Varnum v. Varnum

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 87-308


Larry James Varnum                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Caledonia Superior Court

Christine Carol Varnum                       May Term, 1989


Alan W. Cheever, J.

Gensburg Axelrod & Adler, St. Johnsbury, for plaintiff-appellee

John L. Kellner of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Middlebury, for
  defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Keyser, J. (Ret.) and
          Springer, D.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     DOOLEY, J.   This is a divorce action between Larry James Varnum,
plaintiff, and Carol Christine Varnum, defendant.  They were divorced by
order of the Caledonia Superior Court on May 17, 1987.  Although the trial
court dealt with all issues between the parties, the only appeal issues
relate to custody of the two children of the marriage -- Mack, now age 13
and Sarah, now age 11.  The court awarded legal and physical responsibility
for both children to plaintiff, and defendant appeals that award.  We
affirm.
     Defendant makes four arguments in this Court:  (1) the trial court's
custody decision impermissibly considered her religious beliefs and
activities, in violation of the United States and the Vermont Constitutions;
(2) the trial court failed to consider and accord weight to defendant's
status as the primary care giver as required by 15 V.S.A. { 665(b)(6) (FN1); (3)
the trial court made key findings of fact that were unsupported by the
evidence and clearly erroneous; and (4) the trial court's setting of a
strict time limitation for the presentation of each side's case deprived
defendant of a fair trial.  After setting forth the facts, we discuss these
arguments in order.
     Although the hearing in this case was long and acrimonious, (FN2) the trial
court reduced the testimony to fifty-three findings, made orally and on the
record.  The following is a summary of the findings.
     The parties were married in California and relocated by joint decision
to Vermont in 1978.  Defendant has a daughter from a prior marriage who
lived with them in California and relocated with them to Vermont.  One of
the children of the parties was born shortly before the move, and one was
born shortly thereafter.  The marriage was fraught with difficulty, and the
parties separated twice before seeking a divorce.  They last lived together
in 1985.  Plaintiff filed this action that same year, and defendant was
awarded temporary custody of the two minor children.  Defendant's daughter
returned to California to live with her natural father.
     The court made extensive findings relating to the ability of each
parent to raise the children and serve as primary custodian.  It found that
both parties had secure jobs and sufficient income to raise the children.
It found that plaintiff had on one occasion slapped defendant on the face
but had otherwise not been physically or sexually abusive toward her.  It
rejected as not credible defendant's other allegations that plaintiff
sexually and physically abused her.
     Each party alleged that the other physically abused the children.  The
court found that plaintiff had used a belt to administer discipline to
defendant's daughter, and on one occasion used the belt on his son.  It
found, however, that such discipline was not occurring at the time of the
hearing and that plaintiff did not use physical discipline on a regular
basis.  It found that defendant physically abused the two children and that
she believes:
         strict discipline is essential to install a conditioned
         response in the children to certain demands imposed
         upon them by her.  When the children fail to respond to
         her, she believes that it is appropriate and she does
         administer physical punishment to the children and has
         done so with various implements which includes [sic] a
         spoon, a ladle and a paddle.
            The Defendant has punished the children by striking
         them about the face and body using both her hands and
         other implements with sufficient force to leave red
         marks on the children's skin.  The court finds that
         that physical discipline does amount to physical abuse.

Defendant's daughter alleged that plaintiff had sexually abused her when she
was living with the parties in Vermont.  The court found this accusation not
credible.
     Both parties have abused alcohol, and defendant twice attempted suicide
while under the influence of alcohol.  Although defendant has been told she
should not consume alcohol, she continues to be a moderate drinker.
     Both parties spend a great deal of their free time with the children.
The findings detail activities in which each party participates with the
children to show, with respect to each parent, a supportive relationship.
Each parent has a residence and can provide safe and suitable care for the
children.  If she obtained custody, defendant intended to return to
California with the children.
     The trial court made a number of findings that relate to defendant's
religious beliefs.  Defendant is a Jehovah's Witness and is a strict
disciple of her faith.  Her belief in physical punishment to discipline the
children was apparently related to her religion.  Because of her religious
belief, she forbade the children to have close relationships with children
who were not members of her faith, and would not allow the children to
celebrate birthdays or holidays although the children traditionally
celebrated holidays and found it enjoyable.  Defendant would not permit
blood transfusions even if told by a doctor that the children needed the
procedure.  There was, however, no evidence of health problems in the
children that would create the need for a transfusion.  Defendant deferred
to church elders for help in making decisions.  The court found that
allowing others to assist in decision making hampered her ability to
determine the best interests of the children.
     The court ordered a psychological evaluation of the parties and the
children.  The psychologist's evaluation recommended that custody be
awarded to plaintiff.  Although the psychologist's conclusions were based on
numerous factors, the most important were that:  (1) if defendant obtained
custody, she intended to severely limit plaintiff's access to the children
and move from the state as soon as possible; (2) plaintiff had "a better
attitude and concept of what children need to be raised in a normal
fashion"; and (3) defendant admitted "to hitting the children and leaving
marks on their body, a sign of physical abuse."  Based on the evaluation,
which the court found was fair to both parties, and the extensive evidence,
the court concluded that it would be in the best interests of the children
to award parental rights and responsibilities primarily to the plaintiff
father.
                                    I.
     Defendant first argues that because the court made findings of fact
that touched upon her religious beliefs and because the issue of religion
permeated the trial, the court violated the free exercise clauses of the
Vermont and United States Constitutions. (FN3) She argues, therefore, that the
custody decision of the superior court must be vacated and the cause
remanded for a new custody hearing.
     Defendant acknowledges that her constitutional argument is raised for
the first time on appeal and was never brought before the trial court.
Although there was extensive evidence about the religion and religious
practices of each party, with an emphasis on the religious practices of
defendant, neither party objected to the introduction of the evidence or its
use in arriving at a custody determination.  Both parties submitted evidence
pertaining to religion.
     It is, of course, black-letter law that this Court will not consider an
issue not raised below, see Albarelli v. Albarelli, 152 Vt. 46, 49, 564 A.2d 598, 600 (1989), except in extreme and unusual circumstances.  See State v.
Hoadley, 147 Vt. 49, 53, 512 A.2d 879, 881 (1986).  Defendant argues that
this is one of those rare cases because important interests and basic
constitutional rights are involved, and analogizes to the criminal cases
where we have reviewed unpreserved errors on a finding of plain error.  See,
e.g., State v. Ayers, 148 Vt. 421, 425-26, 535 A.2d 330, 333-34 (1987)
(plain error "strikes at the heart of defendant's constitutional rights or
results in a miscarriage of justice.");  In re Maher, 132 Vt. 560, 562, 326 A.2d 142, 144 (1974) (state employee's due process claim reviewable only
upon showing that "this is one of those rare and extraordinary cases which
is so grave and serious that it strikes at the very heart of the employee's
constitutional rights.").  In evaluating the claim, we recognize that
fundamental rights and interests are at stake.  See Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1029 (Me. 1980).
     We also recognize, however, that there are weighty interests on the
other side of the scale.  The children in this case have already gone
through five of the most important years of their lives under temporary
custody orders, and have had during this period one change of primary
custodian.  The negative effect of this basic family instability, with the
resulting rivalries between their parents, is likely to be profound.  There
is no reason to believe that the trial judge would have been insensitive to
the religious liberty issue defendant raises in this Court if there had been
one whisper of it prior to the filing of defendant's brief here.
     We have no clear precedent to govern the standard of review in this
case.  Our precedents on unpreserved constitutional claims in civil cases do
not involve the weighty countervailing interests of children.  See In re
Maher, 132 Vt. at 562, 326 A.2d  at 144.  Nor do our precedents in the family
law area address constitutional issues.  See, e.g., Brown v. Brown,  1 Vt.
L.W. 301, 302 (Aug. 3, 1990) (admissibility of evidence).  Even with the
important rights and interests defendant seeks to vindicate, we think the
balance tips decidedly in favor of enforcing rules of preservation to avoid
the impact of lengthy delays on the well-being of the children.  We
therefore approach defendant's first claim under a very limited standard of
review -- whether there has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice that
we cannot overlook.
     Consideration of religion and religious practices in custody
determinations may implicate the right to free exercise of religion
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Chapter I, Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution.  See Development in the
Law -- The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1339-40
(1980).  It is often said, as a result, that the courts must be neutral in
matters of religion.  See Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 333 (Mo. 1978);
Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 813, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971).  While
neutrality is a worthy goal, it is rarely achievable in a contested custody
matter where the actions of the parents bearing directly on the best
interest of the children are attributed to religious beliefs.  More often,
the courts must engage in a form of balancing of the relevant interests,
similar to the process we recently employed in State v. DeLaBruere, ___ Vt.
___, ___, 577 A.2d 254, 260-61 (1990), in resolving conflicts over the
education of children between the state and religiously-motivated parents.
See Fisher v. Fisher, 118 Mich. App. 227, 232, 324 N.W.2d 582, 584-85
(1982).  In such a balance, we must be careful to minimize the degree of
interference with religious liberty and use the "least restrictive means" to
accomplish the legitimate objectives that warrant the interference.  State
v. DeLaBruere, ___ Vt. at ___, 557 A.2d  at 264.
     There is no question that the societal interest in protecting and
nurturing children is great.  See Fisher v. Fisher, 118 Mich. App. at 232,
324 N.W.2d  at 584 ("difficult" to conceive of a more compelling state
interest); Morris v. Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19, 26, 412 A.2d 139, 143
(1979).  Thus, in appropriate cases, this interest must override the freedom
of the parent to engage in religious practices.  See Felton v. Felton, 383
Mass. 232, 233, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981).  The challenge for the courts is
to accommodate the differing interests where possible and protect the best
interest of children while minimizing the interference with religious
liberty.  See Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d  at 1031.  To do so, the courts have
developed tests that require a religious practice to have a direct and
immediate negative impact on the physical or mental health of the child
before the practice can be considered in determining the custody of the
child.  See Ex Parte Hilley, 405 So. 2d 708, 711 (Ala. 1981); Stapley v.
Stapley, 15 Ariz. App. 64, 70, 485 P.2d 1181, 1187 (1971); Levitsky v.
Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 398, 190 A.2d 621, 626 (1963); LeDoux v. LeDoux, 234
Neb. 479, ___, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1990); Matter of Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 282-83 (Tex. App. 1987).
     In applying these principles to this case, we are mindful that
defendant's religion, and numerous practices dictated or motivated by her
religion, permeated the trial.  We are also mindful that defendant's beliefs
may appear peculiar and foreign to many.  Indeed, many of the cases in-
volving the impact of religion of a parent on the custody determination of
a child have involved Jehovah's Witnesses and the courts, and the larger
society, have found it difficult to accept, or ignore, their religious
practices even when the impact on the children is speculative or insuf-
ficient to allow an impairment of religious freedom.  See Annotation,
Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 22 A.L.R. 4th
971, 998-1006 (1982) (section summarizing cases involving custody disputes
where one parent is a Jehovah's Witness).
     Finally, we must accept that the trial court made findings and
considered aspects of defendant's religious practices even though it did not
find the required impact on the well-being of the children.  On this
record, we place in that category findings with respect to restrictions
defendant imposed on the ability of the children to associate with peers who
are not Jehovah's Witnesses and her prohibition on the celebration of
holidays and birthdays.  We are also concerned about the use of the finding
that defendant would not allow her children to have blood transfusions even
if medically necessary, in the absence of any evidence that such an
eventuality is likely and cannot be resolved in ways other than depriving
defendant of custody.  See Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d  at 334; Osier v.
Osier, 410 A.2d  at 1031-32.
     It is not surprising that the trial court's findings and conclusions do
not show a careful consideration of the constitutional standard and the
arguments defendant makes in this Court, since the issue was never presented
to the trial court.  Also, with respect to some facts, the deficiency may
have been in failing to make complete enough findings, although such
findings would have been supported by the evidence.  For example, the
evidence may have allowed the trial court to find that the prohibition on
the celebration of birthdays or holidays has a direct and immediate negative
effect on the emotional health of the children, but the court was not
requested to make a finding on this issue.
     Nevertheless, we cannot find that there has been a miscarriage of
justice in the custody award to plaintiff.  In reaching this decision, we
are motivated by the following considerations.
     First, the primary reason for the psychologist's custody recommendation
was the physical discipline imposed regularly by the mother.  This also
appears to be the primary reason for the trial court's custody
determination.  While defendant's practices may have had some religious
motivation, the evidence clearly supported the conclusion that the physical
discipline had a direct and immediate negative impact on the physical and
mental well-being of the children.  We do not mean to suggest that all
physical discipline by parents is prohibited or that, when religiously
motivated, it has no First Amendment protection.  However, the discipline
here was sufficiently severe for the court to characterize it as "physical
abuse."  The trial court could heavily weigh the use of this physical
discipline against defendant.
     Second, there was extensive analysis, both by the expert and in the
evidence, of all aspects of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties as
prospective custodial parents.  In fact, many of the factors that supported
the court's decision were wholly unrelated to the religious beliefs of
defendant.  See Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 436-37 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)
(custody award affirmed where also supported by considerations not involving
religion); accord Aldous v. Aldous, 99 A.D.2d 197, 199-200, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62-63 (1984).  Thus, the expert found that plaintiff had a better
attitude and concept of the needs of the children.  An important part of the
psychologist's recommendation was based on observations of the interaction
between the children and each parent, and the court made findings about
these interactions.
     Third, although the trial court made no findings in this area, the
evidence showed also that defendant intended to minimize plaintiff's access
to the children.  The psychologist recounted defendant's statements that
plaintiff had little to offer the children in large part because he was not
a Jehovah's Witness and thus did not possess the "truth" about life.  The
psychologist found that defendant's "attitude of indifference to the
children's right to appreciate both parent's views will cause the children
emotional harm."  Even though the trial court made no findings on this
subject, we believe it bears on whether there was a miscarriage of justice
in this case.
     Finally, the failure of defendant to make a proper record in the trial
court causes her difficulty in making out a free exercise claim for a
first time in this Court.  While there is a general sense that many of the
defendant's practices are tied in some general way to her religion, there is
no specificity on the exact nature of her religious belief and the extent to
which it commands the practices.  Thus, we can only evaluate in a rough way
the extent to which forgoing some of the practices would burden defendant's
religious expression, an essential aspect of the balancing equation for
First Amendment purposes.  See State v. DeLaBruere, ___ Vt. at ___, 577 A.2d 
at 260.  Two examples will suffice.  Although there was a general assertion
that physical discipline is associated with the child-rearing practices of a
Jehovah's Witness, there was no specific testimony that defendant's
religious beliefs required defendant to hit the children with instruments
like the butter paddle and spoon.  Similarly, the court pointed to the fact
that defendant appeared to routinely turn important decisions in her life
over to church elders and concluded that her ability to determine "the best
interests of the children is hampered by her need to have other people make
her decisions."  The evidence does not show whether the involvement of the
elders in parental decision-making is required by defendant's religious
beliefs.
     In conclusion, we are satisfied that the trial court's custody award
was justified, even though the court did not examine specifically the
aspects of defendant's religious beliefs and practices that do not directly
and immediately impact on the mental and physical well-being of the
children.  The consideration of defendant's religion did not cause a
miscarriage of justice, and we decline to reverse on that basis.
                                    II.
     Defendant next argues that trial court did not adequately weigh her
status as the primary care giver as required by 15 V.S.A.{ 665(b)(6).  Her
argument is based primarily on this Court's decision in Harris v. Harris,
149 Vt. 410, 418, 546 A.2d 208, 214 (1988), where we held that this factor
should be given great weight unless the primary custodian is unfit.
Defendant actually makes two interrelated points here:  (a) the trial court
failed to determine who was the primary custodian and to recognize the legal
significance of this finding; and (b) the trial court failed to give the
necessary weight to this factor.  On the first point, Harris requires that
the record show that the trial court has considered each of the relevant
statutory factors.  Id. at 414, 546 A.2d  at 211.  Here, the court stated
that it considered all of the statutory factors and specifically stated that
it considered "[t]he quality of the child relationship with the primary care
provider."  As the defendant points out, there was no dispute as to who was
the primary care provider of the children either under the temporary order
in effect at the time of trial or throughout the marriage.  It was not
essential for the court to state this obvious and undisputed fact.  The
court properly considered the statutory factor.
     We also see no error in the weight assigned to this factor.  In Harris,
we held that the court must give the factor "great weight unless the primary
custodian is unfit."  Id. at 418, 546 A.2d  at 214.  We stated that the exact
weight cannot be determined "unless there is evidence of the likely effect
of the change of custodian on the child" and, in the absence of such
evidence, the court should ordinarily order that the child remain with the
primary custodian.  Id. at 419, 542 A.2d  at 214.  This latter language was
critical to the Harris holding because there was no evidence in the record
of the effect on the children of a change of custodian.
     The present case is very different from Harris, and the difference is
critical to the decision.  Here, there was extensive evidence of the
interaction of each parent with the children and the plans of each parent if
he or she were awarded custody.  More important, the court ordered an
independent evaluation of the parties and the children by a recognized
expert in the area of family relations, and the expert did a thorough
investigation of the relative merits of each party as a primary custodian
and the effect of a custody award for either party.  In the course of the
evidence and the expert evaluation, defendant's status as primary care-
giver over the course of the marriage was recognized, analyzed and weighed.
Defendant's fitness as a custodian, in light of her use of excessive
physical discipline, was central to the analysis and weighing.  If anything,
this case is a model of how to evaluate the likely effects, pro and con, of
changing the primary custodian of children.
                                   III.
     Defendant's third argument is that two of the trial court's findings
are not supported by the evidence:  (1) the finding that defendant was not
physically abused, except on one occasion, nor sexually abused; and (2) the
finding that she physically abused the children.
     The first point goes to defendant's claim that plaintiff physically
abused her throughout the marriage, often in the presence of the children,
and that his propensity for violence should have been considered in the
custody determination.  Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff
admitted to more instances of physical abuse than the court found, and that
the error prejudiced the result.  We agree that plaintiff admitted that
there were other incidents, but he disputed that his conduct involved
physical abuse.  It is also difficult to gauge the relevance of these claims
to the custodial decision because they generally occurred during periods
when both parties were abusing alcohol and intoxicated frequently.  Neither
party was abusing alcohol at the time of the lower court proceedings.  The
disputed finding is not clearly erroneous.  See Fenoff v. Fenoff, ___ Vt.
___, ___, 578 A.2d 119, 120 (1990).
     The second claim actually reflects an objection to the trial court's
use of the term "physical abuse" to describe defendant's acts of physical
discipline.  Defendant claims that the evidence did not support a finding of
"child abuse" as that term is defined in 33 V.S.A. { 4912 (formerly 33
V.S.A. { 682).  The purpose of that statutory definition is to implement a
system of reporting of incidents to state authorities and investigation of
these reports.  While it appears that the record could have supported a
finding of child abuse, the real answer to the argument is that there is no
indication that the court was intending to use the term "physical abuse" in
a particular way.  The psychologist testified that the children were being
physically abused by defendant's disciplinary practices, and the court
accepted this characterization.  The finding is not in error.
                                    IV.
     Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's time restrictions on
the presentation of evidence deprived her of a fair trial, likening the
situation to that present in Auger v. Auger, 149 Vt. 559, 546 A.2d 1373
(1988).  The court imposed time limits on the presentation of evidence based
on the time estimates provided by counsel.  The time limit was set at eleven
hours for each side, and there was no objection to the limit.  The court
reminded the parties of the limits throughout the trial.  Plaintiff never
exceeded his time.  Defendant ran out of time while cross-examining
plaintiff after he testified as a rebuttal witness.  Defendant's counsel
indicated there were "a number of statements made which we have yet to
cross-examine," and stated that he wanted to ask "three questions" of his
client on surrebuttal, but he made no offer of proof.  The court gave
defendant's counsel another five minutes, and he used it for further cross-
examination.  He indicated no objection when the evidence was terminated by
the court.
     Vermont Rule of Evidence 611(a) directs the court to "exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence" to "avoid needless consumption of time."  We think that
the power granted by Rule 611(a) includes the authority to set reasonable
limits on the consumption of time in examining witnesses.  See United States
v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1577-80 (E.D. Ky. 1986).  We agree with the
observation of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that counsel left to their
own devices may "proceed at a pedestrian pace unsuited to times when court
calendars are crowded and the costs of litigation to the parties and to the
taxpayer are unreasonably high."  State v. Gatcomb, 397 A.2d 185, 188 n.6
(Me. 1979).  We also stress that limits must be reasonable and sufficiently
flexible to ensure that important evidence is not excluded due to artificial
time constraints. See Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987).
     The time limits in this case were generous and were based on the
estimates of counsel.  The trial started in March and did not finish until
the middle of May.  The trial had gone beyond the introduction of new facts.
The transcript consumes almost 850 pages.  It is difficult to see what could
have been left out or how the "omission" could have affected the result.
     This case bears no relationship to Auger v. Auger, where we
acknowledged the power of the trial court to control the presentation of
evidence but reversed because the active interrogation of witnesses by the
judge was such that one of the parties was denied a trial free from the
suspicion of partiality.  149 Vt. at 564, 546 A.2d  at 1376. There is no
indication of partiality here.
     Finally, we note that even if the time limits were too rigid, defendant
failed to preserve the issue for review.  She failed to make a timely
objection to the time limit and failed to make an offer of proof when her
cross-examination was terminated by the expiration of the extended time.
See Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d  at 678-79.  Absent preservation, or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, we could not reverse even if we found an
abuse of discretion.
     Affirmed.

                                        FOR THE COURT:




                                        Associate Justice




FN1.    Section 665 of Title 15 governs the court's responsibilities in
determining which parent should be awarded custody following a divorce.  The
section provides, in pertinent part:
	  (a) In an action under this chapter the court shall
	make an order concerning parental rights and responsi-
	bilities of any minor child of the parties. . . .
	  (b) In making an order under this section, the court
	shall be guided by the best interests of the child, and
	shall consider at least the following factors:
	     (1) the relationship of the child with each parent
	and the ability and disposition of each parent to pro-
	vide the child with love, affection and guidance;
	     (2) the ability and disposition of each parent to
	assure that the child receives adequate food, clothing,
	medical care, other material needs and a safe environ-
	ment;
	     (3) the ability and disposition of each parent to
	meet the child's present and future developmental
	needs;
	     (4) the quality of the child's adjustment to the
	child's present housing, school and community and the
	potential effect of any change;
	     (5) the ability and disposition of each parent to
	foster a positive relationship and frequent and con-
	tinuing contact with the other parent, including
	physical contact, except where contact will result in
	harm to the child or to a parent;
	     (6) the quality of the child's relationship with
	the primary care provider, if appropriate given the
	child's age and development;
	     (7) the relationship of the child with any other
	person who may significantly affect the child;
	     (8)  the ability and disposition of the parents to
	communicate, cooperate with each other and make joint
	decisions concerning the children where parental rights
	and responsibilities are to be shared or divided. . . .

FN2.    The merits hearing took the better part of five days to conclude.
The transcript runs to over eight hundred pages.  The proceedings in this
case were charged with emotion and anger.  We need not revisit the entire
battlefield to resolve the issues before us.


FN3.    The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."  This amendment is
applied to the several states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Vermont
Constitution states:
	     That all men have a natural and unalienable right,
	to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of
	their own consciences and understandings, as in their
	opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that
	no man ought to, or of right can be compelled to attend
	any religious worship, or erect or support any place of
	worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the
	dictates of his conscience, nor can any man be justly
	deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on
	account of his religious sentiments, or peculia[r] mode
	of religious worship; and that no authority can, or
	ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power
	whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in
	any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free
	exercise of religious worship. . . .

Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 3.