Hamilton v. Regan
Annotate this CaseThis opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Twyla Young Hamilton and
Heidi Hamilton, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Stephen Alvin Regan,
Defendant and Appellant.
Child Support Enforcement
Co.,
Intervenor and Appellee.
No. 950521
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May 2, 1997
Third District, Salt Lake Div. I
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys: Kendall Peterson, Salt Lake City, for defendant
Michelle Blomquist, Douglas C. McDougal, Stacie M.
Smith, Taylorsville, for intervenor
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DURHAM, Justice:
Defendant Stephen Regan appeals from a judgment of contempt for failure to comply with a
court order requiring minimum monthly payments on a judgment for child support arrearages.
The court of appeals certified this case to us. We assume jurisdiction under section 78-2-2(3)(b)
and (5) of the Utah Code. We affirm.
Defendant was ordered to pay past due child support for his minor child in the amount of
$17,282.18 in March of 1993. Subsequently, he requested and was granted a stay of execution
on the judgment to permit him to borrow funds with which to pay it. According to the findings
of fact in this case, he did in fact obtain a loan "in excess of $40,000" but failed to make any
significant payments on the arrearage. Nearly two years later, the trial court ordered defendant to
make minimum monthly payments of $500 on the judgment. No appeal was ever taken from that
order, and defendant failed to comply. In June 1995, the trial court issued an order to show cause
and conducted a hearing, after which it made the following findings of fact:
6. Defendant has not submitted the evidence necessary to provide clear determination of his
income. The court does not find Defendant's statements to be credible. . . .
7. Defendant has the ability to pay the judgment or at least to make meaningful payments
toward the judgment.
8. Despite Defendant's ability to pay the judgment, Defendant has not made meaningful efforts
to pay the judgment.
9. Defendant did not intend to pay the past-due child support at the time judgment was entered
or at the present time.
10. Defendant's ability to pay and his refusal to pay are evidences of his contempt of court.
The trial court sentenced defendant to twenty days in jail for contempt of court. Defendant
argues before us that the jail term violated article I, section 16 of the Utah Constitution--prohibiting imprisonment for debt--and that the trial court had no power to order minimum
monthly payments on the judgment or to use the contempt sanction to enforce the order.
Disposition of the first question depends on our treatment of the second. If the trial court had
equitable power to order minimum payments on past-due child support amounts, it could clearly
sanction failure to comply without violating the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) (stating that
imprisonment for contempt of court where one wilfully refuses to pay proper judgment does not
violate constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt). Therefore, we address the primary
question regarding the scope of the court's power regarding these types of judgments.(1)
Defendant argues that once a past-due child support claim has been reduced to judgment, it loses
its character as a family support instrument, becoming no different from any form of commercial
or ordinary debt; it cannot therefore be enforced by equitable means. We disagree. The powers
of Utah courts in domestic cases are broadly described by statute:
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
. . . .
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5 (1), (3) (1995) (amended subsequent to this action by 30-3-5 (Supp.
1996)). The common practice in Utah's trial courts has long been to exercise equitable powers in
connection with judgments for past-due amounts in family law cases. See Bott v. Bott, 22 Utah
2d 368, 453 P.2d 402 (1969). For example, in Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 P.2d 231 (1971), the appellant made the same claim as that before us now: that "the judgment on the
accumulated [child] support money has the same status as any other judgment at law on any other
debt." Id. at 232. This court rejected the claim and explicitly referred to the desirability of the
contempt power for enforcement purposes:
In order to carry out the important responsibility of safeguarding the interests and welfare of
children, it has always been deemed that the courts have broad equitable powers. To accept the
[appellant's] contention that an adjudged arrearage is tantamount to a judgment in law, would in
the long run tend to impair rather than to enhance the abilities of both the plaintiff and the court
to accomplish the desired objective. Such a judgment at law does not have the valuable and
useful attribute which allows its enforcement by contempt measures. For the foregoing reasons
decrees and orders in divorce proceedings are of a different and higher character than judgments
in suits at law; and by their nature are better suited to the purpose of protecting the interests and
welfare of children.
Id. at 232-33. The order challenged in Harmon, interestingly enough, was one staying the
appellant's execution of her arrearage judgment so long as the appellee made minimum monthly
payments on it. Id. at 232. In this case, ironically, defendant appears to have benefitted from a
two-year stay of execution on his judgment to gain time to raise the money to pay it--an equitable
remedy to which, under his theory of the case, he should not have been entitled.
As defendant points out, this court has permitted the assignment of judgments for past-due child
support to both governmental and private entities for collection purposes. State v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah 1996). We have never held, however, and now explicitly decline to hold,
that such judgments lose their fundamental character as instruments of family support subject to
the statutory and equitable enforcement powers of the courts. The policies favoring enhancement
of the enforceability of such judgments through assignment for collection likewise favor
retention of broad judicial enforcement powers.
Affirmed.
Chief Justice Zimmerman, Associate Chief Justice Stewart, Justice Howe, and Justice Russon concur in Justice Durham's opinion.
Opinion Footnotes:
1. Defendant has also challenged the standing of intervenor Child Support Enforcement Co. (CSEC) to enforce the judgment, despite acknowledging that the trial court granted CSEC's motion to appear for purposes of executing on the judgment. The record contains a minute entry signed by the judge in which the "court hereby grants said motion," although apparently the court never entered a formal order to that effect. By failing to oppose the motion, however, defendant waived any challenge to the propriety of CSEC's role in the case.
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