Traveller Invstmts v. Questar

Traveller Invstmts v. Questar

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Kay H. Traveller Investments, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability company,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Questar Gas Company, a Utah corporation,

Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030495-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 16, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 270

 

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Fifth District, St. George Department, 020501454

The Honorable James L. Shumate

Attorneys: James Gregory Hardman and V. Lowry Snow, St. George, for Appellant

Jenniffer N. Byde, C. Scott Brown, and Abigail L. Jones, Salt Lake City, and Russell S. Mitchell, St. George, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne.

DAVIS, Judge:

    Kay H. Traveller Investments, L.L.C. (Traveller) appeals the trial court's grant of Questar Gas Company's (Questar) motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

    Traveller argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the doctrine of after-acquired title applied to give Questar an easement across Traveller's property (the property) because material issues of fact concerning whether Traveller's predecessors in interest intended to grant an easement precluded the trial court's grant of summary judgment.(1)

    Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Because summary judgment presents only questions of law, we review the trial court's decision under a standard of correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). "In evaluating whether the trial court was correct in ruling there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414,¶8, 40 P.3d 1148.

    Traveller asserts that before the trial court considered the applicability of the doctrine of after-acquired property, it should have resolved the factual issue of whether Traveller's predecessors in interest in the property, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess (Burgesses), intended to grant an easement to Questar's predecessor utility company, Mountain Fuel Supply Company (Mountain Fuel). "Interpretation of easements and restrictive covenants follows the same rules of construction used in interpreting contracts. Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law. We review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness." Id. at ¶7 (citation omitted). Moreover, we determine the Burgesses' intent from the plain language of the four corners of the grant. See Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33,¶38, 44 P.3d 781 (explaining the proper construction of deeds).

    The Burgesses, as beneficiaries under a trust deed recorded against the property, signed the "Right-of-way and Easement Grant" (the grant), clearly granting Mountain Fuel and its successors and assigns an easement across the property. Although the signature line presumably intended for the signature of the grantor was left blank, the Burgesses signed their names under the heading "Agreed and Warranted." The plain language of the grant clearly and unequivocally grants an easement to Mountain Fuel and by agreeing to the terms thereof, and absent language qualifying their signatures, the Burgesses intended to grant an easement to Mountain Fuel.

    Although the Burgesses did not own the property at the time they made their grant to Mountain Fuel, the doctrine of after-acquired title operates to preserve the grant because the Burgesses subsequently became the owners of the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code provides:

If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2000). In Arnold Industries v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine of after-acquired title, codified in section 57-1-10, applies also to the grant of written easements. See id. at ¶18. We conclude, therefore, that, as successor in interest to Mountain Fuel, Questar has a valid easement across the property.

    Affirmed.

______________________________

James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. Traveller also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Builder's Statute of Repose, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (2002), applied to bar Traveller's claims. Because we conclude that the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of after-acquired title in granting summary judgment in favor of Questar, we need not reach any other issues raised by Traveller.