Lyon, v. Burton, et al

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

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John Lyon, individually and as
guardian of Matthew J. Lyon, a
minor, and Chris Jacob Walker,
individually and as guardian
for Christopher Michael Walker,
a minor,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,

v.

Glen H. Burton, Weber Fire
District, and Weber County,
Defendants, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 950515, 950516

F I L E D
June 30, 2000
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Second District Court, Ogden
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor

Attorneys:
E. Scott Savage, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
Ray R. Christensen, David C. Richards, Salt Lake City, for Burton and Weber Fire District
Robert R. Wallace, Salt Lake City, for Weber County
Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for North View Fire Department

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On Petition for Rehearing

DURHAM, Justice:

¶1 Both plaintiffs and defendants have asked this court to reconsider various portions of its opinion in this case, issued on January 19, 2000. A majority of the court is unwilling to rehear any of the issues raised by plaintiffs' petition. However, defendants have identified an inconsistency between the "Summary" portion of our earlier opinion and the actual holding of the majority regarding the constitutionality of section 63-30-10(15) of the Utah Code and its implications for the trial court's decision on prejudgment interest.

¶2 The court's Summary noted, in subsection (iii) of paragraph one, that all members of the court agreed with Justice Stewart's holding "that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs prejudgment interest." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 1, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 [hereinafter "Lyon I"]. That portion of Justice Stewart's opinion, however, was predicated on his view that the damages cap was unconstitutional and that the trial court therefore erred in holding that prejudgment interest was subject to the cap. Because a majority of the court declared the cap constitutional, it becomes necessary to consider whether prejudgment interest is properly classified as "damages" under section 63-30-34 and therefore subject to the $250,000 cap.

¶3 Although I shared Justice Stewart's views on the constitutional question, I agree with defendants that, given the majority holding, prejudgment interest must, in fact, be considered part of the "judgment" the statute intended to limit. I therefore write for a reconstituted majority of the court(1) on the limited question of how to treat prejudgment interest in light of the statutory cap. We hold that section 78-27-44 clearly requires prejudgment interest to be "include[d] . . . in th[e] judgment," Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44(2) (1996), and that section 63-30-34 therefore subjects it to the $250,000 limit. We agree with and adopt the reasoning of the court of appeals in Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125, 139-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) on the subject.

¶4 We therefore vacate subsection (iii) of paragraph one in Lyon I, and affirm the ruling of the trial court denying plaintiffs prejudgment interest.

¶5 Justices Durrant and Wilkins do not participate herein.(2)

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¶6 Chief Justice Howe and Associate Chief Justice Russon concur in Justice Durham's opinion.

1. Justice Stewart retired and Justice Zimmerman resigned from the court shortly after the opinion in the case was handed down, leaving only myself, Chief Justice Howe, and Associate Chief Justice Russon with authority to consider the petition for rehearing.

2. Because we decided not to rehear the case, but only to modify part of the court's earlier opinion, no further action is required.