State v. Bisson

STATE_V_BISSON.92-471; 161 Vt. 8; 632 A.2d 34

[Filed 17-Sep-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-471


 State of Vermont Agency of                   Supreme Court
 Development & Community Affairs,
 Department of Housing & Community            On Appeal from
 Affairs and Gladys Rivers, Intervenor        Rutland Superior Court

      v.                                      May Term, 1993

 Eugene & Cobelena Bisson


 Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

 Barbara G. Ripley, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

 Brian Sawyer, Vermont Senior Citizens Law Project, Rutland, for
   intervenor-appellant

 Timothy W. Shanley, Montpelier, for defendants-appellees


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   In this appeal, we must determine whether the eviction
 provisions contained in the Vermont Mobile Home Parks Act, 10 V.S.A. {{
 6201-6243, and specifically { 6237 requiring cause for eviction, apply only
 to persons who own a mobile home and rent a mobile home lot from a park
 owner, or also to those who rent both the mobile home and the lot.  The
 Vermont Department of Housing and Community Affairs and two individual
 mobile home renters appeal from the superior court's ruling that a recent
 amendment to the Mobile Home Parks Act was intended to make it applicable
 only to mobile home owners who rent a mobile home park lot.  We reverse.

 

      The facts of the case are not in dispute.  For several years, Dale
 Bullock and Gladys Rivers rented (FN1) mobile homes in the Forest Dale Mobile
 Home Park in Brandon, Vermont, before it was purchased by defendants, Eugene
 and Cobelena Bisson.  The Bissons did not offer a lease to either tenant.
 The Town of Brandon cited defendants for rental housing code violations and
 ordered them to make repairs on the rented mobile homes.  Shortly
 thereafter, in January 1992, Mr. Bisson informed those persons renting
 mobile homes from him that they either would have to purchase the mobile
 homes on his terms or vacate the homes after he sold them to third parties.
 Both Mr. Bullock and Ms. Rivers wanted to continue renting the homes.
      In February 1992, defendants sent Mr. Bullock a notice to vacate
 within thirty days, pursuant to 9 V.S.A. { 4467(d) (Landlord and Tenant
 Act; termination of tenancy when property is sold), informing him that the
 mobile home he was renting had been sold to a third party.  Ms. Rivers later
 received a similar notice to vacate.  Defendants concede that neither Mr.
 Bullock nor Ms. Rivers had been delinquent in rent payments or had violated
 any park rule or regulation.
      In March 1992, the Vermont Department of Housing and Community
 Affairs (FN2) filed a complaint seeking (1) a declaration that the Mobile Home
 
 

 Parks Act applies to renters of mobile homes, including Mr. Bullock; and (2)
 an injunction preventing defendants from evicting mobile home renters on
 grounds other than those specified in { 6237.  Shortly thereafter, Ms.
 Rivers was permitted to intervene.  Relying on a recent amendment to the
 Mobile Home Parks Act, the court ruled that the rights of a person who rents
 a mobile home situated in a mobile home park are governed by the Landlord
 and Tenant Act, 9 V.S.A. {{ 4451-4468 (residential rental agreements), and
 12 V.S.A. {{ 4851-4856 (ejectment), not the Mobile Home Parks Act.
      On appeal, plaintiffs argue that { 6237 unambiguously applies to
 renters of mobile homes, that only those provisions in Title 9 and Title 12
 that are consistent with the provisions of the Mobile Home Parks Act apply
 to mobile home renters, and that 9 V.S.A. { 4467(d) does not apply to
 renters of mobile homes because it is inconsistent with { 6237.  We agree
 and, accordingly, reverse the superior court's decision.
      Vermont's Mobile Home Parks Act became law in 1970.  At the center of
 this dispute is { 6237(a) of the Act, which provides that "[a] mobile home
 resident may only be evicted for nonpayment of rent or for a substantial
 violation of the lease terms of the mobile home park, or if there is a
 change in use of the park land or parts thereof or a termination of the
 mobile home park."  By allowing evictions only for cause, this provision is
 a clear exception to the general landlord and tenant law of Vermont, which
 allows evictions without cause in the absence of a written rental agreement.

 

  9 V.S.A. { 4467(c).(FN3) If { 6237 applies to renters of mobile homes as well
 as renters of lots, plaintiffs will prevail.  If not, defendants will
 prevail.
      A "mobile home park resident" is defined as "an individual,
 individuals, or family who occupies a mobile home on a permanent or
 temporary basis in a mobile home park."  10 V.S.A. { 6201(6) (emphasis
 added).  The use of the word "resident," and the use of the words
 "occupies" and "temporary" to define resident, make it clear that { 6237
 applies to renters, as well as to owners, of mobile homes.  See Black's Law
 Dictionary 1079 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "occupy" as, among other things,
 "to hold possession of" and "to tenant"); In re Vermont Nat'l Bank, 157 Vt.
 306, 312, 597 A.2d 317, 320 (1991) (words not defined in statute are to be
 given their plain and ordinary meaning, which can be taken from a
 dictionary).
      Notwithstanding defendants' arguments to the contrary, none of the
 other provisions of the statute, read alone or in conjunction with one
 another, suggest that { 6237 applies only to mobile home owners.(FN4) We find
 little significance in the fact that { 6237 uses the term "mobile home
 resident" rather than "mobile home park resident," or that certain sections
 
 

 of the statute refer to the lease of mobile home lots.  See 10 V.S.A. {{
 6236, 6238, 6242.  Indeed, the selective use of the terms "mobile home
 resident" and "mobile home owner," and the terms "mobile home" and "mobile
 home lot," suggests that the Legislature intended to distinguish the terms.
 See Trombley v. Bellows Falls Union High School Dist. No. 27, ___ Vt. ___,
 ___, 624 A.2d 857, 860 (1993) (we presume language is inserted in statute
 advisedly); State v. Tierney, 138 Vt. 163, 165, 412 A.2d 298, 299 (1980) (in
 construing statutes, give effect to every word, clause and sentence if
 possible).
      Given the unambiguous language of {{ 6237 and 6201(6), the only issue
 is whether the Legislature intended, by its 1988 amendments to the Mobile
 Home Parks Act and the Landlord and Tenant Act, to make the former statute
 inapplicable to renters of mobile homes.  As originally enacted in 1986,
 the Landlord and Tenant Act did not apply to the "occupancy and rental of a
 mobile home or a mobile home lot, if the occupancy and rental" was governed
 by the Mobile Home Parks Act.  1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.) { 1.  In 1988,
 however, the Legislature amended 9 V.S.A. { 4452(6) to exclude only "rental
 of a mobile home lot governed by" the Mobile Home Parks Act.  1987, No. 252
 (Adj. Sess.) { 1.  At the same time, the Legislature amended the Mobile Home
 Parks Act by adding 10 V.S.A. { 6204(c), which provides:

              To the extent that they are consistent with this
           chapter, the provisions of chapter 137 of Title 9
           (residential rental agreements) and the provisions of
           subchapter 3 of chapter 169 of Title 12 (eviction) shall
           apply to the occupancy and rental of a mobile home but
           not to the rental of a mobile home lot.
 1987, No. 252 (Adj. Sess.) { 2.

 

      By amending the Landlord and Tenant Act, the Legislature plainly
 intended to make the provisions of the Act applicable to renters of mobile
 homes.  This interpretation is also supported by language of the bill
 amending the Mobile Home Parks Act, which stated that the purpose of the
 amendment was "to apply the law relating to residential rental agreements to
 the rental of mobile homes."  H. 53 of 1987.
      The trial court relied upon the Landlord and Tenant Act amendment to
 determine that { 6237 of the Mobile Home Parks Act does not apply to
 renters of mobile homes.  However, the court erred in not considering the
 relationship between the two acts, which are in many ways complementary
 legislation.  The Landlord and Tenant Act contains the general law of
 landlord and tenant relations that is customarily applicable in any context.
 The Mobile Home Parks Act contains specific requirements applicable only to
 landlord and tenant relationships within a mobile home park.  Except in the
 case of a direct inconsistency, these acts can coexist so that the
 requirements of both can be applicable to the rental of a mobile home.  Cf.
 Bisson v. Ward, No. 92-426, slip op. at 9-10 (Vt. June 11, 1993) (Landlord
 and Tenant Act does not conflict with Consumer Fraud Act).
      If, however, conflict does arise between the Landlord and Tenant Act
 and the Mobile Home Parks Act, the latter controls.  Indeed, { 6204(c)
 explicitly states that the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act apply
 only "to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions" of the
 Mobile Home Parks Act.  In this case, defendants sent plaintiffs Bullock and
 Rivers notices to vacate pursuant to { 4467(d) of the Landlord and Tenant
 Act.  Section 4467(d) allows a landlord to terminate a tenancy on thirty
 days' notice if there is no written rental agreement and the landlord has
 
 
 
 contracted to sell the rental property.  Because this provision would permit
 eviction on grounds other than those stated in { 6237 of the Mobile Home
 Parks Act, it is inconsistent with { 6237, and therefore does not apply to
 renters of mobile homes.
      Accordingly, we conclude that the 1988 amendments to the Mobile Home
 Parks Act and the Landlord and Tenant Act do not render { 6237 inapplicable
 to renters of mobile homes.  The amendment to { 4452(6) of the Landlord and
 Tenant Act simply assures that the provisions in the Landlord and Tenant Act
 are applicable to renters of mobile homes; it does not directly address the
 applicability of the Mobile Home Parks Act to mobile home renters.
 Furthermore, the Legislature left intact the use of the term "mobile home
 resident" in { 6237 and the broad definition of that term in { 6201(6).
 The defendants are in effect asking us to apply { 6204(c) as if the
 operative word is "inconsistent" rather than "consistent," the word actually
 contained in the statute.  We would do great violence to the Legislature's
 direction by interpreting the key word in the Mobile Home Parks Act statute
 as its opposite.
     Defendants also argue that applying the eviction provisions of { 6237 to
 renters of mobile homes would mean that those renters would be treated more
 favorably than other renters for no apparent purpose.  According to
 defendants, { 6237 is intended to give mobile home owners, who can move
 their homes only at some cost and with some inconvenience, additional
 protection against arbitrary eviction.  They contend that extending this
 protection to renters of mobile homes is irrational.
      We acknowledge that the purpose stated by defendants is an underlying
 purpose of the Mobile Home Parks Act.  See Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home
 
 

 Sales, Inc., 546 A.2d 805, 818-19 (Conn. 1988) (recognizing that, absent
 protective legislation, park owners were able to dictate unfair lease terms
 to mobile home owners because of limited availability of space and high cost
 of relocation), appeal dismissed, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989).  See generally
 Note, The Community and the Park Owner Versus the Mobile Home Park
 Resident: Reforming the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 810
 (1972) (detailing predicament of mobile home owners that led to protective
 legislation).  We do not accept, however, that it is necessarily the only
 purpose.
      In its findings supporting the Mobile Home Parks Act, the Legislature
 stated that "there is a substantial need for new housing . . . for moderate
 and low-income groups, which need is likely to increase in the future," that
 the "[c]onstruction of conventional homes had failed to provide sufficient
 low cost housing," and that "most of the new housing available to moderate
 and low-income groups consists of mobile homes."  1969, No. 291 (Adj. Sess.)
 { 1(d), (e).  Addressing these problems, the Legislature stated that one of
 the purposes of the Act is "to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
 residents of mobile home developments."  Id. { 2.  Accordingly, { 6237
 provides owners and renters of mobile homes, who tend to be lower-income
 groups that may have difficulty finding alternative housing, added security
 from arbitrary eviction.  This is a sufficient rationale for treating mobile
 home renters different from other renters.  Cf. Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd.,
 651 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting park owner's claim that mobile
 home statute violated equal protection by giving greater protection to
 mobile home tenants than to apartment tenants because statutory
 
 

 classification, which involved neither fundamental right nor suspect class,
 bore rational relationship to legitimate state interest).
      Finally, defendants briefly argue, without citation to relevant
 authority, that if { 6237 applies to mobile home renters, it violates
 Chapter I, Article 1 of the Vermont Constitution (right to acquire, possess
 and protect property) because it effectively prevents mobile home owners
 from selling their mobile homes.  This argument is both factually and
 legally flawed.  Owners of mobile homes are not prevented from selling the
 mobile homes; rather, the owners have to sell the homes subject to the
 tenancy of the renters, unless one of the grounds for eviction in { 6237 is
 applicable.  This is similar to the limitations the Mobile Home Parks Act
 places on the park owner who rents lots to mobile home owners.  The park
 owners may sell the park, but subject to the continued tenancy of the lot
 renters.  In this context, courts have rejected the argument that a mobile
 home statute that effectively creates a perpetual lease by limiting grounds
 for eviction violates the federal takings clause.  See, e.g., Gibbs v.
 Southeastern Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D. Conn. 1989) (mobile home
 statute that limits grounds for eviction "merely regulates a landlord-tenant
 relationship once the landowner has voluntarily entered into such");
 Eamiello, 546 A.2d  at 818 (mobile home law that restricts grounds for
 eviction "merely regulates the use to which private property may be put").
 For the same reasons relied on by these courts, we find no constitutional
 violation in applying { 6237 to renters of mobile homes.
 Reversed and remanded.
                                    FOR THE COURT:

                                    _____________________________
                                    Associate Justice


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                                 Footnotes


FN1.    For the purposes of this opinion, the term "renter" is used to mean
 those who rent mobile homes from others, not those who rent to others.  The
 term "tenant" will not be used in order to avoid possible confusion in
 discussion of the Landlord & Tenant Act.

FN2.    The Mobile Home Parks Act provides that the Governor must designate
 the agency or department which will administer the act.  10 V.S.A. {
 6201(5).  By Executive Order, the Vermont Department of Housing and
 Community Affairs, a part of the Agency of Development and Community
 Affairs, was designated to administer { 6237.  3 V.S.A. App. Ch. 7,
 Executive Order No. 84-90 (Jan. 22, 1990).  The agency designated by the
 Governor is entitled to sue for an injunction against violations of the Act.
 See 10 V.S.A. { 6205(b).

FN3.    For month-to-month tenants, sixty-days' notice is required to
 evict without cause.  9 V.S.A. { 4467(c)(1).  Defendants are relying on
 a provision that shortens the required notice period to thirty days
 when the building is sold.  See 9 V.S.A. { 4467(d).

FN4.    Defendants candidly admit that the wording of {{ 6201(6) and
 6237 support plaintiffs' position but call it a matter of "legislative
 oversight."  If the Legislature failed to express its intent, and we
 have no evidence this is true, the remedy in this case must lie in the
 Legislature.