State v. Laflin

STATE_V_LAFLIN.92-162; 160 Vt. 198; 627 A.2d 344


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                           Nos. 92-162 and 92-197


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Roy B. Laflin                                February Term, 1993


 State of Vermont

      v.

 Vaughn R. Laflin


 Matthew I. Katz, J.

 Edward D. Sutton, Chittenden County Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for
    plaintiff-appellee

 Karen Rush Shingler, Burlington, for defendant-appellant Roy B. Laflin

 Norman R. Blais, Burlington, for defendant-appellant Vaughn R. Laflin


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      GIBSON, J.   Defendants pled nolo contendere to misdemeanor violations
 of 10 V.S.A. { 4747 (taking big game) and 10 V.S.A. { 4781 (possessing big
 game), reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of their
 motions to suppress.  They argue that their arrests without warrant con-
 stituted violations of V.R.Cr.P. 3 and the Fourth Amendment to the United
 States Constitution and, therefore, evidence seized pursuant to the arrests
 must be suppressed.  We reverse.
      On September 18, 1991, state game wardens received an anonymous tip
 that defendant Vaughn Laflin was engaged in taking big game on the National
 Guard firing range in Jericho.  The wardens located defendant's truck later
 that evening and waited nearly four hours until it left the area.  They then
 proceeded to Vaughn's residence, where they discovered the same truck parked
 in the driveway.
      The wardens could hear two voices in an outbuilding located on the
 premises, but because the windows were boarded up, they could see only
 shadows from interior lights.  They also noticed fresh blood and tallow in
 both the truck bed and on the threshold to the outbuilding.  One of the
 wardens knocked on the door of the building and identified himself.  When he
 received no reply, he announced through the closed door that he was applying
 for a search warrant, and that they could choose to remain inside or come
 out.  When there was still no response, he latched the door to the shed from
 the outside, thus locking the occupants in the building.  The wardens then
 contacted a deputy prosecutor by cellular telephone to procure a warrant.
      Approximately one hour after the officials had arrived at the scene,
 one of the officers noticed that Vaughn had opened a window in an attempt to
 reach the latch on the door.  Vaughn said to the officer, "What, do you have
 us locked in?"  The officials then unlatched the door and ordered Vaughn out
 of the building.  Vaughn opened the door and was again told to come out.
 The four officers had their guns drawn, and the cruiser headlights were
 turned on the building throughout the incident.  Vaughn exited and was
 handcuffed.
      Through the open door, the officers could see the hindquarters of a
 moose in the building.  They entered the structure to conduct a "security
 sweep" and noticed several items, including a large piece of fur, knives, a
 whetstone and saw, a gambrel used to hoist a large carcass to the ceiling,
 and a trap door in the ceiling.  One of the officers pushed on the trap
 door, felt resistance, and ordered the person pushing on the door to come
 out.  The door opened, and the officials repeated their order.  Roy Laflin
 climbed out of the opening, whereupon he was handcuffed.  The wardens seized
 the moose hindquarters and the truck.  After obtaining biographical infor-
 mation from the two men, the officers issued citations and released them.
      Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the grounds that
 their warrantless arrests were in violation of V.R.Cr.P 3 and the Fourth
 Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The trial court denied the
 motion.  It held that the officers had probable cause to believe that the
 defendants had committed a misdemeanor under the fish and wildlife laws
 after discovery of blood and tallow in the bed of the truck and on the
 outbuilding threshold, but noted that "the police did not see the crime
 committed."  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the officers were
 authorized to demand that the occupants come out of the building under
 V.R.Cr.P. 3 in order to identify them, and under the Fourth Amendment due to
 exigent circumstances. (FN1)
      On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in concluding
 that neither the Fourth Amendment nor V.R.Cr.P. 3 required a warrant to
 seize defendants or to search Vaughn Laflin's home and seize evidence.
 V.R.Cr.P. 3(a) provides in part:
         A law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant a
         person whom the officer has probable cause to believe
         has committed a crime in the presence of the officer. .
         . .  An officer may also arrest a person without warrant
         . . . (3) when the officer has probable cause to believe
         that a person has committed a misdemeanor and the person
         has refused to identify himself or herself when request-
         ed by the officer.

      Neither of these exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable in
 this case.  The court did not find that "a crime was committed in the pres-
 ence of the officer," nor did it find that defendants refused to identify
 themselves.  Indeed, the court did not even find that the officers requested
 identification.  Because the court's conclusion that the warrantless arrests
 were authorized under V.R.Cr.P. 3(a) is not supported by its findings, we
 hold that the arrests of both defendants violated V.R.Cr.P. 3.
      Generally, suppression of evidence is mandated if seized in violation
 of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 28-29, 179 A.2d 466,
 468 (1962).  Similarly, if the search occurs incident to an arrest which is
 in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence must be suppressed as
 fruit of the poisonous tree.  State v. Meunier, 137 Vt. 586, 589, 409 A.2d 583, 585 (1979).  The issue in the instant case is whether evidence that is
 seized pursuant to an arrest in violation of V.R.Cr.P. 3 must also be
 suppressed.
      On its face, V.R.Cr.P. 3 does not require exclusion of evidence.
 Absent explicit direction, courts apply the exclusionary rule "when the
 provision in question confers a substantial right, especially if it is one
 which can be said to relate rather closely to Fourth Amendment protections."
 W. LaFave & J. Israel, 1 Criminal Procedure { 3.1, at 146 (1984); see, e.g.,
 Gossett v. State, 188 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
 (warrantless misdemeanor arrest which violated state statute similar to
 V.R.Cr.P. 3 mandated suppression of evidence); State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802,
 809 (Or. 1983) (laws designed to protect against illegal searches and
 seizures are to be given effect by denying state use of evidence secured in
 violation of those laws); State v. Valdez, 561 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Or. 1977)
 (suppressing evidence seized in violation of state statute which protected
 interests of the kind protected by the Fourth Amendment). "[S]o far, the
 only practical method which has been devised to protect rights of this kind
 is exclusion of the evidence which is the fruit of the violation.  Otherwise
 the statute can and will be ignored with impunity."  Valdez, 561 P.2d  at
 1011.
      We hold that V.R.Cr.P. 3 was designed to both codify and enhance
 protections conferred by the Fourth Amendment, and that therefore the evi-
 dence seized should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule doctrine.  See
 State v. LeBlanc, 149 Vt. 141, 145, 540 A.2d 1037, 1040 (1987) (suppressing
 evidence obtained as a result of unauthorized arrest).
      Reversed and remanded.


                                    FOR THE COURT:


                                    _______________________________________
                                    Associate Justice



FN1.          Because we conclude that both the arrests and the seizure of
 evidence were invalid under V.R.Cr.P. 3, we do not reach defendants'
 constitutional claim.