Kellogg-Hubbard Library v. Labor Relations Board
Annotate this Case
KELLOGGHUBBARD_LIB_V_LABOR_RELATIONS_BD.93-161; 162 Vt. 571; 649 A.2d 784
[Filed 30-Sep-1994]
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
No. 93-161
Kellogg-Hubbard Library Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Washington Superior Court
Labor Relations Board January Term, 1994
Stephen B. Martin, J.
J. Scott Cameron of Paterson & Walke, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-
appellant
Colin R. Benjamin and Alan P. Biederman of Biederman and Rakow, P.C.,
Rutland, for appellee Local 1369, AFSCME
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
JOHNSON, J. The issue in this case is whether an aggrieved party may
appeal directly to this Court from orders of the Vermont Labor Relations
Board (VLRB) pertaining to unit determination and certification under the
State Labor Relations Act (SLRA), 21 V.S.A. {{ 1501-1623. Because we agree
with the superior court that statutory law provides for such review, we
affirm the court's refusal to assert jurisdiction over appellant's complaint
under V.R.C.P 75.
In October 1991, appellee, local union 1369 of the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, filed a petition under
the SLRA requesting the VLRB to conduct an election among employees of the
Kellogg-Hubbard Library, a private, nonprofit entity, to determine whether
the employees wanted Local 1369 to represent them as their collective
bargaining agent. Appellant, the library's board of trustees (Library),
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) had jurisdiction over the matter, not the VLRB. On
February 10, 1992, the VLRB denied the Library's motion, ruling that it had
jurisdiction because the NLRB, through an advisory opinion in an analogous
case, had declined to assert jurisdiction over the dispute. See 21 V.S.A. {
1505 (SLRA does not apply to any employer or labor dispute that affects
commerce unless NLRB has ceded, or declined to assert, jurisdiction).
Accordingly, the VLRB granted the union's petition, and in June 1992 the
employees voted 8-1 to have Local 1369 represent them. On July 13, 1992,
the VLRB issued an order certifying the union as the collective bargaining
agent for the library's employees.
On August 10, 1992, the Library filed a complaint in superior court
requesting a declaratory judgment that the VLRB lacked jurisdiction over the
petition filed by the union. The Library asserted that relief was available
in superior court under V.R.C.P. 75 because there was no direct avenue of
appeal under the SLRA. The superior court disagreed. Comparing the SLRA
with the other two acts administered by the VLRB -- the State Employees
Labor Relations Act (SELRA), 3 V.S.A. {{ 901-1007, and the Municipal
Employees Relations Act (MERA), 21 V.S.A. {{ 1721-1735 -- the court
concluded that the legislature intended that the general principles and
powers set forth in SELRA, including the provision allowing aggrieved
persons to appeal directly to the Supreme Court on questions of law raised
by decisions of the VLRB, would also apply in proceedings under SLRA and
MERA. The court stated that it would be "absurd and unreasonable" to
conclude that similar errors of law could be appealed directly to this Court
under one of the statutes administered by the VLRB, but not the others.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the Library's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
We first examine the relevant statutes. The SLRA, which applies to
employees in the private sector, see 21 V.S.A. { 1502(6), (7), was enacted
in 1967. It expressly allows an aggrieved party to appeal to this Court
from a decision in a proceeding involving a charge of an unfair labor
practice, 21 V.S.A. { 1623(c), but it does not provide a right of appeal in
any other type of proceeding. SELRA, which applies to state employees, 3
V.S.A. { 902(4), (5), was enacted in 1969. It includes a broad appeal
provision, which states that "[a]ny person aggrieved by an order or decision
of the board issued under the authority of this chapter may appeal on
questions of law to the supreme court." 3 V.S.A. { 1003(a). MERA, which
applies to municipal employees, was enacted in 1973. It also contains a
broad appeal provision that is virtually identical to 3 V.S.A. { 1003(a).
See 21 V.S.A. { 1729(c). In 1976, the legislature passed Act 152, which
recreated the VLRB within SELRA, 1975 (Adj. Sess.) {{ 1-6, and repealed
provisions in the SLRA pertaining to the creation and empowerment of the
VLRB, id. { 7. Act 152 added, among other things, the following provision
to the "powers and duties" provision in SELRA:
(d) In addition to its responsibilities under this
chapter, the board shall carry out the responsibilities
given to it under [SLRA] and when so doing shall exer-
cise the powers and follow the procedures set out in
that chapter. The board shall also carry out the
responsibilities given to it under [MERA] and when so
doing shall exercise the powers and follow the
procedures set out in that chapter.
3 V.S.A. { 924(d).
We agree with the superior court that the three statutes are closely
related and therefore should be considered in pari materia as part of one
system intended to oversee labor relations. See In re Preseault, 130 Vt.
343, 346, 292 A.2d 832, 834 (1972) ("Statutes in pari materia are to be
construed with reference to each other as parts of one system."). Statutes
are considered to be in pari materia when they deal with the same subject
matter or have the same objective or purpose. 2B N. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction { 51.03, at 138 (5th ed. 1992). Further,
"[c]haracterization of the object or purpose is more important than
characterization of subject matter in determining whether different statutes
are closely enough related to justify interpreting one in light of the
other." Id.
Each of the three statutes has a virtually identical statement of
purpose: To prescribe the rights of certain employees and employers in
their relations with each other, to provide procedures for the protection of
those rights, to protect the rights of individual employees in their rela-
tions with labor organizations, to proscribe harmful labor practices, and to
protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes. See 3
V.S.A. { 901; 21 V.S.A. { 1501(b); 21 V.S.A. { 1721. In furtherance of
these goals, all three statutes require employers, employees, and unions to
follow a similar procedural system administered by a single administrative
agency, which determines appropriate bargaining units, conducts represen-
tation elections, and adjudicates charges of unfair labor practices. More
particularly to this case, all three statutes have similar provisions that
address the procedures and the VLRB's role regarding unit determinations and
petitions for elections. See 3 V.S.A. { 941; 21 V.S.A. {{ 1543, 1581; 21
V.S.A. { 1724.
In the context of these interrelated statutes, the Library argues that
because the SLRA's appeal provision permits our review of VLRB orders that
arise in unfair-labor-practice proceedings but is silent as to review of
VLRB orders in other proceedings, review is unavailable in those other
proceedings. The Library recognizes that we may review VLRB orders in
virtually identical proceedings under the SLRA's two sister statutes, which
expressly permit appeal to this Court from all VLRB orders. Nevertheless,
in support of its position, the Library relies on the plain meaning of {
1623(c) of the SLRA and on the rule of statutory construction called
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius -- the inclusion of one is the
exclusion of another.
Although rules of statutory construction may be helpful in interpreting
the meaning of statutes, they are secondary to our primary objective of
giving effect to the intent of the Legislature. Nash v. Warren Zoning Bd.
of Adjust., 153 Vt. 108, 112, 569 A.2d 447, 450 (1989); see Clymer v.
Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 625, 596 A.2d 905, 912 (1991) (rules of statutory
construction are not followed when they do not further remedial purposes of
statute). We decline to accept the Library's constrained and unreasonable
interpretation of the statutes. Rather, examining the three statutes and
the 1976 amendment to those statutes, we conclude that the legislature
intended to afford aggrieved parties the right to appeal to this Court from
final decisions in all types of proceedings under each of the three statutes
administered by the VLRB.
The only reasonable interpretation of the purpose behind the 1976
amendment is that the legislature intended to consolidate the general powers
and procedures of the VLRB in SELRA and to apply them to proceedings in each
of the three labor-relations statutes, while leaving intact particular
procedures expressly provided in the SLRA and MERA. Subsection 924(d), part
of the "powers and duties" section of SELRA added by the 1976 amendment,
provides that, in addition to its responsibilities under SELRA, the VLRB
shall carry out its responsibilities, exercise its powers, and follow
procedures set forth in the SLRA and MERA. Section 1003(a) of SELRA
permits an aggrieved person to appeal to this Court from any order or
decision of the VLRB "issued under the authority of this chapter." A
hypertechnical reading of the language of {{ 1003 and 924(d) might lead to
the conclusion that the right of appeal in { 1003 was not intended to extend
to proceedings set forth in statutes other than SELRA. Rather than accede
to this unreasonable and irrational result, we conclude that, by consoli-
dating the VLRB's powers and duties in SELRA, the legislature intended to
extend the right of appeal provided in { 1003 to all proceedings admin-
istered by the VLRB, including proceedings set forth in SELRA and MERA.
See Preseault, 130 Vt. at 348, 292 A.2d at 835 ("A statute is to be
construed as to carry out the intent of the legislature, though such
construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute."); cf. Nash,
153 Vt. at 112, 569 A.2d at 450 (general procedural requirements of zoning
appeals apply to conditional use cases although the authority for con-
ditional uses is in separate statute). Indeed, in two prior cases, we have
presumed this to be the case. See In re Local 1201, AFSCME, 143 Vt. 512,
513, 469 A.2d 1176, 1177 (1983) (indicating that union appeal from VLRB
order in MERA proceeding was pursuant to SELRA provision 3 V.S.A. { 1003);
Firefighters v. Brattleboro Fire Dep't, 138 Vt. 347, 349, 415 A.2d 243, 244
(1980) (same).
This interpretation is consistent with other apparent shortcomings in
SELRA and MERA. Although { 924(d) of SELRA requires the VLRB to "exercise
the powers and follow the procedures" set forth in MERA and the SLRA,
neither the SLRA nor MERA include all of the general powers necessary to
carry out the VLRB's responsibilities under those statutes. For example,
though the Board has promulgated rules to implement MERA, unlike SELRA and
the SLRA, see 3 V.S.A. { 928(a); 21 V.S.A. { 1544(a), MERA contains no
provision empowering the VLRB to promulgate rules. If we were to read the
three statutes in isolation, we would reach the anomalous result that the
Board could promulgate rules necessary to carry out its duties under SELRA
and the SLRA, but not MERA. Similarly, 3 V.S.A. { 928 exempts the VLRB, for
the most part, from the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), but SELRA and
MERA are silent on this matter. Yet, the procedures set forth in all three
statutes are inconsistent, in many respects, with the APA.
Moreover, it would not make sense to afford aggrieved parties a right
to appeal from VLRB orders in all proceedings under SELRA and MERA, but to
force parties to use an indirect appeal route under V.R.C.P. 75 to appeal
from VLRB orders in identical proceedings under the SLRA. The Library
points out that the SLRA applies to private employees while SELRA and MERA
apply to state and municipal employees, but it fails to explain, and we
cannot fathom, why this distinction would serve as a basis for precluding
appeals under the SLRA only. See Preseault, 130 Vt. at 348, 292 A.2d at 835
("It is presumed in construing a statute that no unjust or unreasonable
result was intended by the legislature."); cf. State v. International
Collection Serv., Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 543-44, 594 A.2d 426, 429 (1991) (in
construing Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act, this Court stated, "It is
reasonable for the legislature to determine that business persons have
adequate private remedies in existing laws, while special, new remedies are
necessary to protect individual consumers.").
Because we conclude that the Library could have appealed directly to
this Court under 3 V.S.A. { 1003 from the VLRB's ruling accepting Local
1369's petition for an election and certification, we affirm the superior
court's dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of the Library's
complaint brought under V.R.C.P. 75. The Library sought under Rule 75 a
declaratory judgment and extraordinary relief in the nature of certiorari
and prohibition. Relief under Rule 75, however, is not available when the
legislature has established a direct route of appeal. See In re Appeal of
City of Barre, 134 Vt. 519, 520, 365 A.2d 519, 520 (1976) (extraordinary
relief in nature of certiorari is not available where issues could have been
raised by direct appeal); In re Petition of LaFreniere, 126 Vt. 204, 206,
227 A.2d 301, 302 (1967) (extraordinary remedies of mandamus, prohibition
and certiorari are not available to litigant who failed to resort to
statutory procedure); see also In re Fairchild, 159 Vt. 125, 130, 616 A.2d 228, 231 (1992) (court can issue writ of mandamus sought under V.R.C.P. 75
only if there is no other adequate remedy at law); Williams v. State, 156
Vt. 42, 57-58, 589 A.2d 840, 849-50 (1990) (superior court's general
authority to grant declaratory relief does not provide jurisdiction where
legislature has designated another tribunal to hear certain claims).
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
____________________________________________
Associate Justice
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dissenting
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
No. 93-161
Kellogg-Hubbard Library Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Washington Superior Court
Labor Relations Board January Term, 1994
Stephen B. Martin, J.
J. Scott Cameron of Paterson & Walke, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-
appellant
Colin R. Benjamin and Alan P. Biederman of Biederman and Rakow, P.C.,
Rutland, for appellee Local 1369, AFSCME
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
GIBSON, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. As the majority
opinion recognizes, the State Labor Relations Act (SLRA), 21 V.S.A. {{ 1501-
1623, provides no authority to appeal to this Court from a Vermont Labor
Relations Board (VLRB) decision on unit certification. Ante, at 3. To
obtain review of the VLRB decision in this case, the Library, therefore,
sought a declaratory judgment and extraordinary relief in superior court
pursuant to V.R.C.P. 75. Where the Legislature has not provided a specific
means for review, administrative action is normally reviewable under
V.R.C.P. 75, unless the legislation declares the administrative decision to
be final. Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 440, 620 A.2d 1266, 1266
(1992). The SLRA does not declare that VLRB decisions are final; therefore,
review in superior court under V.R.C.P. 75 was the appropriate procedure in
this case.
The majority holds, however, that relief sought by the Library under
V.R.C.P. 75 is not available because the Legislature has established a mode
of appeal from all VLRB decisions in the State Employees Labor Relations Act
(SELRA), 3 V.S.A. {{ 901-1007. Ante, at 6. Neither the plain language of
the statutes, nor the rules of statutory construction relied on by the
majority support this result.
The SLRA expressly provides that an aggrieved party may appeal to this
Court from a VLRB decision on an unfair labor practices charge. 21 V.S.A. {
1623(c). The statute is silent, however, as to appeals from other decisions
under the SLRA, such as the VLRB decision on unit determination and
certification in this case. The majority concludes, however, that the
appeal provision of SELRA provides authority to appeal to this Court from
all VLRB decisions. Ante, at 6. SELRA provides: "Any person aggrieved by
an order of the board issued under the authority of this chapter may appeal
on questions of law to the supreme court." 3 V.S.A. { 1003(a) (emphasis
added). The primary objective in construing a statute, is to effectuate the
intent of the Legislature. We presume the Legislature intended the plain
meaning of the statutory language. Bisson v. Ward, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 628 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1993). The meaning of { 1003(a) is plain on its face; it
grants authority to appeal to this Court from decisions issued under the
SELRA chapter only. It does not authorize review by this Court of decisions
issued under any other chapter.
To reach a result contrary to the plain language of the statute, the
majority relies on the doctrine of in pari materia and the legislative
intent evidenced by the 1976 amendment to SELRA. Where the meaning of a
statute is plain on its face, however, no construction is necessary.
Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83, 86, 499 A.2d 23, 26 (1985). Indeed, the
purpose of construing related statutes in pari materia is to determine the
legislative intent where the statute at issue is ambiguous. General Elec.
Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1967). Here, the
majority construes the SLRA and SELRA in pari materia to create ambiguity
and then resolves it by invoking legislative intent from a 1976 amendment to
SELRA codified at 3 V.S.A. { 924(d). Section 924(d) states:
In addition to its responsibilities under this chapter,
the board shall carry out the responsibilities given to
it under [SLRA] and when doing so shall exercise the
powers and follow the procedures set out in that chapter.
The board shall also carry out the responsibilities given
to it under [the Municipal Employees Labor Relations Act
(MERA)] and when so doing shall exercise the powers and
follow the procedures set out in that chapter. (Emphasis
added.)
This subsection requires the Board to follow the procedures set out in
the specific statute under which it is acting. It does not indicate a
legislative intent to extend the broad right of appeal provided in SELRA to
persons bringing actions under the SLRA; it does not even address the right
of appeal. If { 924(d) sheds any light on the issue in this case, it
suggests, contrary to the majority's conclusion, that the procedures under
SELRA, MERA and the SLRA should be construed independently. By requiring
separate procedures before the Board, the Legislature does not indicate an
intent to merge the statutes to obtain the same procedure on appeal.
SELRA and the SLRA have the same purpose, but they serve mutually
exclusive groups, and the Legislature has elected to address these two
groups in separate statutes. The doctrine of in pari materia is not
applicable when the target of two statutes is different. Burns v. Sundlun,
617 A.2d 114, 118 (R.I. 1992) (statutes targeting different types of
gambling facilities impose independent requirements and are not to be read
in pari materia); see also State v. City of Walnut, 193 P.2d 172, 176-77
(Kan. 1948) (no indication that legislature intended court to read verifi-
cation requirement in statute on ordinance petition into statute on
referendum petition). The majority nullifies the Legislature's deliberate
distinction and makes the existing appeal provisions of both the SLRA and
MERA mere surplusage. See Slocum v. Department of Social Welfare, 154 Vt.
474, 481, 580 A.2d 951, 956 (1990) (Court presumes all language in statute
is purposeful). I therefore dissent. I am authorized to say that Chief
Justice Allen joins in this dissent.
_______________________________________
Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice
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