Stokes v. Van Wagoner, et al
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Betty Stokes,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mark Van Wagoner, and Van
Wagoner & Stevens,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 970596
F I L E D
October 1, 1999
1999 UT 94
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Third District, Salt Lake
Dep't
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:
Jay R. Mohlman, Annette
F. Sorensen, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
M. David Eckersley, Robert
G. Wing, Salt Lake City,
for defendants
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DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:
¶1
Plaintiff Betty Stokes appeals
from a trial court's order dismissing her complaint under Utah R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. We reverse.
¶2
In 1988, Ms. Stokes engaged
the law firm of Van Wagoner & Stevens (the "firm") to pursue a workers'
compensation claim and an employment discrimination claim on her behalf.
The Labor Commission (the "Commission") dismissed Stokes' workers' compensation
claim. See Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 57 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) ("Stokes I"). Following the dismissal, Stokes petitioned
the Commission to order the firm to refund the fees she had paid them on
the unsuccessful claim. She argued that the firm's fee arrangement violated
a Commission rule that permitted contingent fees only. The administrative
law judge agreed with Stokes and entered an order directing the firm to
refund the fees charged for the failed workers' compensation claim. The
Commission subsequently affirmed the order on March 7, 1996.
¶3
In an attempt to collect
the fee refund, Stokes docketed an abstract of award in the district court
as a judicial judgment. The firm challenged the docketing of the abstract
and the district judge vacated it, ruling that the Commission had no authority
to issue an order directing the disgorgement of attorney fees. Stokes appealed
that ruling to this court.
¶4
On August 19, 1997 -- while
the above-mentioned appeal was still pending -- Stokes filed the complaint
in this case against the firm, asserting claims for violations of state
statute and rule, negligence, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and
punitive damages. As pled in the complaint, the question of the propriety
and amount of attorney fees charged by defendant form a basis for each
cause of action. Defendant moved to dismiss Stokes' claims on the ground
that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations which, according
to Stokes' unrebutted allegation, defendant conceded was not shorter than
three years. The trial court granted defendant's motion on November 12,
1997.
¶5
On November 10, 1998, this
court issued the opinion in
Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260 ("Stokes
II"), in which we affirmed the order vacating the "abstract of judgment"
but held that "[i]f the issue of the legality of the fees charged [Stokes]
were to arise in an independent action . . . the Commission's ruling would
be determinative of the issue of the illegality of the fees because the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of attorney
fees charged in cases brought before it, whether the case was successful
or not." Id. at 1265. Stokes has now filed such an action; the sole
question is whether it was timely filed.
¶6
The propriety of a dismissal
based on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law; therefore we review
the district court's ruling for correctness. See St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). In
reaching our judgment, we accept the complaint's factual allegations as
true and draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor. Id.
¶7
We have long recognized
that "[t]he general rule is that [a cause of action] accrues at the time
it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when the claim is in such
a condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim
is established." State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575,
577 (Utah 1940). The logic of this rule is evident. A contrary position
would require a party to file a suit before the party could maintain an
action upon the merits; such a suit would be speculative and could be wasteful
of judicial and other resources in many cases. Indeed, we note that a party
that files a claim prior to the time it accrues is likely to have that
claim dismissed for unripeness.
¶8
Our ruling in Stokes
II made clear that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue of attorney fees charged in the course of proceedings before it.
A ruling from the Commission on the question of the propriety of fees is
thus a predicate to the filing of an action in which the propriety and
amount of those fees is at issue. We therefore conclude that the statute
of limitations on plaintiff's claims began to run on the date the Commission
entered its final order regarding the fees, March 7, 1996. Stokes filed
the present action on August 19, 1997, about a year and a half following
the Commission's final decision. The shortest statute of limitations applicable
to Stokes' claims is three years. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff's
complaint was timely filed. The district court's order dismissing plaintiff's
complaint is reversed.
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¶9
Chief Justice Howe, Justice
Stewart, Justice Zimmerman, and Justice Russon concur in Associate Chief
Justice Durham's opinion.
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