Gerbich v. Numed Inc.,et al
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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De Ette Gerbich,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Numed Inc., Edward Menkemeller,
General Electric Company,
John Doe I, John Doe II, and III,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 970327
F I L E D
April 16, 1999
1999 UT 37
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Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Attorneys:
Wesley F. Sine, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Robert R. Wallace, Lisa Watts Baskin,
Robert C. Keller,
H. James Clegg, Julianne P. Blanch,
Salt Lake City, for defendants
---
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
¶1
This case involves several claims
made by De Ette Gerbich ("Gerbich") against defendants Numed, Inc., and
Edward Menkemeller, president of Numed,(1)
(collectively "Numed") and General Electric ("G.E."). Gerbich has made
several claims against Numed and G.E. arising out of an incident in which
she fell from the steps of a trailer containing a CT scanner leased by
G.E. to Numed and, in turn, by Numed to Jordan Valley Holy Cross Hospital
("the hospital"). Her claims against G.E. were dismissed with prejudice
when G.E. was granted summary judgment. Gerbich's claims against Numed
went to a jury which found in Numed's favor. Gerbich raises several issues
on appeal. We address the following: (i) whether the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment to G.E., and (ii) whether the trial court
erred in disallowing her general safety expert to testify. We affirm.
¶2
During October of 1990, the hospital
leased a trailer containing a CT scanner from Numed. Numed had rented the
scanner and the trailer from G.E. under a "Maxiservice Agreement." MDG
Trailer had assembled the trailer for G.E. Gerbich was employed by the
hospital as a nuclear technician. In this capacity, Gerbich took CT scans
and X-rays of patients in the trailer. She had been in and out of the trailer
at least a dozen times during the week prior to her fall. On a rainy day,
Gerbich was entering the trailer and lost her grip on the door handle,
falling back and injuring her knee and shoulder.
¶3
Gerbich filed her first complaint
in March of 1993, naming Numed and its president, Menkemeller, as defendants.
The complaint alleged that Numed had manufactured and designed the steps
in a defective and dangerous manner. Gerbich amended her complaint in April
of 1993, adding G.E. as a defendant and alleging that G.E. negligently
designed and manufactured the trailer and steps and then leased the trailer
and steps to Numed. The amended complaint alleged that the steps were "of
an inherently dangerous design and that the Defendants were negligent in
building, manufacturing and designing the entrance to the door in this
manner."
¶4
Numed moved to dismiss the amended
complaint on the grounds that it sounded in products liability, and Utah's
two-year products liability statute of limitations had run before Gerbich
filed her initial complaint. The court granted this motion to dismiss without
prejudice, finding that the original complaint was filed more than two
years after the accident. The court granted Gerbich leave to amend her
complaint, suggesting that she "try to state any causes of action in negligence
or recklessness."
¶5
Gerbich filed a second amended complaint
in October of 1993. G.E. moved to dismiss this complaint because it too
sounded in products liability and the original complaint was filed after
Utah's two-year products liability statute of limitations had run. The
court granted this second motion to dismiss without prejudice finding that
Gerbich's "Second Amended Complaint still sounds in product liability."
¶6
Gerbich filed a third amended complaint
in March of 1994 alleging negligence, and for the first time, breach of
warranty. Discovery had been ongoing throughout this process. After discovery
was concluded, G.E. moved for summary judgment, asserting that G.E. did
not owe Gerbich a duty of care. Gerbich admitted to not having any admissible
evidence proving that G.E. had constructed the trailer or attached the
stairs to the trailer. The trial court granted G.E.'s motion for summary
judgment.
¶7
Gerbich's claims against Numed proceeded
to trial in May of 1997. Before trial, many interrogatories were exchanged.
In June of 1994, Numed sent its first set of interrogatories to Gerbich
requesting the names of all experts and a summary of their opinions. In
response, Gerbich stated that the list had yet to be determined but that
it "will be furnished when it is available."
¶8
In August of 1996, the trial court
ordered that exhibit and witness lists be exchanged by December 10, 1996.
A month after that cut-off date, Gerbich filed a witness list with the
court which included "[a]n inspector from the city of South Jordan, Utah
unnamed at this time." Gerbich never furnished an expert witness list.
¶9
At the beginning of the second day
of trial, Gerbich called the inspector whom she had listed on her witness
list. She attempted to call him as a general safety expert, rather than
as a fact witness. Gerbich's attorney admitted that the inspector had not
been designated as an expert and that he had not complied with the requirements
for the witness to testify as an expert. Nevertheless, he asked the court
to permit the witness to be qualified as an expert at that time. Numed's
counsel was prepared to cross-examine the inspector regarding the city's
permitting process, because he had been designated as an investigator and
Gerbich's complaint alleged that the trailer did not meet the city's codes.
However, Numed was not prepared to cross-examine the witness regarding
his qualifications as an expert or on the industry's safety standards.
Numed objected to the use of the inspector as an expert, and on the second
day of trial, the court excluded the witness "due to the lateness of the
designation of the witness, the lack of identification and the lack of
compliance with the statute, the inopportunity of Mr. Wallace to have any
rebuttal evidence". The jury found for Numed and Gerbich brought this appeal.
¶10
Gerbich asserts the trial court
erred in: (i) granting G.E. summary judgment; and (ii) excluding her general
safety expert. We first consider the summary judgment. Summary judgment
is appropriate only where there are no disputed material facts and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Oxendine
v. Overturf, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, ¶ 7 (1999).
¶11
The trial court granted summary
judgment to G.E. after finding that there were no disputed material facts
and that, on the facts, G.E. did not owe a duty to Gerbich. Gerbich first
asserts that there were disputed factual issues as to G.E.'s responsibility
for and knowledge of the defective steps. She argues that the trial court
had to take as true all allegations in the third amended complaint because
G.E. responded to it not by submitting an answer, but by filing a motion
for summary judgment which was not supported by affidavits. It is true
that G.E. did not file an answer or submit affidavits in support of its
motion for summary judgment. However, G.E.'s motion was made after the
close of discovery and incorporated many of the discovery materials, including
answers to interrogatories, admissions, the plaintiff's second complaint,
the contract between G.E. and Numed, and the Maxiservice Agreement. The
rules of civil procedure do not require an answer or affidavits before
the allegations of the complaint are deemed controverted. Rather, rule
56(c) clearly states "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). The rule further
states that where a motion for summary judgment "is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response . . . must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(e).
¶12
While the moving party bears the
burden of proof on its summary judgment motion, viz. that there are no
genuine issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, see Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997), "in opposing a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements
of his or her cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Once the
allegations in the complaint are challenged, as they were here by G.E.,
Gerbich had the obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show
that she was entitled to proceed to trial. She cannot rest on her allegations
alone, particularly when the parties had an opportunity to conduct discovery.
See id.
¶13
Once we move beyond the allegations
of Gerbich's complaint, we conclude that she has not proven that there
are any material facts in dispute. Her supplemental answers to G.E.'s
request
for admissions state that she did not know who constructed or installed
the steps on the trailer. Additionally, when the motion was argued before
the trial judge, Gerbich's counsel admitted that he had no admissible evidence
showing that G.E. had notice of the defective condition. Because Gerbich
has no evidence to support her claim of G.E.'s responsibility, we conclude
that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
¶14
We next address the correctness
of the trial court's ruling that the elements of negligence were not proven
by Gerbich. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show four things: duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages. See Rocky Mountain Thrift
Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1994). G.E.
submitted evidence that showed it did not owe a duty to Gerbich, thereby
negating the first element. That evidence included the following: Numed
was the lessor to the hospital, not G.E., and the contract and Maxiservice
Agreement between G.E. and Numed make it plain that G.E. was under no obligation
to maintain the trailer's steps once the trailer was in place. The Maxiservice
Agreement states: "[t]he service portion of this Agreement covers the GE
CT8800 system only and does not apply to any part of the trailor [sic.]
or its subsystems." Furthermore, Gerbich has not shown that G.E. constructed
or designed the steps; she has merely alleged a belief that G.E.
improperly designed the steps. This is insufficient to show that G.E. was
negligent in designing the steps such that G.E. would have a duty to any
possible users of them.
¶15
When G.E. produced evidence that
there was no basis for imposing a duty on it to users of the trailer, the
onus shifted to Gerbich to prove otherwise. See Jensen, 944 P.2d at 339; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Gerbich offered no
affidavits negating G.E.'s evidence. As noted above, under rule 56(e),
when a party properly supports a motion for summary judgment, as G.E. did
here by referring to Gerbich's admissions, which showed that there were
no material facts in dispute, and by offering a copy of the contract which
negated the existence of a duty, the other party "must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and may not merely
rely on her allegations. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Because Gerbich failed
to offer any proof showing either that there was a material fact question
or that G.E. owed her a duty, we find that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment to G.E.
¶16
We move to Gerbich's second claim
of error: that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
Gerbich's expert witness to testify. This court will overturn a trial court
ruling excluding a proffered witness if the appellant demonstrates that
the trial court has overreached the broad discretion granted it and thereby
affected the appellant's substantial rights. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2);
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994) (applying abuse
of discretion standard in reviewing trial court's refusal to allow undisclosed
witness to testify (citing Utah R. Evid. 103)); State v. Albretsen,
782 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Utah 1989); Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917,
924 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (stating that evidentiary rulings are on the broad
end of the discretion spectrum). In determining whether a trial court has
abused its discretion in excluding a witness's testimony where the witness
was not disclosed beforehand, we ask whether the testimony of the excluded
witness could have been reasonably anticipated by the objecting party prior
to trial or whether the testimony constituted unfair surprise. See
Turner, 872 P.2d at 1024.(2)
¶17
Here, Gerbich had argued in her
brief to the trial court that Numed failed to follow city ordinances. It
was reasonable for Numed to assume, as it did, that the city's inspector
was being called to testify regarding those ordinances and for the trial
court to conclude, as it did, that general safety testimony from this inspector
would be an unfair surprise. As the appellant, Gerbich has the burden of
showing that the trial court erred. See Turner, 872 P.2d
at 1024. Gerbich has not met her burden. Therefore, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented the inspector
from testifying as an expert based on the lateness of the designation and
the fact that Numed's counsel did not have an opportunity to either prepare
a cross-examination or call rebuttal witnesses.
¶18
In conclusion, we affirm the trial
court on these issues and find Gerbich's remaining claim of error to be
without merit.
---
¶19
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief
Justice Durham, Justice Stewart and Justice Russon join in Justice Zimmerman's
opinion.
1. Numed, Inc. and Edward Menkemeller have been treated as and acted as one party throughout this litigation and therefore will be referred to collectively as "Numed."
2. While Turner dealt with rebuttal witnesses, the analysis in that case is appropriate here. In both cases, a party offered a previously-unknown witness. In Turner, the court looked to the surprise of the party opposing the witness in determining whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by allowing the use of the previously-unknown witness. While the witness in the present case is a witness for the case in chief, and was presented as a potential an expert witness, the same considerations of the opposing party's surprise are relevant.
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