VSEA v. State

ENTRY_ORDER.93-071; 161 Vt. 600; 643 A.2d 231

[Filed 30-Dec-1993]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 93-071

                             DECEMBER TERM, 1993


 VSEA (Health Care)                }          APPEALED FROM:
                                   }
                                   }
      v.                           }          Labor Relations Board
                                   }
                                   }
 State of Vermont                  }          DOCKET NO. 92-36


              In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

      VSEA appeals a decision of the Vermont Labor Relations Board declining
 to issue an unfair labor practice complaint against the State of Vermont for
 failure to bargain in good faith over a health insurance premium increase.
 For purposes of deciding whether to issue the complaint, the Board accepted
 the allegations of VSEA as true, but exercised its discretion not to issue a
 complaint.  The Board reasoned that rescinding the premium and ordering the
 parties back to the bargaining table would provide no more inducement to
 bargain in good faith than existed during the negotiations, especially
 because the usual "statutory impasse" procedures did not apply to this
 provision of the contract.  Therefore, the Board refused to allocate its
 limited resources to an issue it considered unenforceable.  We affirm the
 Board, but on other grounds.  Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 153 Vt. 607, 613
 (1990).

      VSEA argues two claims on appeal.  The first is that the health
 insurance premium is a proper subject of bargaining.  Because we affirm,
 rather than reverse, the Board, it is not necessary to decide this issue.
 We take the allegations as true, as did the Board, for the purpose of
 reviewing the Board's exercise of discretion.  The second is that the Board
 abused its discretion because it based its decision on the assumption that
 the State would violate a lawful order to negotiate in good faith, that the
 Board's consideration of its limited resources was arbitrary and
 capricious, and that the Board's action precluded VSEA from any remedy for
 the unfair labor practice it alleged.

      We agree with VSEA that the Board should not have declined to issue the
 complaint on the grounds that it could not force the State to bargain in
 good faith.  The Board's statement was an abrogation of its lawful authority
 to enforce its orders.  The Board has authority under 3 V.S.A. { 965(d) to
 issue cease and desist orders when it finds that a party has committed an
 unfair labor practice and to take such affirmative action as will carry out
 the labor relations policies of the state.  To effectuate its statutory
 purpose, the Board must stand by its own powers to remedy unlawful
 practices.

 


      The Board's action was also based, however, on its limited resources.
 When the Board's jurisdiction is clearly discretionary, as it is here, it is
 not arbitrary or capricious for the Board to allocate limited resources to
 those cases it considers deserve them.  3 V.S.A. { 965(a) (Board may issue
 and cause to be served a complaint); see In re D.C., ___ Vt. ___, ___, 618 A.2d 1325, 1328 (1992) (Commissioner of Mental Health has discretion not to
 create non-mandatory program for persons with mental retardation).  Again,
 the question is whether the Board abused its discretion in failing to
 allocate its resources to this case.  Hinesburg School District v. Vermont
 NEA, 147 Vt. 558, 560 (1986).

      Here, the factual background of the case supports the Board's decision
 not to litigate the unfair labor practice.  The undisputed facts show that
 the state medical benefits plan is self-insured.  The premiums are based on
 the cost of administration and the experience of the fund.  Pursuant to the
 master contract, the State pays 80% of the premium and the employees pay
 20%.  The premium is projected by the State for a particular period.  The
 parties bargain over the premium; however, experience may force an
 adjustment to the premium because it is either too much or too little.
 Regardless of adjustments, all monies collected from state employees inure
 to the benefit of the fund, so that over-collection reduces future premiums.
 The fund is discrete from all other funds belonging to the State.

      In this case, the premium disputed by VSEA was first raised by 22.9%
 and then reduced by 12% six months later, which was subsequent to the
 filing of the unfair labor practice charge but prior to the Board's
 decision.  Thus, at the time of the Board's decision, a significant question
 was raised as to whether any meaningful relief could be afforded even if
 VSEA were successful in proving its claims.  Because of the manner in which
 the fund operates, no refund was due employees, and the claims then left in
 the case were legal ones.  It was not an abuse of discretion for the Board
 to decline jurisdiction based, in part, on limited resources.

      Our conclusion is not altered by VSEA's final argument that the Board
 abused its discretion because it precluded VSEA from any remedy for the
 alleged unfair labor practice.  As discussed in Hinesburg, the Board has
 broad discretion to decide whether to issue a complaint.  This discretion
 necessarily extends to circumstances in which the allegations in the
 complaint will not be addressed in any forum.  We give due regard to the
 Board's "function of assessing carefully the interests of both sides of any
 labor-management dispute in light of the special circumstances of the
 controversy."  Id. at 561.  In the circumstances of this case, it was not an
 abuse of discretion to deny VSEA a forum.

 

      Affirmed.


                                   BY THE COURT:



                                    Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice




                                    Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice



 [ ]  Publish                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice


 [ ]  Do Not Publish
                                    James L. Morse, Associate Justice



                                    Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice