Although I have no reason to doubt Judge DiMauro's fairness and
integrity, in this or any other case, I believe that these two
propositions, which I also accept, compel an opposite result. Our first
priority in resolving a difficult question such as this must be the
preservation of public trust in the judiciary. For a number of reasons,
permitting Judge DiMauro to preside over criminal cases that involve
officers from her husband's barracks raises an appearance of impropriety
and unnecessarily exposes the judiciary to public criticism.

Of critical importance is the fact that this is not an ordinary civil
trial, and the officers involved are not ordinary witnesses. The
appearance, as well as the reality, of fair and impartial proceedings is
especially important in a criminal trial. Criminal defendants have more at
stake than a possible monetary loss. They face a possible loss of liberty.
What stands between a

defendant and the power of the state is the judge and, if the case goes to
trial, the jury.(FN1) An apparent connection between a presiding judge and
the agents of the state who are prosecuting a case undermines the judge's
function as an impartial arbiter between the defendant and the state.

The majority maintains that defendant is seeking Judge DiMauro's
disqualification merely "because a person who works in the same office as
the judge's husband may be a witness, giving unspecified testimony." Ante,
at 5. This characterization of the facts is disingenuous. Police officers
who testify in criminal cases are not ordinary witnesses. As a result of
both the officers' official duties and the typical collaboration between
investigating officers and prosecutors, police officers in criminal cases
appear to be an arm of the state. I see little difference between this
case and one in which the presiding judge is married to a member of the
state's attorney's office. Indeed, in one way the connection is more
troubling: because of the importance of police investigatory work in
criminal trials, Judge DiMauro will likely be called upon in some of these
cases to make rulings that turn on the competence and credibility of
Trooper DiMauro's fellow officers.

I am concerned as well by the practical consequences of the majority's
decision. By requiring defendants to produce evidence showing that either
Judge DiMauro or Trooper DiMauro has some specific connection to the
officers involved in their cases, the Court encourages future defendants to
probe the private lives of Judge DiMauro and her husband, in the hope of
unearthing relevant information. Judge DiMauro's social relationships will
be the subject of routine investigations by defendants.

Not only will the DiMauros' privacy be invaded, but our scarce
judicial resources will be expended on future motions like this one. The
administrative judge will be forced to hold lengthy evidentiary hearings as
defendants attempt to make out a sufficient factual record to

support disqualification. Review of these motions will also absorb the
time of this Court, while unnecessarily delaying the underlying criminal
proceedings.

Defendant urges this Court to avoid these problems by adopting a "per
se" rule requiring Judge DiMauro's disqualification in cases involving
officers from the Rockingham Barracks. Rejecting this approach, the
majority makes two arguments: first, that fashioning a per se rule in this
case is inappropriate, because the Code of Judicial Conduct provides the
list of circumstances in which the Court has decided that disqualification
is always required; and second, that by entrusting disqualification
decisions to the discretion of the administrative judge, we signaled a
shift away from rigid disqualification rules.

Although it is true that this case does not fit within any of the
disqualification rules of the Code, A.O. 10, Canon 3E(1)(a)-(d), I see no
reason to conclude that the Code's list of disqualification rules is
exhaustive. In a state of this size, conflicts are certain to occur
frequently. If such questions were typically litigated, we would quickly
find that the specific rules contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct
barely scratch the surface of this issue. For example, those rules do not
cover situations in which a judge has a social relationship with a party,
yet we have found such a situation troubling enough to require
disqualification. See Richard v. Richard, 146 Vt. 286, 288, 501 A.2d 1190,
1191 (1985) (requiring disqualification of assistant judges based on social
relationship with plaintiff). This Court does not face these questions
often, however, because judges usually go beyond the requirements of the
rules, either simply recusing themselves for any reason that might cast
doubt on their impartiality, or disclosing the information and then
recusing themselves if a party so requests.

Fortunately, this informal system works well, and permits this Court,
and the administrative judge, to avoid most sticky disqualification
questions. Nonetheless, troubling situations may develop that, like this
one, are difficult to pigeonhole within the rules, but are best resolved
with a simple and straightforward requirement of disqualification. This
approach is not inconsistent with our decision in Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161
Vt. 35, 39-40, 633 A.2d 705

, 710 (1993), in which this Court recognized that the administrative judge
has discretion in deciding disqualification issues. That discretion is
appropriate when the administrative judge reaches a decision after weighing
evidence and resolving disputed factual questions. Here, however, I
believe the best approach is to establish a rule that prevents such
fact-based disputes from ever reaching the administrative judge.

I would reverse the decision of the administrative judge, and require
Judge DiMauro's disqualification in this case, and any case involving
officers from the Barracks where Trooper DiMauro is stationed as
investigators, arresting officers, or witnesses.(FN2)

_____________________________
Associate Justice

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes

FN1. A marital relationship between a juror and an officer in the
Rockingham Barracks would likely entitle defendant to strike the juror for
cause.

FN2. If both parties agree, of course, they may notify the court
clerk that Judge DiMauro may preside over a case that involves officers
from the Rockingham Barracks.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dissenting

No. 95-344

State of Vermont Supreme Court

On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Joshua S. Putnam October Term, 1995

Stephen B. Martin, J.

Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and James Maxwell,
Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, and Stephen L. Fine,
Athens, for defendant-appellant

PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

MORSE, J., dissenting. I agree that the standard of review is "abuse
of discretion," and I can imagine a like case where additional factors
might support an affirmance. But, in my opinion, the essential facts, the
very "sparse[ness of the] factual record," require Judge DiMauro's
disqualification. There simply are no facts to weigh on the other side of
the question. The Court's imposition of the burden on defendant, to dispel
any doubt that the perception of partiality requires the judge's
disqualification, turns the standard of review on its ear. In my view,
once the threshold is reached, it is up to the State to overcome the force
of defendant's argument. In this case, the State presented nothing to
rebut the appearance of partiality, and I conclude there is "no reasonable
basis" for affirmance.

The unavoidable public view in Vermont is that a twelve-officer state
police barracks is a tightly knit organization of peace keepers dedicated
to serving and protecting the community. The import of the Court's opinion
is that this perception is not borne out for lack of detail in the

evidence, and is merely "the speculation of a suspicious mind." But, it
takes no "evidence" to establish that officers in the Rockingham barracks
should care deeply about how the judges at Windham District Court handle
the cases generated by any one of them.

This case is not an isolated incident where spouses' professional
roles just happen to cross. The judge's husband is permanently employed at
the Rockingham Barracks, which is the State police venue for Windham
County. Judge DiMauro's court and Trooper DiMauro's office are involved in
one case after another. It is no stretch to imagine that employees in
those two places take more than a passing interest in the interaction of
their work. For instance, the judge might be required to rule on a motion
to suppress the fruits of a search conducted by a local state trooper, one
of her husband's eleven co-workers. Not only will the judge be conscious
of the potential reactions her ruling may engender at the barracks, she
will be aware also that she will have to make such rulings again and again.

Finally, there are no countervailing concerns here about a disruption
in the efficient administration of the court. Defendant gave plenty of
warning by filing his motion to recuse before the judge's investment in the
case was significant enough to cause a hardship to anyone. In fact, the
Court's affirmance redirects the hardship the other way, onto the moving
party, as Justice Johnson points out in her dissent.

None of the cases cited by the Court establishes anything like the
kind of blanket authority it has created here. The administrative judge is
given limitless discretion. There is nothing in the standard created today
that would stop the administrative judge from allowing Judge DiMauro to sit
on a case investigated by another member of the uniformed patrol division
in the Rockingham barracks or even one Trooper DiMauro himself
investigated. I am not saying by this that the Court would approve of
Judge DiMauro sitting, only that the Court has given no parameters for the
administrative judge to use in ruling on future cases. In sum, I think
this case stretches discretion beyond the breaking point.

I respectfully dissent.

_______________________________________
Associate Justice

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